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Version: Version of Record

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<http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21954/ou.ro.0000ea53>

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Single-issue extra-parliamentary groups and  
liberal internationalism, 1899-1920

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Thesis submitted for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in History

Submission date: 27 March 2008  
Date of award: 9 September 2008

March 2008

## **Abstract**

This thesis provides an analysis of liberal internationalism at a critical point in its development, as manifested by the single-issue extra-parliamentary groups: the South Africa Conciliation Committee, the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, the Balkan Committee, the British Armenia Committee, the League of Nations Society and the League of Nations Union. They operated in a period of heightened international tension, beginning as it did with the capitalist inspired war in Southern Africa and culminating with the hopes for a new international order to supersede the 'international anarchy' of the pre-1914 years.

They advocated an ethical foreign policy where the individual could play an important part in its advancement. Consequently, the 'scratch crowd' or 'stage army of the good' attracted to such groups serve as an important indicator of public attitudes to British foreign policy and international relations. Enthused with a belief in a world united in peace and co-operation they were primarily a combination of radical parliamentarians, journalists, academics and lawyers such as Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, Aneurin Williams, J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford, and Arnold Toynbee.

In studying these groups collectively, the development of liberal internationalism from a post-Gladstonian moralist attitude derived from an evangelical religious sentiment, to an institutionalism of an entirely secular character becomes apparent, as does the centrality of the Eastern Question to their understanding of the international system and the policies they advocated for the rights of oppressed peoples to self-determination and the league of Nations. The effective use of insider/outsider strategies enabled the liberal internationalists to manage the interaction of British public opinion, international affairs and foreign policy at a significant juncture in the development of domestic and international politics.

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## Preface

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of many people. I am grateful above all, to my supervisor, Dr Bernard Waites, whose guidance and advice at all stages has been invaluable. I am also grateful to the participants of the conferences, both in this country and abroad, who provided invaluable comments on my papers based upon early drafts of these chapters.

I am most grateful to the help given to me by the staff of: the Modern Papers and John Johnson Reading Room at the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Rare Books and Special Collections, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA; the Archives of the Délégation Nationale Arménienne, Paris; Bristol University Archives; the British Library, London; the British Library of Political and Economic Science, London; Glasgow University; Lambeth Palace Library, London; National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh; National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth; Rhodes House Library, Oxford; The Open University Library; and University of Calgary Special Collections.

Much of the research for this thesis would not have been possible without the help of Mrs Elizabeth Brooks and Mr Edward Williams (Aneurin Williams' grandchildren), who placed Aneurin Williams papers in my care. Additionally, I am grateful to the Open University's Arts Research Committee, Additional Research Funding and the Royal Historical Society Award for Postgraduate Research Funding to enable me to undertake archival research into the Noel Buxton Papers at McGill University, Montreal and Duke University, North Carolina. I am also grateful to the Royal Historical Society for an additional Award to present a paper at the International Association of Genocide Scholars conference in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife and children for their help and consideration while I have been researching and writing up this thesis.

# Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used throughout this thesis

Add. MSS	British Library Additional Manuscripts
AMSP	Alexander McCullum Scott Papers
ADNA	Archives of the Délégation Nationale Arménienne
AND	Armenian National Delegation (Délégation Nationale Arménienne)
AR(LM)F	Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund
ATP	Arnold Toynbee Papers
AWP	Aneurin Williams Papers
BAC	British Armenia Committee
BC	Balkan Committee
BL	British Library
BLPES	British Library of Political and Economic Science
CAB	Cabinet Papers, The National Archive
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terraki Cemiyeti)
FO	Foreign Office Records, The National Archive
GMP	Gilbert Murray Papers
GWP	Graham Wallas Papers
JBP	James Bryce Papers
JJC	John Johnson Collection (Ephemera)
LGP	Lloyd George Papers
LLAAM	League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism
LNS	League of Nations Society
LNU	League of Nations Union
MP	Member of Parliament
NBP	Noel Buxton Papers
PKP	Philip Kerr Papers
SACC	South Africa Conciliation Committee
TNA	The National Archives
UDC	Union of Democratic Control
WHDP	Willoughby Dickinson Papers
WGP	William George Papers



## 1

**Introduction**

On 9 January 1913 the radical intellectual Leonard Hobhouse wrote to Noel Buxton, Liberal MP and chairman of the Balkan Committee (BC) objecting to the formation of a new extra-parliamentary group as he believed it would be little more than a ‘scratch crowd [...] got together for the purpose.’<sup>1</sup> The new body was the British Armenia Committee (BAC) and its able secretary A. G. Symonds’ immediate retort was ‘We may be a ‘scratch crowd’, but we have already done good work in securing [Sir Edward] Grey’s attention to the [Armenian] Question.’<sup>2</sup> He further observed that Hobhouse had frequently demonstrated an ‘Olympian contempt for the practical business-like working of any ordinary body of men.’ In reality, these were not an ordinary body of men, but a selection of radical parliamentarians, journalists, academics and lawyers who were all enthused with a liberal internationalist spirit.<sup>3</sup>

The BAC was but one such single-issue extra-parliamentary group established during the early twentieth century. This thesis will provide a critical analysis of the ‘good work’ achieved by these liberal internationalist groups as well as the ‘scratch crowd’ they attracted. This is not a study of liberal international theory *per se* but rather how liberal internationalism manifested itself in the early twentieth century. Approaching the study of liberal internationalism through the extra-parliamentary groups provides an alternative perspective to that advocated by International Relations scholars with

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1 L. T. Hobhouse to Noel Buxton, 8 January 1913, McGill University Rare Books and Special Collections: Noel Buxton Papers (henceforth NBP), MS951 c24/2; See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

2 Symonds was also at this point Secretary to the BC and therefore well placed to comment on Hobhouse’s criticisms; A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2; See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

3 As those enthused with this spirit were not exclusively members of the Liberal Party, liberal internationalism will be referred to in lower case only.

their emphasis upon the theorists rather than the practitioners. Before the emergence of International Relations as a scholarly discipline in the years following the First World War, the leading liberal international theorists were rarely divorced from the practicalities of international relations. Many were actively engaged in the extra-parliamentary groups under consideration.

The prime focus of this thesis then is upon the ‘practitioners’ whose liberal internationalist zeal animated the extra-parliamentary groups. This thesis makes extensive use of the personal archives of Aneurin Williams and Noel Buxton, who together with James Bryce were key figures in the extra-parliamentary groups.<sup>4</sup> Williams’ liberal internationalism is central to this study, which has developed from an earlier MA dissertation on the development of the British League of Nations movement and unfettered access to his personal archive, a source neglected by historians.<sup>5</sup> Buxton’s liberal internationalism provides a useful juxtaposition, and his papers while not totally neglected by other scholars have remained an under-utilised resource. In addition to the private papers of Williams, Buxton and Bryce, those of their colleagues have been scrutinised, including Charles Roden Buxton, Willoughby Dickinson, Gilbert Murray and Alexander MacCullum Scott amongst others. This thesis also examines the published material generated by both the practitioners and theorists closely associated with liberal internationalism during this period. Of the groups, only the League of Nations Union (LNU) has an extensive archive, but this unfortunately excludes all material relating to the League of Nations Society (LNS). Some minute books for the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism (LLAAM) and BAC survive.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, it is only possible to identify the groups’ activities through consultation of the personal papers of the leading members, such as Bryce, the Buxtons, Dickinson, Macallum Scott and Williams. Also the papers of Boghos Nubar, the official representative of the Armenian Catholicos in Europe, and

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4 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

5 See Barry Dackombe, ‘Aneurin Williams and the Development of the League of Nations Movement in Britain, 1914-1919’ (MA, University of Hertfordshire, 2003); the only known use of the archive was made by Akaby Nassibian in 1980.

6 The BAC propaganda sub-committee minute book at Bristol University Archives was unavailable, as according to the archivists it has been missing for several years. The only published references to its contents are included in Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).



the Armenian National Delegation (AND) provide invaluable material relating to the BAC and the Armenians.<sup>7</sup> This thesis therefore provides a comprehensive survey of liberal internationalism at the beginning of the last century, through a detailed analysis of the writings and utterances of the individuals and the actions of the extra-parliamentary groups.

This thesis is divided into two parts; the first provides a theoretical background to liberal internationalism thereby enabling this research to be placed in context. It also introduces the extra-parliamentary groups and the involvement of the leading internationalists. Additionally, a comparative analysis of the methods utilised by the different groups and an examination of how they functioned is undertaken. The second part provides an in-depth study of liberal internationalism during the first two decades of the twentieth century, through the action and occasionally inaction of the groups and their members, in response to a rapidly changing international system. The early twentieth century was a particularly tumultuous period for internationalists: beginning with Britain embroiled in an imperialist war with the Boer Republics of southern Africa, before rapidly entering a period of heightened international tension culminating in the outbreak of war first in the Balkans and then much closer to home in the heart of Europe. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that this period should witness an increasing interest in international affairs both in theory and in concrete terms amongst liberals.

The liberal internationalists demonstrated a particular interest in the active maintenance of peace and conflict resolution in international affairs. Consequently, the reduction of armaments and countering militarism was a crucial aspect of internationalism. Of equal importance was the character of British foreign policy; in particular its imperialistic nature, the lack of popular control or influence in its formulation, and its role in the Eastern Question. This emphasis on foreign policy separates the liberal internationalists from the traditional peace activists and their blinkered attitude to peace and the abolition of war. Imbued with a progressive outlook the liberal internationalists argued that the

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7 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

modification of the international system was possible through the growth of international co-operation and understanding between both sovereign states and their citizens (or subjects).

At the end of the twentieth century, some of these issues were at the forefront of international thinking. In a speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair exclaimed ‘we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not.’ The speech was concerned with espousing the merits of internationalism following interventions in the former Yugoslavia. In line with liberal internationalists a century earlier, he explained that ‘We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries.’<sup>8</sup> The violations he had in mind were ‘ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, [and] mass murder.’<sup>9</sup> The answer was for the world to unite behind a new doctrine of universal human rights to ensure international security. Subsequent events of course would have a significant effect upon the acceptance of such attitudes.

### **What is liberal internationalism?**

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define liberal internationalism. This is not as straightforward as it would first appear, since there is no authoritative definition. Instead, various alternatives have been proposed, depending upon the situation being studied and the individual perspectives of their proponents. At its most basic, it is the application of liberal beliefs to relations between nations, or as Roland Paris concludes, it is the promotion of liberal policies abroad through international co-operation.<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of this study, the definition put forward by Michael Pugh is perhaps the most suitable. Pugh thus defines liberal internationalism as the ‘foreign policy of those who set the individual above the state and who supposed that the individual could reach across state boundaries with appeals to moral sensibility.’<sup>11</sup>

8 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, address delivered to Chicago Economic Club, 22 April 1999. Available at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/page1297> and also at <http://www.fco.gov.uk> [accessed 2007]

9 Ibid.

10 Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, *International Security*, 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997), 59.

11 Michael Pugh, ‘British Public Opinion and Collective Security 1926-1936’ (PhD, University of East Anglia, 1975), 1.



With the resurgence of liberal internationalist policies during the last decade of the twentieth century, there has been a corresponding increase in academic interest in liberal internationalism during its first four decades.<sup>12</sup> In scrutinising modern liberal internationalism, Stanley Hoffman defines liberalism, as ‘the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms.’<sup>13</sup> This corresponds to the definition of liberalism offered by Aneurin Williams, one of the primary subjects of this study. In 1919, he stressed the importance of human freedom and reason, together with an innate faith in the human ability to resolve issues.<sup>14</sup> Jeremy Bentham first defined ‘international’ in *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), as a means of expressing what was then referred to as the law of nations. Only in the 1850s was ‘internationalism’ used to refer to the international character or principle of action between different nations at either the individual or the state level.

In his analysis of international relations, Fred Halliday observes that within internationalism three broad themes can be ascertained: firstly, that it is promoted through economic processes and communication advances; secondly, it is reflected within the political process with politicians, campaigners and individuals collaborating to a greater degree than previously; thirdly, it is creating greater ‘understanding, prosperity, peace, freedom, tolerance, or whatever the particular advocate holds to be most dear.’<sup>15</sup> Examples of international co-operation are numerous, with the leading exponents of internationalism during the nineteenth century being the Anti-Slavery and Peace Societies.<sup>16</sup>

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12 For example see Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, 58 ; Antonio Franceschet, *Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 68-71; Albert Marrin, *Sir Norman Angell* (Twayne Publishers, 1979); Louis Bisceglia, *Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism in Britain 1931-1935* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1982); J. D. B. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of war: Peace and the Public Mind* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986); D. Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism: The international theory of J. A. Hobson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

13 S. Hoffmann, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, *Foreign Policy*, (1995), 160.

14 Aneurin Williams, ‘The General Election and the Future of the Liberal Party’, *Contemporary Review*, CXV (Feb. 1919), 139.

15 Fred Halliday, ‘Three Concepts of Internationalism’, *International Affairs*, 64, no. 2 (Spring 1988).

16 For an in-depth study of the international movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century see F. S. L. Lyons, *Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914*, European Aspects. Series C: Politics / College of Europe ; no.14 (Leydon: A. W. Sythoff, 1963).



Internationalism is not necessarily synonymous with liberalism and Halliday identifies three distinct strands of internationalism. As well as liberal, he identifies hegemonic and revolutionary strands.<sup>17</sup> Hegemonic internationalism recognises that integration is taking place but not on the equal terms favoured by liberal internationalists. This is in many ways equivalent to the imperialistic policies condemned by many early twentieth-century liberals and has done much to shape the world through the subordination of other states to the power of the hegemonic state. For radical or revolutionary internationalism, Halliday has in mind the exporting of the principles that have radically reshaped one society to other societies. The format can vary, but the prime examples he has in mind are those advocated by Marxist theory and put into practice in Russia and China, but other examples would be the republicanism of the French Revolution and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. As far as Halliday is concerned liberal internationalism is the optimistic belief that through interaction and co-operation, individuals, groups and societies can develop a common purpose, such as peace and prosperity.

Michael Doyle, who in addition to liberal internationalism, which he associates with Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1795), identifies two further liberal variants: liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism.<sup>18</sup> Liberal pacifism he views as being founded upon the interaction of capitalism and democracy. Taking his cue from Joseph Schumpeter's 1919 essay *Sociology of Imperialisms*, he contends that democratic capitalism is inherently unwarlike since democracies are unlikely to tolerate the high cost of 'atavistic' imperialism from which only a militaristic minority would benefit. Similarly, free trade discourages forceful expansion as each nation has equal access to resources. In many ways this echoes Norman Angell's argument in *The Great Illusion*, first published in 1910, that wealth and prosperity in internationalised capitalism did not depend on military power and could not be acquired by conquest.<sup>19</sup> In contrast, liberal imperialism is characteristic of Machiavellian politics where expansion is viewed as the best way of guaranteeing

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17 Halliday, 'Three Concepts of Internationalism', 192-5.

18 Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 80, no. 4 (1986), 1152-1157.

19 See chapter 2, where Angell and *The Great Illusion* is discussed in more depth; Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A study of the relation of military power to their economic and social advantage* (London: William Heinemann, 1910).



survival. Expansion as a measure of a state's strength, he argues, 'results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure.'<sup>20</sup> While such a state would be characterised by social equality, popular liberty and political participation, it would not constitute a true democracy.

Such beliefs differ from the classical economic liberalism as expounded by John Stuart Mill in *Principles of Political Economy* (1848). Although recognising that international trade fostered economic growth by extending the market and raising productivity, Mill was emphatic that its 'intellectual and moral' advantages surpassed its economic benefits. The 'improvement of human beings' came about through their awareness of human difference and their being brought into contact with unfamiliar modes of thought and action. By encouraging communication between nations, international trade had become 'one of the primary sources of progress.' It had also banished the national egoism of mercantilism: 'Before the patriot wished all countries weak, poor, and ill governed, but his own: he now sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and progress to his own country.' The rapid increase of international trade was 'the principal guarantee of the peace of the world [and ensured] the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.'<sup>21</sup> Despite the late nineteenth-early twentieth-century fashion for envisaging the international economic system as an incessant Darwinian 'struggle for life', Mill's optimistic and irenic 'take' on it remained central to the liberal 'world view'. *Principles of Political Economy* also provides an important analysis of economics and social concerns. Mill's concern for the moral impact of industrialisation was instrumental in his advocacy of 'industrial co-operatives', whereby the workers shared in the profitability of their employers either through a profit-sharing system or a share of the ownership of capital. A belief shared by many of the liberal internationalists.<sup>22</sup>

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20 Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics', 1155.

21 John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (London: G. Routledge & Sons Ltd, 1892), 394-5.

22 Williams was Honorary Secretary of the Labour Co-Partnership Association and editor of its journal *Co-Partnership*. Amongst the other members of the Association, who can be seen in Appendix 2, was Lord Robert Cecil who became its president after the war.



### The liberal internationalist groups

The extra-parliamentary groups symbolise the different strands of liberal internationalism during this important period. As such, they are representative of those advocating a British ethical foreign policy, which reflected liberal values as subjected to the rational critique of 'civil society'. It is now evident that they demonstrate the transition from Gladstonian moralism, which was derived from an evangelical religious sentiment, to an institutionalism of an entirely secular character. The first step towards institutionalism in this period, The Hague Peace Conferences, saw the establishment of the International Court of Arbitration; however, the outbreak of total war greatly accelerated its development.

Within months of the first Hague Peace Conference, Britain was engaged in a war with the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, a conflict driven by imperialistic capitalism according to its leading critic, J. A. Hobson.<sup>23</sup> The main groups demonstrating a liberal internationalist ethos during this period were the South Africa Conciliation Committee (SACC), and the LLAAM. As Peter Clarke points out, the South African and First World Wars were but two examples when 'the Gladstonian principles of international morality, law and public right were put to the test.'<sup>24</sup> For many liberal internationalists a prior example was the Ottoman Empire's oppression of its Christian subject races. Such concerns predate the twentieth century and form an essential part of what was termed the 'Eastern Question', namely the future of the Ottoman Empire. Historians can now see the years between the South African War and 1914 as an 'inter-war' period of heightened international tension: especially in the Balkans where nationalism within the Ottoman Empire repeatedly attracted international attention. Gladstonian moralism was by no means passé; during this period two groups emerged (the BC and the BAC) which argued that Britain had a moral responsibility for the Macedonian and Armenian peoples, using the same terms and rhetoric as Gladstone's during the Midlothian campaign. Nonetheless,

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23 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

24 Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 289.

the BAC would also later espouse institutionalism in its calls for an Armenian Mandate under the newly formed League of Nations.

Historians have tended to focus on peace and the abhorrence of war, rather than the full gamut of early twentieth-century liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on co-operation between individuals and nations, anti-imperialism, support for oppressed peoples and the principle of self-determination. The extra-parliamentary groups additionally clearly demonstrated what Michael Bentley has identified as the three criteria of Radical action: that is, their ability to establish easily pressure groups; their journalistic abilities; and their non-conformist enthusiasm.<sup>25</sup> During the South African War, they certainly demonstrated a willingness to oppose critically government policy and Stephen Koss identifies the SACC as one of the most prominent groups.<sup>26</sup> He credits it with utilising the intellect of its leadership to produce coherent arguments based on history and social theory; prominent members included the Liberal Unionist Leonard Courtney, the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace, and the Liberal statesman Bryce.<sup>27</sup> Less 'high-profile' was the LLAAM, usually nicknamed the 'Lambs', formed in direct response to the Liberal Imperialists, which included key Liberals, such as Sir Edward Grey and H. H. Asquith.

While Koss provides some interpretation of key pro-Boer publications and speeches, Arthur Davey undertakes an analysis of the role of these groups.<sup>28</sup> In his investigation he favourably contrasts the SACC approach of 'studied restraint' against the 'denunciation and drama' utilised by groups such as the Stop-the-War Committee. Both the SACC and LLAAM also feature in Richard Price's broad study of working-class attitudes to this imperialist war.<sup>29</sup> The roles of these groups during the South African War also receive attention in both Martin Ceadel's and Paul Laity's admirable studies of the British Peace

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25 Michael Bentley, *The Climax of Liberal Politics: British Liberalism in Theory and Practice 1868-1918* (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 20-21.

26 *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement*, ed. by Stephen Koss, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), xxxii.

27 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

28 Arthur Davey, *The British Pro-Boers, 1877-1902* (Cape Town, S.A.: Tafelberg, 1978).

29 Richard Price, *An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).



Movement.<sup>30</sup> The ‘liberal conscience’ together with their *pacifistic* outlook enabled them to speak out publicly, even during periods of jingoistic fervour. Through the continuity over time in the core personnel of all the liberal internationalist groups and their consistent orientation towards international affairs, the inter-connectiveness of the groups, is I trust, revealed in the course of this thesis.

In arguing for better relations between nations, the liberal internationalists were hoping to reduce conflict and suffering, without regard to faith or race of the sufferers. However, in two particular cases the humanitarian concern was explicitly expressed for their fellow Christians, who were being oppressed by the ruling Ottoman-Turks. The first occurrence was in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia, the second was over the treatment of the Armenians. Both the BC and the BAC sought to persuade the Foreign Office to take greater responsibility for these subject peoples, for whom the liberal internationalists believed Britain had a moral responsibility. This responsibility derived from the refusal of Britain and her allies to accept the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano signed in March 1878, following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The implications of what former Prime Minister David Lloyd George described as ‘our sinister intervention’ are discussed in chapter four.<sup>31</sup>

The historiography directly relating to the BC is limited to two articles: the first by Balkan scholar L. S. Stavrianos appeared in 1941 and the second by Robert McCormick over sixty years later.<sup>32</sup> The BC also features in passing in Akaby Nassibian’s study of Britain’s involvement with Armenia, and is highlighted by Richard Vogel, where he identifies the BC as figuring large in the Buxton papers at McGill University.<sup>33</sup> The role of the BC can

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30 Martin Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists. The British peace movement and international relations, 1854-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Laity, *The British Peace Movement, 1870-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

31 David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938) Vol. 2, 1256-7.

32 L. S. Stavrianos, ‘The Balkan Committee’, *Queens Quarterly*, 48, no. Autumn (1941); Robert B. McCormick, ‘Noel Buxton, The Balkan Committee and Reform in Macedonia, 1903-1914’, in *Antiquity and Modernity: A Celebration of European History and Heritage in the Olympic Year 2004*, ed. by Nicholas C. J. Pappas, vols (Athens: Atiner, 1984), 151-164.

33 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*; Robert Vogel, ‘Noel Buxton: The ‘Trouble-Maker’ and His Papers’, *Fontanus : From the Collections of McGill University*, 3, (1990), 138 — here he identifies ‘twelve boxes and another substantial group of unnumbered files’ relating to the Balkan Committee and associated issues.



also be pieced together from the biographical accounts of BC stalwarts, Noel and Charles Roden Buxton, Henry Noel Brailsford, Henry W. Nevinston, together with Lord Bryce.<sup>34</sup> The BAC lacks even a dedicated article, but does receive several mentions in Richard Hovannisian's multi-volume history of *The Armenian Republic*, which also deals to some extent with the pro-Armenian groups and individuals.<sup>35</sup> While Akaby Nassibian primarily analyses the attitudes within Britain to Armenia through official governmental records, the role of the pro-Armenian groups is not neglected.<sup>36</sup> The parliamentary debates subsequent to the news of the Armenian massacres have recently been published, and in the introduction the Armenian historian Ara Sarafian identifies Aneurin Williams as the leading advocate in the Commons, supported by Noel Buxton and T. P. O'Connor, while in the Lords, the eminent Bryce led the debate.<sup>37</sup> Bryce was also responsible for the British government's Blue Book, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16*.<sup>38</sup> The failure to establish an independent Armenia was a tragedy, or to put it in Williams' own words, it was to 'put a premium on massacre'.<sup>39</sup> The debate over the Turkish government's direct involvement has rumbled on now for over ninety years, with both sides continuing to argue their case.<sup>40</sup> There is little dispute that the atrocities were carried out against the Armenian people and that the liberal internationalists squarely laid the blame on the Ottoman government. Recently the role of Aneurin Williams has once

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34 T. P. Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench 1904-1908: A Study based on the Papers of Lord Noel Buxton* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932); Mosa Anderson, *Noel Buxton A Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952); Victoria de Bunsen, *Charles Roden Buxton* (London: George Allen & Unwin 1948); F. M. Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Angela V. John, *War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century: The Life and Times of Henry W. Nevinston* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); H. A. L. Fisher, *James Bryce (Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O.M.)*, 2 vols (London: Macmillan and Co, 1927); John T. Seaman, *A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).

35 Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia* (Berkeley: University of California Press) 4 vols., I: The First Year, 1918-1919 (1971), II: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 (1982), III: From London to Sèvres, February-August 1920 (1996), IV: Between Crescent and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization (1996).

36 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*.

37 *British Parliamentary Debates on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918*, ed. by Ara Sarafian, (Princeton, N.J. ; London: Gomidas Institute, 2003), x; See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

38 James Bryce, and Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916: documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon*, (Hodder and Stoughton, 1916).

39 *British Parliamentary Debates on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918*, v; *Hansard (5<sup>th</sup> Series)*, CXI, House of Commons (hereinafter HC), 18 November 1918, col.3239-70.

40 See for example Isreal. W. Charny and Daphna Fromer, 'Denying the Armenian Genocide: Patterns of Thinking as Defense-Mechanisms', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 32, no. 1 (1998), 39-49 and V. N. Dadrian, 'The signal facts surrounding the Armenian genocide and the Turkish denial syndrome', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 5, no. 2 (2003), 269-279.



again come to the fore in his native Wales, as the 2002 Armenian Genocide debate in the National Assembly for Wales and the 2007 dedication of the Welsh National Monument to the Armenian Genocide clearly demonstrates.<sup>41</sup> He was in both cases cited as an exemplary Welshman who spoke out against the genocide.

The declaration of war in August 1914 initiated the formulation of proposals for a permanent international body to maintain better understanding and relations between nations, ultimately, leading to the founding of the LNS and its successor the LNU. Of the groups engaged in formulating proposals, Lord Bryce's committee was perhaps the most distinguished. The influential role of this committee has been scrutinised by Martin Dubin, and provides a useful, if limited background to the formation of the LNS.<sup>42</sup> The Bryce Group is also the starting point for Donald Birn's examination of the LNU.<sup>43</sup> As far as most historians writing on the British League of Nations movement are concerned, the statement of Peter Raffo's that the origins of the LNU were 'somewhat obscure' adequately sums up their knowledge of the LNS.<sup>44</sup> Although Henry Winkler and Martin Ceadel are notable exceptions, in the main there has been an overwhelming tendency to concentrate on the internal divisions within the LNS and its subsequent split and re-amalgamation with its sibling organisation.<sup>45</sup> This has, I would argue, resulted in the underplaying of the role of the LNS in formulating and promoting the idea of a League during the early years of the war.

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41 Cynog Dafis, Short Debate, 'The Armenian Community in Wales and Genocide in Turkey,' National Assembly of Wales (The Official Record), 16 May 2002, 75; 'Unveiling of the Memorial to Victims of the Armenian Genocide 1915', Temple of Peace, Cardiff, 3 November 2007 included a tribute to Aneurin Williams pioneering of the Armenian cause.

42 Martin D. Dubin, 'Towards the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's "Proposals for the Avoidance of War", 1914-1917', *International Organization*, 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970), 288-318.

43 Donald S Birn, *The League of Nations Union 1918-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

44 Peter Raffo, 'The Founding of the League of Nations Union', *Canadian Journal of History*, 12 (1977), 193-206.

45 Henry R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain 1914-1919* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952); Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists.*; Martin Ceadel, 'Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement during the early Twentieth Century', in *The Federal Idea*, ed. by Andrea Bosco, ii vols (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), vol. i, The History of Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945, 169-191; For examples of the tendency to undervalue the LNS see J. A. Thompson, 'The League of Nations Union and the Promotion of the League Idea in Great Britain', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 18, (April 1972); Raffo, 'The Founding of the League of Nations Union'; George W. Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organisation, 1914-1919* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).



### Radicals, dissenters and trouble makers

The views of the liberal internationalists attracted to such groups were often at odds with the British government. Consequently, their non-conformist - or 'awkward squad' - attitudes to foreign policy ensured they form part of A. J. P. Taylor's dissenting or *Trouble Makers* tradition. For Taylor, dissent was a normal and sensible position; they were 'radicals' regardless of which party was in office; they opposed British foreign policy to such an extent that they repudiated its aims, methods and principles.<sup>46</sup> As a result, they rarely held high office, and had to make their voices heard from the sidelines. According to A. J. A. Morris, the radicals' message was frequently diluted through their failure to co-operate amongst themselves, to the extent that on occasions they opposed each other as much as they did the government.<sup>47</sup> The liberal internationalist groups however demonstrate a greater cross-fertilisation of ideas and personnel than Morris gives credit. Increasingly utilising extra-parliamentary methods, they sought to take their message directly to the nation, through the printed word.<sup>48</sup> In a period when political communication was rapidly changing, with the emergence of cheap mass circulation dailies, they primarily addressed the educated elite and because of the slow trickle effect of such methods, they have in the main remained obscure figures.

Morris maintains the radicals were fired by a 'nonconformist conscience' that justified their campaigns but conflicted with their desire to be loyal to the Liberal government. This reference to 'conscience' is utilised in Michael Howard's extensive survey of intellectual opposition to war. For Howard, the choice of 'liberal conscience' has particular relevance, as it implies not only 'a belief or an attitude but also an inner compulsion to act upon it [...together with] faith in the power of human reason and human action' to make changes to enable everyone to reach their full potential.<sup>49</sup> This compulsion to act, and an unerring

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46 A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent of Foreign Policy, 1792-1939* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), 19-20.

47 A. J. A. Morris, *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972); see also A. J. A. Morris, *Edwardian Radicalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).

48 These form an integral part of Bentley's key contributions of the Radicals, see fn 25, 9.

49 Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Temple Smith, 1978), 11.



confidence in rational discourse, made it possible for them to speak out on issues of importance, such as peace and oppressed peoples of the world.

The liberal internationalists have been eclipsed by the dominant post-Second World War realist attitudes, which have painted them as ideological idealists. Even prominent individuals like Angell, whom Albert Marrin describes as a giant of his time, have become merely items of academic interest.<sup>50</sup> Before the First World War his book, *The Great Illusion* proved to be very influential and in September 1914, he was a founding member of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC).<sup>51</sup> Louis Bisceglia associates his post-war liberal internationalism closely with the LNU in the 1920s and 30s.<sup>52</sup> Hobson's international theories also had a significant impact upon liberal internationalist thinking, with the introduction of constructive internationalism.<sup>53</sup> His ideas were developed through a 'new liberal' approach, arguing for greater institutional intervention, increased social organisation and co-operation on an international scale. In his biographical analysis of the relationship between liberalism and social democracy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Peter Clarke identifies Hobson as 'a thinker of profound originality'.<sup>54</sup> Hobson was particularly active in international affairs, as were his journalistic colleagues such as Brailsford and Nevinson.<sup>55</sup> At various times they had served as foreign correspondents for the *Manchester Guardian*, with both Brailsford and Nevinson reporting from the Balkans.

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50 Marrin, *Sir Norman Angell*, 8; other biographies include Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of war*; Bisceglia, *Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism*; and a forthcoming biography by Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); for biographical details of Angell see Appendix 1.

51 Angell's involvement with the UDC feature in Marvin Swartz, 'A Study in Futility: The British Radicals at the Outbreak of the First World War', in *Edwardian Radicalism 1900-1914*, ed. by A. J. A. Morris, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 246-261; Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); and Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control* (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996).

52 Louis Bisceglia, 'Norman Angell and the "Pacifist" Muddle', *Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research*, XLV (May 1972), iii.

53 Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism*, 1-3, 135.

54 Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats*, 46

55 Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*; John, *War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century*; See Appendix 1 for biographical information.



As well as in 'quality' journalism, the liberal internationalists were evident on the parliamentary backbenches. Bryce was undoubtedly their most authoritative figure, guiding much of the liberal internationalist groups' activities, but not involving himself in the minutiae of organisation.<sup>56</sup> He served in Gladstone's second ministry, and was influential in mobilising him in 1895-6 on behalf of the Armenians.<sup>57</sup> Under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's premiership, he initially served as Irish Chief Secretary before becoming British Ambassador in Washington in 1907. He played an active role throughout the period of study and was instrumental in many of the liberal internationalist groups. The other important parliamentarians were backbench Liberals, and in particular Noel Buxton and Aneurin Williams. Of the two Buxton is the better known though, concerning Armenia and the League, Williams' role was more notable.<sup>58</sup> The late 1890s saw the development of their interest in foreign affairs and soon after, they became effective and influential members of several liberal internationalist groups. In many ways, they were exemplars of early twentieth-century liberal internationalism, from championing 'small nations' and the right to self-determination, to the advocacy of the League of Nations.

Unquestionably part of Taylor's 'trouble makers' tradition, a study of such individuals can be justified on two counts; firstly as Taylor observed 'The Dissenters existed: therefore, they deserve to be put on record. They cannot be passed over by anyone who is studying British foreign policy in its official form; and they appear in all the books if only as 'noises off''.<sup>59</sup> Secondly, and more importantly, through a study of their involvement with these groups we can see how liberal internationalism manifested itself during the first two decades of the twentieth century.

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56 The most recent biography is Seaman, *A Citizen of the World*; a more detailed account is however provided by Fisher, *James Bryce*.

57 Christopher Harvie, 'Bryce, James, Viscount Bryce (1838-1922)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

58 For biographies of Noel Buxton see Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy*; Anderson, *Noel Buxton A Life*; and H. N. Fieldhouse, 'Noel Buxton and A. J. P. Taylor's 'The Trouble Makers'', in *A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor*, ed. by Martin Gilbert, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), 175-198; biographies of Aneurin Williams include Barry Dackombe, 'A fine and disinterested spirit', *Journal of Liberal History*, no. 57 (Winter 2008), 34-41; *Representation: The Journal of the Proportional Representation Society*, 'Aneurin Williams: A Personal Tribute', no. 42, February 1924, 4; *Dictionary of Labour Biography*, ed. by Joyce Bellamy and John Saville, (London: 1974), i, 346-347.

59 Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, 15.

This thesis demonstrates that by taking a holistic approach to the study of the groups it is possible to obtain a more complete view of liberal internationalism than by studying one individual or group. Although they emphasised the optimistic belief that liberal democracies could establish peaceful relations through the development of economic interdependence and international law, it would be a fallacy to view them as the ‘utopian’ caricature painted by E. H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939). As the *New York Globe* commented in 1916, ‘only by adopting some of the principles of utopia can peace and justice be safeguarded.’<sup>60</sup>

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60 Quoted in *Common Sense*, 21 October 1916.

**I**



## 2

## Liberal Internationalism in the early Twentieth Century

As a system of beliefs, liberal internationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in particular Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century, it was closely associated with international co-operation between individuals and organisations for the promotion of peace through economic, social and legal channels. By the 1920s, the liberal internationalists' hopes of transforming international relations were embodied in the League of Nations and the emergence of International Relations as a separate academic discipline. The trauma of the First World War and the events preceding it had resulted in the realisation that the traditional balance of power and the use of military force were no longer the answer to international disputes. The alternative they advocated was the fostering of peaceful relations by developing an international system of law, international arbitration and collective security. Consequently, the new liberal internationalists actively argued in favour of public scrutiny and the introduction of democratic accountability to international relations. On this basis Hedley Bull, identified their distinctive characteristics as a:

Belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order;

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<sup>1</sup> A history of the development of liberal international history is provided by Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, ed. by Charles W. Kegley, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1995), 107-150; see also F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of the 'international mind', the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teachings, it was in fact being transformed.<sup>2</sup>

### **Liberal international convictions**

Since the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* has regularly been cited for its argument that the spread of republican liberal democracies would negate the possibility of war. The establishment of a 'universal association of states' and 'universal conditions of hospitality' Kant argued would enable states to share common values. He constructed a framework of ideas in which the generally acknowledged rights and duties of states vis à vis their own citizens can be shown to require, logically, acknowledgement of certain equally important rights and duties towards each other (and each other's citizens) if their traditionally recognised tasks are ever to be effectively discharged.<sup>3</sup> Kant's theory has led to the proposition of Doyle and others that liberal states do not go to war with one another, though they are not precluded from engaging in wars with non-liberal states.<sup>4</sup> Doyle has identified two particular legacies of liberal internationalism.<sup>5</sup> The first he describes as the pacification of relations between liberal states, and the peaceful restraint exercised amongst them. This Doyle equates to Kant's 'pacific federation', which has resulted in a separate peace amongst liberal states. The second legacy he identifies as international 'imprudence', where peaceful restraint does not apply to relations with non-liberal states. Consequently, numerous wars have been fought for defensive purposes against authoritarian regimes and even for territorial expansion against weaker non-liberal states.

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2 Quoted in Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 20.

3 See W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

4 M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983), 205-235; M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), 323-353.

5 Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics', 1155-57.



The importance of liberal states to the establishment of peaceful relations between states is unmistakable in this analysis: a liberal regime was associated with constitutional government and the emancipation of its citizens. In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant outlined three definitive articles, which form an integral part of liberal internationalist thought.<sup>6</sup> Firstly, nation states should have representative and responsible government as they will not initiate war but they still reserve the right to defend themselves; secondly, international law should be based upon a federation or league of peace whose ultimate aim is to abolish war; and thirdly, a system of 'Universal Hospitality' should exist to allow the freedom of movement for individuals between nations in a peaceful way.

Kantian internationalism is identified with the development of co-operation and interdependence between nations, and the development of a league or federation of states. The greatest problem for such a vision is that it has from necessity come to rely upon institutions, which depend for their effectiveness upon the leadership and will of the Great Powers. The indecisiveness of international organisations is all too evident where there is a conflict of interest, a problem inherent in both the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Whereas Kantian internationalism focuses on international governance the Liberal and Radical traditions focused on an international civil society where individuals, groups and transnational communities could co-operate despite the narrow national interests of the individual state. Closely linked to this world view was the belief in free trade, which they thought would encourage interdependence between nations and a mutual desire to avoid conflicts, to the benefit of both producer and consumer alike. The intellectual rationale for free trade can be found in Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), where he demonstrated the importance of extending the market in raising productivity and improving the welfare of mankind. Bentham too recognised the economic importance of free trade, together with its potential to discourage war through international commerce. His *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace* (1789) recognised that international

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<sup>6</sup> W. L. Huntley, 'Kant's third image: Systemic sources of the liberal peace', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, no. 1 (March 1996), 49; Doyle, 'Liberalism in World Politics', 1157-1159.



integration would remain unattainable as long as the conflicting interests of individual states were allowed to dominate concerns. While being passionately opposed to war on moral grounds, he recognised the possibility that war may be acceptable for reasons of defence and security against outside aggression.<sup>7</sup> F. H. Hinsley credits him with being the first internationalist to recognise the importance of public opinion as the means by which states could be coerced to keep their pledges under international law.<sup>8</sup> This was to be an important tool for the early twentieth-century liberal internationalists, in an age of quickening communications and emergent mass media.

For the nineteenth-century liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Richard Cobden free trade was in many ways the panacea, which would provide peace and prosperity through the co-operation of private enterprise operating within the freedom allowed by representative government. Trade free of governmental restrictions enabled industry to develop unfettered by contrived limitations, while fostering a better understanding and friendship with fellow traders in other countries. Certainly, for Cobden free trade was a means towards an end, as the resultant prosperity would lead to peace. On this basis, he successfully integrated free traders within the pacifist peace movement. Mill meanwhile provided the intellectual basis by which liberals of the early twentieth century could understand the need for national self-determination. As Hoffman illustrates, he provided both an explicit and convincing explanation why multinational states or empires would remain illiberal while their aspiring nationalities sought self-rule.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, democratic government would best serve the post-1918 liberal dream of self-determination.

### *Liberal pacificism*

John MacMillan questions the Kantian liberal peace thesis as expounded by Doyle, as he argues that peace is just one manifestation of the correlation between liberalism and *pacifism*.<sup>10</sup> For him peace is such an essential constituent of liberalism that he labels

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<sup>7</sup> Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, 81-2.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>9</sup> Hoffmann, 'The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', 162-3.

<sup>10</sup> John MacMillan, *On Liberal Peace: Democracy, War and the International Order* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 275-7; This argument is further developed in John MacMillan, 'Whose Democracy: Which Peace? Contextualising the Democratic Peace', *International Politics*, 41, no. 4 (December 2004), 472-493.



the process whereby it is interwoven with the positive values of liberalism as ‘liberal *pacifism*’. Peace then is recognised as a positive value or moral requirement, which following Kant’s argument will enable the construction of a society of nations.

MacMillan deliberately uses the term *pacifism* rather than pacifism to describe the peaceful nature of liberalism. This distinction is important, as the work by Martin Ceadel clearly demonstrates the historical significance of liberal *pacifists*. A clear distinction exists between pacifism and *pacifism*; the latter is associated with the conviction that war can ultimately be prevented and abolished through reforms, which establish justice in both international and domestic politics.<sup>11</sup> Pacifism in contrast is the complete rejection of war, and the just or defensive war ideas supported by *pacifists*. More recently, Ceadel has identified the origin of *pacifism* in the eighteenth century when ‘beliefs in the harmony of international interests and in the capacity of public pressure to alter government policy both began to develop.’<sup>12</sup> Interestingly while not directly using the term *pacifist*, Angell’s continually evolving interpretation is evident in the numerous editions of *The Great Illusion*. In 1912, he argues that a balance was required between those advocating war and the pacifist as ‘to concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the other half is to render the whole problem insoluble.’<sup>13</sup> By the 1930s he describes what he terms the ‘active pacifist’ as an individual who believes that war is likely unless precautions are taken, and that it is justifiable to protect a nation’s ‘vital interests’ through warfare.<sup>14</sup>

Ceadel has further developed his typological analysis to identify several variants within *pacifism*. Those of particular relevance are liberal *pacifism* and radical *pacifism*.<sup>15</sup> Both can trace their development to the influential ideas of Richard Cobden who played

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11 Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Martin Ceadel, *Thinking About Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*.

12 M Ceadel, ‘Pacifism and *pacifism*’, in Bellamy, Richard, ed. by Terence Ball, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 473-492, 475.

13 Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage* (London: William Heinemann, 1912), 330.

14 Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion, 1933* (London: William Heinemann, 1933), 90 & 268

15 Ceadel, *Thinking About Peace and War*, 109-21.



a pivotal role in both the free trade and peace movements. While radicalism during the early twentieth century was primarily concerned with the extension of democratic control, as exemplified by the UDC, that of liberalism looked outwards to reforms of the international system and the recognition that a supranational body is necessary for the peaceful co-existence of states. Similarly, as previously mentioned, Bentham advanced a *pacifist* argument for defensive wars.

David Martin has identified a clear correlation between *pacifism* and dissenting opposition to war.<sup>16</sup> That this should be the case is perhaps not surprising as *pacifism* is re-introduced in Taylor's seminal work on dissent over British foreign policy, where he defines *pacifism* as advocating a 'peaceful policy.'<sup>17</sup> This link is significant as the liberal internationalists' interests encompassed many aspects of British foreign policy, but overwhelmingly advocated an alternative policy based on co-operation and conciliation. This together, with their principled conscience, meant that they rarely achieved office, and on the odd occasion they did, it was because they had something else to offer. A case in point is Noel Buxton, an outspoken critic of British foreign policy who served in the first Labour government as Minister of Agriculture.

Within liberal *pacifism* Ceadel has further identified four phases: internationalism (up to 1914), confederalism (1914 to the 1940s), federalism (from the late 1930s to the 1950s) and transnationalism (since the 1960s). Of these, only the first two have a bearing on the period under consideration. The first phase placed its faith in international law and arbitration treaties to solve disputes, particularly through the role of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The second phase evolved out of the shock of the First World War, which persuaded many liberals of the need for a confederal institution, such as the League of Nations. Ceadel of course is not without his critics, but his typology is extremely useful in revealing the nuances within this concept.<sup>18</sup>

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16 David A. Martin, *Pacifism: An Historical and Sociological Study* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 73.

17 Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, 51n.

18 For example see David S. Yost, 'Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations', *International Affairs*, 70, no. 2 (April 1994), 281 and Norman Ingram, *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France 1919-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 7-10.

### Towards a new liberal internationalism

In the early twentieth century, liberal international theory underwent a profound change. The leading proponents of what David Long has termed the ‘new liberal internationalism’ were the radical journalists Hobson, Angell and Brailsford.<sup>19</sup> Academic credibility was provided by George Peabody Gooch, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Gilbert Murray and Arnold Toynbee. While in Parliament the crusading internationalist spirit was evident in their political collaborators such as Bryce, and backbench Liberals Noel Buxton and Aneurin Williams.

A central proposition of ‘new liberal internationalism’ was that foreign policy-making should be democratically accountable, rather than being formulated by a secretive, aristocratic elite within the governing class. Parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy was limited, which had the inevitable consequence that the British public were ill-informed on foreign affairs. Calls for the establishment of a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee came from many quarters, most notably from the UDC during the First World War, but there had been earlier demands for greater parliamentary oversight of imperial and foreign policy; for example, the Jameson Raid of 1896 prompted calls for an inquiry into Joseph Chamberlain’s alleged collusion with this disastrous episode. Liberal internationalists wholeheartedly endorsed the principle of parliamentary scrutiny and many supported the Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee in the years leading up to the First World War. While adamantly opposing the veil of secrecy Brailsford recognised the need for parliamentary scrutiny to operate quietly while treaty negotiations proceeded.<sup>20</sup> Bryce fully supported this approach, but he believed both parliamentarians and the public required more knowledge of world affairs, since ignorance was the greatest obstacle to peaceful relations.<sup>21</sup>

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19 Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism*, especially chapter 9.

20 H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace*, sixth edn (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1916), 208-9.

21 James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, ii vols (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 2, 383.



For convenience, the main arguments of liberal internationalism are divided into four significant areas: the role of capitalism and imperialism; democracy and free speech; co-operation and institutionalism; and, nationalism and self-determination. In the main, these will be addressed through the theories advanced by Angell, Brailsford and Hobson, together with relevant ideas advanced by the other liberal internationalists.

### *Imperialism and the capitalist conspiracy*

The ‘taproot of Imperialism’ was, according to Hobson, under-consumption in the industrialised economies, which encouraged their expansion into new overseas territories, and stimulated the rise of militarism and its associated arms race (with periodic outbreaks of war). This theory of imperialism was significant in that it made a major impact upon liberal internationalism; no longer was it possible to regard economics and politics as mutually exclusive. Sectional interests endowed capitalism with the potential to act as a catalyst for war.<sup>22</sup> In his critique of imperialism, he observed:

Every improvement of methods of production, every concentration of ownership and control, seems to accentuate the [expansive imperialist] tendency. As one nation after another enters the machine economy and adopts advanced industrial methods, it becomes more difficult for its manufacturers, merchants, and financiers to dispose profitably of their economic resources, and they are tempted more and more to use their Governments in order to secure for their particular use some distant undeveloped country by annexation and protection. [...] Everywhere appear excessive powers of production, excessive capital in search of investment. It is admitted by all business men that the growth of the powers of production in their country exceeds the growth in consumption, that the more goods can be produced than can be sold at a profit, and that more capital exists than can find remunerative investment.<sup>23</sup>

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22 See J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1938), part I, chs. 4 & 6; Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism*, 184.

23 Hobson, *Imperialism*, 80-81.

In a similar vein, Brailsford's *War of Steel and Gold* (1914) argued that the pressure of economic expansion and the resultant demand for new markets was the driving force behind the international struggle. He advocated a distinctly socialist approach to correct what he perceived as the dominant capitalist-inspired policies. Hobson's notion of imperialism also had socialist political implications though its intellectual sources were non-marxist in that he believed redistribution and democracy could 'correct' the imperialist tendency in the development of capitalism. Nonetheless, Hobson had a more significant influence upon Vladimir Lenin, whose theory regarding the inter-imperialist rivalry indicated that competition between capitalists of different nationalities transformed into competition between states seeking to defend their interests.

The task of British diplomacy according to Brailsford was to preserve our freedom and independence, followed by preserving the freedom of the seas for our exports and imports.<sup>24</sup> He argued imperialism had led to individuals expecting the government to protect their investments abroad. Consequently, imperialism was 'simply the political manifestation of the growing tendency of capital accumulated in the more civilised industrial countries to export itself to the less civilised and the less settled.'<sup>25</sup>

While Hobson's *Imperialism* provided the theoretical groundwork with which to criticise the prevailing imperialistic policies, it was also a departure from the traditional Cobdenite doctrine advocated by Norman Angell in his influential *The Great Illusion*. Angell sought to defend the pacifying tendencies of international capitalism, which he viewed as a positive force against war.<sup>26</sup> Certainly, in the pre-war years, his reassuring message that the interdependence of the world's economies rendered fallacious the prospect of any financial gains from war was eagerly welcomed. The problems of the twentieth century, Angell argued, were based upon the false assumption that each nation needed to expand its territory in order to ensure sufficient outlets for its industry and capital investments. Industrialised nations were struggling with each other, he claimed, not for the raw

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24 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 52.

25 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 79.

26 Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 1933, 251.



materials or resources required in manufacturing, but for the right to sell them at the expense of their competitors. On this basis, he argued that there was no need for the build-up of armaments, as the size of the British navy had done little to halt the success of Germany's industrial expansion.<sup>27</sup> Rather than seeing capitalists as conspirators seeking to gain financially from war, he argued that in order to make a profit they required some degree of security for their investments. The instability war causes would be detrimental, and capitalists therefore sought stability and consequently, he believed, they were amongst the greatest internationalists.<sup>28</sup> While accepting Angell's thesis, Brailsford argued that he failed to take full account of the nationality of capitalism, by which Brailsford meant that the capital invested within a colony or sphere of influence tends to belong predominantly to the subjects of that power.<sup>29</sup> On this basis, he questioned Angell's assumption that a nation does not benefit from conquest.

### *Democracy and free speech*

The link between capitalism and imperialism was, as Hobson explained, a danger to democracy due to its 'destruction or enfeeblement of the popular franchise and representative government.'<sup>30</sup> Imperialism was therefore anti-democratic and associated with autocratic regimes. Despite this for those with greater parliamentary experience, such as Bryce, the role of managing foreign policy was naturally within the purview of the Foreign Office and their agents; the general principles by which such policy was to be guided should however be informed by the views of the people.<sup>31</sup> In a similar vein the political scientist, Graham Wallas described the ideal democracy as one where:

Every citizen is intelligent, patriotic, disinterested. His sole wish is to discover the right side in each contested issue, and to fix upon the best man among competing candidates. His common sense, aided by a knowledge of the constitution of his country, enables him to judge

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27 Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 64.

28 Ibid., 309.

29 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 164.

30 Hobson, *Imperialism*, xxi.

31 Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 2, 368-70.

wisely between the arguments submitted to him, while his own zeal is sufficient to carry him to the polling booth.<sup>32</sup>

The greatest problem was the limited knowledge the public had of other countries. Due to this ignorance, it was natural that they should look to more experienced voices for guidance, such as politicians or the press. These, Bryce argued, were untrustworthy as most politicians would seek to make political capital and the press could easily exaggerate prevailing sentiment.<sup>33</sup> Brailsford ascribed the British public's sporadic interest in foreign affairs to the striking and spectacular nature of isolated and shocking events, such as the Balkan atrocities, in comparison to the everyday routine of diplomatic relations.<sup>34</sup> The difficulty of arousing public opinion in favour of intervention in Macedonia was attributed by Noel and Charles Buxton to the exhaustion of the country's 'stock of sensation' following the South African War.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the main outlet for public opinion to express itself effectively was at parliamentary elections. These occurred infrequently and rarely related to foreign policy, a notable exception being the 1900 'Khaki' election fought on what was then believed to have been a successful campaign in South Africa. The primary concern of parliamentary candidates in either general or by-elections was nevertheless domestic issues to which their electors could more easily relate.

The free press was an important feature of democracy since it diffused information rapidly and actively engaged its readership in public debates. While a free press was seen as a guarantor of public expression in a democracy, it was nevertheless subjected to a variety of pressures. One was its commercial nature; it had to sell both news and advertising, and adopting an unpopular line could seriously affect its circulation. Editorial policy could, therefore be determined by commercial imperatives.<sup>36</sup>

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32 Quoted in Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (London: Archibald Constable & Co, 1908), 126.

33 Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 2, 370; see also Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 159

34 Brailsford, *ibid.*, 129.

35 Noel Buxton and C. R. Buxton, 'Public Opinion and Macedonia', *The Monthly Review*, no. 39 (December 1903), 96, 98.

36 See Brailsford, *op cit.*, 135.



Increasingly, the profitability of a newspaper rested on its ability to entertain and stimulate, as well as inform its readers. In presenting non-domestic issues there was a greater possibility of misrepresenting, falsifying, or even suppressing the facts.<sup>37</sup> The power of what Bryce termed the 'cheap press' concerned many liberals who feared its capacity to mis-inform, prejudice or unduly influence an ill-educated audience.<sup>38</sup> This mis-information, Hobson claimed, was designed to pander to vulgar curiosity rather than educate. In addition, liberals were persuaded that the ill-educated were credulous readers for whom the mere appearance of a statement in a newspaper guaranteed its truth. They feared the power of suggestion without real evidence. With the increase in publications, Hobson found the possibility of misleading the public particularly disturbing:

Those papers which have lent themselves to this unscrupulous enterprise are debasing the intellectual currency of print – one of the foulest injuries which can be inflicted upon a civilised nation.<sup>39</sup>

### *Co-operation and Institutionalism*

The dominant principle of the international system of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the balance of power, which sought to preserve an equilibrium between the Great Powers of Europe, by denying preponderance to any one of them. For 'realists' the balance of power was a source of security; for liberal internationalists it was in reality an unstable balance of force, always liable to be upset by states pursuing their own interests. The establishment of a new international system would, they hoped, provide the stability that the division of the Powers into rival alliances had ultimately failed to do. As Brailsford argued, the alliances just like the arms race were a symptom of the universal insecurity prevalent in the years leading up to the First World War.<sup>40</sup> The balance of power was merely a metaphor to 'disguise the perennial struggle for power and predominance,' and establish exclusive areas of financial penetration.<sup>41</sup>

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37 Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 1, 100-01.

38 Ibid., 94-5; J. A. Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism* (London: Grant Richards, 1901), 9.

39 Hobson, *ibid.*, 124.

40 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 22.

41 Ibid., 28 and 63.

The distinction between the civilised states and the non-civilised world had long been a 'background' assumption of international relations, one shared by J. S. Mill. Speaking in 1916, Hobhouse echoed this distinction when he identified the future of internationalism with European civilisation.<sup>42</sup> They were, he claimed, so intertwined that without one, there was no hope for the other. As Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest have noted, civilisation was 'an elusive, always slippery concept' emanating out from a Christian European core.<sup>43</sup> On the periphery was the Ottoman Empire, which possessed 'civilised' potential as evidenced by its ability to enter treaties with European states, but was nonetheless never regarded as being fully 'within the pale'. Brailsford implicitly endorsed this notion of civilisation when he observed that the Balkans, Transvaal, Turkey and Japan were outside the 'charmed circle of European fraternity.'<sup>44</sup> As part of the Ottoman Empire's peripheral 'quasi civilised' position some Powers supported and encouraged its Christian subject ethnic groups in their claims for autonomy and self-determination, on the grounds that this would enable their entry into the civilised world. Similarly, the Powers were able to subvert the Sultan's sovereignty in all but name, through the occupation and direct administration of provinces such as Bosnia and Egypt. The fig-leaf of sovereignty was maintained until the early twentieth century, with Bosnia being annexed by the Austro-Hungarians in 1908, and Britain declaring a Protectorate over Egypt following Turkey's entry into the First World War. The protests over the Armenian massacres in 1915 again highlighted the distinction between the Christian 'civilised' Allied Powers and the non-Christian Turks. While France and Russia proposed condemning the massacres as 'crimes against Christendom', the British with an eye to Muslim opinion within India, put forward the suggestion of 'crimes against humanity'.<sup>45</sup>

For the liberal internationalists, the pre-war international relations were not a 'system' but in Lowes Dickinson's phrase an 'international anarchy', with fundamental irremediable

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42 L. T. Hobhouse, *The Future of Internationalism, an address delivered by Professor L. T. Hobhouse, 18 January 1916*, Transactions (London: National Liberal Club Political & Economic Circle, 1916), 90.

43 Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest, 'International Society in Victorian Political Thought: T H Green, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick', *Modern Intellectual History*, 3, no. 2 (2006), 232

44 Brailsford, op cit., 15.

45 See chapter 8.



defects that had resulted in the breakdown of peace.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, its failure to prevent the outbreak of the War, led him and many internationalists to advocate the notion of a league of nations, with mutual interdependence or collective security. By placing the responsibility for keeping peace on all nations, it was believed that peaceful relations would ensue. Through the establishment of new *pacifistic* institutions including arbitration tribunals, and international courts, coupled with disarmament, they believed it was possible to transform state behaviour. Specifically through the idea of collective security, a degree of coherence and direction was given to the inter-war liberal internationalists in Britain and, similarly to their American counterparts after 1945.<sup>47</sup> Indeed, as Michael Howard observes, it had been the consistent aim of liberal statesman throughout the twentieth century, to work for the creation of a 'genuine world system of collective security.'<sup>48</sup>

In *Towards International Government* (1915), Hobson maintained that 'public opinion and a common sense of justice were inadequate safeguards. There must, [he argued], be an executive power enabled to apply an economic boycott, or in the last resort an international force.'<sup>49</sup> Importantly this embraced and expanded upon the institutional ideas of Lowes Dickinson and Aneurin Williams, which had been independently formulated soon after August 1914.<sup>50</sup> Leonard Woolf was to further the process of institutional internationalism, through the publication of his Fabian-inspired *International Government* (1916). As a result, the traditional liberal internationalist policies of disarmament, international law and peace became firmly associated with the League agenda.

In a similar vein, Angell attributed the outbreak of war to a lack of federalism and co-operation, between individuals and nations.<sup>51</sup> As well as aiding wealth production, an important aspect of co-operation was its instilling of social habits and behaviour, which

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46 G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (London: 1916), 9-10 & 151-2.

47 G. W. Egerton, 'Collective Security as Political Myth - Liberal Internationalism and the League of Nations in Politics and History', *International History Review*, 5, no. 4 (1983), 496-524.

48 Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (London: Oxford, 1989), 132.

49 J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915), 6.

50 See Aneurin Williams, 'Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection among Nations', *Contemporary Review*, November 1914), 628-636 and E. M. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson* (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 136.

51 Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 1933, 252-3.

he believed would enable the successful survival of co-operative nations. A co-operative alliance between nations would, he believed, additionally provide security from predation. He therefore argued that an international body was required to administer this collective power. Hobhouse, too, recognised that there was a need for a 'mechanism which will bind the nations together into an orderly whole.'<sup>52</sup> In 1916, he was unsure how internationalism could be reinstated, but argued that every possibility should be fully investigated. In Hobhouse's view, internationalism was based upon a union of independent nations, but the greatest obstacle was the misunderstanding that such a union was a surrender of a nation's sovereignty and power.

As far as the liberal internationalists were concerned, peace and justice could only be achieved through the extension, strengthening and enforcement of international law. This has led to 'realist' charges of utopianism as international law is between sovereign states and not over them: they are unlikely to observe those judgements, which are contrary to their national interests. The liberal internationalists riposte was that, without recourse to institutionalism there was the danger of the continuation and expansion of the arms race and would ultimately culminate in the 'Balkanisation of the world' and mutual destruction.<sup>53</sup>

### *Nationalism and self-determination*

Many liberal internationalists experienced at first hand the inflamed nationalistic passions of their fellow countrymen, when during the South African War they were publicly denounced as pro-Boers. Brailsford identified this false patriotism with the militarism which turned 'men into machines' and was a necessary condition of the 'criminal stupidity called war.'<sup>54</sup> Hobson in his *Psychology of Jingoism* (1901) identified false patriotism or jingoism as:

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52 Hobhouse, *The Future of Internationalism*, 2.

53 Norman Angell, *The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to 'The Great Illusion'* (London: W. Collins & Co, 1921), 101; Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 1933, 241.

54 This observation was based upon his personal experiences fighting in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, see Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 180 & 177.



That inverted patriotism whereby the love of one's own nation is transformed into the hatred of another nation, and the fierce craving to destroy the individual members of that other nation.<sup>55</sup>

The rapid spread of jingoism during the South African War he attributed to improvements in mass communication, which brought the cheap press, music hall chains and other forms of popular entertainment to the labouring classes. Consequently, jingoism was clearly viewed as the product of a 'civilised' country.<sup>56</sup> As Hobhouse observed, nationality was a vague term, but it included 'a heightened sense of group consciousness, a feeling for a corporate life animating a certain mass of people and separating them out from other people.'<sup>57</sup> He continued that a peaceful world should recognise nationalistic aspirations and enable sufficient autonomy to satisfy their requirements. Nationalism, then, was regarded as Janus faced; on the one hand it was easily elided with xenophobia but on the other it inspired subject peoples to strive for their political self-determination, something which Liberals could only applaud and which they believed had a positive role in amicable international relations. For President Woodrow Wilson this notion is evident in his speech to the Senate on 22 January 1917, when he stated that 'only a peace between equals can last' and 'no peace can last or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed.'<sup>58</sup> The First World War firmly placed nationalism on the international agenda, and in the form of self-determination, its application would prove to be very problematic.

Acceptance of the notion of national self-determination was significant in that it tied the formation of new nations to democracy and it embedded popular sovereignty in international law. It broke with the historical tradition that states derived their legitimacy from their military power to sustain themselves in a world of hostile states. It was also a

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55 Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism*, 1.

56 Ibid., 12.

57 Hobhouse, *The Future of Internationalism*, 5.

58 'The World after the War. Mr Wilson's Plan', *The Times*, 23 January 1917.

controversial move, as it theoretically gave a voice to nationalist movements, which as the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing recalled in his diary:

The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of self-determination, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Conference and create trouble in many lands.

What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly Morocco and Tripoli rely on it?<sup>59</sup>

As a stepping-stone towards autonomy, Noel Buxton argued that the new League Mandates be applied to all colonies, not just those of Germany and Turkey. Norman Angell, in contrast, viewed the nationalist tendencies within multinational states as anarchical and ultimately leading to conflict.<sup>60</sup> Increasing pressure for self-determination has continued apace making many of Robert Lansing's concerns a reality. Frequently self-determination has legitimised the tyranny of the majority and the exclusion by force of ethnic and religious minorities.

According to Bryce, self-government was only successful when it had been actively fought for, and therefore was highly valued by those who saw it as the only true remedy for mismanagement and misgovernment.<sup>61</sup> Bryce recognised the importance of a nation's social structure, in which he included language, religion and caste distinctions as well as racial differences. Where such distinctions are prevalent, there exist grounds for mutual distrust and animosity. For Graham Wallas, the European experiment of creating a homogeneous state, whereby the citizens can recognise in each other similarities, played

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59 Quoted in David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 125.

60 Angell, *The Fruits of Victory*, 101.

61 Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 2, 502.



an important part in the development of the political consciousness of the nineteenth century.<sup>62</sup>

Bryce identified three distinct dangers for newly emergent nations, especially those with limited experience of constitutional government.<sup>63</sup> The first danger was covetous neighbouring countries, which experience had shown were not always ready to respect international agreements. Writing soon after the establishment of the League of Nations, he was hopeful it would prove to be an effective enforcer of the new territorial settlements. The second problem for newly emergent nation states was the need to earn the respect of their new citizens, without misusing this power. The last problem was not just confined to the newly emerging nations. It also related to the exploitation of the weaker members of a society through the restriction of suffrage, and therefore any requirement to acknowledge their needs. He also expressed concern that newly empowered officials and legislators would be tempted to abuse their positions. He concluded that only in those countries where the seed of democracy had been fertilised by European influence would democracy take root, and mature successfully.<sup>64</sup>

### **The true internationalists**

Certainly, the liberal internationalists viewed war as irrational and an anathema, which was the result of militaristic and undemocratic self-interest. Despite this it would be a mistake to view them as pacifists when their outlook was predominantly *pacifist* in orientation, so perhaps it is not surprising that Angell identified the 'active pacifist' or *pacifist* as the true internationalist.<sup>65</sup> They also shared the Cobdenite belief in the immorality of state-directed force as exemplified by their hostility to needless entanglements, distrust of traditional diplomacy and a belief in the limitation of armaments. At the same time, they acknowledged the moral obligation to come to the aid of the weak and oppressed with the full force of economic and military sanctions. This was clearly demonstrated in

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62 Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*, Pt II, Ch IV: Nationality & Humanity, 269.

63 Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 2, 508.

64 Ibid., 513.

65 Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 1933, 268.

their attitudes towards the suffering of subject peoples whether it be due to imperialism or indigenous tyranny. For this reason, they actively supported the national struggles for emancipation.

This chapter has outlined the views of the new liberal internationalists, who were concerned with the central questions of political theory, which Collini identifies as democracy, authority and the rights of individuals.<sup>66</sup> Although this thesis is concerned with how the liberal internationalist ethos was manifested during the first two decades of the twentieth century, it should be pointed out that the individuals were not blind to the situation closer to home. As David Long indicates in his analysis of Hobson's international theories, his concern was to illustrate the interrelationship between international affairs and the domestic situation.<sup>67</sup> Indeed many of the liberal internationalists were actively engaged simultaneously with domestic problems such as housing, temperance, and democratic representation. According to Stanley Hoffman, the ideas and practice of liberal internationalism were not as precisely defined as domestic liberalism, and therefore he argues that the 'international side of the liberal coin is far less polished than the domestic one.'<sup>68</sup> While this stricture may generally be true, it should not occlude the breadth and sophistication of liberal internationalist thinking. The groups and individuals with whom this thesis is concerned made a sustained collective effort to identify the principles of conduct in international affairs that would be both ethically defensible and of practical application to the complex situations in South Africa, the Balkans and the Near East. They recognised the inherent conflicts between national self-determination and minority rights, freedom and order in the concrete situations in which they were concerned and advocated liberal, 'progressive' solutions which would endow foreign policy with an 'ethical dimension'. The following chapter will look in detail at how the liberal internationalist groups were established and provide a comparative analysis of how they functioned.

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66 Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1.

67 Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism*, 176.

68 Hoffmann, 'The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', 161.



## 3

## The Liberal Internationalist Groups

The extra-parliamentary groups provided the focal point where the various strands of liberal internationalism could converge. Gladstonian moralism remained a potent source of the groups' energies, but one combined with sympathy for liberal nationalism and institutionalism. This chapter turns from the ideas and theory of the liberal internationalists to the practical workings of the groups, which articulated their understanding of foreign affairs.

The liberal internationalists often bemoaned the volatility of the British public's interest in foreign affairs. According to Brailsford, it was due to a defect in the English psyche, whereby the public will could be organised and articulated only in relation to foreign issues that were clearly associated with humanitarianism, such as slavery and the slave trade, or massacres and the mistreatment of subject peoples.<sup>1</sup> Certainly, the liberal internationalist groups contained an element of humanitarianism but it would be a mistake to view this as their primary *raison d'être*. They maintained their political nature and purpose due to the establishment of separate but closely allied humanitarian groups: viz. the Balkan Relief Fund for the BC and the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund for the BAC.

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<sup>1</sup> Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 134.

## Group Characteristics

All the groups operated within the bourgeois public sphere at a historical junction between the elitist politics of the later nineteenth century, when most major offices of the state were held by aristocrats or men with aristocratic connections, and the 'mass' democratic politics which emerged in the early 1900s. Their *modus operandi* reflected this junction: they sought to both influence ministers and party leaders and mobilise democratic citizens. In doing so, they conformed to the generally accepted definition of a pressure group: that is an organisation, which seeks to 'influence the formulation and implementation of public policy.'<sup>2</sup> In attempting to differentiate between extra-parliamentary groups, and other voluntary associations, Francis Castle offers the definition that a pressure group covers 'any group attempting to bring about political change, whether through government activity or not, and which is not a political party in the sense of being represented, at that particular time, in the legislative body.'<sup>3</sup> This highlights a disconnection between party politics and pressure group politics, but in the case of the groups being studied nearly all key figures were backbench Liberal politicians.

Certainly, the groups attempted to exert pressure upon the Foreign Secretary, and the British government, as A. G. Symonds' letter to Noel Buxton illustrates, when he referred to the 'good work' done in securing Sir Edward Grey's attention to the Armenian Question.<sup>4</sup> They utilised a variety of mechanisms to ensure their opinion was heard by those wielding power within Whitehall, thereby demonstrating many of the characteristics of pressure groups. It would however, be a mistake merely to view them as such; as Martin Ceadel has observed of the peace movement in general, such groups owed their existence not just to influence policy makers, but to bear witness to their beliefs.<sup>5</sup> In doing so, they manifested a non-conformist or liberal conscience, which was an essential part of the liberal internationalist ethos. Through the involvement of the politicians at the highest

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2 Wyn Grant, *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain* (Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 1989), 9.

3 Francis G. Castle, *Pressure Groups and Political Culture: A Comparative Study* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 1.

4 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

5 Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 3.



level, the groups attempted to emulate the parliamentary select committees, by bringing together those with knowledge and experience of the pertinent issue. Therefore, rather than viewing them as pressure groups it would perhaps be appropriate to treat them as self-appointed select committees, or as Brailsford describes them, ‘unofficial leagues or committees.’<sup>6</sup>

### *Group Classification*

Three possible ways of classifying the groups will be put forward: the liberal internationalist argument employed; the influence they wielded; and the methods they utilised to get their message across to the government ministers and the British public. The first simply differentiates them by the type of internationalism being advocated; firstly, moral internationalism which was prevalent in the period up to the First World War and secondly, institutional internationalism, which developed in response to the war.<sup>7</sup> To summarise: the moral arguments are essentially based upon a positive view of humanity, where the development of an international consciousness will lead to the benign transformation of the international system. Certainly, the early twentieth-century liberal internationalists were imbued with moral and humanitarian principles, which were heavily influenced by Gladstonian Liberalism. Some, such as the Buxtons, belonged to the evangelical tradition but Williams was agnostic for whom humanity was the source of moral precept.<sup>8</sup>

Whether they were religious believers or agnostics, an appeal to the conscience of the public could help in the reformation of international politics. The institutional approach recognised that raising people’s consciousness was insufficient to achieve the desired changes. A suitable mechanism was therefore required. The liberal internationalists reacted to the war with deep pessimism, but also a determination to seek an alternative way of achieving their ultimate goal. The proposals for a League or Society of Nations emerged from this mix of emotions.

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<sup>6</sup> Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 132.

<sup>7</sup> For an overview of these concepts in relation to British liberal internationalism see Sylvest, ‘Continuity and Change’, 266-269.

<sup>8</sup> For Williams views on Christianity and the morality of the ‘religion of the future’ open to all regardless of race, age or creed, see Aneurin Williams to Noel Buxton, 5 March 1905, Duke University Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library: Noel Buxton Papers.

In the move towards institutionalism, the moralist arguments were not totally displaced, but there was an abrupt rise of those advocating institutional ones. During the Paris Peace Conference, the BAC simultaneously advanced both moral and institutional arguments for direct intervention on behalf of the Armenian people and their right to self-determination and protection under a League of Nations Mandate.

Alternatively, it is possible to differentiate between the groups according to how much influence they exerted on the political class.<sup>9</sup> Brailsford argued that the more influential were wealthier and better organised and consequently, he believed, 'that the tendencies which they represent are well entrenched within the governing class. They can always secure peers and bishops for their platforms, and great capitalists sit on the inner executive committees of several of them.'<sup>10</sup> He argued it was the 'weight' of the individuals supporting the groups, and not necessarily the number of supporters they could muster, which led to their success. Such groups were 'influential just so far as they can persuade or delude the Foreign Office into the belief that they speak for society and capital.'<sup>11</sup> The key to success, Brailsford argued, was access to large funds and imposing names and, importantly, a competent secretary. In contrast, those with limited funds and reliance upon voluntary services were seldom a real force. Ultimately, he saw their function as 'strengthening' the hands of the relevant Minister, by generating public opinion in support of a policy he was either already committed to, or at least in sympathy with. As will be seen in subsequent chapters this latter point is exemplified by the difficulties of the pro-Boer groups during the South African War, and the BC's feeling of accomplishment during Lord Lansdowne's tenure as Foreign Secretary.<sup>12</sup> Brailsford identified the BC as one of the more successful groups: the other liberal internationalist groups also fulfil his criteria in that they had good financial support, and efficient secretaries to support their activities.<sup>13</sup> For the SACC and LLAAM, the major difficulty was finding a Minister even vaguely sympathetic with their view point.

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9 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 132-3.

10 Ibid., 133.

11 Ibid., 133.

12 See chapter 5 and 6.

13 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 133.



Hitherto, the groups have been classified in simple terms, the argument they employed or the influence they wielded. For a more sophisticated method, we must turn to the academic studies of pressure groups. Wyn Grant's distinction between *insider* and *outsider* is the most significant in the literature.<sup>14</sup> In essence, an *insider* group is afforded some form of legitimacy through its privileged access to the government, either through senior civil servants or junior and occasionally middle-ranking ministers. This consultation enables them to have a greater influence on policy-making. In order to achieve this status they usually operate in areas where government knowledge or provision is inadequate.<sup>15</sup> In addition, if their area of interest becomes sufficiently popular, they may be able to undertake a media campaign. Conversely, *outsider* groups are excluded from what is termed 'the corridors of power,' and as a result have to resort to raising public awareness in order to gain support for their views. These actions can in turn further alienate them from the government. Despite this, it is possible in certain circumstances for groups carefully to balance the use of outsider strategies without losing their insider status.

As Edward Page has observed, for those groups seeking to influence the government the insider/outsider distinction ascribes influence to some and impotence to others.<sup>16</sup> Insider characteristics are predominantly concerned with access, such as contact with government ministers and their civil servants, Members of Parliament and the House of Lords and, importantly, specialist knowledge on the particular issues. Outsider characteristics are in contrast predominantly related to public opinion, and methods to engage its attention. These include utilising the press, through letters to the Editor and the provision of press releases, together with engaging with the British public through the publication of leaflets and pamphlets, as well as organising public meetings and the preparation of petitions to illustrate public support for the relevant issue. Typically, the insider/outsider distinction has been applied to modern pressure groups, which can be classified by their response to a questionnaire, but such a luxury is not available to the historian. To assign

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14 Grant, *Pressure Groups*, 15-21; Wyn Grant, 'Pressure Politics: From 'Insider' Politics to Direct Action?' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54, (2001), 337-348.

15 Grant, 'Pressure Politics: From 'Insider' Politics to Direct Action?', 346.

16 Edward Page, 'The insider/outsider distinction: an empirical investigation', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1, no. 2 (June 1999), 206 & 208.

the groups either insider or outsider status it is instead necessary to assess their use of the different strategies, using a ‘whole life’ analysis, rather than the ‘snap-shot’ approach of a questionnaire. Whilst this cannot match the critical interrogation of modern pressure groups, it nevertheless provides an important tool by which to evaluate the overall role of the liberal internationalist groups and their *modus operandi*.

Through a detailed study of the workings of the liberal internationalist groups, it is possible to identify the key methods they employed. The different approaches associated with either insider or outsider strategies, by which the groups were evaluated, can be seen in Table 3.1. The benefit of this procedure is that it provides an assessment that can be readily applied to all groups, thereby enabling their methods to be compared and contrasted.

The pro-Boer groups were, overwhelmingly, outsiders with limited access to government ministers, and only slightly greater rapport with the upper echelons of the Church of England. The other groups were predominantly insider groups as they had regular access to government ministers and the support of high-ranking Church officials such as the Archbishop of Canterbury. All the groups at various times utilised the outsider strategy of press and public campaigns to advance their cause. However, their willingness to use such campaigns varied during the lifetime of the groups. For the SACC and LLAAM it was the main channel open to them; government ministers regarded them as giving comfort to the enemy. What follows is a discussion of how the liberal internationalist groups exploited the strategies associated with the insider/outsider distinction.

### *Governmental Connections*

Contact with government was a strategy closed to the SACC and LLAAM as they were regularly derided by ministers as being pro-Boer and by implication anti-British. They were ideologically at odds with both the Conservative government and their Liberal Imperialist colleagues. The other groups were advocating policies which were more congruent with the overall thrust of British foreign policy, and could certainly not be



Table 3.1: Characteristics of the liberal internationalist groups

	South Africa Conciliation Committee	League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism	Balkan Committee	British Armenia Committee	League of Nations Society	League of Nations Union
<b>Insider Strategies</b>						
<i>Governmental Connections</i>						
Regular contact with ministers	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regular contact with Civil servants	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Parliamentary Connections</i>						
House of Lords	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Members of Parliament	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Religious Connections</i>						
Church of England	Limited	Limited	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Non-conformist	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Specialist Knowledge</i>						
Access to first-hand reports	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Relevant knowledge and experience	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Outsider Strategies</b>						
<i>Press Campaigns</i>						
Letters to the Editor	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Press Releases	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Public Campaigns</i>						
Publication of leaflets and pamphlets	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Meetings	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conducting petitions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<b>Group Classification</b>						
Predominant Characteristics	Outsider	Outsider	Insider	Insider	Insider	Insider
Predominant Strategy	Outsider	Outsider	Both	Both	Both	Both
Type of Membership	Open	Open	Open / Select	Select	Open	Open / Mass
Argument Approach	Moral	Moral	Moral / Institutional	Moral / Institutional	Institutional	Institutional

construed as unpatriotic; they were therefore afforded the privilege of insider status. As a result, they were able to make representation to government ministers, and entered into regular and fruitful correspondence with departmental officials.

The necessity of having access to government departments, but maintaining sufficient independence to enable constructive criticism of their policies became more of an issue with the change to a Liberal government. In 1903, at the time of setting up the BC, Bryce, as a former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, insisted that it should pursue its aims 'without directly challenging any of the Powers with which a [future] Liberal Government might have to deal.'<sup>17</sup>

The Foreign Secretary and his junior ministers regularly received deputations from the BC and BAC. The BAC was also able to develop good relations with the Conservative members of the wartime coalition government, including Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office. Bryce, Aneurin Williams and other representatives of the BAC and LNS also held meetings with Lloyd George including a breakfast meeting on 4 December 1919 and a private meeting 'in the country' in May 1920.<sup>18</sup> Two important differences made governmental contact easier for the post-South African War groups: firstly, they were dealing at least initially with members of their own political party; and secondly, while they were scathing of Britain's previous policy, their actions were not in conflict with Britain's war efforts.

### *Parliamentary Connections*

Through their political membership, all the groups were fully capable of utilising the political system to their best advantage. Politicians sat on the executive committees of all the groups; in some cases, they were founded and controlled by backbench MPs. With the exception of the LLAAM, the other liberal internationalist groups were able to claim they

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17 Quoted in Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy*, 3; this letter could not be found amongst the Noel Buxton Papers at either McGill or Duke Universities as not all of the papers used in the biography are extant.

18 'Notes of breakfast meeting', 4 December 1919, Private Collection: Aneurin Williams Papers (henceforth AWP) AW/3/4/1; Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 21 May 1920, Bibliothèque Nubar: Archives of the Délégation Nationale Arménienne (henceforth ADNA) Liaise 1/24.



were above party politics. This was particularly important in their appeal to a wide range of parliamentarians, academics and journalists. Prior to 1914, liberal internationalism was predominantly the domain of Liberals, but it could nevertheless appeal to a wide political spectrum including both Labour and Conservatives. Opposition to the Boer war was not exclusively Liberal, and anti-war Conservative and Liberal Unionist MPs included Leonard Courtney, Sir Edward Clarke, Arthur Elliot and J. M. Maclean.<sup>19</sup> The association with Labour was more evident, particularly through the radical Liberals. The drift of many of the more prominent radicals to Labour during and after the First World War enabled them to play an important role in directing post-war Labour foreign policy.<sup>20</sup> As a result, by the 1920s, the Labour Party had officially come to accept the liberal internationalist ideal embodied in the League of Nations.

The South African War was an important turning point for many, as it served as a spur for their political involvement. Some may have been politically active prior to the war, but for others like Aneurin Williams it marked his active involvement in foreign policy issues; prior to this, his interests were primarily with Radical domestic policies. As can be seen in Table 3.2 and Appendix 3, he was one of at least 28 SACC and LLAAM members to stand for Parliament after the South African War.

**Table 3.2: Members of SACC and LLAAM standing for Parliament**

MPs before 1900 but not standing in that election	18
Unsuccessfully standing for Parliament before 1900	20
Candidates in 1900 General Election	43
Elected after 1900	25
Unsuccessfully standing for Parliament after 1900	9

Note: For details of the individuals see Appendix 3

19 See Richard Price, *An Imperial War and the British Working Class* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 16, note 15; see also Derek Walker-Smith and Edward Clarke, *The Life of Sir Edward Clarke* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939), 256-274.

20 See R. M. Douglas, *The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951* (London: Routledge, 2004) and C. Sylvest, 'Interwar internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the historiography of international relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 48, no. 2 (June 2004), 409-432.

### *Religious Connections*

Religious support for the pro-Boers was in the main restricted to non-conformist ministers, with only a few representatives from the Church of England.<sup>21</sup> In Liverpool, support for the SACC came primarily from the nonconformist churches.<sup>22</sup> For the subsequent groups support from the highest levels of the Church of England was easier to elicit. Randall Thomas Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury (1903-1928) led several BC and BAC delegations to the Foreign Secretary, and spoke at public meetings for them and the LNS.

### *Specialist Knowledge*

Journalists and experienced travellers on the committees gave the groups an unrivalled knowledge of the regions. In addition, they acted as conduits for missionaries, European residents, and those directly affected. Access to experienced and distinguished international lawyers was especially important in the formulation of their policies. During the First World War, the pro-leaguers formulated and promoted various institutional proposals at a time when the government were not able to give them sufficient thought. In this way, they were performing the function of a political think tank.

### *Public Opinion*

The mobilising of public opinion was an essential tool, which required careful management. If the groups could get their timing right, it was possible for them to influence public opinion without jeopardising their insider status. The distribution of selective information on issues relating to foreign affairs was not just the preserve of the press. Public meetings, especially those organised in Central London or the major municipalities, usually attracted a certain degree of press attention. However whether or not to hold a high profile meeting was a fine judgement as a low turn out could lead to the press dismissing a group as insignificant. Indeed the cautious approach advocated by Bryce in the post-South African war period was testimony to this dilemma.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> See Appendix 2 and 4.

<sup>22</sup> I. Sellers, 'The Pro-Boer Movement in Liverpool', *Unitarian Historical Society, Transactions*, 12, no. 1 (October 1960), 72-3 and 75-76; they were amongst over 200 religious ministers to join the SACC, see Appendix 2.

<sup>23</sup> An example of this cautiousness can be seen in the setting up of the LNS public meeting on 14 May 1917, see 167



An important attribute of the liberal internationalist groups was their ability to lead rather than to be merely led by events. The making of opinion was, according to Brailsford, the sign of an effective group rather than purely expressing 'the spontaneous movements of the mass mind.'<sup>24</sup> In a more detailed analysis of public opinion in relation to modern democracy, Bryce identified three distinct categories of individuals involved in its formulation: the opinion makers, the opinion moulders and the opinion followers.<sup>25</sup> The 'opinion makers', were actively engaged in politics professionally as either parliamentarians or journalists, together with some enthusiastic amateurs. Despite only being a fraction of the voting public, Bryce concluded they practically made public opinion. They were the leading members of the liberal internationalist groups and the primary members of what Brailsford viewed as effective foreign policy groups.<sup>26</sup> Such individuals are equivalent to Stefan Collini's 'public moralists,' in that they attempted to persuade a public audience of the need to 'give such moral considerations priority over other concerns, whether personal, political, or aesthetic.'<sup>27</sup> Whether viewed as public moralists or opinion makers the liberal internationalists played a significant role in utilising public opinion in relation to issues of foreign affairs.

Bryce's second category, the critics or 'opinion moulders' took a more passive interest in politics. Through listening and reading, they carefully considered both sides of an argument before forming their own judgements. According to Bryce, they represented the true feelings of the nation and could therefore influence the 'opinion makers.' This category was more numerous and formed the backbone of the liberal internationalist groups' membership. The final category was the 'opinion followers' who represented the bulk of the population. Invariably they read little and exhibited no real interest in public affairs, but what little opinion they expressed generally follows that prevailing within their locality, workplace or social class. By its size, this group could provide a major presence for or against a movement.

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24 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 134.

25 James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, (New York: Macmillan, 1922), i, 156.

26 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 133.

27 Collini, *Public Moralists*, 1.

### *Press Campaigns*

All the groups regardless of status followed a high-profile strategy in their attempts to cultivate public opinion. The support of the press was invariably limited, no more so than during the South African War when the anti-war stance adopted by the *Manchester Guardian*, *Morning Leader* and *Daily News* was overshadowed by the pro-war attitude of the bulk of the middle-class papers such as the *Daily Mail* and *The Times*. Hobson's experience in South Africa as a correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* is well known. Scott had also wanted to send Brailsford to South Africa but the *Manchester Guardian*'s owner blocked his posting so he joined the *Morning Leader*.<sup>28</sup>

Prior to 1917, while the United States remained a neutral power, Aneurin Williams successfully attracted a great deal of press attention in America to the genocide of the Armenians. He also recognised the need to arouse press interest in how Armenia should be governed following the peace settlement.

### *Public Campaigns*

The rampant jingoism during the South African War was a sobering experience for many liberal internationalists, who were consequently cautious of making themselves targets in subsequent campaigns. Even ten years after the event, Liberal MP Philip Morrell was warning against loud public pronouncements, preferring to influence 'public opinion in articles in the Press and all other well known silent methods [rather] than the clumsy method of a public meeting.'<sup>29</sup>

The objective of most groups was the education of the public, and the focusing of public opinion through the dissemination of accurate news, through public meetings and publications. All the groups at various times organised public meetings, but only the pro-Boer ones attracted the unwelcome attentions of the jingoistic mob. One other way of demonstrating support was the preparation of petitions and the collection of signatures. Rather than concentrate on quantity the liberal internationalist groups invariably followed

<sup>28</sup> Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*, 42.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Morrell to Noel Buxton, 18 October 1912, NBP, MS951, c4/13.



Brailsford's maxim of selecting 'weighty' public figures.<sup>30</sup> Consequently, they sought the affirmation of Peers and other prominent men whose position would warrant the Foreign Secretary's attention.

Another 'non-silent' method was the publication and distribution of literature. Of all the groups, the SACC most successfully utilised this medium. In its first three months, it distributed around 390,000 copies of its 38 leaflets and pamphlets.<sup>31</sup> In addition, its Liverpool branch succeeded in distributing in excess of 120,000 leaflets and pamphlets around the city, during its first twelve months. Utilising their considerable membership base they undertook a major door-to-door distribution of leaflets, as well as approaching churches and work places. Amongst the distributed leaflets was one aimed directly at the local shopkeepers: it appealed to them as businessmen, by highlighting the fact that the war would need to be paid for by taxation of the British consumers, who would in consequence have less money to spend. These were just part of the leaflet campaign waged by the government's opponents and its supporters, as John S. Galbraith's seminal study of the role of the pamphlet during the war clearly illustrates.<sup>32</sup>

The groups also embraced the new medium of film as a propaganda tool. In 1919, the LNU agreed to sponsor the American produced film *Auction of Souls*, which was based on Aurora Mardiganian's *Ravished Armenia* and sought to re-enact many the Armenian atrocities described in the Bryce's report.<sup>33</sup> Prior to its three week run at the Royal Albert Hall, the film had received the approval of a LNU sub-committee including Lord Bryce and Aneurin Williams. They lauded the film as 'a vivid exemplification of the horrors of war', but it soon fell foul of the authorities.<sup>34</sup> Only after modification of crucifixion

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30 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 133.

31 SACC, Minutes of General Meeting, 25 April 1900, Oxford University Bodleian Library: John Johnson Collection (Ephemera) (henceforth JJC), Box 4: South African War, 3.

32 John S. Galbraith, 'The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War', *Journal of Modern History*, 24, no. 2 (June 1952), 111-126.

33 Henry Leyford Gates, *Ravished Armenia; or, "The Auction of Souls": the story of Aurora Mardiganian, the Christian girl who survived the great massacres*. (New York: International Copyright Bureau, 1919); James Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916 : documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916).

34 Lord Robert Cecil to Philip Kerr, 28 January 1920, National Archives of Scotland: Philip Kerr Papers (henceforth PKP), GD40/17/207; no extant copies of the film have been located.

scenes and the removal of 'Christian' from all subtitles did it get a public airing.<sup>35</sup> The furore created by the film caused considerable consternation to LNU chairman, Lord Robert Cecil, and Phillip Kerr, Lloyd George's personal private secretary. Kerr was being 'besieged' by complaints of the films 'artificial manufacture of atrocities' and its potential to affect Moslem opinion within India.<sup>36</sup> Cecil's response to the re-enactment of events in the film demonstrated his exasperation: 'It is of course quite obvious that the pictures of the atrocities were not taken on the spot [...] I cannot think that any spectator is so foolish or perverse as to imagine that, when the Turks were going to murder somebody, they sent for a cinematographic operator to record the incident!'<sup>37</sup> Similarly, he dismissed the claims of the film's potential to embitter Moslem feelings as 'the greatest balderdash I ever heard.'<sup>38</sup>

### Group Membership

As can be seen in Table 3.1 (page 43) the groups were primarily 'open' to members from the general public; however, only the LNU could be truly classified as a mass membership group, especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The BAC's membership was predominantly by invitation, and usually restricted to those with specialist knowledge of the region, while the BC could be considered as a hybrid in that, although it acted very much as a select committee, it nevertheless actively sought members at least in its early years.

#### *The Usual Suspects?*

Returning to Hobhouse's assertion that it was always possible to get together a 'scratch crowd,' an important question is, were these groups in effect new clothing for the same old dissidents? How representative were the groups, or did they just provide a suitable home for the 'usual suspects': A. J. P. Taylors' *Trouble Makers*, the dissenters, and the

35 James C. Robertson, *The Hidden Cinema: British Film Censorship in Action, 1913-1972* (London: Routledge, 1989), 14-16.

36 Philip Kerr to Lord Robert Cecil, 26 January 1920, PKP, GD40/17/207.

37 Lord Robert Cecil to Philip Kerr, 2 February 1920, PKP, GD40/17/207.

38 *Ibid.*



radicals? In order to evaluate this adequately, a list of officers, members and supporters, of all the groups has been compiled which is as comprehensive as the surviving literature and manuscripts allow.<sup>39</sup>

As we have noted the membership of the groups varied and the evidence on this matter is variable. The SACC published regular detailed membership lists, while the LLAAM and BC published limited details of all their subscribers in their annual reports. Only two complete membership lists for the LNS are known to survive, together with an undated list of additional members.<sup>40</sup> No details of LNU members are available, while the BAC sole membership appears to have been its executive committee. From an examination of the surviving minute books and publications, it is possible to identify Presidents, Vice-Presidents, prominent supporters and Committee members for all the groups. Together, as can be seen in Appendix 2, these give a combined membership of just over 2,200 named individuals, which – though not an exhaustive list – provides a significant sample of support for liberal internationalism over a seventeen-year period. (By way of comparison, the LNU boasted 987 founding members, and 14,665 by the end of 1919; but these remain anonymous.) Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the overlap in membership between the comparable groups varied considerably, depending on their membership type and the information that survives.

By combining the membership of the comparable groups, it is possible to compare the different strands of liberal internationalism. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the overlap of members is not very large, and amounted to just 8.31 percent of the combined membership. Appendix 2 demonstrates that the ‘core’ members were overwhelmingly male and well educated with over half receiving a university education, and three-quarters had a publication history. Just under half were or had been MPs, and amongst the others were journalists, academics and religious ministers. This made them ideal candidates to

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39 The complete list of individuals can be seen in Appendix 2, and will be referred to throughout the remaining text.

40 ‘First list of members, 12 June 1915’, AWP 3/1/3; ‘List of members, March 1916’, Oxford University Bodleian Library: Willoughby Hyett Dickinson Papers (henceforth WHDP), c404, f14-18.



be Lord Bryce’s ‘opinion makers,’ Stefan Collini’s ‘public moralists,’ as well as fulfilling Michael Bentley’s criteria for radical action.<sup>41</sup>




Figure 3.1: Liberal internationalist group membership




Figure 3.2: Overlap in liberal internationalist membership

41 See 47 and 9.



## Analysis

The characteristics of the mass membership is much harder to identify, however taking the SACC membership lists as being representative, it is possible to undertake an analysis of a ten percent sample in conjunction with the 1901 Census returns.<sup>42</sup> While the executive committees were certainly middle class, it is debatable whether the SACC was 'entirely middle class in membership' as Richard Price claims.<sup>43</sup> How he came to this conclusion is unclear, other than a reference to the fact that just fewer than twenty percent of its membership in March 1900 held an ecclesiastical post.<sup>44</sup> While the sample SACC membership does contain a similar percentage of religious ministers, this is an unsatisfactory method of classifying a group. Certainly, the sample contains some very eminent figures including the former Lord Chief Justice Lord Coleridge, Lady Fitch, Lady Hobhouse and Sir Robert Head, together with numerous professionals. There are however, also shopkeepers, postmen, steel workers and labourers, who accounted for nearly a quarter of the sample membership. Analysis of the membership lists indicates that Price's assumptions do not bear up to detailed scrutiny.

During its two years of existence, the SACC attracted 1,220 full members and around 730 associate members, slightly more than Price's membership figure of 1,700 for November 1900.<sup>45</sup> His claim that one-half of the membership lived in Liverpool does not bear up to scrutiny either, as interrogation of the lists only identifies 17 individuals living in Liverpool, while the local branch boasted a membership of 781.<sup>46</sup> Liverpool was one of 35 such branches and auxiliary groups throughout Great Britain, which by June 1900 had

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42 122 individuals were sampled out of a membership of 1220 full members. The membership list gives name and address of all members at the time of joining, which can be compared with the 1901 Census returns; see Appendix 4.

43 Price, *An Imperial War*, 18.

44 Ibid., 18 n29.

45 Six published membership lists for the SACC have been identified: the first three (11 January 1900, 17 March 1900 and 27 June 1900) are cumulative while the last three only list new members (31 October 1900, 29 March 1901 and 29 March 1902); The figures quoted by Price appear to be the combination of the full members (1082 at the end of October 1900) plus the Associates, see Price, *An Imperial War; The First Annual Report on the Work of The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism*, (London: The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1901), 18; see also Appendix 2.

46 While some active Liverpool branch members, like Sir John Brunner gave their London address, such individuals however were in the minority. While large numbers joined the Liverpool branch, only a small percentage became full members of the SACC. It is highly likely that the local members were working class, but in the absence of local membership lists this cannot be verified.

a combined membership in excess of 3,900.<sup>47</sup> Of the eight major cities with significantly sized local branches, the number of full SACC members living within them on average amounted to less than five percent of the local branch membership.<sup>48</sup>

The SACC lists 22 women’s groups in London, and it organised several women-only meetings. The controversial Emily Hobhouse was co-organiser and main speaker at what Martin Ceadel describes as ‘the first public meeting for women during a major war’, held at Queen’s Hall on 13 June 1900.<sup>49</sup> Despite representation from leading women campaigners, such as the suffragist and radical Jane Cobden Unwin, the freethinker Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, and Elizabeth Bryce, all the groups were predominantly male. As can be seen in Table 3.3 female membership of the groups confirms the observation made by Felix Moscheles in 1912 that there was a considerable under representation of women in the peace groups.<sup>50</sup> The role of women in the groups was usually of a secondary nature, the exceptions being the BAC and the LNS where they played an important role in the executive committees.

**Table 3.3: Female Membership of groups**

	Membership		
	Female	Total	Percent
SACC	252	1220	20.65
LLAAM	87	593	14.67
BC	4	63	2.75
BAC	11	400	10.64
LNS	51	215	23.72

Note: see Appendix 2 for details of individuals

The LLAAM certainly did not actively seek to engage women in the debate over the South African War. When the former Liberal MP, C. A. V. Conybeare suggested that they

47 The Peace and Humanity Society of Victoria, Australia was also recorded as an auxiliary group.  
48 The eight cities being Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Derby, Huddersfield, Leeds, Liverpool, and Sheffield.  
49 Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 155.  
50 Ibid., 185; Moscheles was a member of the SACC and BC.



should organise a meeting to hear Emily Hobhouse's account of life in the Concentration Camps no action was taken.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, when Jane Cobden Unwin requested that women be represented on the executive committee, the request was initially deferred and finally it was decided not to pursue it.<sup>52</sup> This under-representation is also evident in the analysis of the core members, where less than ten percent were women. Attempts to engage women followed the gradual awakening of interest of existing women's groups to the unfolding events in South Africa, which according to Stephen Koss was a result of their perceiving themselves as an 'interest group'.<sup>53</sup>

The liberal internationalists were as Akaby Nassibian observed all thoroughly 'imbued with moral and humanitarian principles.'<sup>54</sup> Gladstone's 1876 agitation was an inspirational example of moral passion being brought to bear on British public opinion and the liberal internationalists echoed Gladstone's view that the Crimean War had ensured the continuation of a 'system of gross barbarism and cruelty.'<sup>55</sup> This link to Gladstonian principles is a recurring theme. In describing his brother's motives, Noel states that 'What inspired Charlie was, I think, the pure Gladstonian doctrines, the Liberal idea for small nations, with the added motive of Gladstone's abhorrence of barbarity – such as was shown by the Turks'.<sup>56</sup> There was also the belief that they were the inheritors of the Gladstonian tradition, which meant that, 'Wherever in the world a high aspiration was entertained, or a noble blow was struck, it was to England that the eyes of the oppressed were always turned.'<sup>57</sup>

Another biographical vignette of the Gladstonian myth is demonstrated by Brailsford's 1898 reporting on the turmoil in Crete, where the insurgents were demanding union with Greece. The Powers and the Sultan desired a less definitive solution. He observed at

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51 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1 July 1901, Glasgow University Special Collections: Alexander MacCullam Scott Papers (henceforth AMSP), MS Gen 1465/69.

52 Ibid., 15 April, 5 May and 23 May 1902, AMSP MS Gen 1465/69.

53 *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement*, ed. by Stephen Koss, 173.

54 While her observation was in relation to Armenia it is equally true of the other groups; see Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, 35.

55 *Westminster Gazette*, 8 October 1912.

56 Noel Buxton quoted in de Bunsen, *Charles Roden Buxton*, 54.

57 *The Voice of Gladstone*, Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 15, (1912) 1.



close quarters the actions of a small British garrison who held the port of Candia where around 50,000 Muslim refugees gathered in near starvation.<sup>58</sup> The distress he attributed to the naval blockade and the failure of the authorities to allow communication with the interior. Consequently he became very disillusioned about Britain's foreign policy, which he equated with a 'soul-less pursuit of power and gain.'<sup>59</sup> A belief further strengthened by his period reporting on the South African War for the *Morning Leader*. Contact with Noel Buxton, in whom he saw the ideals of an older Gladstonian tradition, soon restored his faith. Similarly, Sir Mark Sykes recognised Buxton as the inheritor of the 'great Gladstonian tradition in the Balkans'.<sup>60</sup>

Although not conceived as pressure groups, through their attempt to educate and inform they shared many of the same methodologies. The analysis of their membership shows that even a small 'core' was sufficient to mobilise a 'stage army of the good'.<sup>61</sup> People largely engaged with single issues, rather than committing themselves to liberal internationalism as such, which was the 'world-view' of a progressive political-cum-intellectual coterie, not a popular creed. We must recall, too, that the inter-play of history and biography was complex: we sometimes find the same individual responding to ostensibly similar events in dramatically different ways. Bertrand Russell is a pertinent example: he reacted to the Boer War with a fierce patriotism and penned a general defence of imperialism that echoed the views of his god-father, J. S. Mill, on the British Empire's role in disseminating 'civilisation'. Nevertheless, he was appalled by the Liberal Government's decision to declare war in August 1914 and became an early member of the UDC.<sup>62</sup> The central figures in this study – Williams, Hobson, and Bryce – were rather more consistent in their political outlook over the years but we should not exaggerate their consistency. They brought certain principles (explicit and implicit) to their understanding of world affairs,

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58 See Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*, 34-39.

59 'Dinner given by the members of the Balkan Committee to the Chairman, Noel Buxton', NBP, MS951 c25/3.

60 Sir Mark Sykes to Noel Buxton, 10 February 1915, NBP, MS951 c24/10.

61 A phrase coined by Nevinson to refer to the small number of people who could be called upon to support worthy causes, see Henry W. Nevinson, 'Edward Carpenter, 1844-1929', in *Great Democrats*, ed. by Alfred Barratt Brown, vols (1934), 101-118.; John, *War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century*, 199.

62 See Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell; The Spirit of Solitude*, (Jonathan Cape, 1996), 125-6, 370-1.



but they did not have a programmatic doctrine comparable to socialist internationalism.<sup>63</sup> As with much liberal political argument, their interventions were (mostly) extemporised: they were unscripted responses to events but with a characteristic 'voice'. The second part of this thesis will look in more detail at how they engaged with British foreign and imperial policy and the international situation, between the outbreak of the South African War and the demise of the Armenians' aspirations for self-determination in the 1920s.

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63 In this respect, it is instructive to compare Lenin's *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) with Hobson's *Imperialism*.

## II



## 4

## Liberal Internationalism and the Eastern Question

Liberal internationalism developed as an antithesis to the imperialistic nature of British foreign policy, which on strategic, economic and moral grounds was considered abhorrent. Imperial expansion, liberal internationalists argued, would be damaging to Britain's relations with the other Powers, and those benefiting from such expansion were an influential minority. They also opposed the idea of a 'spirited' foreign policy whereby national patriotism was projected upon an international stage. The dependence of imperialism upon patriotism was as repugnant as its dependence on the use of force.<sup>1</sup> British foreign policy in the words of a BC leaflet instead should be adapted 'to protect the weak, to relieve the oppressed, and to secure the kindly light of civilisation for every backward and unfortunate State.'<sup>2</sup>

Any consideration of liberal internationalism which ignores the historical context of the 'Eastern Question' would impede our understanding of the crucial importance of this issue to the crystallisation of their outlook on foreign affairs, so this chapter provides the essential context for understanding that hugely complex imbroglio. It is significant for this study because Britain's involvement in the Eastern Question in the 1870s foregrounded jingoism and imperialism.<sup>3</sup> The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the growth of Balkan nationalism subjected the region to the political machinations of the Great Powers and in

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1 See Hobson, *Imperialism*, 107.

2 *The Appeal of the Churches*, (The Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 12, n.d.), 4.

3 George J. Holyoake, a co-partnership colleague of Williams, is credited with first coining the phrase 'Jingoes' in 1878, see Hugh Cunningham, 'Jingoism in 1877-78', *Victorian Studies*, 14, no. 4 (June 1971), 429.

particular, the conflicting interests of Britain and Russia.<sup>4</sup> Britain's need to maintain the *status quo* arose out of strategic concerns for the route to India and fears that any newly emerging states would be more receptive to Russia due to their shared Orthodox culture and Slavic ethnicity.

The Balkan uprisings of the 1870s brought together Christian humanitarian sympathy for the suffering of co-religionists at the hands of their Muslim overlords and liberal sympathy for the aspirations of national minorities to sovereign nationhood. That such a combination of Christian humanitarianism and liberal nationalism should find a particular resonance in Britain is not surprising: non-conformists constituted about half the church-going population and they were particularly active in sustaining political Liberalism outside parliament. Central to this union was former Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone, a figure of inspiration to the liberal internationalists, particularly through his pamphlet *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*, published in response to the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876. Here he claimed that in order to redeem British honour it was imperative that the Turks' 'anarchical misrule' was halted by:

The extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall I hope clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, maiden, and of child<sup>5</sup>

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4 For the history of this conflict see Jennifer Seigel, *Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).

5 W. E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London: John Murray, 1876), 61-62; for further details regarding Gladstone's involvement with the Balkan situation see Richard Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876*, (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1975) and *Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865-1898* (London: Allen Lane, 1999).



This extinction of executive power required both a change in British foreign policy, and coercion by the Concert of Europe: it would not be by force of arms, territorial invasion or loss of Ottoman sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> Instead, Gladstone advocated a pacific policy, which called for Balkan autonomy while recognising the need for territorial integrity as an essential barrier to Great Power expansion.<sup>7</sup> This remained fundamental to the liberal internationalist solutions in the years leading up to the First World War. Utilising both insider and outsider strategies they followed Gladstone's maxim that the government must be taught what to say and do.<sup>8</sup> In order to understand the subsequent actions of the liberal internationalists it is imperative first to consider the pertinent events of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

### The Balkan Uprisings

The revolts of the mid-1870s firmly placed the Eastern Question on the national and international agenda. In 1875, the peasants in Bosnia and Hercegovina rose up in protest at the level of taxation and the deplorable conditions imposed by their overlords. This led to waves of refugees, Muslim and Christian alike, resulting in around one and a half million Muslims seeking refuge in Anatolia. The presence of these displaced Balkan émigrés was no doubt an exacerbating factor in the ensuing waves of ethnic cleansing.

Meanwhile, in June 1876 the Serbs declared war and subsequently invaded Bosnia, followed soon afterwards by a Montenegrin declaration and its invasion of neighbouring Hercegovina. Conditions in Bulgaria were little better and at the end of April 1876 a carefully planned and co-ordinated rebellion erupted, resulting in the slaughter of local Moslems. The Ottoman response was swift and severe, leading to the destruction of some 60 villages and the massacre of tens of thousands of peasants. When news reached Britain in May 1876, public opinion was aghast, all the more so due to the claims of complicity through Britain's long-standing Near East policy.

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6 John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, 2 vols (London: Edward Lloyd, 1908), 121.

7 Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors*, 50-55.

8 Ibid., 11.

In May 1876 the *Dreikaiserbund* or the League of the Three Emperors (Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany), issued the Berlin Memorandum. This called for the Porte to initiate a ceasefire with the rebels and carry out the already agreed to reforms in the Christian provinces. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli refused to sign in part because it contained the implication that the Powers were willing to act should the Ottomans fail to comply and thereby opened Britain to criticism that it had failed to support the Christian subjects.<sup>9</sup> A further Note issued by the *Dreikaiserbund* in late December, expressed their fears that in the Spring Bulgaria would rise up, and that Serbia and Montenegro would enter the fray. The Sultan acquiesced to the suggested reforms, but failed to implement them, and consequently the predictions of the *Dreikaiserbund* came to fruition.

By October 1876, the war over Bosnia and Hercegovina, which had broken out four months earlier, was reaching its conclusion. A Serb defeat looked imminent and as a result, the Russians issued an ultimatum to the Porte, which secured a six-week ceasefire and a peace treaty that enforced the *status quo ante bellum*. Consequently, Russian attention turned from the Serbs to the prospects of Bulgaria, and the Budapest Convention of January 1877 accepted Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in return for Austro-Hungarian neutrality. Additionally it precluded the establishment of 'a large compact' state in the Balkans.

As well as pressure on its periphery, the Ottoman Empire was subjected to internal instability, as within the space of three months, May to August 1876, two Sultans had been deposed. Their successor was Abdülhamid II, whose thirty-three year reign was notorious for its authoritarianism over an increasingly secessionist population. One of his first actions was promulgating a liberal Ottoman Constitution, which contained provisions for an elected parliament, representative of all religions, as well as promises of religious freedom and a fairer tax system. The Sultan however retained ultimate power to declare war, make treaties, and issue legally binding decrees without consultation. While the Ottomans adjusted to the new Constitution and the return of peace to the Balkans, Russia

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<sup>9</sup> For a discussion on Disraeli's attitude see John Charmley, *Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origin of the First World War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), 25.



entered into negotiations with Romania to ensure the safe passage of their troops, in return for recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

### *The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano*

In what would prove to be the most decisive of their many conflicts, Russia declared war on the Ottomans on 24 April 1877. The possibility of British intervention and Romania's declaration of complete independence intensified the ongoing crisis. In Britain anti-Turk and anti-war feeling had been strengthened by Gladstone's rhetoric and Cabinet divisions limited the scope for Beaconsfield's interventions (Disraeli had recently been created Earl of Beaconsfield). For over five months, the Ottomans seriously impeded the Russian advance in both Bulgaria and Armenia.

By the end of January 1878, the Russians were within sight of Istanbul and the Sultan requested an Armistice. The peace terms were particularly severe and included the creation of a large autonomous Bulgaria, together with autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, independence for Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Additionally Russian interests in the Straits and eastern Anatolia were to be safeguarded. During the war, Russia had seized the Armenian districts of Kars, Ardahan, Bayazid and Alashkert together with the seaport of Batum.

Just over a month later, on 3 March 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. This confirmed the preliminary territorial changes, which in effect transferred the majority of the Christian subjects out of the Ottoman Empire (see Figure 4.1). The Sublime Port had also agreed under Article 16 of the Treaty to 'carry out into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from the Kurds and Circasians.'<sup>10</sup> This protection was necessary, as the Armenians had given assistance to the Russians during the recent war. In addition, the Russian army would remain within Turkish Armenia until

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10 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 22), Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed by Ignatiev, Safvet and Sadoullah at San Stefano on 19 February / 3 March 1878, 262.






Figure 4.1: The Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of San Stefano



these reforms were introduced. As a result, the Armenian Question was projected to the forefront of international politics. According to the distinguished Belgian international lawyer, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyes, this was the first international compact to mention Armenia.<sup>11</sup>

Between his request for an Armistice and the Treaty of San Stefano, the Sultan abruptly ended his attempt at constitutional monarchy by suspending the parliament, which during its brief existence was preoccupied with the disastrous war, and levelling criticism at the governments handling of the situation. The constitution would remain in abeyance for another 30 years until its reinstatement following the Young Turk revolution, a false dawn widely welcomed by the liberal internationalists.

### *Congress of Berlin and Internationalism*

The Powers did not welcome the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. While Britain and Austria were not averse to the establishment of an autonomous Bulgaria *per se*, its creation by force of arms would they feared lead to its becoming a Russian satellite, provide a springboard for future Russian incursions, and importantly seriously affect the current balance of power in the region. According to the terms of their agreement of 1856, Britain, Austria and France were bound to defend the integrity of the Empire; as a result, they were able to claim that the treaty terms were of international concern and therefore any treaty required the consent of the Powers. In an attempt to prevent the possibility of Britain and Austria-Hungary being drawn into a conflict over a post-San Stefano Balkans, the German Chancellor, Bismarck intervened as an 'honest broker'. Consequently, a Congress in Berlin was convened to renegotiate the treaty. Britain insisted that, without exception, all the terms were to be submitted to the Congress and, importantly, no territorial changes would become legitimate without its approval. Britain's objection to the treaty centred primarily upon Russian territorial gains in Armenia, and the new autonomous Bulgarian principality: potential threats to British prestige and its power base in India.

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11 He was a Belgian jurist and founder of the *Institut de Droit International* as a body of experts on international law.; Gustave Rolin-Jaequeny, *Armenia, the Armenians, and the treaties* (London: 1891).

Before the Congress met, it was made clear to the Porte that the price of British intervention in a future conflict was to be the island of Cyprus together with the promise of improved conditions for all Christians within the Empire. On the 4 June 1878 the secret Cyprus Convention was signed, which stated that, should Russia not return the captured territory or again threaten the integrity of the Empire, Britain promised to help 'the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers in these territories.'<sup>12</sup> The terms of this treaty did not become public knowledge until after the Sultan issued a *firman*, or Royal decree, proclaiming the occupation on the 6 July.

The Congress of Berlin was one of seven called as part of the 'Concert of Europe' during the nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> The Concert arose in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars (1798-1815) as an attempt to preserve peace and international order and thereby maintain the balance of power. This was to be achieved by the mutual recognition of the other Great Powers' authority within certain geographical areas and national frontiers. Consequently, the Concert was not predisposed to recognise the idea of national self-determination. Changes to the status quo in Europe required the consent of the Great Powers through the convening of a Congress. Importantly the Concert marked the first recognition that the Great Powers had a duty to limit the pursuit of their individual interests where this was detrimental to the stability of Europe.<sup>14</sup> The notion of working together to maintain peace was not consistently sustained, and as the century drew to a close competition between the opposing alliances would intensify.

Consequently, the Berlin Congress has been described as the last 'great international gathering of the 'old diplomacy', the last to be held before democracy and small-state nationalism transformed international relations so much for the worse.'<sup>15</sup> Certainly, the issue of nationalism would resurface on a regular basis with the number of internationally

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12 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 36) Convention of Defensive Alliance Between Great Britain and Turkey, signed 4 June 1878.

13 F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, 214.

14 F. H. Hinsley, *Nationalism and the International System* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 84.

15 M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1966), 210.



recognised states increasing with every decade. While the Concert system viewed self-determination unfavourably, the liberal internationalists argued that nationalism or 'heightened group consciousness' should not be suppressed; instead sufficient autonomy should be allowed in order to guarantee their freedom. The First World War heightened the issue of nationality, as well as the liberal internationalists' vision of a league or 'union of autonomous nations'.<sup>16</sup>

### *Liberal internationalist concerns*

While upholding most of the provisions of San Stefano, the Treaty of Berlin contained significant changes. An autonomous Bulgarian Principality did emerge, but it was significantly smaller in size and excluded the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia. In addition Western Thrace and Macedonia were 'returned' to the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary occupied a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, much to the chagrin of Serbia, and the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, thereby preventing Serbian and Montenegrin unification. Russia also had to restore part of the occupied Armenian territories to the Ottoman Empire, but retained the three districts of Batum, Kars and Ardahan. As a result the Ottoman Empire saw its territory reduced by two-fifths and its population by one-fifth (see Figure 4.2). In addition, Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano was superseded by Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which in its diluted form merely stated:

The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the ameliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.<sup>17</sup>

Such supervision remained unspecified and Britain was unwilling to allow the Russians to continue to occupy the territory until such reforms were introduced. For liberal

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<sup>16</sup> Hobhouse, *The Future of Internationalism*, 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 38), Despatch from the Marquis of Salisbury, enclosing a copy of the Treaty signed at Berlin, 13 July 1878.






Figure 4.2: The Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Berlin



internationalists this was a significant change. As the Duke of Argyll commented, 'what was everybody's business was [now] nobody's business'.<sup>18</sup> Similarly unimpressed were the Workmen's Peace Association who commented that there was 'not a free or an enslaved Christian in the South East of Europe' that did not 'owe England a legacy of disappointment and ill-will.'<sup>19</sup> In his history of the period, Gooch observed the Congress completely failed to provide a permanent settlement to the 'tangled problem of the Balkans'.<sup>20</sup>

For the early twentieth-century liberal internationalists, the root of the problems for both the Armenians and the Macedonians was the Treaty of Berlin. However, there were important differences because the Armenians were an ethnically homogenous people, albeit widely distributed throughout the Ottoman Empire beyond their traditional homelands. In addition, Armenia's location on the eastern edge of the Ottoman Empire meant that the 'core' Armenian population was in a region where, of the European Powers, only Russia could physically intervene. The substantial Armenian population amplified Russian interests.

The liberal internationalists were unequivocal in condemning the substitution of the Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin for the Treaty of San Stefano: without this substitution, the great massacres of the 1890s and early twentieth century would not have occurred.<sup>21</sup> Bryce observed that the treaties had only served to draw attention to the Armenians. Previously the Sultan had shown no interest in them, and they had no real aspirations for nationhood. As a result of their raised profile, the Armenians came under greater scrutiny by the Sultan while at the same time a slumbering dream of nationhood was awakened.<sup>22</sup>

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18 Very much a Gladstonian Liberal, he nevertheless broke with the party over Home Rule, he consistently argued against imperial expansion and took a keen interest in the Eastern Question. During the Armenian atrocities of the 1890s he was a prominent critic of Ottoman Turkey; Duke of Argyll, *Our Responsibilities for Turkey: Facts and Memories of Forty Years* (London: 1896), 74.

19 Quoted in Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, 77.

20 G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe 1878-1919* (London: Cassell and Co, 1923), 1.

21 For example see Noel Buxton and Harold Buxton, *Travels and Politics in Armenia* (London: 1914), 132-3; Aneurin Williams, 'Armenia: Is It the End?' *Contemporary Review*, 108 (Nov. 1915), 555-561; *The Manchester Guardian*, 16 October 1915.

22 James Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, 4<sup>th</sup> edn (London, 1896).



## Armenia and the Eastern question

The 1890s witnessed another Turkish massacre, this time of the Armenians, who had adopted Christianity early in the 300s A.D., and were apparently the first nation to do so thereby serving to highlight their differences from their neighbours. Armenia's position was unenviable, situated as it was between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and caught between the tectonic plates of rival empires. Subjected to repeated and quite lengthy periods of foreign domination, the Armenians became widely scattered throughout the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia, as well as Europe, America and India.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the Armenian populations were divided between the Eastern or Russian Armenia and the Western or Turkish (Ottoman) Armenia. Russian Armenia at this point consisted of the provinces of Erevan, Kars, the highlands of Karabagh, and southern parts of Tiflis, while Ottoman Armenia consisted of the *vilayets* (provinces) of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir and Sivas (see figure 4.3).<sup>23</sup>




Figure 4.3: The Ottoman Armenian vilayets

<sup>23</sup> For detailed history of Armenia, see for example Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*; Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (1996).



The Armenians were integral to the Ottoman Empire's trading system, with many occupying prominent positions within medicine, the gold and jewellery trades, and most importantly foreign trade. Arnold J. Toynbee, observed that:

The Armenians during the centuries they have been under Turkish rule, have been characterised by the extraordinary patience with which they have borne that rule, and by their unrequited fidelity to the Turkish government. Indeed, they have long ago earned in Turkey the name of the 'Loyal Race'. They are, nevertheless, remarkably progressive in their character and eminently suited by their intelligence, industry, thrift and sobriety for settled civilised life.<sup>24</sup>

The Armenians had a degree of religious and cultural autonomy within the Gregorian *millet* system, which was an expression of nationhood, though this did not imply entitlement to a nation state (as in the West) but rather denoted ethnic and religious affiliation.<sup>25</sup> As well as being responsible for the spiritual welfare of its followers, the *millet* also oversaw their social and educational life.

### *Armenian Revolutionary Parties*

The nineteenth century witnessed a cultural awakening for the Armenians, primarily due to exposure to western culture; these included missionary activities and the education of wealthy Armenian children in France. However, the greatest catalyst was the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which projected the Armenian Question into the international arena without producing any tangible benefits. Despite sending a delegation to Berlin, they had not been given a hearing. Not surprisingly, the representatives looked to the Balkan states, which had gained greater respect from the European Powers because of taking up arms.<sup>26</sup>

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24 'Pamphlets on the Armenian Question, Draft Memorandum on the Political Future of Armenia', 1917, Oxford University Bodleian Library: Arnold Toynbee Papers (henceforth ATP), Box 44.

25 All Christians who were not Greek Orthodox were placed within the Gregorian millet.

26 A fuller discussion of the impact of the Armenian revolutionaries can be found in Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, 29.



In the 1880s, the pacific response of the Armenians was to undergo a significant change. In 1887, a group of Russian Armenian students formed the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party with the aim of having Turkish Armenia recognised as an independent nation free from Turkish oppression. In order to claim the attention of the Europeans they utilised propaganda, demonstrations and peaceful protests, together with acts of terrorism. In the 1890s, they joined forces with other Armenian groups to form the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or *Dashnaktsuthium* (meaning Federation). This organisation sought the political and economic freedom of Turkish Armenia but according to Nalbandian, due to its diverse membership the fledgling Dashnaks suffered from indecision and vagueness.<sup>27</sup> The Hunchaks recognised, that as in the Balkans, attacks against their Muslim neighbours and the resultant reprisals was the only way to rouse Russia and Europe out of their lethargy. For the Hunchaks:

Armenians are determined to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian horrors and made Bulgaria free. She will listen to our cry when it goes up in the shrieks and blood of millions of women and children [...] We are desperate, we shall do it.<sup>28</sup>

In response to the Dashnak capture of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in August 1896, the Ottoman authorities encouraged and instigated Turkish mobs to massacre around 6,000 Armenian and other Christians in the capital.<sup>29</sup> The resultant protests from the European Powers were ineffective, but such drastic action was seen as the only way to achieve ‘human rights’ for the Armenians. This onset of Armenian terrorism coincided with a major influx of Muslim refugees from Russia, and the Balkan region, many arriving with their own tales of atrocities, loss of life and property.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 156-7.

<sup>28</sup> The National Archives (henceforth TNA) TNA FO 424/178, Memorandum by the Revd. Dr Hamil, Robert College, 25 December 1893; published as Cyrus Hamlin, ‘A Dangerous Movement Among the Armenians’, *The Congregationalist*, (28 December 1897).

<sup>29</sup> See Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, 178.



### *Armenian Massacres*

The 1890s were a particularly troubled decade for the Armenians and, between 1894 and 1896, the attention of the foreign press and public was directed to eastern Anatolia. While news of massacres was soon alarming British opinion there was little concerted effort by either the European Powers or Russia to influence the Sultan. For the Duke of Argyll here was another example of the British government abandoning the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire to an ‘incurably barbarous and corrupt government.’<sup>30</sup>

The first major massacre occurred at Sasun in the Bitlis *vilayet*, by the Kurds following the refusal of the Armenian villagers to pay a ‘tribute’ or protection money. According to Shaw and Shaw, the refusal to pay this ‘tax’ was instigated by the Hunchaks who fled into the mountains before the arrival of the irregular Kurdish *Hamidiye* and Turkish army.<sup>31</sup> The resultant publicity led to the establishment of a European commission of inquiry, which insisted upon new reforms in favour of the Armenians. In October 1895, in response to foreign pressure the Sultan put forward his own reforms, which were only partly based upon the European submission, but as far as the liberal internationalists were concerned they were little more than ‘paper reforms.’

While the British government pursued an apparently pro-Ottoman policy, the liberal internationalists viewed with disdain any action, which prolonged the Ottoman Empire at the expense of its non-Moslem subjects. Despite its complexity, many shared Bryce’s 1905 assesment that the essence of the Eastern Question was:

[That] encamped in Eastern Europe and Western Asia [is] a band of raiders, miscalled a government, who have done nothing since they came out of Central Asia but rob and murder the unhappy peoples they have conquered, and who have unfortunately been treated by the European States as if they were a civilised Power.<sup>32</sup>

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30 Argyll, *Our Responsibilities for Turkey*, 78.

31 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 204.

32 *The Right Hon. James Bryce on the Near Eastern Question*, (London: 1912), Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 7, 1.



Such anti-Ottoman feelings were evident in many of those arguing for liberation of the Macedonians, who claimed ‘the gravest evil of Turkish misrule is not massacre; it is daily cruelty and demoralisation.’<sup>33</sup>

While the Eastern Question and actions of the last quarter of the nineteenth century were to prove essential to the new liberal internationalist’s conceptualisation of international relations, so too were events much closer to home. At the end of the nineteenth century, interest was focussed upon the establishment of the international Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Initiated by Tsar Nicholas II as a means to limit the build-up of armaments, they had greater success with the creation of a permanent international court of arbitration. The response of the indomitable W. T. Stead was to initiate an International Crusade of Peace: a three-month campaign of meetings around the country culminating in a National Convention in London on 21 March 1899.<sup>34</sup> It was at Stead’s Middlesbrough meeting on 10 March that Aneurin Williams spoke in support of international conciliation and arbitration, and the institutional approach of liberal internationalism.<sup>35</sup>

While the focus was on the potential of The Hague Conference and the International Court of Arbitration, Britain’s imperialistic policies were on a collision course with the independently minded Boer Republics in southern Africa. The following chapters adopt a chronological approach to liberal internationalism as it developed during the early twentieth century.

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33 *Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for 1903 and 1904*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1904), 7.

34 See Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 151-3.

35 Diary, 10 March 1899, AWP AW/1/4; ‘Peace Crusade’, *Northern Echo*, 11 March 1899.



## 5

### **Friends of Conciliation and the South African War, 1899-1902**

The outbreak of hostilities in October 1899, whilst not totally unexpected, was viewed with despair by certain sections of the Liberal Party, and in particular its Radical element. This second South African War would drag on for two and a half years and see the re-emergence of rampant jingoism not evident since the late-1870s. Importantly, it also provided a significant stimulus for liberal internationalist ideas; in particular, the critique of capitalist-inspired imperialism, and the defence of the principle of national self-determination, and the moral arguments based upon obligations to relieve human suffering. From our perspective, however, it is striking how little attention was paid to the welfare and political future of the black South Africans.

Like the earlier Transvaal War of Independence, the liberal internationalists identified the South African War's origin with the desire of capitalists to exploit the mineral resources and Britain's imperialistic policies. The original Dutch settlers were pastoral farmers (Boers) who underwent the Great Trek northwards as British control of the region increased. Despite being awarded self-government, the Boers had seen the annexation of their territory following the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870. The regional balance of power was again under threat when extensive gold fields on the Witwatersrand were discovered in 1886. The predominance of non-Boer mine owners and the large numbers of immigrant workers, 'Uitlanders,' or outlanders was perceived as a threat to the Boer way of life. This resulted in the introduction of a 14-year suffrage residency rule, which provoked Uitlander demands for their rights and Rhodes, Premier of the



Cape Colony, to champion their cause. The infamous Jameson Raid of December 1895 resulted in the failed incursion into the Transvaal and the strengthening of President Kruger's position.

On the pretext of Uitlanders' demands and infringement of suzerainty, talks were held between British and Transvaal representatives. The Boer ultimatum for a reversal of the British troop build up along the Transvaal border was rejected. Consequently, on the 11 October 1899, the Boers declared war and the following day invaded the Cape Colony, laid siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, and inflicted several defeats upon the British forces.

The SACC grew from the initial idea of Frederic Mackarness, Percy Molteno, and Frederic Phillipson Stow during the summer of 1899.<sup>1</sup> Together they had identified the need for publications to correct the erroneous statements regularly appearing in the press. The major achievement of this trio was the organisation of a private meeting at the Westminster Palace Hotel on 1 November 1899, at which the SACC was formed. Mackarness became its Chairman, following Leonard Courtney's reluctance to accept. However, on 18 December, Courtney was persuaded to become President, with the hunter and explorer Frederick Selous as vice-president.<sup>2</sup> Courtney, despite being a Liberal Unionist, was in most respects like many of the pro-Boers, a Gladstonian Liberal.<sup>3</sup> As Richard Price has observed, for many Liberals the SACC acted as a 'spiritual home [...] based [as it was] on the twin pillars of legality and morality.'<sup>4</sup> For Courtney, Britain had no moral right to fight and by doing so it would be committing 'an atrocious crime', and 'that [such a] war would be unjustifiable [and] unjustifiable war is a crime.'<sup>5</sup> *The Times*

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1 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

2 'The Work of the South Africa Conciliation Committee', JJC, Box 5: South African War ; G. P. Gooch, *Life of Lord Courtney* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 393.

3 He disagreed with Gladstone over Home Rule for Ireland, but supported the Liberal Party in nearly everything else, especially as the Liberal Unionists moved closer to the Conservative Party. He was later to resign and rejoin the Liberal Party, and in the 1906 General Election stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate at Edinburgh West.

4 Price, *An Imperial War*, 17.

5 Leonard Courtney to John Morley, 1 September 1899, British Library of Political and Economic Science (henceforth BLPES) Courtney Papers, Vol. VIII; Draft Manifesto concerning the South African War, Courtney Papers, Vol. XVI.



described the objects of the SACC as ‘innocent and even laudable,’ and reported it was looking forward to receiving ‘the promised accurate intelligence.’<sup>6</sup>

The other pro-Boer organisation under consideration, the LLAAM was closely tied to the Liberal Party. It emerged from a private conference of Liberals on Foreign and Colonial Policy, held at the Westminster Palace Hotel on 14 February 1900. The audience of over 200 listened to the assembled anti-imperialist Liberal MPs who included David Lloyd George, C. P. Scott, F. A. Channing, Sir William B. Gurdon, Sir Wilfred Lawson, and Fred Maddison. The resolutions passed at this meeting were widely reported in the press: namely, the denunciation of the war, disbelief in a conspiracy against Britain, opposition to increases in spending on armaments at the expense of social reform at home, a faith in Gladstone’s policy of courtesy and conciliation, and confidence in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s leadership.<sup>7</sup> The final resolution called for the establishment of an ‘organisation to enforce by means of vigorous political propaganda’ the resolutions passed by the meeting.

The political nature of the ensuing body can be seen in its first object, namely ‘to press forward in the councils of the Liberal Party the policy of peace, retrenchment, and reform.’<sup>8</sup> The first meeting of the new organisation took place on 26 February in the House of Commons, where Herbert Gladstone objected to their desire to name themselves ‘The Gladstone League.’<sup>9</sup> The remainder of the meeting was devoted to finding an acceptable alternative, Lloyd George’s main input being the suggestion of ‘League of Liberals’, to which the ‘Against Aggression and Militarism’ was appended in favour of the more suggestive ‘Against Aggressive Imperialism.’

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6 *The Times*, 17 Jan. 1900.

7 These included the *Daily Graphic*, *Bristol Mercury*, *Standard*, *Morning Herald*, and *Manchester Guardian*.

8 *The First Annual Report on the Work of The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism*, (London: The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1901), 4.

9 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, AMSP MS Gen 1465/69, fl.



### Anti-war attitudes and the pro-Boers

The British press and government ministers soon denounced anyone willing to speak publicly against the handling of the situation in Southern Africa, as being supporters of the Boer Republics and hence derogatorily called 'pro-Boer.' The anti-war protesters actively embraced the abusive term, much the same as members of the Society of Friends had two centuries earlier taken on the offensive label 'Quakers.' In a speech at Arbroath, just one month before the declaration of war, the veteran Liberal MP, John Morley claimed:

They will tell you to-morrow morning that I am pro-Boer [...] I do not believe there can be greater differences in temperament, in pursuits, in tastes, in beliefs than there are between the Boers and the very humble individual who is now addressing you.<sup>10</sup>

The war was a pivotal point; while the Peace Society and International Arbitration and Peace Association participated in the pro-Boer campaigns, it was the new single-issue groups, the LLAAM and SACC, which led the agenda. Bernard Porter characterised the pro-Boers as a 'tiny eccentric minority,' but this is a facile judgement.<sup>11</sup> Amongst their ranks were to be found many Liberals and much of the Labour movement, all of whom were vehemently opposed to both the war and the official interpretation of events. Nor was opposition confined to just the Liberals and Labour movement: amongst the leading anti-war campaigners were the Liberal Unionist Leonard Courtney, President of the SACC, and Conservative Sir Edward Clarke who as an experienced barrister had defended Dr Jameson following the unsuccessful Raid of 1895.<sup>12</sup> However, any Unionist or Conservative MPs who dared to speak out tended to find themselves deselected by their constituencies in the October 1900 'Khaki' General Election.

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10 'Mr Morley on the Transvaal Crises', *The Times*, 6 September 1899.

11 Bernard Porter, 'The pro-Boers in Britain', in *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902*, ed. by Peter Warwick, (Harlow: Longman, 1980), 239-257 & 239.

12 See Walker-Smith and Clarke, *The Life of Sir Edward Clarke*, 256-274.



According to Donal Lowry, many of those regarded as pro-Boer were in fact pacifist or humanitarian, and projected a romantic notion of the Boers.<sup>13</sup> While the pejorative use of the term ‘pro-Boer’ was intended to suggest they desired a Boer victory, I would argue the liberal internationalist element were neither true pacifists nor deluded romantics. The reality was that they viewed the Transvaal government as ‘an unjust and corrupt oligarchy’ that had been forced to act by the conduct of the British government.<sup>14</sup> Certainly, both the SACC and LLAAM were *pacifist* and deplored the negative impact of imperialism upon Britain. The Boers’ historical triumphs over adversity made it easier to romanticise their public image. Even staunchly imperialistic individuals such as Dr Arthur Conan Doyle were not immune as his *The Great Boer War* clearly illustrates.<sup>15</sup>

### *Pro-Boers and liberal internationalist arguments*

Doyle’s history of the Boer War, was first published in 1900, and subsequently revised until appearing in its final form in 1903. Of greater impact was his staunchly patriotic pamphlet on the causes and conduct of the war, published in January 1902. It went on to be translated into several languages and served to promote the British case worldwide. The propaganda aspect of this cheap paperback was not lost upon the SACC, who encouraged Williams to prepare a detailed reply to its numerous ‘misstatement[s] and faulty arguments.’<sup>16</sup> Although never completed before the end the war, Williams’ self styled ‘anti-Doyle’ manuscripts were prepared in consultation with jurists and those with first-hand knowledge of conditions in South Africa, including Emily Hobhouse, and Hobson. This collaborative aspect together with Williams’ new found international zeal confers upon the manuscript increased significance, by providing a perspective on liberal internationalism during a formative period.<sup>17</sup>

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13 Donal Lowry, ‘The Boers were the beginning of the end’?: The Wider Impact of the South African War’, in *The South African War Reappraised*, ed. by Donal Lowry, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 208-9.

14 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, *Somerset County Express*, 2 February 1901.

15 Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Great Boer War*, Final edn (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1903), 11.

16 Diary, 11 February 1902, AWP, AW/1/5; Aneurin Williams, ‘Anti-Doyle’ MSS, Part 1: Preface, AWP, AW/3/2/5 fl.

17 The ‘anti-Doyle’ manuscripts were prepared while both Doyle and Williams lived at Hindhead in Surrey, their homes a mere 600 metres apart.



Williams and the pro-Boer liberal internationalists were not against Empire *per se*, but viewed unfavourably the direction of the new imperialism being pursued by the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury's Conservative government. They viewed the government policy as a betrayal of liberty, which had detrimental effects upon British politics. They believed that the war had been forced upon the Boers by the British government, which in turn had been manipulated by the capitalists eager to gain control of the gold mines. However, the liberal internationalists had to accept certain inconvenient truths. Firstly, it was the Boers who delivered the ultimatum that led to the declaration of war, and secondly, the speed of their invasion of neighbouring British colonies revealed them to be well prepared. Despite this Britain was not an innocent party; its aggressive diplomacy handled by Chamberlain and Milner and the build-up of troops had ultimately forced the Boers' hand. The liberal internationalists also expressed concern over what they viewed as the corrupt financial motives of Rhodes and his fellow British South Africa Company directors. They derided the government's claim that they were seeking to achieve better political rights for the Uitlanders, as the Boers had met nearly all the British demands and those still outstanding could surely have been settled amicably. Conciliation, the liberal internationalists argued, was the only satisfactory way to solve the problem.

In his assessment of British policy in South Africa, Aneurin Williams concluded its ultimate aim was to grind 'the Boer peoples to powder until the remnant submits to whatever terms we choose to impose.'<sup>18</sup> He believed, like most pro-Boers, that the Boers had acted out of fear that Britain, under the pretext of Uitlander grievances, was primarily interested in seizing the gold mines, in much the same way as the Kimberly diamond mines had been seized nearly two decades earlier. As a result, the Boers actions were undertaken in the 'cause of justice and freedom.'<sup>19</sup>

Both the SACC and the LLAAM were overtly anti-imperialist, the latter were particularly scathing of Liberals such as Asquith and the 'Rosebery clique', who according to Fred

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18 'Anti-Doyle' MS Preface, AWP, AW/3/2/3 f1.

19 'Anti-Doyle' MS Chapter III, AWP, AW/3/2/11, f26.



Maddison were stopping the Liberal Party from following the 'right path'.<sup>20</sup> The response to the formation of the LLAAM, at the end of February 1900, was the emergence of the Imperial Liberal Council. Its first public meeting took place in April 1900 with the backbench Liberal Imperialist MP Robert Perks in the chair.<sup>21</sup> Their intention was to promote the traditional principles of Liberalism 'and, at the same time, cherish the larger patriotism which is now called Imperialism.'<sup>22</sup> However, the leading Liberal Imperialists, such as Grey and Rosebery did not associate with this organisation until the middle of 1901.<sup>23</sup> Only with the election of Grey and Asquith as President and Vice-President in October and November 1901, did control of the organisation effectively pass to the Liberal Imperialist MPs.

### *Annexation*

The annexing of foreign territory was readily associated with the aristocratic and capitalistic influence upon British foreign policy. Hobson deduced from his analysis of domestic under-consumption that capitalists sought ever more lucrative returns from their investments abroad. Typically, the unpredictable political situation in these countries eventually required the manipulation of the British government in order to guarantee the security of their investments. Such a situation had arisen twice in the Transvaal, and for Williams an unsympathetic British government and its subsequent 'breach of faith' had brought about the Transvaal War of Independence.<sup>24</sup> This was again an issue in the current South African War due to Chamberlain's use of the Suzerainty issue. Further, Williams believed that the policy of annexation was ensuring the war's prolongation, as it forced the Boers to consider they needed to fight to the bitter end.<sup>25</sup>

In February 1901, Williams publicly outlined his thinking. To him both sides had a shared responsibility and he proposed what he believed to be a solution, which would enshrine

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20 *The Morning Herald*, 15 Feb. 1900.

21 *The Times*, 11 April 1900.

22 *The Times*, 6 July 1900.

23 Price, *An Imperial War*, 39.

24 'Anti-Doyle' MS chapter V, AWP AW/3/2/26, f1-2.

25 'Anti-Doyle' MS chapter VII: *The Concentration Camps*, AWP, AW/3/2/34, f2.



the ‘great principles of liberty and justice.’<sup>26</sup> The Boers should, he argued have sufficient arms to ‘defend themselves against hostile natives’, but he accepted British responsibility for foreign affairs and defence from outside aggression. Eleven months later, he sought clarification from the Liberal leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman on recent reports that he regarded annexation as being inevitable. For Williams, annexation was the ‘reduction of the former [Boer] republics to the status of ordinary British Colonies.’<sup>27</sup> Such a course he viewed as being unjust, but also dangerous to the British Empire. However, he did not believe it possible, let alone desirable, to reinstate the Boer oligarchy. Instead, he proposed that the Boer Republics be established as ‘protected states, without power to erect forts or keep artillery, but with complete internal autonomy subject to equal rights for all civilised inhabitants.’<sup>28</sup> Foreign relations would remain the prerogative of the British government. The reference to ‘civilised’ was a problematic issue, with the black Africans being excluded.

In response, Campbell-Bannerman admitted that ‘annexation’ was not a word he would care to use, but preferred to talk of ‘incorporation’ with the qualification, ‘under one consideration or another.’<sup>29</sup> He explained that he could not envisage the republics being granted a form of ‘independence’ that was governed by a Convention, as this would ultimately result in the resurrection of the ‘old intrigues.’ Instead, he confided that he preferred ‘a Colony (with full domestic powers) to the Protected State, which has the air of a temporary arrangement’. In addition the Boers should be given ‘all that constitutes identity – flag, name, &c.’ Williams could not see such an arrangement coming about as ‘I fear the Boers will consider that the distinction between a ‘nation’ under British protection with however limited powers, and a ‘Colony’ with a governor appointed from London, is vital, in spite of self-government. I wish they were otherwise minded.’<sup>30</sup> For the liberal internationalists the issue of self-determination would resurface on a regular basis.

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26 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, *Somerset County Express*, 2 February 1901.

27 Aneurin Williams to Campbell Bannerman, 13 December 1901, British Library: Campbell Bannerman Papers, MS Add. 41236 f241-2.

28 Ibid.

29 Campbell-Bannerman to Aneurin Williams, 18 December 1901, AWP, AW3/2/41.

30 Aneurin Williams to Campbell-Bannerman (copy), 26 December 1901, AWP, AW/3/2/41.



In March 1900, Lord Roberts initiated the systematic destruction of the crops and homes of guerrillas fighting in the bush. Lord Kitchener extended this practice when he succeeded as commander-in-chief in December. The policy was condemned as dishonourable and contrary to the Hague Convention, which forbade attacks on undefended property. For John M. Robertson, the policy of annexation was at the root of the escalating violence; it had forced the Boers to adopt the guerrilla tactics, and ultimately led to the utter devastation of the Boer territories.<sup>31</sup>

The major consequence of this was the forced removal of the civilian population, into 'concentration camps.' The first camps were formed in September 1900 for surrendering burghers and their families, who would be housed and fed by the British Army. Kitchener made it official policy that those displaced by the farm-burning policy would be housed in the camps. With the increase in numbers and the Army's inability to care for the inhabitants, problems arose with food, fuel and general well-being. The Boer prisoners were widely dispersed, as well as camps within South Africa many found their way to the islands of Bermuda, St Helena and Ceylon.<sup>32</sup>

### *Capitalist inspired conspiracy*

The conspiracy behind the Jameson Raid was still fresh in many minds, and had a significant bearing upon attitudes to the war. Writing in the *Labour Leader* in January 1900, Keir Hardie observed that the 'war is a capitalists' war, begotten by capitalists' money, lied into being by a perjured mercenary capitalist press, and fathered by unscrupulous politicians, themselves the merest tools of the capitalists.'<sup>33</sup> Hobson, made a similar observation following his time reporting from South Africa at the beginning of the war. As far as he was concerned the war was being fought 'in order to place a small international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in power at Pretoria [...] most of

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31 John M. Robertson, *The Truth about the War: An Open Letter to Dr. Arthur A. Conan Doyle* (London: The New Age Press, 1902), 38.

32 Further details on the transported Boer prisoners, see C Benbow, *Boer Prisoners of War in Bermuda*, 3rd edn (Hamilton, Bermuda: Bermuda Historical Society, 1994); S. A. Royle, 'St Helena as a Boer Prisoner of War Camp, 1900-2: Information from the Alice Stopford Green Papers', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 24, no. 1 (1998), 53-68.

33 J. Keir Hardie, 'A Capitalist's War', *The Labour Leader*, 6 January 1900, in *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement*, ed. by Koss, 54.



whom are foreigners by origin, whose trade is finance, and whose trade interests are not chiefly British.’<sup>34</sup> The role of outside interests and foreign financiers were at the heart of many of the anti-imperialist critiques, which often adopted an anti-Semitic tone. In the weeks leading up to the Boer ultimatum Hobson described Johannesburg as outwardly British on first appearance but essentially a Jewish town, where the ‘rich, rigorous, and energetic financial and commercial families are chiefly English Jews, not a few of whom here, as elsewhere, have Anglicised their names after true parasitic fashion.’<sup>35</sup> He was not alone in stressing malign Jewish influence: the socialist Edward Carpenter described how since the finding of gold in the Transvaal, Johannesburg had become ‘a hell full of Jews, financiers, greedy speculators, adventurers, prostitutes, bars, banks, gaming saloons, and every invention of the devil.’<sup>36</sup> Similarly Liberal MP John Burns in a debate over the British Army in Africa claimed it had ‘become the janissary of the Jews’.<sup>37</sup> These negative portrayals highlighted a contrasting portrait of the Boers as honest and hardworking. In defending his reasoning for blaming the Jewish financiers for the outbreak of the war, Hobson countered, ‘that it is not possible rightly to comprehend the methods employed, unless the race-basis [...] is understood to be a fact.’<sup>38</sup> Lloyd George too demonstrated a venomous prejudice against Jewry, as his condemnation of the Uitlander, who he viewed as predominantly German Jews clearly demonstrated.<sup>39</sup>

In his lecture to the South Place Ethical Society, in 1886, J. M. Robertson had criticised British imperialism as ‘the practice of international burglary.’ In *Patriotism and Empire*, published just before the outbreak of the war, Robertson clearly identified the driving force behind imperialism as ‘the passion for nation and race’, which strengthened the power exerted by the aristocracy and military. Nevertheless, he also accused capitalists of manipulating the situation. Those benefiting from imperialism were ‘the speculative trading class, the speculative capitalist class, the military and naval services, the industrial

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34 J. A. Hobson, *The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects* (London: James Nisbet & Co, 1900), 197.

35 ‘Johannesburg Today’, *Manchester Guardian*, 28 September 1899.

36 Edward Carpenter, ‘Boer or Briton’, 1 Jan. 1900, in *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement*, ed. by Koss, 55.

37 *Hansard*, (4<sup>th</sup> Series) LXXVIII, 6 February 1900, col. 795-7.

38 J. A. Hobson, ‘The Last Chance for a Liberal Party’, *The New Age*, 9 Jan. 1902, 25.

39 See John Grigg, *The Young Lloyd George* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), 260.



class which supplies war material, and generally those who look to an imperial civil service as a means of employment for themselves and their kin.’<sup>40</sup> G. H. Perris tapped into an anti-aristocratic theme by describing the British Empire as ‘a dumping ground for the greedy plutocrats, the decrepit aristocracy, the parasitic official and military classes who feel their supremacy in British life gradually slipping away.’<sup>41</sup>

### *Imperialism and social reform*

The soldiers were not the only casualties of the war; non-combatant Boers suffered and, as Aneurin Williams observed, the war resulted in the ‘squandering of millions which are so sorely needed for the elevation of our own people.’<sup>42</sup> As Peter Clarke and Michael Freeden have demonstrated this was the main criticism ‘New Liberals’ levelled against Britain’s imperial policies.<sup>43</sup> Imperialism then was the enemy of social reform as it diverted investment into speculative foreign ventures and away from the important social issues of the day. An imperialist war was a threat to the alleviation of the ills of late Victorian Britain.

The *Westminster Gazette* illustrated this dichotomy with Joseph Chamberlain affixing a poster of a British soldier over an older poster promising social reform. His remark being: ‘What a relief to get rid of all those old Social Programme promises!’ (Figure 5.1). In their public deliberations over how the new imperialism could possibly bring any direct benefits to Britain, the liberal internationalists questioned why the public were so keen to support it. The answer clearly lay with the capitalist conspiracy and the jingoistic fervour it was able to command.

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40 John M. Robertson, *Patriotism and Empire* (London: Grant Richards, 1899), 187.

41 G. H. Perris, *Blood and Gold in South Africa: An Answer to Dr. Conan Doyle: Being an Examination of his account of the “Cause and Conduct” of the South-African War* (London: International Arbitration Association, 1902).


42 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, *Somerset County Express*, 2 February 1901.

43 For further details on the policies of ‘new liberalism’ see Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats*; and Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).



# PASTING OVER THE OLD PROMISES.

*The "Ordinary Strategy" of the Tories.*



(From the "Westminster Gazette".)

BILLSTICKER CHAMBERLAIN: What a relief to get rid of all those old Social Programme promises!

Mr. Chamberlain, when he was a Liberal, once said, that the "ordinary strategy" of the Tories was to "distract" the people's "attention from Home Affairs to the complications of Foreign Policy."

That is exactly what this Tory Government is doing now when it urges the Electors to "Vote Khaki."

Don't be duped by this attempt to use Lord Roberts's skill and Tommy Atkins's valour to cover up all the Tory failure to redeem their Election Promises.

Published by the Liberal Publication Department (in accordance with the National Liberal Federation) at 1, The Liberal Centre, Abchurch Lane, London, E.C. 4. Printed by the National Press Agency, Limited, 1, Abchurch Lane, London, E.C. 4.

January No. 1837 1

4600.

Price 5s. per 1,000.

**Figure 5.1: Imperialism and the social reform programme**



This point was evident to Hobson who characterised imperialism as the enemy of social reform and the ‘forcible conquest and control of foreign peoples.’<sup>44</sup> While the Empire continued to expand, imperialism together with militarism would absorb all time, energy and finance. In a true ‘Cobdenite’ spirit, imperialism was seen as threatening economic wellbeing by diverting investment into speculative foreign ventures and de-stabilising ‘retrenched’ public finances since it required higher taxation to fund adventures abroad. Moreover, imperialism was linked with neo-mercantilism and the abandonment of free trade.<sup>45</sup> These attacks upon imperialism revealed the continuing salience of classical liberal economic thought as well as demonstrating the moral tone of liberal internationalism at this time. This was in part a continuation of the ‘little Englandism’ tradition whereby the establishment of colonies and empires was seen as serving to promote international rivalries and ultimately war. This was a departure from the liberal internationalism of John Stuart Mill for whom the expansion of the colonial empire denoted the spread of representative government and free trade. For Mill the ‘colonies’ referred principally to colonies of white settlement.

The pro-Boers showed contempt for the profiteering nature of British imperialism, which corrupted the unwary. To compensate, some pro-Boer industrialists, such as George Cadbury who were compelled to supply the British army, soothed their consciences by refusing to make a profit on such orders.<sup>46</sup>

### **‘The mind of the nation’**

So long as patriotism and imperialism were firmly linked in the public mind the acceptance of the pro-Boers’ ideas could make little progress. They struggled to get their message heard, with many of their main meetings being broken-up by riotous crowds who were fired by the jingoistic press and a surfeit of drink. The organisers and speakers were

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44 Long, *Towards a new liberal internationalism*, 73.

45 For the liberal internationalists no one better embodied this than Joseph Chamberlain, especially in his advocacy of tariff reform.

46 See A. Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 35.



frequently targeted by the mob, suffering blows to both body and property, while the police looked helplessly on, and the government weakly censured the rioters. However, as the war progressed and the British army resorted to farm burnings and the use of concentration camps, the British public gradually became more receptive to their ideas.

### *Jingoism*

Aneurin Williams expressed the liberal internationalists' view, when he observed that 'our government and people have been greatly to blame, and have acted clumsily, rashly, and in a spirit of Jingoism.'<sup>47</sup> Jingoism was a symptom of the direction in which nationalism within Britain was being steered. As Mark Hampton has observed the most effective way for an imperialist government to deflect unwanted criticism was to unite feeling of patriotism with 'its sinister cousin, jingoism'<sup>48</sup>

Through this 'perversion' of patriotism it was possible for the British government and its supporters to attack their detractors, by invariably portraying them as unpatriotic eccentrics and accusing them of actively supporting President Kruger and the Boers. In an attempt to placate his detractors the publisher and anti-war novelist A. M. S. Methuen described a meeting organised by the Haslemere pro-Boer community, as 'being held in the interests of peace in South Africa, and it was, in the proper sense of the much-abused word, a patriotic meeting.'<sup>49</sup> Jingoism was of course not a new phenomenon, as Hugh Cunningham's study of the period 1877 to 1878 illustrates, however, it was now more prevalent and prone to violence.<sup>50</sup>

During the war jingoism became more apparent, particularly in relation to the Mafeking and Ladysmith celebrations. In London, celebrations over the relief of Mafeking started on 18 May and soon the streets were 'draped in red, white and blue from the bus horse to the less intelligent ass that rides behind him.'<sup>51</sup> This according to Paula Krebs helped

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47 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, *Somerset County Express*, 2 February 1901.

48 Mark Hampton, 'The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C. P. Scott, *The Manchester Guardian*, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', *The Historical Journal*, 44, no. 1 (2001) 178.

49 *The Surrey Times*, 25 May 1901.

50 Cunningham, 'Jingoism', 429-453.

51 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, National Library of Wales: William George Papers (henceforth WGP), 945.



to blur the distinction between working-class jingoism and middle-class patriotism.<sup>52</sup> Lloyd George on arrival at his Solicitors office found his clerks swept up with the national rejoicing and released them to join in with the 'crowds parading the streets shouting and bellowing'.<sup>53</sup> He observed that, had the Boers succeeded, these same people would be demanding a 'war of revenge' and pro-Boers 'would have been clawed to pieces'.<sup>54</sup> The day to day reporting of military operations had excited enormous public interest; nevertheless, the celebrations throughout Britain were spontaneous events. The allegation they were 'got-up' by the press does not bear scrutiny. For Emily Hobhouse the resultant hysteria was 'most alarming', while Lloyd George saw it as indicative of the 'sick society' Britain had become.<sup>55</sup> Despite this, the pro-Boers struggled against the jingoistic tide of opinion and certainly in the first year were as Brian Porter reminds us, 'out-shouted' and out-numbered.<sup>56</sup>

### *The Press*

In the *Psychology of Jingoism* (1901) Hobson identified the press as being one means by which 'the mind of the nation' was manipulated to accept the justice and necessity of the war.<sup>57</sup> In doing so it was able to fuel the jingoistic passions and generate a mob mentality within the British public. Emily Hobhouse, who in 1901 raised public awareness of the situation in the concentration camps, observed 'truth and reason were obscured' by the press, which 'excelled itself in virulence and inaccuracy'.<sup>58</sup>

Pro-Boers viewed the South African press as being in the control of the capitalists who had bought it up following the failed Jameson Raid.<sup>59</sup> This was particularly important as prior to the outbreak of hostilities nearly all the news from southern Africa was supplied by these papers. Concern over the influence of an imperialistically-inclined press led to

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52 Paula M Krebs, *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2.

53 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, WGP, 945.

54 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, WGP, 945.

55 Quoted in *Emily Hobhouse - The Boer War Letters*, ed. by Rykie Van Reenen, (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1984), 15; see also Kenneth O. Morgan, 'Lloyd George, Keir Hardie and the Importance of the 'pro-Boers'', *South African Historical Journal*, 41 (Nov. 1999), 296.

56 Porter, 'The pro-Boers in Britain', 239.

57 Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism*, 107-109.

58 *Emily Hobhouse - The Boer War Letters*, ed. by Reenen, 16 & 21.

59 See Hobson, *The War in South Africa*, 206-28; 'Anti-Doyle' MS Chapter IV, AWP, AW/3/2/17, f4.



the Quaker chocolate manufacturers, Joseph Rowntree and George Cadbury, becoming newspaper proprietors. Both men had been associated with the pro-Boer movement from its earliest days and were supporters of the LLAAM and SACC. Cadbury's financial involvement with the *Daily News* enabled it to return to its peace movement roots, under the editorship of H. W. Massingham.<sup>60</sup> Rowntree's involvement came after the war with his newly created trusts to acquire interests in the *Northern Echo*, *The Nation* and the London-based *Morning Leader* and the *Star*.<sup>61</sup>

### *Propaganda*

While much of the propaganda produced during the war was primarily of a political nature, research by Andrew Thompson has identified two other forms, namely, commercial and philanthropic.<sup>62</sup> The latter was primarily concerned with fund-raising activities, for the benefit of soldiers and their families, or to relieve the suffering of the Uitlanders. The amount raised by Boer orientated funds such as the Women and Children's Distress Fund was just over two percent of that raised by the Lord Mayor's Mansion House Fund on behalf of the Uitlanders; thereby demonstrating the difficulty of capturing the financial hearts of the populace.<sup>63</sup> However, the political publications operated on several fronts, for recruitment purposes, as a justification of the war, and to boost public morale. In doing so, they needed to refute the claims made by the pro-Boers, and also to persuade the British public that the war was over the rights of the Uitlanders, many of whom were British subjects. The pro-war publicity also projected President Kruger and his fellow countrymen as the villains and the prime culprits in the war.

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60 For further details of George Cadbury's concern and actions during the South African War, see A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of George Cadbury* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1923); Hope Hay Hewison, *Hedge of Wild Almonds: South Africa, the Pro-Boers and the Quaker Conscience, 1890-1910* (Portsmouth, N. H.: Heineman, 1989) esp. ch. 8; for details of the role of Cadbury's and the controversy over colonial cocoa see Iolo Aneurin Williams, *The Firm of Cadbury* (London: Constable & Co, 1931) ch 8 (Iolo was Aneurin Williams' son, and a close friend of the Cadbury family through his father's business interests).

61 For further details on Rowntree's concern and actions during the South African War, see M. Higham, 'Rowntree, Joseph (1836-1925)', in *Dictionary of Business Biography: a biographical dictionary of business leaders active in Britain in the period 1860-1980*, ed. by David J. Jeremy, (London: Butterworths), 4, 965-972; D. Rubinstein, *Faithful to Ourselves and the Outside World: York Quakers in the Twentieth Century* (York: William Sessions, 2001).

62 Andrew Thompson, 'Publicity, Philanthropy and Commemoration: British Society and the War', in *The Impact of the South African War*, ed. by David Omissi and Andrew Thompson, vols (Basingstove: Palgrave, 2002), 99-123, & 100-103.

63 Ibid., 112.



### *Public Meetings*

The jingoistic attitude of the British public was most evident when prominent pro-Boers attended public meetings. The riot following Lloyd George's widely-advertised meeting at Birmingham in December 1901, adequately illustrates reaction to their message. Birmingham was a predominantly Conservative and Unionist stronghold, however the local Liberal Association felt the omens were good following the recent Municipal elections where they succeeded in holding onto five of their six contested seats, and importantly had gained another from the Unionists.<sup>64</sup> As with many pro-Boer ticket-only events, it was subjected to infiltration through the circulation of forged tickets and public calls for a crowd to denounce the 'Brum Boers.' The resultant riot produced twenty-seven casualties and two fatalities following a baton charge by police. The role of the Conservative *Birmingham Daily Mail* in feeding the jingo mentality included regular pronouncements against the 'unpatriotic' Lloyd George and the local Liberal Association, countenance of forged tickets and spreading of false rumours.<sup>65</sup> The local press squarely laid the blame against the Liberals who had 'deliberately defied the warnings given and courted the disaster they experienced'.<sup>66</sup> William Finnemore on behalf of the Association stated that they did 'not believe that any unbiased person will consider us responsible for the disturbance, which we did all in our power to avert' and that to cancel the meeting would have been against 'the inalienable right of Englishmen to free speech.'

This was not an isolated occurrence as Lloyd George's meeting in Liverpool in November 1900 also met with violence. The local press were again hostile to his meeting and actively courted mob action with statements like 'the riot that would follow would be worth seeing.'<sup>67</sup> Lloyd George was not alone in being targeted and another ill-fated speaker was Samuel Cronwright-Schreiner, a British subject who was a resident of South Africa, and husband of the writer Olive Schreiner. In the late 1890s she had contributed a

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64 Of the 84 Birmingham City councillors only 19 were Liberals.

65 See Price, *An Imperial War*, 141-2 and M D Blanch, 'British Society and the War', in *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902*, ed. by Peter Warwick, (Harlow: Longman, 1980), 210-238.

66 *The Times*, 21 December 1901, 11.

67 Quoted in I. Sellers, 'The Pro-Boer Movement in Liverpool', 78.



series of articles to the *Fortnightly Review*, which encapsulated the pro-Boer attitudes.<sup>68</sup> Cronwright-Schreiner's arrival in England in January 1900 enabled him to accompany Hobson on a speaking tour; however, by the time of his return to South Africa at the end of July, the majority of his meetings had been subjected to violence or intimidation, with the result that only a handful actually took place. His arrival at Scarborough in early March led to riotous behaviour aimed primarily at property belonging to the Quaker Rowntree family, organisers of the private meeting. Aided by the police, Cronwright-Schreiner and Hobson were escorted to the train station in an attempt to escape the hostile crowd. Commenting in *The Speaker*, J. L. Hammond saw this and earlier instances of mob rule as examples 'of a besotted Imperialism [...and] are the inevitable psychological results of the treachery of the last few years.'<sup>69</sup> A common response was to hold meetings in secret, or with promotion being confined only to known sympathisers. Soon after the Scarborough debacle, Cronwright-Schreiner was invited to attend the Penistone Liberal Association by the local MP, Henry J. Wilson a founding member of the LLAAM. However, fearing adverse reactions the Association officers decided to keep his attendance secret from the membership until the start of the meeting.<sup>70</sup>

### *Branches*

The SACC was particularly successful in developing a presence beyond the metropolis. Of all its local branches, Liverpool was by far the largest. This branch had been formed at a meeting in January 1900 attended by just 11 men.<sup>71</sup> Its leaders were overwhelmingly members of the Unitarian church, and its membership included Sir John Brunner, former Liberal MP William Rathbone, and William Bowring, one of the financial backers behind the take-over of the *Daily News*. Although the leadership was predominantly middle-class, branches such as those in Liverpool were able to attract support from their working-class communities.

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68 W. B. Hancock, *Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 60.

69 *The Speaker*, 17 March 1900, 635-6.

70 The full report of the meeting was published and distributed by the various pro-Boer groups, see *The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement*, ed. by Koss. 121-126.

71 South Africa Conciliation Committee Liverpool Branch, Executive Committee Report, JJC, Box 5: South African War.



While R. A. Armstrong of Hope Street's Unitarian Church and Charles Aked of the Pembroke Place Baptist Chapel regularly preached from the pro-Boer gospel, the failure of the other churches and their religious ministers to speak out against the war was 'one of the saddest features of the deplorable state of public opinion.'<sup>72</sup> This observation was not confined to Liverpool for throughout mainland Britain only a minority of nonconformist ministers spoke out, the majority remained silent or favoured the government's policies in Southern Africa. This was in stark contrast to Ireland where the analogy between the Irish and South African questions ensured strong pro-Boer support within the nationalist communities.<sup>73</sup>

One local group that was certainly a predominantly middle-class body was the independent 'Friends of Conciliation' who resided in the area around Haslemere in Surrey.<sup>74</sup> The attraction of the 'heather-clad hilltops' and its relative wilderness within close proximity to London had led to the development of a 'hilltop' community of writers, novelists and intellectuals.<sup>75</sup> This area provided a microcosm of attitudes to the war in Southern Africa. Those drawn to the pro-Boer cause included the scholars Raynor Storr and Gilbert Murray, the Hon. Rollo Russell (Bertrand's uncle), the writer and publisher Algernon Methuen, as well as future Liberal MPs Joseph King and Aneurin Williams. The presence of these individuals may have influenced Montagu White, the Consul-General for the Boer Republics in Great Britain when he chose to settle in Haslemere soon after war was declared.<sup>76</sup> Another resident from South Africa was Frederic Philpson Stow, the diamond magnate and a founder of De Beers. Despite his close association with Cecil Rhodes, he rapidly became disillusioned with his methods and by 1898 had severed

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72 Ibid.

73 For a detailed study of Irish attitudes to South Africa see Donal McCracken, *The Irish Pro-Boers: 1877-1902* (Johannesburg: Perskor, 1989).

74 Diary entry, 18 January 1902. AWP AW/1/5.

75 Grant Allen, *The British Barbarians: a hill-top novel* (London: J Lane, 1895) p. xvii; The effect of the South African War on the local community is indicated in Flora Thompson, *Heatherley* (Headley Down: John Owen Smith, 1999), who as post office assistant at Grayshott provided the telegraphic service for Williams and the Hindhead community.

76 See W. R. Trotter, *The Hilltop Writers: a Victorian Colony among the Surrey Hills* (Headley Down, Hants: John Owen Smith, 2003), 218-9.



his connections.<sup>77</sup> The role of De Beers in the Jameson Raid particularly came as a shock and strengthened his view that the war was a capitalist conspiracy aided by Rhodes, Chamberlain and Milner: despite his background he identified himself as an opponent of ‘[British] race supremacy and the capitalists.’<sup>78</sup>

This close-knit community also contained imperialists, such as the influential Dr Arthur Conan Doyle, who was an enthusiastic supporter and vociferous defender of British policy during the war. Another was the author Bernard Hamilton, a ‘brash imperialist’ who soon after the outbreak of the war published a pretentious allegory demonstrating his desire to see Rhodes in charge of the war effort and the British Empire.<sup>79</sup>

While the pro-Boer community at Haslemere was fairly small in number, it was still able to attract several influential speakers to their meetings, including Hobson in May 1900, and J. X. Merriman the opposition leader in the Cape Parliament and Frederick Selous in April 1901. The arrival of friends and associates also served as rallying calls and opportunities to discuss the current situation: visitors to Williams’ home included George Bernard Shaw, John Morley, and George Holyoake. Other visitors locally included Canon Samuel Barnett of Toynbee Hall, who discovered:

A pleasant sense of freedom when one gets in such a company. The sense proves how one’s mind is occupied by the war even when one talks of other things and does the daily work. Last night therefore we glowed as we talked freely of our hopes.<sup>80</sup>

He was particularly intrigued by Methuen whom he found ‘Very interesting [...] He has more poetry than most pro-Boers, less of that intolerant and masterful principle which in

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77 For details of the pivotal role of Philipson Stow in De Beers and his subsequent opposition to Rhodes business and political methods see Rob Turrell, ‘Sir Frederic Philipson Stow: The Unknown Diamond Magnate’, *Business History*, xxviii, no. 1 (Jan. 1986), 62-79.

78 Quoted in *Ibid.* 76.

79 Trotter, *The Hilltop Writers*, 122-3.

80 Letter of 21 December 1901, Samuel Barnett to Frank ... , quoted in Henrietta Octavia Weston Barnett, *Canon Barnett : his life, work, and friends, by his wife*, 2 vols (London: John Murray, 1919), 2, 183.



good people is almost as ugly as a sword and a gun. The question is whether he has their grit.’<sup>81</sup> In 1901, Methuen published *Peace or War in South Africa*, which outlined the liberal internationalist concerns over the disastrous handling of the situation.

Meetings organised by the Haslemere pro-Boers were rarely reported in the local press. The only exception being the visit in May 1901 of the *Morning Leader*’s J. M. Robertson. In a detailed report and editorial, the *Surrey Times* welcomed the fact that at least in Haslemere they been permitted to express their views as to the origin and ‘inequality’ of the war ‘without the least molestation or serious attempt at interruption.’<sup>82</sup> Fears for a disorderly meeting were evidenced by the fact that a police Superintendent and a number of policemen were present outside the meeting hall. Their services were not required. The more imperialistic members of the audience disparagingly accused Robertson of merely repeating what they believed to be the unsubstantiated stories regularly appearing in the *Daily News*, *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Speaker*. Surprisingly, Bernard Hamilton declared to the meeting that he had come with an open mind, but went on to defend enthusiastically the government and accused Robertson of presenting an unconvincing pro-Boer speech. Some of the audience concurred with Hamilton. It was left to an American lady in the audience to remind them that the people in South Africa were also human beings, who like the Americans before them were fighting for their freedom. A claim readily recognised by many pro-Boers.<sup>83</sup>

Despite the jingoistic attitudes demonstrated in the large cities, very little opposition had been directed towards the Haslemere pro-Boers, the main exception being an episode of drunken bonfire night rowdyism directed against the house of Montagu White. On 5 November 1899, a mob of 30 to 40 assembled outside his house where they ‘hooted and howled’ and broke several windows.<sup>84</sup> The only other incident in the locality appears to have taken place at Midhurst just seven miles south of Haslemere. On 5 February 1900 ringleaders calling themselves ‘The Albions,’ led a crowd of some 500 around the

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81 Letter of 21 December 1901, Samuel Barnett to Frank ... , quoted in *Ibid.*, 184.

82 The *Surrey Times*, 25 May 1901.

83 See A. M. S. Methuen, *Peace or War in South Africa* (London: Methuen & Co, 1901), 1-6.

84 *Surrey Times*, 11 November 1899.



pro-Boer homes in the neighbourhood. Armed with 'noise-making instruments' they too proceeded to produce an alarming cacophony reminiscent of the rough music protests of earlier epochs. This temporarily descended into a full-scale riot with indiscriminate breaking of windows, before the rioters returned to a public house for a patriotic rendition of the National Anthem.<sup>85</sup> One of their main targets was Jane Cobden Unwin, the daughter of the peace campaigner Richard Cobden, who was actively involved in The Stop-the-War Committee, and the SACC. Together with her husband the publisher T. Fisher Unwin, they and several others in the town had been publicly named on posters calling for demonstrations against them.

### The 'Khaki' Election

The divisions within the Liberal Party were hard to hide and long before the disastrous 'Khaki' General Election of 1900, the sectional interests were evident in the choice of by-election candidates. The two by-elections held late in May 1900, at South Manchester and the Isle of White are illustrative of the differences of opinion. The pro-Boer Lief Jones stood at South Manchester resolutely refusing to 'trim his colours to the jingo gale', while at the latter was the Liberal Imperialist Godfrey Baring.<sup>86</sup> For Lief Jones the government's 'policy of Jingoism' was responsible for the postponement of much needed social reforms at home, their 'policy of reckless and indefinite expansion' was also leading to the neglect of the Indian famine.<sup>87</sup> He appealed for a British foreign policy that exhibited an element of self-restraint and respect for international morality. His opponent, the grandson of Sir Robert Peel, was as a result of his increased majority from 78 to 2,309 able to claim solid support for the government's policy in South Africa. *The Speaker* found consolation in the fact that so many voted for 'moderation and self-restraint' during what it termed the 'Mafeking Carnival.'<sup>88</sup>

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85 See Newspaper Cuttings, University of Bristol Special Collections: Cobden Unwin Collection, DM851,

86 *The Speaker*, 5 May 1900, 125.

87 Lief Jones South Manchester by-election Leaflet, May 1900, Oxford University Bodleian Library: Gilbert Murray Papers (henceforth GMP), MSS 7, f84-5.

88 *The Speaker*, 2 June 1900, 234.



The campaign in the Isle of White illustrated how Field Marshall Lord Roberts ('Bobs') and the South African War would be utilised in the forthcoming General Election. Here the Liberals operated under the banner 'Vote for Baring and back up Bobs', however this was to backfire seriously when the Unionists, whose candidate was serving in Southern Africa, replied, 'Vote for Seely who is backing up Bobs'.<sup>89</sup> In both cases, the Unionists or Conservatives already held the seat and the resultant losses were a blow to Liberals regardless of sectional affiliation. In a letter to his brother, Lloyd George commented that 'The Jingo Liberal candidate has been beaten [...] so much for turning suits to catch the passing [...] gale'.<sup>90</sup>

This public enthusiasm was utilised during the October General Election, following Lord Roberts' proclamation that the war was over. The pro-Boer candidates found themselves on the defensive and, as in the by-elections of South Manchester and Stratford-Upon-Avon, the LLAAM tried to support suitable candidates. The other involvement for the LLAAM was the support they gave to J. L. Hammond as Editor of *The Speaker*. In September, he informed the executive committee that he would be publishing an election supplement that would actively promote their policies: as a result they purchased and distributed over 2,000 copies to their members and other interested parties. The general feeling amongst the pro-Boers was it would be unwise to hold meetings in the run-up to the General election due to heightened excitement the election campaigns would generate.

The problems some MPs experienced are outlined in Price, for example LLAAM member Fred Maddison in Sheffield and W. C. Steadman in Stepney.<sup>91</sup> The latter's consistent opposition to the government's policy in Southern Africa generated a great deal of hostility, as a result the local Liberals issued a plea for a 'volunteer guard of peace' to canvass on his behalf.<sup>92</sup> Amongst those answering the call was the East London Working Men's Club.<sup>93</sup>

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89 *The Times*, 24 May 1900.

90 Lloyd George to William George, 24 May 1900, WGP, 947.

91 Price, *An Imperial War*, 41-43 & 126.

92 F Victor Fisher, Volunteer Guard of Peace, printed card, JJC, Box 4: South African War.

93 Price, *An Imperial War*, 91.



In his analysis of the General Election, Price concluded that the issue of the War and its jingoistic appeal was not the main factor, particularly in working-class constituencies. More recently, Paul Readman has sought to demonstrate that the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists successfully exploited the war to appeal to the patriotism of their electorate.<sup>94</sup> Through his analysis of electoral speeches, he has shown that the war was a more dominant factor than has been assumed. The Liberals were portrayed as a party divided by the war, and those deemed pro-Boer were portrayed as enemy sympathisers and unpatriotic.<sup>95</sup> Regardless of their stance towards the war, many Liberal candidates were tarred with the pro-Boer brush.

The emotive nature of the campaigns can be gauged from the following examples. Both were used on advertising hoardings, the first in Central Leeds was in support of the Irish Secretary Gerald Balfour, and the second from Stowmarket was used against the Liberal candidate John Horobin.

Our Brave Soldiers in South Africa Expect that every Voter this day will do his duty Vote for Balfour. Remember! To vote for a Liberal is a Vote to the Boer.

Every Vote given for Mr HOROBIN is a BOER BULLET fired at your fellow-countrymen and AN INSULT to the memory of every BRITISH SOLDIER who has fallen in the service of his Queen and Country.<sup>96</sup>

In both cases, the Liberal candidate was unsuccessful and, despite the assertion of their opponents, there is no real evidence to suggest they were pro-Boers. They were certainly not listed as members or supporters of either the SACC or LLAAM. As early as July 1900

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94 Paul Readman, 'The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the General Election of 1900', *The Journal of British Studies*, 40, no. 1 (Jan. 2001), 107-145.

95 Ibid. 116-17.

96 Balfour's election accounts included expenses for £12 25s for the printing and posting of 100 of these posters; Augustine Birrell, *The General Election: How the Tories Won, Why the Liberals Lost* (London: Liberal Publication Department, 1900), Liberal Magazine Extra, No. 1, 10 & 12-13.



*The Times* calculated that there were 68 pro-Boer Liberal and 62 Liberal Imperialist MPs in parliament, but as Readman points out the newspaper was keen to give the impression that the Liberal Party was a devoutly unpatriotic party and thereby unworthy of support.<sup>97</sup> His own calculations based upon voting patterns together with analysis of speeches and election addresses identifies only 60 pro-Boers, compared to 141 Liberal Imperialists. This is higher than the 52 Liberal pro-Boers identified by Price, and 45 by John Auld.<sup>98</sup>

While such lists are of value, an analysis of the merits of each classification is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, combining the lists produced by Auld, Price and Readman with that published in *The Times* on 19 October 1900, generates a list of 88 MPs. Of these only 25 were members of the SACC and 15 were members of the LLAAM, and only 12 were members of both organisations.<sup>99</sup> So while the MPs identified by Auld, Price, Readman and *The Times* may have demonstrated pro-Boer sentiments the majority failed to affiliate themselves with either group.

What none of the lists are able to show is the level of support these pro-Boer groups were able to command from both former and future MPs. Analysis of the membership identifies fifteen former MPs who supported both organisations and an additional twenty who had unsuccessfully stood for election before the outbreak of the South African War (see Appendix 3). Of greater interest is the number of pro-Boers who stood in subsequent elections: nine stood unsuccessfully but a further eighteen were elected to parliament. Included in this list are the known liberal internationalists Aneurin Williams, Gooch and J. Annan Bryce. This is indicative of the impact the War had upon Liberal attitudes and politicisation of the leading pro-Boer camp. Despite the calumny heaped on them and the jingoistic fervour of the moment liberal internationalism emerged from the war strengthened and a more coherent doctrine with greater influence upon British political thinking. In many ways it had been tempered by the experience of the South African War.

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97 Readman, 'The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics', 141.

98 John W Auld, 'The Liberal Pro-Boers', *The Journal of British Studies*, 14, no. 2 (May 1975), 100-101; Price, *An Imperial War*, 250-1.

99 See Appendix 3.



*Pro-Boers and the Liberal Party*

The LLAAM's attempts to influence the policy of the Liberal Party on the South African War were conducted indirectly through their parliamentary members, and directly through the National Liberal Federation (NLF). The Federation's President was Robert Spence Watson, who was also nominally on the executive committee of the LLAAM. They sought to achieve their aims through the submission of anti-war resolutions and the encouragement of local associations to support such measures. They also widely canvassed on behalf of those candidates they believed were in sympathy with them for election to the Federation's Executive Committee.

On 15 December 1901 Lord Rosebery addressed a meeting in Chesterfield, where he challenged the Liberal party to adopt policies, which reflected the new century, abandon the Gladstonian Home Rule traditions and embrace the imperialistic fervour currently prevalent within the country. He also offered some hope to the pro-Boers by urging the government to resume negotiations and condemned those who had announced that every Liberal elected in the Khaki election was supporting the Boers. After a troubled two months, the liberal imperialists rebranded themselves as the Liberal League and announced its main aim was to propagate Lord Rosebery's Chesterfield policy.<sup>100</sup> They also put into action an attempt to infiltrate the Executive of the NLF by offering to pay delegates' expenses.<sup>101</sup> The LLAAM was indignant and the NLF President at the meeting in Leicester on 15 February 1902 was forced publicly to condemn the policy of buying votes and canvassing in general; despite this, he was reportedly satisfied with the actual result of the election.<sup>102</sup>

The Guildford Division Liberal Association in their report for 1900 guardedly commented that it was inevitable that divisions should have arisen 'as to the justice or otherwise of the causes' of the war.<sup>103</sup> As a result the prospective candidate A. W. Chapman, a recognised

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100 Price, *An Imperial War*, 40.

101 LLAAM Minutes of the Executive Committee, 17 Feb. 1902, AMSP, MS GEN 1465/69.

102 Robert Spence Watson, *The National Liberal Federation: from its Commencement to the General Election of 1906* (London: T Fisher Unwin, 1907), 262-3.

103 *The Surrey Times*, 9 March 1901.



Liberal Imperialist, left the local Liberals in no doubt as to his views over the war when he addressed them in February 1900. Despite the potential for a disastrous split in March 1902 the *Surrey Times* welcomed the way local Liberals were able to ‘promote unity [...] by reasonable toleration of differences,’ and in doing so commended Williams and his Haslemere colleague, T. P. Newman, for their positive response.<sup>104</sup> A month earlier Williams as secretary of the Haslemere Liberals stated ‘that an attitude of conciliation and a disposition to treat with the Boers upon generous terms are essential to procure an early peace.’<sup>105</sup> As a result, they passed a resolution calling for the government to enter into immediate negotiations, and improve conditions within the concentration camps. They also declared their full support for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Liberal leader, while welcoming Lord Rosebery’s Chesterfield speech.

### *Culmination*

The South African War demonstrated to the liberal internationalists that without respect for liberty Britain had engaged in an imperialistic war fuelled by a jingoistic false patriotism. The true alternative they claimed lay in:

International morality and in the co-operation of nations for mutual help; who if they are to dream at all, will dream not of Armageddons and Empires, but of progress and freedom, and the ultimate fraternity of mankind.<sup>106</sup>

News that indentured Chinese labourers were being transported to work in the gold mines vindicated the pro-Boer arguments which would within a few years triumph in the conciliation of the Boer Republics and the British Colonies and between the Dutch and the British. A significant figure to emerge from the war was Jan Smuts, a Boer general who would join Lloyd George’s Imperial War Cabinet in 1916 and successfully champion the

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104 The *Surrey Times*, 8 March 1902.

105 The *Surrey Times*, 8 Feb. 1902.

106 Francis W Hirst, Gilbert Murray and J. L. Hammond, *Liberalism and the Empire: Three Essays*, with new introduction by Peter Cain (London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1998), xiii.



liberal internationalist ethos of institutionalism and self-determination. The paradox was that the war had served as a toughening experience for many liberal internationalists.

Writing in 1902 Williams recognised the Union of South Africa as ‘a legitimate dream’ and believed it could even be the ‘ideal of all reasonable imperialists’.<sup>107</sup> Within eight years, the South African Union became a reality. However, the deep-rooted animosity towards the black Africans and other ethnic groups gradually became more legally enshrined. With the introduction of racially oppressive apartheid laws, the South Africans would lose their appeal as victims of British imperialism. The anti-apartheid movement of the late twentieth century would become the beneficiary of many of the pro-Boer sentiments.

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107 *‘Anti-Doyle’ MS Chapter IV*, AWP, AW/3/2/22, f26.



## 6

## Macedonia and the Ottoman Empire, 1903-1908

The end of the South African War demonstrated the ephemeral nature of single-issue groups: once their original *raison d'être* was settled they had to either fold or continue aimlessly in search of a new purpose. Subsequently, both the SACC and the LLAAM eventually agreed with R. C. Lehmann's conclusion that their objects were too narrow to ensure their continued existence.<sup>1</sup> As Aneurin Williams' diary clearly shows the decision to terminate the groups was not an easy one: the SACC executive continually postponed a decision on its future until October 1902, when it finally agreed to wind up its operations.<sup>2</sup> The LLAAM however, sought to strengthen its political base within the Liberal Party through the co-ordination of an election fund. According to MacCullum Scott, its future lay in its ability to speak out against the growth of military and naval expenditure and to provide a co-ordinated opposition to the Liberal Imperialists.<sup>3</sup> While there was no doubt a role for such an organisation, the LLAAM continued to haemorrhage members at an unsustainable rate. As a result, early in 1903 it merged with the New Reform Club.<sup>4</sup>

Williams like many of his liberal internationalist colleagues maintained his connection with the LLAAM in its post-merger form, but soon found other issues dominating his concerns. The Eastern Question was once more becoming a focus of international attention and the activities of his friend Noel Buxton ensured his attention. While the South African War was the main inspiration for Williams' political engagement, for Buxton it was his

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1 LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, 5 November 1902, AMSP, MS Gen 1465/69.

2 Diary entries, 5 June to 16 October 1902, AWP AW/1/5.

3 LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, 3 September 1902, AMSP, MS Gen 1465/69.

4 LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, see entries 6 August 1902 to 4 February 1903, AMSP MS Gen 1465/69.



1899 visit to the Balkan Peninsula, which encompassed a tour of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Turkey. This and subsequent tours highlighted the deplorable conditions of the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire and initiated his lasting interest in the region.

In the early twentieth century, Macedonia was central to the Eastern Question and the future of Ottoman rule within Europe. It was a key area, straddling southern Europe south of the Balkans with the autonomous Ottoman provinces of Bulgaria to the north and an independent Greece to the south. It consisted of the three *vilayets*, Kossovo, Monastir, and Salonika (see Figure 6.1). Although the population were generally described as Macedonians, it was not an ethnically homogeneous area as the various ethnographical maps produced for the Carnegie report on the causes and conduct of the Balkan Wars clearly illustrate.<sup>5</sup> In reality there was little to distinguish Macedonians from the neighbouring states, consequently Macedonia was a microcosm of ethnic and religious divisions. These resulted in internecine struggles, which culminated in the uprising of August 1903. Organised by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), it was met by ruthless Ottoman reprisals and the loss of over 5,000 lives. For liberal internationalists the unfolding events were reminiscent of the Armenian massacres of 1895 and the Bulgarian atrocities a quarter of a century earlier. Importantly it also served as a reminder that the Congress of Berlin had thwarted the prospect of Macedonian liberation.<sup>6</sup> Additionally Macedonia's position within Europe meant its future was of great interest to both neighbouring Austria-Hungary and Russia.

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5 The discrepancies between the Bulgarian and Serbian point of view are clearly illustrated in the ethnographical maps reproduced in the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington D. C, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914); Another ethnographical map can be found in H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and their Future* (London: Methuen & Co, 1906).

6 For example see *Autobiography – Balkan Reform* chapter, unpublished MS, NBP, MS951, c8/2, 147.





**Figure 6.1: Macedonian vilayets**

The view of most liberal internationalists was that the desperation of the Macedonians would continue for as long as the Ottoman system prevailed. Based on personal observations Brailsford concluded that:

The reality behind the whole muddle of racial conflicts, beyond the Chauvinism of the Balkan peoples and the calculations of the greater Powers, is the unregarded figure of the Macedonian peasant, harried, exploited, enslaved, careless of national programmes, and anxious only for a day when he may keep his warm sheepskin coat upon his back, give his daughter in marriage without dishonour, and eat in peace the bread of his own unceasing labour.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Brailsford, *Macedonia*, 57.



## The Balkan Committee

The BC emerged as the new focus for liberal internationalist attention and activism. While its genesis lay in Noel Buxton's 1899 visit to Macedonia and the pitiable conditions he observed, it was news of the atrocities that provided the catalyst for the Committee's formation.<sup>8</sup> Contemporary reports corroborate this, but confusingly Buxton in later life would regularly cite 1902 as the beginning of the Committee; subsequent accounts have tended to accept this version of events.<sup>9</sup> There is however, evidence that Noel and Charles Buxton discussed the possibility of forming a committee long before the 1903 insurrections. At the height of the South African War, F. S. Stevenson of the Byron Society advised Noel that his Society's Executive believed there was little hope of rousing public sympathy for the subject peoples in the Balkans while Britain was still engaged in Southern Africa.<sup>10</sup> Importantly he believed that more harm than good would result from 'public agitation' at this time; his advice was instead to diffuse well-considered information, and he cited a recent article in *The Times* which was picked up in a 'leader' as the best way to influence a jingoistic public. It was therefore only after the Macedonian uprising of 1903 that the nascent BC actually came into being. Importantly, it was the intervention of Bryce in July 1903 that initiated its establishment; consequently, the founders agreed that it should:

Watch the progress of events in Macedonia and the Turkish East generally [...] The Committee ought for the present to be confined to obtaining and diffusing information and views, exciting interest in the subject and advocating measures calculated to secure peace, and put an end to oppression, bloodshed and cruelty.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Autobiography – Balkan Reform* chapter, unpublished MS, NBP, MS951, c8/2, 147.

<sup>9</sup> The Balkan Committee, *Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for 1903 and 1904* (1904); The main biographies were written by his then Secretaries, based upon his private papers, the majority of which are at McGill University, Montreal and Duke University, North Carolina, however some of those used in the biographies are no longer extant; Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench*; Anderson, *Noel Buxton A Life*; see also 'Balkan Reform' MS draft autobiography 'good copy', NBP, MS951 c8/2, 147.

<sup>10</sup> F. S. Stevenson to Noel Buxton, 29 October 1901, NBP, MS951, c24/1.

<sup>11</sup> Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench*, 3.



The Committee outlined its objectives as being primarily to educate the public as to Britain's moral responsibility to the Macedonians (because of its intervention some twenty-one years earlier) and focusing public opinion through the dissemination of accurate news by meetings and publications. The *Speaker*, in August 1903, acknowledged that while the 'English' were not unsympathetic to the plight of the Macedonians, they were unaware of the circumstances under which they lived.<sup>12</sup> The BC also intended to scrutinise the actions of the European Powers with regard to Macedonia, and work to ensure the British government gave the situation adequate attention. Ultimately, they believed that, without European control of the reform process, events would lead inexorably to war between Turkey and Bulgaria, and possibly even to a major European conflagration.

Bryce's long-standing friendship with the Buxton family made him the ideal figurehead for the BC, but his appointment to the Cabinet as Chief Secretary for Ireland in the new Liberal government obliged him to resign. Subsequently, the eminent international lawyer John Westlake K.C. took on the role of President.<sup>13</sup> The ability to enlist Bryce as the BC's first President was an important factor in persuading leading public figures and churchmen to lend their support. This is evident in the Bishop of Hereford's decision to allow his name to be used as a Vice-President. In a letter to Noel Buxton he pointed out that, the BC would be useless without the backing of a President who was 'one of the few public men whose knowledge, judgement & position will command general confidence.'<sup>14</sup> Despite sympathies with the Macedonians and the aims of the BC, some like Joe St Loe Stratchey, editor of the *Spectator* did not like joining committees, and felt he needed to devote his time 'to fighting against Mr Chamberlain's disastrous [Tariff Reform] proposals.'<sup>15</sup> This response clearly demonstrates that foreign policy issues were competing with urgent domestic ones.

For Bryce it was essential that the BC was independent of the government so that it had sufficient freedom of movement. He foresaw the need for them to criticise a Liberal

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12 *The Speaker*, 1 August 1903, NBP, MS951 c24/1.

13 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

14 Bishop of Hereford to Noel Buxton, 12 July 1903, NBP, MS951, c24/1.

15 St Loe Stratchey to Noel Buxton, n.d. [c.1903], NBP, MS951, c24/1.



government because 'there never was a Government that did not need criticism'.<sup>16</sup> Bryce would two years later travel to the United States of America as the British Ambassador, thereby making direct contact with the BC even more problematic. Despite his official position, he would however, remain an active and influential but unofficial member of the committee for the rest of his life.

### *Public Opinion*

The BC organised its first public meeting at St James' Hall, London in September 1903. This attracted many influential speakers including the Bishop of Worcester, Lord Stanhope, Lord Farrer, Sir Thomas Fowel Buxton, Sir Edward Fry, Bryce, the Irish Nationalist T. P. O'Connor, Brailsford and Noel Buxton. The views expressed by the Bishop of Worcester, echoed those of most speakers, when he stated that the Macedonians 'were on the threshold of liberty by the Treaty of San Stefano, which a victorious Russia had imposed upon the Sultan'.<sup>17</sup> He further argued that 'No one who knows the place that England held in the Convention of Berlin, could doubt for a moment that we are, by the obligations we then contracted, pre-eminently interested in this matter'.<sup>18</sup> These statements were in line with Bryce's directions that the BC should dwell on Britain's responsibilities beginning with the Treaty of San Stefano as 'it will be better to direct attention to the vital facts and the responsibility of Britain and the need to clear out the Turk once and for all rather than 'justifying' the insurrection.'<sup>19</sup>

After the initial flurry of activity, the BC settled down to organising or assisting with a series of meetings. In the autumn of 1903 over 300 meetings were organised around the country, this fell to 60 in 1904, 23 in 1905, but rose slightly in 1906 when 31 meetings took place.<sup>20</sup> Other outsider strategies employed by the BC included using the press and distributing publications. Combined with the insider strategies of submitting Memorials,

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16 'The Balkan Committee: Farewell Speech by Mr Bryce', *The Times*, 23 December 1905.

17 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting at St James's Hall, Piccadilly on Tuesday September 29, 1903, Typescript, NBP, MS951 c.25/1, 8.

18 Ibid., 8.

19 Bryce to Buxton, 31 August 1903, quoted in *A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor* ed. by Martin Gilbert, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), 179.

20 See BC annual reports.



Memoranda and making direct representations with the support of sympathetic MPs, they attempted to keep the Macedonian question at the forefront of the government's attention. In addition to regularly submitting copies of their memorials and reports to the press, the BC published a series of leaflets and pamphlets. In a similar vein to the SACC, these consisted of a mixture of specially commissioned articles and reports, together with the reprinting of items previously published in the press. During 1904, they attempted to issue regular 'Balkan Committee Reports', which consisted of recent extracts from the press, together with briefings on the situation in Macedonia. With public attention looking elsewhere, they felt that it was 'imperative that the needs of Macedonia and the responsibility of Great Britain [...] should be kept before the public.'<sup>21</sup> However, only two issues were prepared, for June and August 1904, as it soon became evident that the cost of printing and posting 3,000 copies was beyond the limited finances of the BC.<sup>22</sup> Printing and distribution of literature consumed over 40 percent of its income during the first two years. Staff salaries were the other major expense, which amounted to £328 for 1903 and 1904 (34 percent of its income).<sup>23</sup> The remainder was spent on organising meetings, especially the St James Hall meeting in 1903, and renting office space.

With a limited membership base and no apparent membership fee, the expense of running the BC required regular requests for donations. In its first four years, only 21 members donated more than £10, with the major subscribers coming from the Executive committee. The most generous supporters were the Buxtons, Gooch, William Allen, George Cadbury, Lord and Lady Farrer and Aneurin Williams, who together provided nearly 60 percent of the its funds. Of these, Noel Buxton was undoubtedly the most generous, contributing over £330.<sup>24</sup>

One unusual means of attracting attention to the region was their involvement in the 1907 Balkan States Exhibition at the Earls Court Exhibition Centre, held in partnership with

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21 *Balkan Committee Report*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1904), 1.

22 *Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for 1903 and 1904*, 10.

23 In its first year, it employed MacCullum Scott, formerly the secretary of the LLAAM, who was succeeded by W. A. Moore and then A. G. Symonds.

24 Analysed from statement of accounts as published in Annual Reports.



the governments of Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro. Running from May to October, it sought to provide an opportunity to demonstrate the arts, industries and handicrafts of the Balkan peoples and promote the region as a tourist destination.<sup>25</sup> This was an important vehicle for the BC to convey its message to a curious public, who attended what was according to *The Times*, a popular event.

### *Specialist Knowledge*

While news of major atrocities and massacres enabled the mobilisation of public opinion, this was short-lived. Such public agitation was vital in promoting the need for Ottoman reform, but difficult to sustain without a mechanism to keep Macedonia at the forefront of public minds. To this end, the BC decided that it was essential that they should obtain accurate news from Macedonia independent of the Foreign Office. Consequently, they prided themselves on their propriety, objectivity, and ability to act as a conduit for information. They believed this enabled them to advocate policies that were concerned purely with the advancement of the Macedonians and not any self-interest. Information derived directly from the victims and those close to the suffering was balanced against that obtained from European residents and visitors within Macedonia and surrounding areas of Turkey. In addition, several committee members made separate but extensive forays into the heartland of Macedonia to view for themselves the conditions.<sup>26</sup> During these visits, the members sought out the opinions of local inhabitants, together with official representatives of the various Powers and the Porte, and foreign missionaries working within Macedonia. The BC's Secretary W. A. Moore made numerous visits and in 1908 succeeded in arranging with the *Chronicle* to provide reports. As a result, his articles also appeared the *Morning Leader*, *Daily News*, *Manchester Guardian*, and the *Times*, as well as some of the provincial press.

In addition to Brailsford and Nevinson of the *Manchester Guardian*, the Committee was able to call upon James Bouchier, Balkan correspondent for *The Times*, whose

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<sup>25</sup> *The Times*, 23 May 1907.

<sup>26</sup> Visitors to the region included Noel and Leyland Buxton, W. A. Moore, C. M. Lloyd and Bryce.



local knowledge was unsurpassed.<sup>27</sup> Brailsford visited the Balkans and Macedonia in particular, six times between 1897 and 1913, amounting to a total of 16 months in the region.<sup>28</sup> In April 1903, C. P. Scott sent him to Macedonia where he observed at first hand the increasing tensions between the Macedonians and the Ottoman government. Despite his strong belief in self-determination, he concluded that the Bulgarian-supported IMRO was 'as ruthless, as brutal, as unscrupulous as the Turkish government itself.'<sup>29</sup> With his return to England preceding the IMRO-inspired uprising, he rapidly became an important source for the newly-formed BC.

In December 1903, as Aneurin Williams' diary indicates, the BC held meetings with the leaders of the two rival Macedonian revolutionary groups, who had come to England in order to engender support and finance for their struggle.<sup>30</sup> These meetings would provide a unique opportunity for individuals like Williams, who had limited direct experience of the region. The first meeting was with General Tzontcheff, vice-President of the Bulgarian Society, whom Williams described as a 'masterful & able man' with 'a very determined mouth & broad big forehead.' Later the same day he attended the meeting with Boris Sarafoff, General Guerdjikoff and Dr Tatartcheff of the IMRO. Sarafoff was the chief speaker of the second group, 'a large man, big bulgy eyes, [...] a powerful man in every way, but not with so much shrewdness & self-control as Tzontcheff. Guerdjikoff looked more common place [...] rather ugly, twisted up features [...] but strong & very energetic, Tatartcheff looked rather sinister'. Amongst those present at the meetings were C. F. G. Masterman, the archaeologist Arthur Evans and Nevinson. The IMRO representatives claimed that Tzontcheff was only representing himself, and only they truly had the interests of the Macedonians at heart.

Williams pointed out that the dynamiting and attacks upon Turkish villages had done immeasurable harm to their cause. In their defence, the IMRO representatives replied they had been 'forced to retaliate. But they had sent the women, children &c. out of the

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27 See Appendix 1 for biographical information.

28 Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter*, 47.

29 *Manchester Guardian*, 8 June 1903.

30 Diary, 21 December 1903 (& overflow pages), AWP, AW/1/5.



villages unharmed before burning, whereas the Turks dishonoured the women.' Williams was in no doubt that the possibility of annexation by Bulgaria or any power would only be an interim measure, for they were revolutionaries who desired complete independence regardless of the cost.

### *Connections*

While the original executive committee of twenty-seven consisted of only two MPs (Hugh Law and Herbert Samuel), it contained seven future MPs (Noel and Charles Buxton, Gooch, Masterman, Arthur Ponsonby, C. P. Trevelyan and Aneurin Williams). In addition at least two others had unsuccessfully contested seats, and the committee was able to claim the support of a further 31 MPs and several members of the House of Lords.

The BC developed close relations with the Foreign Office, during both Conservative and Liberal administrations. The Foreign Secretary would regularly listen patiently to their representation if not necessarily welcoming their continued interventions. Certainly while Lord Lansdowne was Foreign Secretary, Noel Buxton was able to imply that their public pronouncements were welcomed and could strengthen his hand in negotiations.<sup>31</sup> In addition, seven memorials on the situation were submitted during 1905 alone, all of which were subsequently published in the press. Furthermore, through Buxton's direct intervention in September 1905, the Foreign Office were made aware of the massacre at Konopnitsa, where W. A. Moore had personally witnessed the killing of women and children by Turkish troops.<sup>32</sup> This resulted in British calls for an inquiry, but the perpetrators went unpunished.

There is certainly evidence that Lansdowne intimated to foreign Ambassadors of his need to consider British public opinion when framing foreign policy.<sup>33</sup> Sir Edward Grey's tenure as Foreign Secretary was more challenging; his reputation for being remote and

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31 Noel Buxton to Archbishop of Canterbury, 10 Nov. 1905, and 14 November 1905, Lambeth Palace Library: Randall Davidson Papers, volume 105, f372 & 377.

32 *Second Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for the Year ending December 31st, 1905*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1906), 10.

33 Keith Robbins, 'Public opinion, the press and pressure groups', in *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey*, ed. by F. H. Hinsley, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 70-88 & 70.



aloof convinced many that he was less receptive to outside opinion than his predecessor was. However, early in 1911 Grey accepted that public opinion was such that there was nothing that he could do that would repress the newly-independent Bulgaria.<sup>34</sup> This gives the impression that if sufficiently roused public opinion could make a serious impression upon British foreign policy. No doubt, it was this experience that informed Brailsford's declaration that groups such as the BC were able to strengthen the hand of the Foreign Office.<sup>35</sup> In reality, as Noel Buxton and his colleagues were frequently to discover, the Foreign Secretary and the government were only likely to be amenable to their suggestions when they were harmonised with official policy.

The BC along with other like-minded organisations within Britain and Europe sought the international supervision of a reformed Ottoman administration. Consequently, a joint meeting with other societies concerned with Armenia, Crete and Macedonia was held in February 1906 in the Westminster Palace Hotel, under the presidency of Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. D'Estournelles, an international jurist, was also to serve as the President of the Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry into the Balkan Wars, which included the liberal internationalists Brailsford and F. W. Hirst. The former he described as 'a true disciple of Lord Byron and of Gladstone' and an invaluable member of the Commission.<sup>36</sup>

Later in August 1908, the BC worked together with the Congo Reform Association and the Anti-Slavery Society on a joint publication.<sup>37</sup> 7,000 copies were printed and distributed through the Baptist Association, Church of England Men's Societies, Congregational Churches, Free Church Secretaries, Liberal Clubs, P.S.A. Societies, as well as working men's clubs and the YMCA.<sup>38</sup>

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34 Keith Robbins, 'British Diplomacy and Bulgaria, 1914-15', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 49 (1971), 218.

35 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 133.

36 *Report ... into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 7.

37 An extant copy has not been traced but its production indicates a significant overlapping of humanitarian interests.

38 George O. Donald to Noel Buxton, 15 August 1908, NBP, MS951, c24/1.



### *Non-partisan message*

Although undoubtedly Gladstonian in outlook, the BC was at pains to stress it stood above party politics and this appears to have been a significant factor in its appeal. While calling for the British government to intervene and ensure the introduction of much-needed reforms, it attempted to propagate a non-partisan message in both sectarian and non-religious terms. Consequently, Bryce felt confident when he claimed that the question of Macedonian reforms was above party politics.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to the South African War, this was an occasion when both the established church and the non-conformists could rally together for a common cause. Support within the Church of England came from the highest levels, with the Archbishop of Canterbury playing a prominent part. In July 1907, he headed a deputation to Sir Edward Grey, during which he declared that he believed that to varying degrees everyone felt some direct responsibility for the Macedonian Question by virtue of Britain's political intervention in the events of 1878, which had created an obligation to improve the Macedonians' situation. Furthermore, they argued Britain had a self-interest in reform because of her financial and trade commitments to the region.<sup>40</sup> This latter point was of particular significance as Turkish requests for an increase in the Custom duties could give Macedonian reforms a significant negotiation advantage.<sup>41</sup>

At the time of the BC's formation, the underlying tensions created during the South African War were still evident when, during the 1903 St James' Hall Meeting, the Revd. R. J. Campbell described the war as 'just' it was met by calls from the audience of 'No' and 'It was unjust'.<sup>42</sup> He did however admit that the war in South Africa had seriously weakened Britain's role as the traditional champion of the oppressed. However, by 1907 the Rev. Dr Horton, ex-President of the Free Church Council reported that 'in this particular instance the Free Churches of the country stand shoulder to shoulder with the Established Church'.<sup>43</sup>

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39 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting ... September 29, 1903, NBP, MS951 c.25/1, 14.

40 Balkan Committee, *The Appeal of the Churches*, 1-2.

41 Since declaring itself bankrupt in 1875 the Ottoman debts and custom dues had increasingly come under international supervision.

42 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting ... September 29, 1903, NBP, MS951 c.25/1, 26.

43 Balkan Committee, *The Appeal of the Churches*, 3.



Despite the BC priding itself on being impartial between the different ethnic groups within Macedonia, it was perceived by many as being pro-Bulgarian, which was undoubtedly true of the Buxtons. However, the complete picture was more complex. Certainly, it greatly disapproved of the Ottomans administration of the Empire and its detrimental effects upon its non-Muslim subjects. The BC's composition ensured that it attempted to speak openly in support of all Macedonians regardless of ethnicity and religion. In July 1905, a joint statement from the BC and the Byron Society stated that 'We cannot be partisans in this racial struggle, nor can our habitual sympathies with either race blind us to the faults on both sides.'<sup>44</sup> Despite this, some BC members were uncomfortable with the pro-Bulgarian attitude of Noel and Charles Buxton. Following the first Balkan War, Aubrey Herbert resigned in response to the partisan attitude exhibited by the BC in its resolutions and public declarations.<sup>45</sup>

### *Moral Argument*

The notion of British culpability was an essential part of the BC's ethos. However, its concern for the Macedonians was far greater than just a humanitarian one; indeed if this had been the case then the relief fund formed under the presidency of the Bishop of London would have sufficed. While the funds raised through the generosity of the British public helped alleviate the initial hardships, those donors attracted by the BC's message sought a more pro-active approach. The heart of the Macedonian problem was Ottoman misrule, and as far as they were concerned, only the introduction of drastic reforms to its government would alleviate it.

According to Bryce, speaking in 1903, there were three possible outcomes; firstly, the extermination of the Macedonians; secondly, Bulgaria would be driven to war to achieve what negotiation had failed to restore to them; or thirdly, there was the possibility of an all-out European war.<sup>46</sup> The full implementation of reforms were only way to avert these possibilities. Nine years later Bryce wrote it was Britain's duty to see the complete

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44 'Protest to Lord Lansdowne' 28 July 1905, NBP, MS951, c.25/2.

45 *A Century of Conflict 1850-1950*, ed. by Gilbert, 181, n2.

46 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting ... September 29, 1903, NBP, MS951 c.25/1, 20.



liberation of the Macedonians from Turkish rule. He identified two options: the first was to give it independence as an autonomous state, such as that accorded to Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria; the alternative was to allow the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan to remain, but with the removal of his direct control. Instead, there would be a European-appointed Governor, answerable to the Powers and responsible for the upkeep of law and order through the gendarmerie and judicial system.<sup>47</sup> The latter had always been the BC's preferred policy as it was the easier option. In order to generate support for this initiative they sought the help of the Labour movement through the issuing of a manifesto to the workmen of the United Kingdom, signed by a total of 54 prominent Labour leaders. The manifesto urged Labour organisations and Trades Councils to forward the following resolution to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary:

That we call upon His Majesty's Government, with a view to carrying out British obligations, 1<sup>st</sup>:- To urge upon the other great Powers the appointment of a Governor of Macedonia, not himself a Turkish subject, and independent of Turkish interference; and 2<sup>nd</sup>:- If necessary to summon a Conference of the great Powers of Europe to consider the affairs of Macedonia and the carrying out of the Treaty of Berlin.'<sup>48</sup>

It would take another four years for the British government to show any public signs of acknowledging the merits of this solution. On 24 February 1908, Sir Edward Grey in response to speeches by both Gooch and Masterman, demonstrated his frustration with the pace of reforms whose progress or lack of it was he considered 'little better than a farce.'<sup>49</sup> As a result, 112 Members of Parliament signed a Manifesto, in which they welcomed his acquiescence in the need for the Concert of Europe to secure the appointment of a governor as the minimum reform required. They warned that 'unless the Powers will give their support, the Concert of Europe will perish from lack of vitality and

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47 *Bryce on the Near Eastern Question*, 1905, 5.

48 To the Workmen of the United Kingdom. Our Duty to Macedonia, AWP AW/3/3.

49 *Hansard*, CLXXXIII, HC, 25 February 1908, col. 1707.



a catastrophe be precipitated.’<sup>50</sup> Events over the past decades led Bryce to warn them that the Powers had offered a ‘perfectly empty and ineffective protection’ to Macedonia.<sup>51</sup>

### Reform Programmes

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Powers began again to show an interest in Turkey-in-Europe, and Macedonia in particular. The uprising and resulting violence led the Tsarist and Habsburg governments to formulate a policy, which could maintain the status quo, while simultaneously addressing the concerns of the Christian population. The result was the Mürzsteg Programme, as accepted by the Sultan in November 1903; it consisted of two civil assessors, one Austrian and the other Russian, to assist a Turkish Inspector-General who would establish control over the application of reforms by the local Ottoman authorities and reform the entire system of civil administration within two years. The Powers were also to provide officers for an international gendarmerie, though poor pay and miserable conditions turned many to corruption.

Reports received from Nevinson, Brailsford and others in the field convinced the BC that the Mürzsteg reforms were wholly ineffectual. They provided insufficient executive authority to the European officials and failed to remedy the inept Ottoman bureaucracy. The reform scheme contained the seeds of failure, and the Porte’s uncooperative attitude had turned it into a farce. Even the Powers were forced to admit that the scheme was not working and the British government in particular was pressing for further reforms and concerted action to coerce the Porte.

1905 saw the British government taking several promising steps, with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne outlining a scheme which would reduce the military presence in Macedonia to the minimum required for internal security. The scheme proposed the appointment of a Commission consisting of delegates nominated by the Powers, under the presidency of an Inspector-General. The Commission was to have administrative and executive powers so that it could instigate effective controls of local finance and justice.

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50 *Sir Edward Grey’s Proposal in 1908*, (The Balkan Committee, Leaflet No. 3).

51 *Bryce on the Near Eastern Question*, 1905, 2.



The financial reforms were to include the commutation of the tithes, and provide for a fixed payment to the Porte by each of the Macedonian vilayets, the balance of the revenue collected remaining available for local purposes. In addition the Inspector-General was to be entrusted with the command of such Turkish troops as it might be found necessary to remain in Macedonia.<sup>52</sup>

Neither Austria nor Russia was willing to accept such a scheme, and France would take no action without Russian consent. As a consequence Russia and Austria put forward a counter proposal for financial control within Macedonia, which maintained their preferential treatment. Lord Lansdowne responded with a scheme which ensured greater equality, but the Porte ultimately rejected this. The glaring omission from the liberal internationalists' perspective was failure to incorporate any form of effective guarantees. To compound matters events at home made it impossible to keep the public spotlight on Macedonia and the government's resignation at a critical stage in the negotiations resulted in what the BC considered 'concessions which are clearly fatal to the efficacy of the scheme for financial control.'<sup>53</sup> They further viewed the introduction of a Turk to the Board of Delegates and Turkish financial inspectors as seriously weakening its potential. In addition, its Turkish President could refuse to execute any of the Board's decisions, thereby enabling the Turkish government to obstruct and passively resist any reforms.

Nationalist forces eager to claim greater representation continued to subject the region to terrorism. In response, the Turkish troops indiscriminately raided the villages whilst avoiding conflict with the armed nationalist bands.<sup>54</sup> As a result by 1907 the BC believed that over 10,000 individuals had been murdered, the majority of them women and children. Despite previous promises of reform, the subject Christians were still suffering from mal-administration, corrupt officials, illegal taxation, and the absence of judicial equality with Moslems. Bryce echoed the resounding feeling of many when

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52 Balkan Committee, *Second Report ... Year ending December 31st, 1905*, 13.

53 Ibid., 14.

54 'The Action of the Great Powers in Macedonia up till the end of 1907' memorandum dated 10 January 1908, reprinted in *Fourth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for Year ending December 31st, 1907*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1908), 15-20.



he proclaimed that any reform scheme was dead before it was even born because 'its execution is entrusted to the Turks and they never execute any reforms [...] the promises of the Turk are almost as numerous as his victims'.<sup>55</sup> Without external pressure, there was no possibility of implementing effective reforms. Visible coercion they argued was an essential prerequisite; this could be either fiscal or by force.

Discussions increasingly centred on the Turkish government's desire to increase its custom duties from eight to eleven percent. While the other Powers acquiesced in this proposal, for Britain this was of far greater significance, as around 60 percent of Turkey's imports were British. Lansdowne could only contemplate such an increase on the proviso that the surtax would not be utilised to offset the cost of the military force within Macedonia, but instead allocated to assist local administration. Again, the BC argued that the proposals contained no adequate guarantees on reform, but as far as the Porte was concerned, they were too stringent. The British government's attempt to get the custom surtax allocated to civil administration and an increase in gendarmerie powers were unsurprisingly unpalatable to the Porte and to some of the other Powers. Following the change of government and further negotiations, the Foreign Office felt impelled to accept the increase, as:

Sir Edward Grey considers, therefore, that the assent of His Majesty's Government to the increased duties has been made conditional upon the maximum of concessions it is possible at present to obtain, and that further resistance on this question would impede and embarrass, rather than effectively promote, the progress of reform.<sup>56</sup>

To the consternation of liberal internationalists, the Powers regularly demonstrated a half-hearted engagement with the Eastern Question. In many ways, the liberal internationalists

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<sup>55</sup> The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting ... September 29, 1903, NBP, MS951 c.25/1, 18.

<sup>56</sup> Extract of letter from Foreign Office to Balkans BC, 9 June 1906 in *Third Annual Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statement of Accounts for Year ending December 31st, 1906*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1907), 19-20.



were naively idealistic in expecting Britain and the other Powers to get too embroiled with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The expectation that the moral indignation of concerned citizens such as themselves could generate sufficient public pressure to stir the Powers into action on behalf of their fellow Christians was flawed. The BC focused upon the British public and as events demonstrated the interest of the press vacillated in its search for topicality. Increasingly the inability of the Powers to reach agreement on major issues paralysed any possibility of concerted international action.



## 7

## **The Young Turks and the Balkan Wars, 1908-1914**

Events in the Balkans took a dramatic turn in 1908, with the Young Turk Revolution of July. This was the culmination of the growth of secret societies pledged to the reform of the Ottoman Empire, which had developed during the post-Berlin Congress period and following the suspended Constitution of 1878. Macedonia, long a hotbed of ethnic tensions and insurrections, provided the perfect atmosphere for the development of a Turkish nationalist movement. Fears that the empire's Christians, with the backing of the Great Powers, were assuming greater influence at the expense of the ethnic Turks, coupled with a principled objection to the Sultan's autocracy, assisted the formation of an underground revolutionary movement.

The secretive Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was the result of a merger of the Young Turks and the Ottoman Freedom Society, which replicated the structure and discipline of the IMRO guerrillas by operating through small isolated cells. Their target was the Porte and consequently they received support from the existing Christian guerrilla networks. They sought to infiltrate the civil and military administrations, and had their greatest success in the Second and Third Armies, based in Salonika and Edirne. Amongst their Macedonian based members were several important figures in the future governments: Mehmet Talat, Enver Bey and Mustafa Kemal.

Initially the ideology of Turkish nationalism was not an influencing factor behind the conspirators' actions, but rather the removal of the corrupt regime headed by the Sultan and the restoration of the constitution. Following fears of Great Power intervention, the CUP acted quickly. An attempt by the Sultan to quell rebellion within the ranks in



Macedonia resulted in the assassination of his personally chosen general. With rebellion spreading, the Sultan announced on 24 July the reinstatement of the suspended Midhat Constitution. The diminution of the Sultan's power was clear for all to see.

Since its formation the BC had been calling for Great Power intervention on behalf of the Christian subject peoples; ironically it was the fear of such an intervention that served as the impetus for the emergence of the Young Turks. While the result, at least at first, achieved the BC's aim its initial response was one of amazement which 'reduces us almost to silence' due to the 'amazing transformation' that had occurred.<sup>1</sup> The BC's new policy, as outlined by W. A. Moore to Arthur Ponsonby, was to express sympathy with the liberal movement in Turkey and to obtain assurances from the British government of its neutrality and its support for the continuation of the reform schemes in Macedonia. While the sympathy of the public was naturally with the Young Turks, Moore warned that the failure to restore public order would result in the transference of public sympathy to those who could, and here he identified the Bulgarians as the most likely recipient.

The power vacuum created by the Young Turk revolution was quickly followed by Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declaring independence, and the unification of Crete with Greece. Instead of preserving the integrity of the empire, the Young Turk Revolution had resulted in its diminution. With the dawn of a new regime, the BC and its members soon succumbed to the CUP assurances of 'freedom to every race and creed.' They therefore publicly requested that the new leaders be allowed sufficient time to come to terms with the situation before any criticisms should be levelled against them. For Charles Buxton the important question was 'not whether the present Turkish Government is all that was hoped for by the optimists [... but] whether it is preferable to any alternative which is, at the present time, possible.'<sup>2</sup> In arguing for the right to speak out against past and present actions of the Turkish government, he wanted it to be:

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1 [W. A. Moore] to Arthur Ponsonby, 27 July 1908, NBP, MS951, c24.

2 *Seventh Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1910*, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1911), 11.



Understood that we express our opinions, not because we wish to interfere in her internal affairs for interference's sake, but because Turkey herself aims at bringing her Government into accord with Liberal opinion in Europe, and wants to know what that opinion is, and because we have responsibilities under the Treaty of Berlin towards the Christian subjects of the Porte. These facts justify us in following more closely the course of affairs in Turkey than in other foreign states. While criticising, we should at the same time support and help the Young Turks in their efforts towards progress.<sup>3</sup>

### **Putting 'money on the right horse'**

Through their shared interest in Macedonia, the BC was well known to the CUP leaders and, following the unprecedented change in the BC's attitude from vehement outspoken critics to forthright supporters of what they identified as a new liberal regime, their relationship was to become much closer. The first evidence of this was the arrival of Noel and Charles Buxton, Dr Arthur Evans, Sir Arthur Pears and two other BC members in Constantinople in December 1908 at the invitation of the CUP. They were entertained at dinner by the Young Turks, received by the Sultan and even witnessed the opening of the Turkish Parliament. According to Noel Buxton, they had been invited in order to 'strengthen' the Young Turks' hands, and that 'it cannot be denied that the BC can claim to have helped the reformers'.<sup>4</sup> In a reference to an earlier comment on Britain's backing of Turkey, he commented that 'By chance we put our money on the right horse.'<sup>5</sup> This visit by the Buxtons was widely reported and certainly, Charles Buxton was 'amazingly thrilled by the idea of reconciliation of Moslem and Christian, and especially by the atmosphere which surrounded the opening of the Turkish parliament.'<sup>6</sup>

To foreign observers the December invitation to Constantinople and the attempts of the CUP leadership to obtain the support of influential friends in London were evidence of

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3 Ibid., 11-12.

4 'Mr Noel Buxton's Tour in Near East', *Eastern Daily Press*, 22 December 1908; 'A Mission to Turkey. Cordial Reception of the Balkan Committee', *Daily News*, 8 December 1908.

5 'Mr Noel Buxton's Tour in Near East', *Eastern Daily Press*, 22 December 1908.

6 Noel Buxton quoted in de Bunsen, *Charles Roden Buxton*, 55.



the great power wielded by Noel Buxton and the BC. This visit also demonstrates the concerns of the Great Powers over the role of the BC. *Osmanischer Lloyd*, the German newspaper in Constantinople, regarded Buxton as both a power broker to the CUP and a puppet of the British government. Buxton's immediate retort was that he had been at odds with the British government on too many occasions to be seriously considered its tool.<sup>7</sup> This demonstrated an ongoing problem for the liberal internationalists, while wishing to influence governments and develop an authoritative position they nevertheless needed to maintain their integrity and independence.

At the same time, the Austro-Hungarians also exhibited concern over Noel Buxton's potential influence in the region. At the end of December, their Foreign Minister Count von Aehrenthal complained to the British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, about his alleged financing of Serbian insurgents.<sup>8</sup> Such an accusation was 'absurd', but Cartwright was instructed to obtain specific details should the subject be raised again. By the end of January 1909, Grey informed Cartwright that Buxton had attempted to 'exercise a moderating influence' and had informed the Serbians they could expect assistance from neither the BC nor the British government should war break out.<sup>9</sup> Reports in the *Budapesti Hirlap* critical of British policy in the region following the annexation were attributed to 'the efforts of the Balkan Committee, and particularly of its president, Mr Noel Buxton'.<sup>10</sup> Together these events supported the Foreign Office view that Buxton was a nuisance who was blithely unaware of the mischief his actions were causing.

The BC while projecting an image of authority to all concerned were at pains to dispel the belief that they held any official position. Following their visit to Constantinople in 1908, they informed the Foreign Office that when the CUP 'appeared to regard us as able to voice official views we were, of course, careful to explain our position and refer them to the proper quarter.'<sup>11</sup>

7 Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 9 December 1908, TNA FO 371/561/43986.

8 Sir Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 23 December 1908, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. vol. 5. The Near East: The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia, 1903-1909*, ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, (London: HMSO, 1928), 535.

9 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Fairfax Cartwright, 26 January 1909, *Ibid.*, ed. by, 575.

10 'Perfidious Albion', *Daily Mail*, 21 January 1909.

11 [Report to Sir Edward Grey following visit to Young Turks], NBP, MS951, c24/4.



By 1909, the BC was so enamoured with the Young Turks that they saw within them the salvation of Macedonia. Consequently, they felt so confident in the situation that the Committee held a dinner in Noel Buxton's honour. To Buxton the recent events in Turkey had proved that the efforts of the BC had been on the 'right lines and had had some effect in helping the cause of justice, though in an unexpected fashion.'<sup>12</sup> However, they detected within official circles a degree of reticence towards the new regime: while the British government viewed them with restrained optimism, their European counterparts were overtly pessimistic as to the future.

Such was their enthusiasm for the new regime that a CUP delegation, consisting of Dr Riza Tewfik Bey, Ismael Hakki Bey, Ismael Djamblat Bey and Talaat Bey, attended the BC's 1909 Annual Meeting. In a resolution the BC expressed its 'profound admiration' of what the CUP had achieved for its subjects, developing good relations with the Balkan States and ultimately they anticipated 'a *régime* at once strong and tolerant, wherein all races of the Empire may give loyalty and receive equal justice.'<sup>13</sup> At this Meeting Sir Edwin Pears, remarked that as one of the delegates to Turkey the previous year, he was impressed by the 'the unanimity of the sentiment prevailing among the Moslem people in favour of giving equal rights to their Christian fellow-subjects.'<sup>14</sup> Like many of his compatriots, he viewed the BC's work as being instrumental in imbuing the leaders of the revolutionary movement in Macedonia and Constantinople with the desire to work in a legitimate and constitutional manner to rid themselves of tyranny. In response, the Turkish representatives confirmed that the Gladstonian desire for liberty had been a factor in helping make Turkey free, and that they welcomed the BC's work in the cause of liberty and equality within Turkey.<sup>15</sup> Another sign of the good relations is evidenced in their March 1910 luncheon in honour of Enver Bey, Turkish Military *Attaché* to Berlin, who was described by Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General, as 'the Garibaldi of

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12 'Dinner given by the members of the Balkan Committee to the Chairman, Noel Buxton', NBP, MS951 c25/3.

13 *Sixth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1909*, (London: Balkan Committee, 1910), 10.

14 *Ibid.*, 10.

15 *Ibid.*, 11-12.



Turkey.’<sup>16</sup> In response Enver Bey welcomed the opportunity to meet the ‘true friends of Young Turkey’, especially Noel Buxton whom he had previously met in Constantinople, and whose visit had given them courage and moral support.

### *Foreign affairs*

It was during the period of optimism for a new liberal Turkey, that Noel joined the Anglo-German Friendship Committee, whose aim it was to reduce tension between the two imperialistic nations. Dissenters such as Buxton viewed with dismay the policy of Sir Edward Grey in relation to both Germany and the Balkans and, following the Agadir Crises of 1911, he and Arthur Ponsonby formed the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group.<sup>17</sup> This Group, which boasted an initial membership of over seventy-five Liberal MPs, advocated greater parliamentary control over foreign policy through the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Group rather than the plethora of unofficial groups concerned with specific problems such as the BC. Despite its limited success, Buxton viewed this as one of his greatest achievements.<sup>18</sup> For Marvin Swartz the most important fact was that the Group actually existed and its failure was influential in the establishment of the UDC.<sup>19</sup>

### *Armenia and the Young Turks*

The Armenians’ hopes and aspirations had received little attention in Europe since 1897, so they particularly welcomed the Young Turk revolution. Consequently, the newly formed CUP received the support of the Armenian leaders, for which they were rewarded with seats in the Ottoman Parliament, the re-establishment of the Armenian National Assembly and the freedom to develop their own schools, libraries and newspapers.

However, regime change did not halt the attacks against the Armenians, and in April 1909 up to thirty thousand Armenians in Cilicia lost their lives. The Turkish authorities accused the Hunchaks of providing arms in preparation for new demands for independence. Both

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16 Ibid., 12; ‘Enver Bey and Turkish Reform’, *The Times*, 8 March 1910.

17 ‘Foreign Affairs Group’, NBP, MS951, c19/1.

18 Biographies of Living Members of Parliament – questions from Committee on History of Parliament NBP, MS951, c10/8.

19 Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control*, 6-7.



the British Vice-Consul at Mersina and the Russian Vice-Consul at Adana dismissed the idea that the Armenians provoked the massacres.<sup>20</sup> This was to provide a foretaste of future events.

### *Return of the sceptics*

By 1911, hopes of the development of a more egalitarian Turkish state had been severely dented; the honeymoon period was well and truly over and frustration was evident on both sides. The BC's policy of advocating a degree of latitude to the Turkish leaders and a strong reluctance to criticise them while the new regime was establishing itself, now appeared too sanguine. The failure of the CUP to improve significantly conditions for the Macedonians resulted in new claims of the BC financing insurrections amongst the Christian populations.<sup>21</sup> The subsequent execution of leaders and the suppression of revolutionary propaganda were also reminiscent of the pre-revolutionary period.

Despite the enlightenment and good-will demonstrated by the new regime, there still remained an underlying level of distrust amongst non-Muslim subjects of Ottoman government. This distrust was exacerbated by attempts to create a secular state, which would forcefully abrogate the long recognised liberties of the Christians.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, the Churches and schools were viewed as a state-within-a-state, which was subjected to a new regime of misguided oppression. By the beginning of 1912, the BC concluded that the new Turkey offered no better hope for the Macedonians and other non-Moslem subjects than the old Ottoman regime.<sup>23</sup> The new government was, it realised, undertaking a 'Turkification' policy, which was contrary to the original pledges made for political and religious equality. Consequently, the BC could no longer plead for patience and a sympathetic treatment of the government's actions.

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20 Manoug Joseph Somakian, *Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 42.

21 Translation of newspaper report from Serbia, 1 March 1911, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

22 H. N. Brailsford, *Who are the Balkan Peoples?* (1912), Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 9.

23 'The Condition of the Subject Races in Turkey', Balkans Committee, January 1912, NBP, MS951, c24/2.



Naively the BC felt confident that the CUP's desire for a common Turkish patriotism was compatible with individual ethnic consciousness and religious equality. However, they were not blind to the possibility that the habits of the old regime could eventually become re-established. Following their 1908 visit, they warned Sir Edward Grey they were concerned by the level of jingoism certain CUP leaders exhibited.<sup>24</sup> If left unchecked this could lead to two possible outcomes: either they would provoke hostility among the different Christian nationalities; or the self-confidence they displayed would lead them inextricably into difficulties with the various nationalities within the empire. In addition, the CUP was subject to the conflicting internal interests of the liberal reformers, the chauvinist militarists and the Pan-Islamists. Should the latter gain the upper hand they predicted the destruction of the Empire.<sup>25</sup> According to Brailsford, in the run-up to the Balkan Wars the Young Turks had committed the 'supreme folly of alienating every Balkan race at once.'<sup>26</sup>

The return of the old policies of repression and misgovernment proved that the Young Turks were little better than the old ones. The Porte's Turkification policy and its failure to improve conditions in Macedonia came as a disappointing blow to Buxton.<sup>27</sup> In August 1912, A. G. Symonds, the BC's new Secretary, was caught in a dilemma between issuing a manifesto which boldly advocated Gladstone's 'bag and baggage' policy which, he recognised, might have encouraged the 'subject populations to go to war' or a more optimistic proclamation.<sup>28</sup> Brailsford however was against issuing any form of manifesto or even making representations to Sir Edward Grey. The conditions in Macedonia prior to the outbreak of war were highlighted by the *Daily Telegraph's* Paris Correspondent, who compared Macedonia with its neighbour Romania, 'both equally rich countries naturally. On the one hand, in Roumania, peace, prosperity, and wealth. On the other side, in Macedonia, wretched poverty.'<sup>29</sup>

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24 [Report to Sir Edward Grey following visit to Young Turks], NBP, MS951, c24/4.

25 *Sixth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1909*, 9.

26 Brailsford, *Who are the Balkan Peoples?* (1912).

27 'Balkan Committee Remonstrance', *The Times*, 12 January 1912.

28 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 28 September 1912, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

29 *Daily Telegraph*, 10 October 1912.



## An Ideal War

Throughout its early years the BC constantly warned that unless a peaceful solution was quickly found, the region would descend into anarchy, insurrection and ultimately war. However, when war came it was unexpectedly initiated by the Italian attack on Tripoli in September 1911, which the Great Powers had clearly been impotent to avert (or even foresee). Following the outbreak of war in North Africa, the normally factious Balkan states exhibited a degree of co-operation that was previously believed impossible. In order to achieve this, Bulgaria and Serbia came to an agreement over the future of Macedonia. Under Russian auspices in early 1912, they divided Macedonia into three zones, one Bulgarian, one Serbian and a central uncontested buffer zone. Despite the failure to resolve the territorial dispute between the Bulgarians and the Greeks over Salonika these two belligerents joined to form the Balkan League with Serbia and Montenegro to divest the Ottoman Empire of its remaining European possessions.

While the BC had long been calling for the different ethnic groups to co-operate this was not necessarily the outcome they had in mind. In July 1905, they had issued an appeal to the various 'races' in the Balkan Peninsula to unite in common action and not to weaken their forces by mutual hatreds.<sup>30</sup> Their combined desire was for the Great Powers to accept responsibility for their fellow Christians and ensure that the Turkish rule was at least moderated, if not completely removed. Ideally, protection would come from a European Power with international authority to govern in the interests of the local population, which in many ways foreshadowed the Mandate System that would emerge as part of the post First World War League of Nations.

The Balkan Wars were significant for the Armenians as those living in the Balkans fought alongside the Bulgarians, while those in Anatolia agitated for Russian involvement.<sup>31</sup> While the Tsar appeared to be sympathetic to the Armenians, his prime concern was to

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30 Balkan Committee, *Second Report ... Year ending December 31st, 1905*, 16.

31 Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, 31.



avoid anarchy in Transcaucasia. By reviving the Armenian Question, he hoped to retain the loyalty of the Russian Armenians.<sup>32</sup> The 1905-1907 disturbances within the Russian heartland encouraged the Russian government to seek the introduction of reforms for the Ottoman Armenians in order to mitigate disturbances along their border with Turkey. The increase of Russian influence in the region, following the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, which identified the northern provinces of Persia as being within a Russian zone of influence, compounded the need.

An Albanian rebellion in May 1912 served to highlight the internal pressures and in October, the Balkan League declared war. The future of Macedonia was central to the nationalist struggles of the League members, a fact the BC viewed with dismay. In a last-ditch plea to the Powers, the BC urged the despatch of their fleets to Constantinople to 'achieve without bloodshed what the armies of the [Balkan] League may win with slaughter.'<sup>33</sup> As far as the BC was concerned, the Balkan states had mobilised not for war, but for the prospect of justice for their fellows. In vain, they looked to the European Powers to intervene.

Buxton's response was to go with his brother Charles and see at first hand the horrors of the war.<sup>34</sup> Their position with the Bulgarian general staff was, according to Noel Buxton, the result of his high profile position within the BC.<sup>35</sup> During this period, he observed the devastation the war was causing and the distress and suffering it brought to the ordinary peasants. In his address to the 1912 National Peace Congress, Noel Buxton demonstrated the liberal internationalists' frustration at the failure of the international system to settle the dispute between Turkey and her neighbours:

Must I abandon my desire to see home happiness brought to the  
unfortunate subjects of Turkey, must I abandon my hope that this can

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32 Roderic H. Davison, 'The Armenian Crises, 1912-1914', *American Historical Review*, 53, no. 3 (April 1948), 486-7.

33 Balkan Committee, Manifesto of the Balkan Committee, 12 October 1912, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

34 Noel Buxton, 'The Wounded', *Contemporary Review*, 103 (1913), 153-159.

35 'Mr Noel Buxton on the War.' *Norwich Eastern Daily Press*, 18 December 1912.



be done by peaceful means, and so must I become an advocate of this war? That is a dilemma [...and] what a horrible contradiction presents itself in this matter.<sup>36</sup>

The level of co-operation between the Bulgarian, Greek and Serb armies indicated that now was the time to implement Gladstone's 'bag and baggage' policy. The war Buxton concluded was 'an ideal one', as it provided the greatest chance of releasing the Macedonians from the Turkish yoke; it was a war of liberation, which placed the right of self-determination above peace.<sup>37</sup> Angell in his *Peace Theories and the Balkan War* concurred by arguing that the war was 'justified' as it brought to an end centuries of tyranny and repression: 'that is why those of us who do not believe in military force rejoice.'<sup>38</sup>

Despite their initial reservations over the resort to war, the BC could not be anything but satisfied with the outcome of the First Balkan War, which saw the Balkan League states victorious. The subsequent peace conference opened in London on 16 December 1912, with Austro-Hungarian demands for the Serbian withdrawal from the newly proclaimed state of Albania. In January 1913, the BC issued a Manifesto to the Peace delegates of the Balkan States, in which they expressed their 'profound satisfaction at the glorious results' achieved through the use of force.<sup>39</sup> Paradoxically, this was a *pacifistic* response to the justness of the recent war. Nevertheless, a lasting peace required co-operation between the individual States, and they warned the delegates against the break-up of their alliance. Through their combined efforts, the Powers took a greater interest in the region and considered them serious negotiating partners, a lesson soon forgotten.

The London Conference adjourned without reaching any agreement at the end of January. This month also saw a coup d'état in Constantinople, which brought the CUP

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36 Quoted in Laity, *The British Peace Movement, 1870-1914*, 209.

37 [Manifesto to the Peace Delegates], NBP, MS951, c24/1.

38 Norman Angell, *Peace Theories and the Balkan War* (London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1912), 8-9, 58.

39 [Manifesto to the Peace Delegates], NBP, MS951, c24/1.



untrammelled power for the first time since the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Despite the revolution, the CUP and its followers did not have overwhelming control of the Ottoman government. Due to its occasional break-up into differing factions and so-called counter-revolutions, power had proved to be transitory and elusive. However, the defeat in the Balkans provided a unifying force and justification for the coup, together with the fear that the government would surrender Edirne as part of the peace settlement. As in 1908, the change in the Turkish power structure and the appearance of internal disarray caused the Empire's neighbours to look on covetously. The Treaty of London finally signed on 30 May 1913, officially recognised Albania and assigned to Bulgaria a southern frontier running from Enos, on the Aegean to Midia on the Black Sea.

The apparent unity of the Balkan states soon dissipated. The Serbian loss of the Albanian territories resulted in their unwillingness to accept the pre-war agreement to apportion Macedonia. Consequently, a conflagration of disputes erupted within Macedonia. At the beginning of June 1913, the Serbs and Greeks made an alliance against Bulgaria, which was increasingly being isolated. With Russia taking a firm stance against it, Bulgaria made a pre-emptive strike against Serbia and Greece at the end of June. During the ensuing chaos Rumania invaded Dobruja, which it had previously demanded as compensation for maintaining neutrality during the earlier disputes; the Ottomans also recaptured Adrianople. As D. K. Fieldhouse observes, this same Ottoman army that suffered decisively at the hands of its former subject states would, with just three years' further training, assisted by German officers, defeat the Allies in the Dardanelles, limit British progress in Mesopotamia, and drive out the French, Greeks and Italians from Anatolia.<sup>40</sup>

Bulgarian humiliation was enshrined in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913. For the Bulgarians this had a double blow of losing Dobruja, its most productive region, to Rumania and the dissection of Macedonia to its disadvantage. Because of the

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40 D. K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 16.



loss of Dobruja, the Bulgarians had to secure sufficient financial aid to develop their backward areas in compensation and cover the general costs of the recent wars.<sup>41</sup> This would have a significant bearing upon the attitude of Bulgaria during the First World War. Greece obtained Salonika, Kavalla and coastal Macedonia; Serbia gained northern and central Macedonia, leaving Bulgaria just the Strumnica region.

### *Consequences of the Balkan War*

In his introduction to the Carnegie Inquiry into the recent wars, d'Estournelles insisted that the neither the Balkan peoples nor the European governments were to blame. The real culprits were irresponsible nationalists who placed their particular interests above the general good of their fellow citizens.<sup>42</sup> While the decline of Ottoman-Turkish power and prestige was a critical factor behind the wars, strident nationalist propaganda was also significant. The primary agitators were the priests, schoolmasters, revolutionary movements as well as the press and officials.<sup>43</sup> True salvation for both small and large states lay in 'union and conciliation.'<sup>44</sup>

Following a visit to Macedonia in May 1914 David Starr Jordan, of Stanford University, and President of the World Peace Foundation reported to Noel Buxton that the greatest problem now faced within Macedonia was that of the volume of refugees. From his observation, the individual states were following a unifying policy through 'the forcible conversion, assimilation or banishment of aliens within their borders'.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, the homeless and displaced invariably found themselves on the wrong side of an arbitrary boundary, the path of self-determination ultimately led to mass migration and ethnic cleansing.

### *Watching the interests of the Armenians*

The liberal internationalists' concern for the subject peoples also extended to the

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41 For details of the position of Bulgaria in the Balkan conflicts see Richard J Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 427.

42 *Report ... into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, 19.

43 *Ibid.*, 50-51.

44 *Ibid.*, 19.

45 David Starr Jordan to Noel Buxton, 12 July 1914, NBP, MS951, c24/2.



Armenians whose homeland straddled the border between the Tsarist and Ottoman Empires. Some like Hobhouse saw this as a suitable extension for the BC as 'I feel that the interests of the Armenians would be better served by that body than by any scratch crowd that is likely to be got together for the purpose.'<sup>46</sup> Rather than broaden the BC's remit several of its leading members together with some of their former pro-Boer colleagues established the BAC in late 1912. The initial meeting took place in the House of Commons at the end of December, and amongst those MPs attending were Arthur Ponsonby, J. F. Whyte, George Greenwood, Sir Charles Swann, J. Allen Baker, and J. M. Dent.<sup>47</sup> The key players were notable by their absence from this initial meeting, but under the chairmanship of Aneurin Williams, the BAC became the political organisation 'which protects the Armenian interest in this country'.<sup>48</sup> Noel Buxton, Gooch, and T. P. O'Connor soon joined Williams, with Bryce as de facto President. Operating very much as a political select committee it attracted many politicians and those with 'first-hand knowledge of Armenia and the East.'<sup>49</sup>

Only Bryce and Noel Buxton had direct experience of Armenia. Bryce had travelled extensively around the region in the 1870s and published his impressions in *Transcaucasia and Ararat*. Noel Buxton and his brother the Revd. Harold Buxton had explored both Russian and Turkish Armenia during the autumn of 1913 with their impressions published in 1914 as *Travels and Politics in Armenia*. The overriding perspective they reached would have a significant influence over the BAC. They believed that the peasants were increasingly reliant upon self-defence, and that their best hope lay in annexation by Russia.<sup>50</sup>

The genesis of the BAC coincided with the arrival in London of representatives of the Ottoman government and the Balkan League in an attempt by the European Powers to

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46 L. T. Hobhouse to Noel Buxton, 8 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

47 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2.

48 'Resolution of the Armenian committees of London, Paris and Manchester', 20 April 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar's Papers and the Armenian Question: 1915-1918*, ed. by Vatche Ghazarian, (Waltham, MA: Mayreni Publishing, 1996), 39.

49 Aneurin Williams letter to the Editor, *The Times*, 12 July 1913.

50 Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 26 November 1913, Oxford University Bodleian Library: James Bryce Papers (henceforth JBP), MS201, f34.



conclude the ongoing Balkan Wars. A consequence of these negotiations appears to be the raising of Armenian hopes and, in late 1913, a Russo-Turkish agreement was reached which included the introduction of new reforms for the Armenians. In response, *The Times* leader commented that the Armenians ‘must obtain safety for their lives and for their homes, they must be delivered from the constant fear of massacre and of plunder; they must be granted a reasonably just and enlightened administration [...] this time the paper reforms must be translated into facts.’<sup>51</sup> Williams, on behalf of the BAC argued that the Armenians earnestly desired to remain subjects of the Ottoman Empire, provided some form of tolerable government was available to them. To ensure the implementation of reforms he insisted that the Powers should monitor and oversee them.<sup>52</sup> In November 1913, Williams headed a deputation to the Foreign Office, where Sir Edward Grey failed to persuade him that the reforms could work.<sup>53</sup> Grey was confident that the Turks had learnt from their mistakes, but he claimed it would be impossible to exert any financial pressure on them.<sup>54</sup> This was in part due to the agreements already made relating to the Baghdad Railway.

Despite these promises the BAC and others, watching events in eastern Turkey, continued to express concern over the fate of the Armenians. The Armenian Question was becoming more politicised with every passing moment. In March 1914, Williams and Bryce discussed the possibility of introducing a debate into the House of Lords over the issue of reform.<sup>55</sup> It would take another 19 months and the wholesale massacre of the Armenian people to enable the first real debate to take place.

The importance of Macedonia cannot be underestimated. It provided a focus for the liberal internationalists’ Gladstonian moralism, which saw the detachment – administratively or completely – of territories from the Ottoman Empire as the salvation of its subject populations. Force – diplomatic or military – would, they believed, have to be used by

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51 *The Times*, 31 October 1913.

52 *The Times*, 12 July 1913.

53 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 26 November 1913; JBP, MS201, f33.

54 Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 26 November 1913, JBP, MS201, f34.

55 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 12 March 1914; JBP, MS201, f65.



outside governments. It was fear of such force within the Macedonia-based Ottoman army that resulted in the Young Turk Revolution and ultimately the establishment of a CUP government. The subsequent nationalistic policies adopted by the Turks would result in a sea change in liberal internationalists thinking on self-determination.



## 8

### **Going out of the Lights, 1914-1915**

The First World War was in many ways the crucial turning point for liberal internationalism. While the groundwork for the development of an institutional approach was laid down in the preceding decades, it took the escalation of the 'third Balkan war' into total war to put that approach at the fore of public debate on foreign policy. Paradoxically, the catastrophic breakdown of the international system in August 1914 ushered in a golden opportunity for the liberal internationalists to formulate their vision of the institution(s) needed to secure a 'new world order'. The first nine months of the war would witness its rapid gestation before settling down to a more gradual but steady growth and eventual acceptance and embodiment in the form of the League of Nations. At the same time, the moral approach was not totally abandoned; it was employed on behalf of the Armenians who in early 1915 found their lives and liberty threatened by a policy of ethnic cleansing and ultimately genocide. This chapter will examine these contemporaneous issues: the origins of the League idea and the response to the Armenian massacres. Together they demonstrate the twin dimensions of liberal internationalism evolving simultaneously as the international anarchy reigned supreme.

### Relics of barbarism

In the period leading up to the declaration of war, the liberal internationalists continued to play an important role in criticising British foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> They were also evident amongst the strident calls for reductions in naval expenditure on the *Dreadnoughts*. The view expressed by Aneurin Williams that this was ‘a shocking waste and a relic of barbarism’ reflected the desire of many to divert the expenditure to further social reforms.<sup>2</sup> Their response to the impending conflict is illustrated in Aneurin Williams’ correspondence with his wife. On 28 July, the news from the ‘East’ regarding Austria-Hungary and Serbia provided ‘nothing but horrid confirmation of the outbreak of war’.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, he sought out Noel Buxton and other like-minded individuals in order to discuss the possibility of organising sufficient Liberal MPs to protest against the government dragging Britain into the conflict. The following day Arthur Ponsonby initiated a series of meetings of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group in an attempt to mobilise opposition.<sup>4</sup> After listening to Sir Edward Grey’s statement to the House, they issued a resolution stating that they were ‘of the opinion that no sufficient reason exists [...] for Great Britain intervening in the War’.<sup>5</sup> Williams like many of his contemporaries was ‘not won over the Foreign Secretary’s eloquence’, and would subsequently speak out against the government’s policy which he believed was merely pandering to the anti-German press rather than doing ‘all it could for peace’.<sup>6</sup>

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- 1 A discussion of the role of radical Liberals can be found in, H Weinroth, ‘The British Radicals & the Balance of Power, 1902-14’, *Historical Journal*, XIII, no. 4 (1970), 681; G. R. Searle, *The Liberal Party: Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); Bentley, *The Climax of Liberal Politics*; Chris Cook, *A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1997*, fifth edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Keith Laybourn and Jack Reynolds, *Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1880-1918* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).
  - 2 *Manchester Guardian*, 24 January 1914; The dilemma for Liberals such as Williams over the issue of expenditure on armaments rather than social reform is addressed by Gerald Jordan, ‘Pensions not Dreadnoughts: The Radicals and Naval Retrenchment’, in *Edwardian Radicalism*, ed. by A. J. A. Morris, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 162-179.
  - 3 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 28 July 1914, AWP, AW/2/1/12.
  - 4 ‘Notes on Meetings’, APP, c660, f64-65; for a detailed analysis of the events see Swartz, ‘A Study of Futility’, *Edwardian Radicalism*, ed. by A. J. A. Morris, 252-259.
  - 5 ‘Notes on Meetings’, APP, c660, f64-65.
  - 6 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, AWP AW/2/1/12; *Hansard*, LXV, HC, 3 August 1914, col. 1871.



The divisions within Parliament were also played out in the press with *The Times* calling for military intervention while the *Manchester Guardian* and other radical papers expressed a desire to see Britain acting as impartial mediator. The subsequent resignations of Lord Morley, John Burns and Charles Trevelyan from the government were applauded for making a stand 'against this awful war fever'.<sup>7</sup> Hastily organised campaigns to maintain British neutrality were initiated both in and out of parliament. Hobson and Wallas formed the Neutrality Committee, with the support of Lord Courtney, Ramsay MacDonald, Gilbert Murray, A. G. Gardiner, Hobhouse, F. W. Hirst and J. L. Hammond. At the same time, Angell launched an alternative Neutrality League. Both proved to be ineffectual and short-lived.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, in the Commons thirty of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group formed a new parliamentary association 'for the purposes of watching the progress of the European crisis and for taking such steps [...] as shall relieve the distress resulting from the war and expedite a speedy settlement.'<sup>9</sup> Trevelyan, free from his ministerial responsibilities was elected chairman and Ponsonby its vice-chairman. With the intention of it becoming a cross-party committee, a meeting was arranged with Labour's Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson. According to Williams this would mean that 80 to 100 Liberal and Labour MPs would join the group 'to watch over the interests of peace'.<sup>10</sup> MacDonald's resignation as chairman of the parliamentary Labour Party, following the Party's decision to support the government's request for war credits, wrecked these plans.<sup>11</sup> This unnamed group continued to meet until at least 23 February 1915, to discuss and plan action with regard to the government's policy. The role of the group was constrained by its commitment not to do 'anything to embarrass the Government in the conduct of the

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7 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, op cit.; Aneurin Williams to John Burns, Burns Papers, British Library Add. MSS. 46303, f17; for a discussion on the resignations see K. Robbins, *The Abolition of War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976), 36.

8 For the role of the Neutrality Committee and League see Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 184-5; Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, 220; Robbins, *The Abolition of War*, 28.

9 R. D. Denmann MSS, 4 4(3), f1.

10 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, AWP AW/2/1/12.

11 Denman MSS, 4 4(3), f1-3; see also David Marquand, *Ramsay MacDonald* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977) 169.



war'.<sup>12</sup> Ultimately, its activities were subsumed within those of the UDC of which E. D. Morel, Trevelyan, Ponsonby, and MacDonald were the prime movers.

### Proposals for a League of Peace

With Britain engaged in the war, the futility of protest soon became apparent to the majority who shared Hobhouse's belief that 'our safety is at stake.'<sup>13</sup> The proximity to the conflict was to prove to be a most effective stimulus for liberal internationalism. Despite Williams' associations with MacDonald, Angell and Trevelyan, he decided not to join the UDC, preferring instead to turn his mind to the development of an institutional mechanism to limit armed conflict.<sup>14</sup> He was not alone amongst liberal internationalists in considering how international relations could be organised to reduce potential conflicts. While a league of nations or states rapidly became their preferred means, its ultimate structure, functions and *Modus operandi* would remain under discussion for the duration of the conflict.

In November 1914, Williams published 'Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection,' in *The Contemporary Review*. Subsequently described as the 'first moderate-defencist scheme' published during the war, it outlined a 'true' Concert of Europe.<sup>15</sup> His suggestion was that the League would be established as a mechanism for settling disputes by peaceful means, and provide support for the judgements of international tribunals. His scheme also included provision for mutual defence, or as it would later become known, collective security. His ideas were to undergo considerable revision and re-evaluation as the war progressed, but mutual protection remained an integral aspect of his league.<sup>16</sup> Williams' article gave a sharp impetus to the evolution of liberal internationalist ideas and according to Laity represented a major departure from traditional peace thinking.<sup>17</sup>

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12 *Manchester Guardian*, 7 August 1914.

13 Cited in Robbins, *The Abolition of War*, 39.

14 Williams had been invited to join the UDCs Council, but preferred to concentrate on the League as a distinct issue, Aneurin Williams to C. P. Trevelyan, 8 January 1915, AWP AW/3/1/26.

15 M Ceadel, 'Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement', 169-191 & 177.

16 For a comparison of the components of the different proposals see Dackombe, 'Aneurin Williams and the Development of the League of Nations Movement in Britain, 1914-1919', 51-55.

17 Laity, *The British Peace Movement*, 234.



Others giving consideration to a league of nations during the first year of conflict included Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, a Fellow of Kings College, Cambridge; Hobson; the lawyer F. N. Keen; Brailsford; and Leonard Woolf.<sup>18</sup> Like Williams, Lowes Dickinson soon after the outbreak of hostilities had sought a way to avoid future wars. In early September 1914, he wrote to Wallas informing him that it was important that they should:

Concentrate, on a few definite principles, the new European order we want to be introduced at the peace [...] it is not necessary, nor even desirable, to work out in detail the whole machinery, and to meet beforehand all the difficulties and objections. The point is to convince those who are to act for us, that those are the principles and aims we want them to adopt when they work out a settlement.<sup>19</sup>

In order to formulate these principles and aims he brought together a small group of individuals which included the Liberal MPs Ponsonby, and Sir Willoughby Dickinson, together with Hobson, Wallas, and E. Richard Cross, solicitor to the Rowntree family and manager of *The Nation*. On the condition that the group's discussions were private, Bryce agreed to act as its figurehead, and prepared a discussion paper advocating national self-determination, limitation of armaments and a league of nations.<sup>20</sup>

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18 For example see, G. Lowes Dickinson, 'The Way Out', *War and Peace*, 1, no. 12 (September 1914), 345-346; G. Lowes Dickinson, *After the War* (London: A. C. Fifield, 1915); H N Brailsford, 'On Preventing Wars', *War and Peace*, II (1915), 71-72; Hobson, *Towards International Government.*; Frank Noel Keen, *The World Alliance. A Plan for Preventing Future Wars* (London: W. Southwood & Co, Ltd, 1915); Leonard Woolf, 'Suggestions for the Prevention of War: An International Authority and the Prevention of War', *New Statesman*, 5, no. 118 (July 1915), Special Supplement 1-24; Leonard Woolf, 'Suggestions for the Prevention of War: Articles Suggested for adoption by an International Conference at the Termination of the present War by the International Agreements Committee of the Fabian Research Department', *New Statesman*, 5, no. 119 (1915), Special supplement 1-8.

19 Goldesworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, BLPES: Graham Wallas Papers (henceforth GWP) 1/55, f21-22.

20 A copy can be seen in WHDP, c.402; see also Keith G. Robbins, 'Lord Bryce and the First World War', *The Historical Journal*, 10, no. 2 (1967); Robbins, *The Abolition of War*, 49-50; Martin David Dubin, 'Towards the Concept of Collective Security: the Bryce Group's "Proposals for the Avoidance of War" 1914-1917', *International Organization*, 24, no. 2 (1983), 290.



While its deliberations were in private, the Bryce Group sought the opinions of others with an interest in its objects.<sup>21</sup> Amongst those consulted were Williams whose recently published proposals were according to Bryce, 'well worth our consideration.'<sup>22</sup> The first version of the Group's 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War' was privately distributed in March 1915, and underwent several revisions.<sup>23</sup> However, it was only in April 1917, following America's entry into the war, that they were finally published.<sup>24</sup>

The Bryce Group and Williams' proposals both followed a practical approach in advocating a limited 'league': they sought an association of sovereign states, which would agree to refer all disputes to a tribunal or council, while observing a cooling-off period, pending a decision. Any states not observing this process were to be subjected to 'collective' diplomatic, economic or military action, but this fell short of the establishment of an international police force. Certainly, Lowes Dickinson took William's criticism of the original draft proposals into account and together with other Bryce Group members he was involved in subsequent LNS discussions which utilised Williams' proposals as the basis of its discussions.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, the Fabian Society commissioned Leonard Woolf to investigate the possibility of an international organisation to prevent future wars. Woolf's suggestions published in the *New Statesman* in July 1915, advocated an international organisation, comprising a high court and a secretariat to service a council, which would codify and amend international law, as well as having jurisdiction over economic and social questions. The three proposals displayed many similarities, but an important distinction was that of the three only the Bryce Group was unwilling to utilise sanctions against a member refusing to accept an award in justiciable disputes.<sup>26</sup>

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21 See WHDP, c.402 for details of the various comments received on the Group's proposals.

22 Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 3 December 1914, AWP AW/3/1/2.

23 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce' (As revised up to 24<sup>th</sup> February, 1915); 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce' (Amended after receipt of criticisms, August 1915); 'Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce' (Amended after receipt of criticism, November 1915) AWP AW/3/1/2.

24 Viscount Bryce, *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917); *Manchester Guardian*, 12 April 1917.

25 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Aneurin Williams, 16 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/10.

26 Such disputes are those which are capable of being decided by a court of law.



Founded in February 1915, the LNS was the culmination of Aneurin Williams' efforts to bring together like-minded men and women to consider the ideas outlined in his *Contemporary Review* article. While Williams' proposals formed the initial starting point for subsequent discussions, the Society sought to consider all relevant aspects, including the complete abolition of war.<sup>27</sup> They also demonstrated a natural caution in making any public pronouncements, as they had no wish to be considered an anti-war group. Additionally, they believed that the premature publication of their plans would be detrimental to the acceptance of its underlying premise. In addition, the rise in anti-German feeling following the sinking of the *Lusitania*, together with observation of how their associates in the UDC had been received, no doubt revived memories of the jingoistic attitudes of the public during the South African War.

Williams was insistent that the League idea should be promoted as a distinctive aspiration rather than becoming subsumed within a pre-existing group.<sup>28</sup> The traditional peace societies were hardly likely to endorse the strongly *pacifistic* approach adopted by the pro-leaguers. As it transpired, the groups formed in response to the war such as the LNS were to prove more successful than the older societies. Consequently Williams' select group of internationalists informally discussed amongst themselves ways of improving international relations. Finally, on Friday 5 February 1915, the LNS was formed at a meeting in Mrs Walter Rea's house in Westminster, 'to popularise the principle that the eventual TREATY of Peace shall contain provision to ensure the judicial settlement of all international disputes.'<sup>29</sup> In addition to Mrs Rea and Aneurin Williams, those present included Mr Allen of Bedford College, Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Senator La Fontaine of Belgium.<sup>30</sup> Over the coming weeks, those receiving invitations and joining

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27 'Note as to the origin of the League of Nations Union', WHDP, c406, f70; *World-wide Support for a League of Nations*, (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 34, 1918) WHDP, c406, f101.

28 Aneurin Williams to G. P. Gooch, 27 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13; Aneurin Williams to Dr. C. L. Lange, 4 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/19.

29 'Original Agenda', WHDP, c.404, f7; Mrs Walter Rea to Gilbert Murray, 8 February 1915, GMP, MS178, f33.

30 Mrs Walter Rea to Gilbert Murray, 8 February 1915, GMP, MS 178, f33; La Fontaine was a Professor in International Law, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913, President of the International Peace Bureau and a strong advocate of internationalism. Williams had been appointed as a representative on the International Peace Bureau.



the discussions included Gilbert Murray, Lowes Dickinson, Ernest Rhys, Hobhouse, London County Councillor A. W. Claremont and his wife, together with John Russell, headmaster of Hampstead's King Alfred School, and H. N. Spalding who during the war served in the Admiralty before becoming Director of Welfare within the Ministry of Munitions. By 12 February, they had formulated the new society's objects, which were:

To secure the establishment of an International Court, and the federation of civilised nations [...] which shall bind themselves, (a) to settle by peaceful means all disputes arising among themselves, (b) to defend any one of their number wh[ich] may be attacked by some state not willing to submit its quarrels to peaceful settlement, (c) to admit to membership on equal terms any civilised state desiring to join.<sup>31</sup>

The influences of Aneurin Williams' proposals are evident in the various drafts prepared by the LNS, and those finally adopted on 3 May 1915.<sup>32</sup> The main areas of contention amongst the discussants were when the League should actually be formed and the issue of mutual protection. While most agreed the League could only be instituted after the conclusion of hostilities, some were reluctant to preclude its earlier creation.<sup>33</sup> As the war progressed, this issue would become a major obstacle and would lead to the temporary disintegration of the LNS.

The other issue, which nearly led to the stillbirth of the fledgling society, was that of mutual protection. For Aneurin Williams, this was a crucial issue. For as he informed Charles Gide, the French economist, at the end of May, it was important 'to persuade my friends to concentrate their efforts on the one idea of Mutual Protection and the maintenance of International Law by an agreement among those powers which really desire peace.'<sup>34</sup>

31 Sub-committee Report for meeting on 12 February 1915, AWP AW/3/1/3.

32 'First Draft of the Basis of the Society', Thursday 25 [February 1915], AWP AW/3/1/3; 'The Union of States Society, Objects of the Society', 10 March 1915, AWP AW/3/1/3; 'The League of Nations Society, adopted 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1915', AWP AW/3/1/2.

33 Basil Williams to Aneurin Williams, 4 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/28; Aneurin Williams to Basil Williams, 19 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/28.

34 Aneurin Williams to Professor Charles Gide, 28 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13.



Ultimately, Williams accepted the compromise of League members making 'provision for mutual defence' rather than see the whole scheme fall at its first hurdle.<sup>35</sup> Even this proved too strong for some of the more pacifist members of the committee: Mrs Rea, the hostess and convenor of the preliminary meetings felt this clause made it impossible for her to serve on the committee.<sup>36</sup> Mutual protection was also in the Bryce Group's proposals as without such a provision, Bryce argued, 'the whole thing will seem pointless and ineffective.'<sup>37</sup>

The preparation of the Society's aims fell to Williams, who expounded upon his belief, that without collective action 'the League would become a farce: there would be no security against aggressive States. It does not follow that the force need always be military or naval: it is possible that in certain cases diplomatic pressure, or economic pressure, might be sufficient.'<sup>38</sup> His address to the November General Meeting illustrated the idealistic assumption, common amongst his contemporaries, that the League could ultimately act as a mechanism for armaments reduction by providing security from aggression.

Of the five significant groups launched within the first fifteen months of the war, only the LNS and UDC operated on truly *pacifistic* lines.<sup>39</sup> The UDC leadership was more willing to identify itself with pacifism, while those of the LNS constantly strove to disassociate themselves from what they perceived as its negative connotation.<sup>40</sup>

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35 League of Nations Society, *Report of General Meeting [...] November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1915* (LNS Publication no. 3, 1915), 17.

36 Mrs Claremont to Aneurin Williams, 22 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/8.

37 'Memorandum on Mr J. A. Hobson's Notes', WHDP c.402.

38 Theodore Marburg to W. H. Short, 11 September 1916 in *Development of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg*, ed. by John H. Latané, 2 vols (New York: MacMillan, 1932), vol. i, 158 ; League of Nations Society, *Report of General Meeting ... November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1915* (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 3, 1915), 7; League of Nations Society, *Explanation of the Objects of the Society* (Letchworth: League of Nations Society Publication No. 2, 1916).

39 Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 198.

40 See A. Williams to G. P. Gooch, 27 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13; A. Williams to G. P. Gooch, 12 June 1915, AWP; A. Steel-Maitland to W. H. Dickinson, 19 June 1918, WHDP, c.403, f115; W. H. Dickinson to G. Murray, 24 August 1918, GMP, MS 178, f51.



## The New Eastern Question

The outbreak of war saw Williams' attention divided between his desire to build support for the new form of international machinery he and his fellow liberal internationalists were busy formulating, and his concern for the Armenians. This would remain a difficult but important balancing act. Noel Buxton too found an important outlet for his energies, a mission to obtain Bulgarian support undertaken at the behest of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill who dispatched him to Sofia in a vain attempt to secure Bulgaria's allegiance to the Allies.<sup>41</sup> In February 1915, Mark Sykes confided to Noel Buxton that the key to the war lay with the Bulgarians, whose help he hoped Buxton could obtain. 'Of course we can wear Germany down, but a war of exhaustion is very deadly even to the winners [...] The war has completely transformed our strategic position in the East and in the World.'<sup>42</sup> The policy of keeping the Ottoman Empire intact had failed in many respects and for Sykes it had in particular failed to prevent the First World War. Buxton ultimately viewed the Bulgarians' decision to support the Germans, as being forced upon them by a series of diplomatic blunders, and as such they should not be punished in the post-war settlement.<sup>43</sup>

While Buxton undertook his abortive mission, Williams and his BAC colleagues kept an ever-watchful eye on Turkey. Recent years had seen an extension of the 'Turkification' policies, whereby the assimilation of non-Turkish groups within the empire took place, by force if necessary. The compulsory use of Turkish in commerce and education was essential for moulding a cohesive Turkish identity. Williams shared the Armenian leaders' fears that Turkey's entry into the war in November 1914 would be 'the signal for a massacre of the Christians.'<sup>44</sup> For the Armenian community living in London there was the portent that 'Armenia could be regarded as the Belgium of the Near East.'<sup>45</sup>

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41 He was supported by Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George but importantly not Sir Edward Grey; see Charles Raymond Zienius, 'The Secret Mission of Noel Buxton to Bulgaria, September 1914 - January 1915' (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1997); Conwell-Evans, *Foreign Policy from a Back Bench*, 88-100; Anderson, *Noel Buxton A Life*, 62-70.

42 Mark Sykes to Noel Buxton, 10 February 1915, NBP, MS951 c24/10.

43 Noel Buxton, Outlines of a Lasting Balkan Settlement, NBP, MS951, c26/7.

44 *The Manchester Guardian*, 5 November 1914.

45 *The Manchester Guardian*, 6 November 1914.



Reinforcement of these fears came with the proclamation of a Jihad against Britain, France and Russia.

In truth, the liberal internationalists had been making similar representations to Sir Edward Grey for some time: examples included those by the BC in November 1912, the Archbishop of Canterbury the following year, and another by Williams in September 1914. On that occasion, he reported that the fear of a massacre was the result of a perceived Turkish policy to rid the country of its Christian subjects, who were viewed as weakening the Empire.<sup>46</sup> In the years leading up to the First World War the typical Foreign Office response was to do little more than make representations as an *acquiescence* (to salve our conscience).<sup>47</sup> All this changed in November 1914 when the Foreign Office's and the liberal internationalist's attitudes converged, and it rapidly became expedient to expose the situation publicly. As a result, a close collaboration soon developed between Bryce, Williams and the Foreign Office. Consequently, as Akaby Nassibian has observed, the BAC became 'the most active and influential political group' engaged with the Armenian Question.<sup>48</sup>

The change in government attitude was demonstrated by both Asquith and Lloyd George who publicly denounced the empire as a 'blight' and a 'cancer' upon a once fair land.<sup>49</sup> *The Times* leader reporting on Asquith's Guildhall speech in November 1914 argued that Britain's promise to guarantee the integrity and independence of Asiatic Turkey following the Cyprus Convention was no longer valid. In addition the pledge that Turkey would introduce proper government within the Armenian provinces had never materialised as she had continued persistently to misrule and periodically massacre the Armenians.<sup>50</sup>

### *Background to Genocide*

In the summer of 1915 news gradually reached Britain that the Armenians in Turkey were again being subjected to mistreatment at the hands of their Turkish and Kurdish

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46 Aneurin Williams to Sir Edward Grey, 18 September 1914, TNA FO 371/2116/51007.

47 TNA FO 371/1773/4961 Jan/Feb 1913.

48 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, 46.

49 *The Times*, 10 November 1914, 10; *ibid.*, 11 November 1914, 10.

50 *The Times*, 10 November 1914.

neighbours. The reports of massacres and mass deportations would continue throughout the war and even into the 1920s. The actual number of Armenians and their fellow Christians who lost their lives has been difficult to determine, in part due to the differences in the number of Armenians as recorded by the Ottoman authorities and the Armenian Catholicos prior to the First World War. However, as the historian Richard Hovannisian points out, the figures provided by the Armenians are likely to be exaggerated but those of the Ottomans are 'even more distorted.'<sup>51</sup> As a result he identifies the true number of Armenians to lie somewhere between the two, at between one and a half and two million. Of this, it is believed that at least one million lost their lives, in what is often referred to as the first genocide of the twentieth century.

While most academics and authorities accept this as a historical fact, the Turkish government still refuses to accept the deaths of the Armenians as a genocidal act, instead claiming that there was no official organisation or sanction for the massacres. Those transportations that occurred were, they argue, for internal security purposes, which were justified by the fact that large numbers of Armenians died fighting for Russia.<sup>52</sup>

While the term 'genocide' is now generally used to describe the Armenian massacres, it was first coined by Raphael Lemkin to describe the Nazi Holocaust of the Jewish people. For Lemkin, genocide referred to the destruction of a nation or ethnic group as a result of a coordinated plan.<sup>53</sup> While such an evocative term was not available to Bryce and Williams, their statements in parliament and the press regularly described the treatment of the Armenians as being coordinated with the intention of 'exterminating' and 'extirpating' the Armenian race.<sup>54</sup> This view was supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury who saw the treatment of the Armenians as little more than 'the attempted obliteration of a people.'<sup>55</sup> Contemporaries described the unfolding events in Eastern

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51 See Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, 34-37.

52 A great body of Armenian genocide denial literature exists, for an analysis see Dadrian, 'The signal facts', 269-279; and Charny and Fromer, 'Denying the Armenian Genocide', 39-49.

53 Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

54 For example see *New York Times*, 18 August 1915, letter from Aneurin Williams and 10 October 1915, letter from Lord Bryce; see also *Hansard*, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, col. 1770-1776.

55 *Manchester Guardian*, 16 October 1915.



Turkey in such a way that it is difficult not to accept that the massacre and mistreatment of the Armenians was an act of genocide. From the daily reports Bryce was receiving, he concluded there:

Seemed to be an effort to exterminate a whole nation, without discrimination of age or sex, whose misfortune it was to be the subjects of a Government devoid of scruples and of pity, and the policy they disclosed was one without precedent even in the blood-stained annals of the East.<sup>56</sup>

Today, while the British government agrees that the events were ‘an atrocity of the first order’ it does not believe that the ‘evidence is sufficiently unequivocal’ to enable them to use the term genocide.<sup>57</sup> This is in contrast to the statement made in 1915 to the House of Commons by Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Here Cecil stated categorically ‘that no more horrible crime has been committed in the history of the world [...] The crime was a deliberate one, not to punish insurrection but to destroy the Armenian race.’<sup>58</sup> This was no spur of the moment reply, but a calculated response to a debate initiated with the prior approval from the Foreign Office.<sup>59</sup> An in-depth analysis by Donald Bloxham shows that the Armenians were subjected to ‘ethnic cleansing, or forced collective displacement, and direct physical annihilation [...] therefore] the epithet genocide [is] applicable.’<sup>60</sup>

### *A deliberate crime*

When news of the massacres was first received Williams sought to establish whether the government would consider securing for the Armenians some form of autonomy. Neil Primrose, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that the government would

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56 Bryce and Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, 19.

57 Lord Triesman, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, 14 July 2005, *Lords Hansard*, 673 pt33, column 1212.

58 *Hansard*, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, cols. 1770-1776.

59 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 12 November 1915, JBP, MS201, f142.

60 Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69.

‘consider the interests of the Armenian people sympathetically; but it is not possible at this juncture to determine future political arrangements.’<sup>61</sup>

According to Donald Bloxham, a systematic Turkish policy against the Armenians only emerged in the early summer of 1915.<sup>62</sup> Prior to this, he argues, the treatment of the Armenians was regionally-controlled and developed in a piecemeal basis and only in response to circumstances. This distinction is evident in Aneurin Williams’ statement to the House of Commons in November: ‘The Turkish authorities within the little time of five months proceeded systematically to exterminate a whole race out of their dominions’<sup>63</sup> He then went onto provide a graphic description of the events that occurred:

Armenians [...] were collected together at short notice, sometimes within a few hours [...] It was not men of military age that were taken [...] The Armenians of military age were already serving Turkey as soldiers in the ranks [...] men from fifteen to seventy who had not been taken as soldiers were collected together and for the most part shot. The older men, women and children, were ordered to prepare to go away to a great distance. This did not take place simply in one town, but in practically every town where there was an Armenian population of any importance. It did not occur owing to the fanaticism of one particular magistrate or one particular population. It is what took place in obedience to the orders sent round from the central authorities.

While it is possible to view the massacres and deportations of the Armenians in both ethnic and religious terms, Williams was at pains to point out that the Greeks and Syrian Christians as well as non-Christians were subjected to ethnic cleansing. With the British public’s natural sympathies directed to their European neighbours, it would be easier to

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61 Aneurin Williams to Sir Edward Grey, 3 April 1915, TNA FO 371/2485, 40247/30439/15; *Hansard*, LXXI, HC, 14 April 1915, Col. 2-3.

62 Bloxham, *Great Game of Genocide*, 69.

63 *Hansard*, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, cols. 1770-1776.



generate sympathy with the Armenians by stressing their religious similarity. The nature of the crime being perpetrated against them, however, required no embellishment.

The first mass movements occurred in April 1915 and involved all Christians who lived in coastal areas, such as the Gallipoli peninsula where there were fears of their aiding the Allies. Armenian volunteer units were established with Russian encouragement, primarily manned by Russian Armenians, to aid incursions into Turkey. In April, the Russians captured the strategically important city of Van, and defended it against the inferior Turkish troops. The Armenians had fortified the town in order to protect themselves from attack by the Turks and, this according to Fridtjof Nassen, was misrepresented as an uprising.<sup>64</sup> While the plain of Van was under Tsarist control, Russian Armenians allegedly massacred the Turkish peasantry and this was followed by Turkish massacres of the local Armenians after the Russian withdrawal.

In June 1915, the mass movement of the Armenians began on the death marches; consisting primarily of women, children and the elderly. Forced to leave behind their property and possessions, what little they could carry gradually diminished. The destination for many of these mass deportations was the deserts where as Williams informed *The New York Times*, 'those who survive are doomed to certain death, since they will find neither house, work, nor food in the desert.'<sup>65</sup> Those living in the more northern provinces were either massacred or fled into the mountains en-route to Russia.

Soon after the news of the massacres and deportations reached Britain, Williams informed Boghos Nubar that the BAC was keeping a close watch on developments and was in 'constant communication with the Foreign Office'.<sup>66</sup> During the next few years he also held meetings with Lloyd George during his premiership, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Curzon and Lord Robert Cecil. The latter was a long-term associate through the Labour Co-Partnership Association and a fellow advocate for the League of Nations.

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64 Fridtjof Nassen, *Armenia and the Near East* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 301-2.

65 'Letter from Aneurin Williams', *The New York Times*, 18 August 1915.

66 Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 10 May 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar's Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 25-6.

### *Humanitarian Response*

Increasing public awareness led to several humanitarian relief organisations attempting to relieve the distress of Armenians within the affected areas. Unlike the BAC they were not explicitly political in nature, but they did receive the support of many of the BAC's members. As the wholesale deportations of the Armenian population grew apace, the existing organisations became overwhelmed with the sheer enormity of the task before them. Against this background the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund (AR(LM)F) was inaugurated in October 1915, and became the 'best organised, and most active and influential of the relief agencies.'<sup>67</sup> The relief was channelled through existing missionaries and the American Near East Relief, as well as the British Consulate in Batum. In 1916 the AR(LM)F sent its own agents and medical staff to Van and the Caucasus.<sup>68</sup>

The inaugural meeting took place at the Mansion House in London with its President, the Lord Mayor of London, recalling the events of the 1890s and the generosity of the British public.<sup>69</sup> Also addressing the meeting were Bryce, Cardinal Bourne and the Bishop of Oxford and letters of support were read from, amongst others, the Archbishop of Canterbury and A. J. Balfour.<sup>70</sup> The Fund was able to elicit support from a wide spectrum of British society and its Vice-Presidents included eminent representatives from most Christian denominations and public figures. In a reflection of the dilemma faced by the liberal internationalists, the *Manchester Guardian* commented 'For the reply of politics we must wait, but not for that of our humanity.'<sup>71</sup>

The AR(LM)F also functioned under the chairmanship of Aneurin Williams and had several of the BAC's members on its executive, including the Revd. Harold Buxton as its Secretary. Additionally, the Fund was unofficially an effective source of information on the situation in the Caucasus for the BAC. On occasions the AR(LM)F was even able to finance the publication of the BAC's memoranda and distribute them to its 5,000

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<sup>67</sup> Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, 63.

<sup>68</sup> *The Martyrdom of a Nation*, (London: Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund, n.d. c.1917).

<sup>69</sup> *The Times*, 16 October 1915.

<sup>70</sup> *The Times*, 9 October 1915; *The Times*, op cit.

<sup>71</sup> *Manchester Guardian*, 5 February 1916.



subscribers.<sup>72</sup> The AR(LM)F continued in existence long after the end of the war and in 1925 it was appointed by the then Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald to assist in the settlement of Armenian refugees under the League of Nations scheme.<sup>73</sup>

### *Crimes against Humanity*

With the continual arrival of news of the massacres and deportations Bryce, Williams and other concerned liberal internationalists constantly sought a government declaration that would influence the Turkish authorities to halt the proceedings. As early as May 1915, Williams had approached the Foreign Office and sought their assurance that the Turkish leaders would be made aware that Britain personally held them responsible for the fate of the Armenians.<sup>74</sup> Unbeknown, the Foreign Office had been negotiating with their French and Russian counterparts over a joint declaration holding the Turkish officials personally responsible.<sup>75</sup> Despite Sir Edward Grey's concern that there was 'not sufficient trustworthy data on which to base such a message', and a fear that it could lead to further massacres, a joint declaration was published on 24 May 1915.<sup>76</sup> This stated the Kurds and Turks had 'been engaged in massacring Armenians with the connivance and often help of Ottoman authorities.' The Allies would as a result of these 'crimes' hold 'all the members of the Ottoman government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally responsible for Armenian massacres.'<sup>77</sup> There were some differences between the final wordings used by the Allies: Grey objected to the use of the term 'crimes committed by Turkey against Christianity and civilisation'. As a result the British version dropped the phrase 'against Christianity and civilisation', while the French and Russians substituted 'against humanity and civilisation.'<sup>78</sup> This would make it difficult for the declaration to be dismissed as merely pro-Christian propaganda.

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72 B.A.C. Minutes, 18 December 1919, 23 March 1920 and BAC Propaganda Sub-Committee Minutes, 15 June 1920, Oxford University Rhodes House Library MSS British Empire (henceforth MSS Brit. Emp.) S22/G506.

73 A. E. Backhouse to Lord Mayor, 16 December 1931, MSS Brit. Emp S22 G506.

74 TNA FO 371/2488/51009/54821 5 May 1915.

75 TNA FO 371/2488/51009/51010, 28 April 1915.

76 TNA FO 371/2488/51009/57956, telegram to Sir F Bertie, 11 May 1915.

77 TNA FO 371/2488/51009/63095.

78 See TNA FO 371/2488/51009/58387 & TNA FO 371/2488/51009/65759.



According to Vahakn Dadrian, this indicated an Allied desire to prosecute after the war those responsible, including the complicit Ottoman officials. He further identifies in the statement the introduction of the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ into international law and its subsequent use in the Nuremberg trials.<sup>79</sup> In the immediate post-war period a series of military tribunals were conducted as a cathartic act following the serious defeat, which was blamed upon the wartime CUP leaders, who fled the country before charges were brought. In addition to charges of military incompetence, two charges related to the Armenian massacres. In their absence Talât Bey, Enver Bey, Cemal Bey and Dr Nazim were condemned to death; an act carried out by Armenian vigilantes in several cases. The rise of the Kemalists saw the end of the Court Martials and international trials under the Treaty of Sèvres.<sup>80</sup> Certainly, in May 1915 it was important to both Bryce and Williams that the Turkish leaders realise that they were personally responsible for the massacres, although they never publicly called for an international trial.<sup>81</sup> For Bloxham, the declaration as initiated by Russia was little more than a cynical deception for the benefit of the Armenians; it was, he claims, Russia’s way of playing lip service to the plight and future of the Armenians at a time when insurrection amongst its Caucasus territories would be most unwelcome.<sup>82</sup>

The joint declaration was widely welcomed and for Boghos Nubar it suggested ‘the Allies are taking our cause seriously and are ready to offer us their complete collaboration.’<sup>83</sup> Its impact upon Turkey was likely to be limited; independent pronouncements from neutral states, such as America would be more effective. To this end, Bryce instructed Boghos Nubar to encourage the Armenians living in Paris to address President Woodrow Wilson and urge him to ‘issue an effective warning to the Turkish government against the attempt to annihilate a whole nation.’<sup>84</sup> The previous week Williams had telegraphed

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79 Dadrian *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 216-7.

80 For further details on the Court Martials and trials see *ibid.* and Taner Akçam *A Shameful Act: the Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*, (Constable, 2007).

81 Aneurin Williams to Noel Buxton, 14 May 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar’s Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 41.

82 Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 136.

83 Boghos Nubar to Lieut.-Col. Gregory, 25 May 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar’s Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 54.

84 Lord Bryce to Boghos Nubar, 9 May 1915, quoted in *Ibid.*, 23.



the American State Department in Washington urging them to take action.<sup>85</sup> He also approached the Foreign Office to ask them to persuade the Americans to intervene, and was informed that both the Americans and the Italians had made diplomatic representations in Constantinople.<sup>86</sup> Cecil was however sceptical of any influence that President Wilson could exert; he believed the Pope would be more effective.<sup>87</sup> Williams also approached Noel Buxton who had close contacts with Bulgaria with the view to getting them to exert similar pressure on Turkey.<sup>88</sup> In this way, Williams and his BAC colleagues sought to utilise their political connections in order to keep the plight of the Armenians at the forefront of international attention.

When the Turkish response came, it cited self-defence as the justification for any actions taken. The responsibility lay not with the Turkish government but, it claimed, was entirely the fault of the Entente Powers who had long been directing and organising the Armenian revolutionaries.<sup>89</sup>

### *Public Awareness or wartime propaganda?*

In his letter to the AR(LM)F, Balfour observed that ‘in the midst of all the horrors of this war nothing [...] is more horrible than the treatment meted out to the wretched Armenians by the Turkish government’ and condemned Germany for its failure to halt the atrocities, a point supported by Bryce.<sup>90</sup> Balfour and Bryce were not alone in observing that Germany bore some responsibility for the massacres, if only for its failure to halt the ongoing proceedings. Boghos Nubar, however, saw the German guilt extending much further; in a letter to Aneurin Williams, he confided ‘witnessing the barbaric acts of the Germans, it is no wonder that the Turks are trying to imitate their ally.’<sup>91</sup>

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85 Aneurin Williams to State Department, 3 May 1915, quoted in *Ibid.*, 26.

86 TNA FO 371/2488/51009/54821, 4 May 1915.

87 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 12 November 1915, JBP, MS201, f142.

88 Aneurin Williams to Noel Buxton, 14 May 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar's Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 41.

89 Martin Gilbert, *The First World War: a complete History* (1994), 166; Emin, Ahmed *Turkey in the World War* (1930), 218-9; see also ch 4.

90 *The Times*, 9 October 1915 and, 16 October 1915.

91 Boghos Nubar to Aneurin Williams, 14 May 1915, quoted in *Boghos Nubar's Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 42.

For the British government, it was certainly expedient to stress Germany's moral responsibility in order to influence both British and American public opinion.<sup>92</sup> The German press confronted such attitudes by arguing, like their Turkish allies, that responsibility lay with the Allies who had falsely raised hopes and in so doing had fostered the enmity that now existed between the Turks and the Armenians.<sup>93</sup>

Throughout the war, Williams had privileged access to Foreign Office intelligence on the Armenian situation while he was also the chief intermediary between the Foreign Office and the Armenian Diaspora. A regular source of information was the British Consul at Batum, just over the border in the Russian Caucasus. Summaries of his reports to the Foreign Office were regularly forwarded to Williams, and on occasions the diplomatic telegraph service were used to send encrypted reports on Williams' behalf.<sup>94</sup>

While the BAC sought to raise public awareness in order to exert pressure upon the British government, the latter were more concerned to argue that the Armenians' only hope was an Allied victory, thereby exploiting the situation in order to strengthen the war effort. The BAC also sought to engage the American people: examples include Aneurin Williams' submission of a letter he had received from Bryce to the American press in September 1915. This carefully worded letter outlined the facts and was intended to appeal to the 'hearts' of all Americans and persuade them through their government to exert influence upon the Germans to 'check the Turkish government before their ghastly work is completed.'<sup>95</sup> The leader in the *Manchester Guardian* supported this initiative to help form American opinion on the subject.<sup>96</sup>

In December 1915, Bryce had warned the BAC to be careful about publishing anything that could encourage the Turks to undertake further acts of aggression against the Armenian people. However, by February 1916, with the aid of Arnold J. Toynbee he

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92 Nassibian, 73-5; Bloxham *The Great Game of Genocide*, 129-32.

93 Bloxham *The Great Game of Genocide*, 130.

94 See TNA FO 371/2488 ; TNA FO 371/34000/16 2 June 1916.

95 *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1915; *New York Times*, 10 October 1915.

96 *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1915.



began the momentous task of collecting ‘in the interest of historic truth’ all available data relating to the massacres and forced movement of the Armenians.<sup>97</sup> This was to be the most important collaboration between the pro-Armenian liberal internationalists and the Foreign Office. Both Bryce and Toynbee were pivotal figures in the BAC, and Bryce as an elder statesman and major figure during the 1890s massacres was a natural outlet for receiving first-hand reports from eastern Turkey.

The resultant meticulous research was published as an official Blue Book, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16*. Bryce was determined that it should be an ‘authentic record’ of events and was careful to stress that all information was treated impartially; in spite of this it has since been subjected to Turkish claims that it was little more than British wartime propaganda. The contradictory statements as to the origin of the project made by the government in 1916 and Toynbee half a century later have in part fuelled speculation. In addition, Bryce’s *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* was criticised for its uncorroborated anonymous statements collected by a team of barristers.<sup>98</sup> Certainly, Britain’s wartime Ministry of Information, under the direction of C. F. G. Masterman, choreographed both reports. Known merely as ‘Wellington House’, its inspiration according to Lucy Masterman came from the BAC’s T. P. O’Connor.<sup>99</sup>

Masterman was certainly pleased with the reception the Belgian report received in America.<sup>100</sup> In June 1916, he informed Bryce that he was very anxious to publish the Armenian report as soon as possible in order to influence public opinion, especially in relation to the post-war settlement of the Near East.<sup>101</sup> Masterman also suggested the official presentation of the report to the House should be in response to a question placed by Williams.<sup>102</sup> The official version as outlined to the House of Commons by Cecil was

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97 Bryce and Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, xvi.

98 Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I* (New York: New York University Press, 2004), 132-3.

99 Lucy Masterman, *C. F. G. Masterman* (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1968), 272.

100 C. F. G. Masterman to Bryce, 7 June 1915, JBP, MS248.

101 C. F. G. Masterman to Bryce, 14 June 1916, JBP, MS202 f153.

102 C. F. G. Masterman to Bryce, 20 June 1916, JBP MS202, f165.

that it was prepared at the suggestion of Bryce; Toynbee however would later record that Bryce had undertaken the work at the request of the government.<sup>103</sup> However, in October 1915 Toynbee recorded 'They have turned over to me Bryce's evidence about the Armenians, to make up into a report.'<sup>104</sup>

Regardless of the differences of opinion as to its origin, it remains a foundational body of testimony in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide.<sup>105</sup> While the original publication withheld the identities of his sources, for fear of reprisals, their identities were scrupulously recorded and were later published separately; additionally the primary sources and working copies of the book were specifically retained thereby enabling the methodology of the original to be scrutinised.<sup>106</sup>

At the time of its publication, the report was widely held up as an important source and liberal internationalists like Noel Buxton believed that it was instrumental in influencing American opinion.<sup>107</sup> Further, from conversations with President Wilson's confidential advisor, Colonel House, he was under the impression that this was one of the motive factors in the President's decision to enter the war. Despite the United States never actually declaring war on Turkey, he still believed the Allies owed a special obligation to the Armenians. The 1924 memorial from former Prime Ministers Asquith and Baldwin to then Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald clearly supported this view.<sup>108</sup>

Certainly, there is no denying the British government and its Allies were prepared to utilise the Blue Book for propaganda purposes, but they were also willing to exploit all other suitable channels. These included forwarding information to the press and the pro-Armenian groups, and Aneurin Williams in his role as Chairman of both the BAC and AR(LM)F was a major recipient. When in November 1915 the British Consul in

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103 *Hansard*, LXXXV, HC, 23 August 1916, col. 2650; A J Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London, 1967), 147.

104 Quoted in William H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 73.

105 Bryce, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, xvi.

106 The Toynbee Papers, TNA FO 96/205-11.

107 Mosa Anderson, *Noel Buxton: A Life* (London, 1952), 110.

108 'Memorial', 26 September 1924, ATP, Armenia Box 44.



Batum forwarded information on recent events to the Foreign Office, it was noted by an official that it might be useful to forward the official despatch directly to Williams with the understanding that 'it may be published if considered necessary'.<sup>109</sup> This suggestion met with the approval of Cecil, who requested it be sent at once. This was followed by the regular transmission of information to Williams, invariably on the understanding that he was free to use the information as he saw fit. In this way, Williams was able to ensure that the latest news was brought before the public's attention. Similarly, when Bryce and Williams shared information with the Foreign Office there was the less than subtle suggestion that they should publish it immediately. A case in point occurred in January 1917, when Cecil confided to Bryce that the information he had shared was 'an appalling story', but 'we could scarcely ask leave to publish, could not your society commit an indiscretion?'<sup>110</sup>

While it is evident that there was a certain degree of manipulation by the Foreign Office, it did however serve both parties, since without access to these reports it would have been harder to stimulate the public's concern and elicit aid for the Armenians. This was of course not the only source of information as Williams and his associates also received detailed intelligence from missionaries and aid workers in the region, the most reliable source being the AR(LM)F's own field agents.

The BAC was also able to ensure that the British press regularly reported on the Armenian Question. News items, which were based upon the BAC's press releases, appeared in a wide variety of papers, but it was C. P. Scott's *Manchester Guardian*, which showed most interest. Scott was a lifelong friend of Bryce, and shared many of the same ideals. Another outlet was the prestigious monthly journal *The Contemporary Review*, which was co-edited by two BAC members, the historian Gooch and the leading Methodist, Revd. Dr J. Scott Lidgett.

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109 TNA FO 371/2488/51009.

110 Lord Robert Cecil to Lord Bryce, 18 January 1917, JBP, MS204, f6.

In August, Boghos Nubar forwarded a copy of a graphic description of the effects of the deportations from the Patriarch of Constantinople to Williams on the understanding that the information could be made public but not the identity of the author.<sup>111</sup> Williams immediately forwarded it to the *Daily News*, and soon after it appeared in the *New York Times*.<sup>112</sup> While the BAC found new impetus, the BC struggled to find a role for itself. As long as the war raged, they could do little but appeal for small contributions to keep it going until the moment came again to demand ‘justice, liberty and peace for all the Balkan peoples.’<sup>113</sup>

The first full year of total war had seen the liberal internationalist ethos challenged on several fronts simultaneously. Firstly, the genocide of the Armenians had reawakened the issue of nationality and the Eastern Question, and secondly it had given an important boost to institutional internationalism. With regard to Armenia, the links between the liberal internationalists, the Foreign Office and Wellington House were particularly strong; these connections would be important in the subsequent discussions over the League. Although the interconnectivity was not yet apparent to those involved, as the following chapter will demonstrate, the inextricable link would become evident over the next few years.

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111 Boghos Nubar to Aneurin Williams, 7 August 1915, in *Boghos Nubar's Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 239.

112 ‘Letter from Aneurin Williams’, *New York Times*, 18 August 1915.

113 Draft Circular letter, 5 March 1915, NBP, MS951, c24/2.



## 9

## Nationality and internationalism, 1916 – 1918

The first full year of war had seen both the LNS and the Bryce Group preparing their proposals, though the former was the more inclusive and undertook to educate the British public of the importance of the League. For Lowes Dickinson it was vital to work out and agree upon the ‘immense amount of very difficult controversial detail [... and] get together so strong a body of opinion that our government will have to take account of it’.<sup>1</sup>

Despite this original intention, Williams would nine months later inform Gooch that everyone was ‘very determined not to do anything to shock public opinion, or divert men’s minds from winning the war.’<sup>2</sup> Consequently, they were at pains to stress they were not a ‘stop the war’ organisation, nor were they advocating disarmament or criticising British foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> In January 1916, Lord Bryce informed Theodore Marburg of the American League to Enforce Peace (LEP) that he was very keen that the League idea should be promoted as much as possible in the United States as ‘It is impossible to secure attention here at present for anything except the current events of the war.’<sup>4</sup> Such cautiousness was not evident in the actions of Charles Buxton, who actively sought to promote the principles embodied in the League’s programme and the settlement of the war on lines likely to promote peace. While some of the meetings at which he spoke

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- 1 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, 8 September 1914, BLPES: Graham Wallas Papers (henceforth GWP), 1/55, f22.
  - 2 Aneurin Williams to G. P. Gooch, 12 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13.
  - 3 Lord Bryce to Theodore Marburg, 7 December 1916, in *Development of the League of Nations Idea*, ed. by Latané; F. N. Keen to Graham Wallas, 19 May 1915, GWP, 1/56, f55; see also Robbins, *The Abolition of War*, 53.
  - 4 Lord Bryce to Theodore Marburg, 11 January 1916, in *Development of the League of Nations Idea*, ed. by Latané, 91.

were organised by the UDC, he attached greater importance to organisations not easily identified as pacifist, such as the Workers Educational Association, suffragette groups, church groups and trades unions.<sup>5</sup>

While Sir Edward Grey expressed sympathy with the aims of the pro-Leaguers, he was reluctant to make any public pronouncement open to misinterpretation either by Britain's allies or by the Germans.<sup>6</sup> Again, at the end of December 1916, he informed Gilbert Murray that it was difficult to do anything publicly because, 'till a safe end of the war is in sight people can't be expected whole-heartedly to promote what they hope to realize after the war'<sup>7</sup> Thereby illustrating the greatest problem of the pro-leaguers, that of being identified as idealistic visionaries.

Whereas the LEP initially had a free hand to discuss openly the League idea due to American neutrality, its British counterpart, the LNS had to work more circumspectly. Despite this constraint and the prevailing attitude, as expressed by Grey, the LNS's major task was 'to get the public to understand the necessity for a League and its establishment in the peace treaty.'<sup>8</sup> Obstacles to publicising the League idea were not restricted to external factors, but also thrown up by those engaged in its formulation. Bryce's insistence on keeping their proposals private frustrated Lowes Dickinson, as did Sir Willoughby Dickinson's reluctance to organise public meetings.<sup>9</sup>

A significant reason for their reticence was the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which gave the government wide-ranging powers including censorship. As far as Hobson was concerned the emergency powers of suppressing leaflets and pamphlets discussing the war and the making of peace were a 'process to strangle freedom of opinion.'<sup>10</sup> Many

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5 Charles Roden Buxton to Theodore Marburg, 20 March 1916, *Ibid.*, 98-99.

6 Sir Edward Grey to Theodore Marburg, 7 April 1916, in *Ibid.*, 103.

7 Quoted in George MacCaulay Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon: Being the Life of Sir Edward Grey Afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon* (London: Longman, Green & Co, 1937), 331.

8 Leonard Woolf, *Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the years 1911-1918* (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 191.

9 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, 8 September 1914, GWP 1/55; Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Aneurin Williams, 8 June 1917, AWP AW/3/1/10.

10 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 22 November 1917, GMP, MS 35, f65.



of what Hobson termed the 'unpopular' societies were raided, including the Council for Civil Liberties and, in August 1917, E. D. Morel was arrested under DORA and sentenced to six months imprisonment, where according to Marvin Swartz he 'suffered malnutrition of the ego'.<sup>11</sup> As a consequence of the government clamping down on the activities of the UDC and other pacifist groups, it fell to the pro-league groups to work with 'the grain of official and public opinion.'<sup>12</sup>

### **An Inopportune Suggestion**

The real breakthrough came with President Wilson's public declaration in May 1916, which endorsed a 'universal association of nations'. Whether British thought on the League influenced the President is unclear, but as Martin Ceadel points out, that did not stop many British activists claiming credit.<sup>13</sup> The President was certainly kept abreast of British attitudes by a wide range of individuals, including Angell, Lowes Dickinson and Noel Buxton who all travelled to America. Another informant was Theodore Marburg who acted as a conduit between the Bryce Group, the LNS, other interested parties in Britain and the President.

Despite Lloyd George's October 1916 'knock-out blow' interview, which rebuffed American proposals for a negotiated peace, the LNS leadership still found sufficient encouragement to enable it to issue a statement to *The Times*. Published on the 3 November 1916, the joint letter from Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Williams outlined their vision for a League of Nations.<sup>14</sup> The premise of their proposal was that members would refer their judicial disputes to an international tribunal, with all other disputes being referred to a council of conciliation, and the security of League members protected through the provision of mutual protection. In response *The Times* devoted a leader article to the proposals, which it described as 'An inopportune suggestion', since it believed that discussion at this point would be premature and unhelpful as it did little to promote victory over Germany and her allies. Pro-Leaguers, such as Dickinson and Williams,

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11 Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control*, 179.

12 Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 233.

13 Ibid., 226.

14 *The Times*, 3 November 1916, and 6 November 1916.

however, strongly believed that only through the discussion of the future of international relations would it be possible to ensure that the eventual peace settlement was along the correct lines.

As a result, articles appeared in the London press, and more importantly the regional papers such as the *Sheffield Independent*, which expressed a far greater degree of willingness to contemplate their suggestion. In the paper's opinion, it was strange that those in London should consider it 'inopportune to consider how we can secure and enforce peace when the great conflict has been brought to an end?'<sup>15</sup>

While not totally dismissing the idea, *The Times* stressed the time was not yet right to discuss such proposals. However, Dickinson and Williams had patiently waited over eighteen months for a sign that the British public was ready to consider such a scheme. The signal had finally come through recent public pronouncements from President Woodrow Wilson and Sir Edward Grey, amongst others. Despite Grey's expressed sympathy for the pro-Leaguers aims, George Egerton has accused him of utilising the League idea in order to cultivate good relations with America.<sup>16</sup> Only six months earlier, he had informed the *Chicago Daily News* that he had long held the belief that there was a need for a League of Nations that would punish violations of international treaties and national independence, and arbitrate through an impartial tribunal.<sup>17</sup> According G. M. Trevelyan, Grey's original biographer, his advocacy of the League was not a cynical attempt to lure the Americans, but a sincerely held belief.<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps the most important signal came from Bryce: after several years of refusing to publicise his belief in the League idea, he finally agreed to speak publicly. On 3 October 1916, he stated that it was time to consider 'the grave questions which will arise when we come to make a treaty of peace.'<sup>19</sup> The terms of peace should not be vindictive as this

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15 'To Enforce Peace', *Sheffield Independent*, 4 November 1916.

16 G. W. Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 42.

17 *The Times*, 15 May 1916.

18 Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon*, 312.

19 'Lord Bryce on Victory. The Conditions of Peace', *The Times*, 4 October 1916; NBP, MS951, c32/5.



would lead again to war; they should respect the principles of nationality, and secure a permanent alliance for peace. Although he did not say so directly, he hoped this alliance would be along the lines of a league of nations, to which he had been privately working for nearly two years.

Late November and early December 1916 saw a political struggle between Asquith and Lloyd George over the future conduct of the war and control of a new war council. This culminated on 7 December with Lloyd George becoming Prime Minister of a coalition government, and Arthur Balfour succeeding Grey as Foreign Secretary. Within a week, the attitude of the new government became apparent when Arthur Henderson, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party and member of the newly formed War Cabinet publicly rejected the league idea. Britain was, he stressed, fighting for ‘a lasting permanent peace, peace based upon national right and national honour’; consequently, it was not right that the belligerents should discuss the League.<sup>20</sup> However, within a month the official line was in favour of the League. The change in attitude was in response to Wilson’s request for publication of the war aims and peace objectives of the belligerents. The joint Allied response on 10 January 1917 outlined their aim of defeating Germany and restoring a European balance of power, but importantly for the first time they admitted they were ‘wholeheartedly with the plan of creating a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world’ backed by sanctions.<sup>21</sup>

The League received increasing attention and its discussion was an integral part of the Imperial War Conference. With reference to the recent public debates over the British and American proposals for a league of peace or nations, Lloyd George informed the Imperial War Cabinet that ‘there is no doubt at all that we should endeavour to establish a league of that kind.’<sup>22</sup> He added the proviso that Germany had first to be defeated and an example made of it. It fell to a sub-committee headed by Milner to throw ‘cold water

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20 *The Times*, 12 December 1916.

21 *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918*, ed. by James Brown Scott, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 35-36.

22 Imperial War Cabinet Minute 1, 20 March 1917, TNA CAB 23/43; see also David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, (London: Odhams, 1938), i, 1037-1041.



on the idea of the League of Nations', with its conclusions 'that any too comprehensive or ambitious project to ensure world peace might prove not only too impracticable, but harmful.'<sup>23</sup> The debate continued within the Imperial War Cabinet, without reaching any real conclusion, thereby illustrating the government's difficulty in accepting such a scheme wholeheartedly.

However, the pro-Leaguers could detect sufficient shift in official and national attitudes to contemplate the launch of the second phase of their campaign. The change of premier and restructuring of the coalition was a matter of concern because it brought so many hard-line imperialists, such as Milner, to the centre of power. On the 17 December 1916, Lowes Dickinson warned Gilbert Murray that he considered Lloyd George to be 'indifferent and the rest of the new cabinet definitely sceptical or hostile' to the League idea.<sup>24</sup> However, the cabinet did include Cecil, one of the League's staunchest supporters in government and, following the Imperial War Conference, he was joined by South Africa's General Smuts, who had been close to key liberal internationalists since the South African War. In April 1917, Smuts summarised the situation as perceived by the pro-Leaguers, that 'The war is lasting very long and there is a distinct tendency to weariness which only the realisation of high and inspiring ideas could effectively counteract'.<sup>25</sup>

### *Public Attention*

With the anticipated entry of America into the war and increasing signs of war-weariness, the LNS drew up plans to organise a large public meeting at the Central Hall in Westminster. Bryce was persuaded to chair the meeting, his *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars* having finally been published in April 1917. They succeeded in gathering an impressive array of speakers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and General Smuts.<sup>26</sup> The meeting on 17 May, on Bryce's insistence was to be 'devoted to explaining & recommending the general notion & plan [for a League, and . . .] not to the putting

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23 Minutes and report of the Imperial War Cabinet Terms of Peace Committee (Economic and Non-Territorial Desiderata), TNA CAB 23/40; see also Ibid., 1066-1067.

24 Quoted in Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, 214, n19.

25 General Smuts to Gilbert Murray, 5 April 1917, GMP, MS 34, f12.

26 League of Nations Society, *League of Nations Society: Report of a Meeting, May 14, 1917* (London: League of Nations Society Publication No.11, 1917).



forward of any one particular scheme as at this stage we want to get people to take in the idea.’<sup>27</sup> Bryce’s desire was to restrict it to 200 ‘sensible men’, rather than the major event Williams sought. The resultant meeting was hugely successful attracting in excess of 1,000 men and women and a good deal of press attention.<sup>28</sup>

Buoyed up by this success Lowes Dickinson and Williams directed the LNS’s ‘most impressive’ publication, *The Project of a League of Nations*, with articles from a variety of liberal internationalists.<sup>29</sup> Gooch traced the development of the concert of Europe and the balance of power; T. J. Lawrence, an international lawyer looked at the development of international arbitration; Williams compared the use of force between the schemes advocated by the LNS and its American counterpart, not surprisingly demonstrating a greater bias towards the English scheme; Willoughby Dickinson illustrated how a League of Nations could lead to disarmament; Woolf argued that periodic conferences of the League were essential for the development of international law and readjustment of the *status quo*; Noel Buxton outlined the role of America in securing a League, while Theodore Marburg outlined the plans of the American LEP; Dr De Jong Van Beek en Donk provided an outline of the League movement within the neutral European countries; and lastly Mrs Creighton summarised the links between the women’s movements and the League. The customary selection of quotes from leading statesmen served to reinforce the importance of the whole scheme.

Later in the year, they published two plans for a future league. The first by Williams, argued that in the short term it would be easier to establish a league consisting of the ‘minimum of machinery’, a tribunal, council of conciliation and a conference or parliament.<sup>30</sup> To some this would be to leave too much to chance.<sup>31</sup> His Letchworth Garden City architect,

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27 Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 24 April 1917, AWP AW/3/1/7.

28 H. E. Williams to Iolo A. Williams, 14 May 1917, AWP ; *The Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Westminster Guardian*, 15 May 1917; *Daily News and Leader*, 17 May 1917.

29 Henry R. Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Reprint Corporation, 1967), 59; *The Project of a League of Nations*, (League of Nations Society Publication No. 15, 1917).

30 Aneurin Williams, *The Minimum of Machinery. Schemes of International Organisation No. 1* (London: League of Nations Society, 1917).

31 ‘Schemes of International Organisation’, *War and Peace*, March 1918, 216.

Raymond Unwin, prepared the second plan, which, despite its greater elaboration, was according to Henry Winkler merely Williams' scheme 'writ large'.<sup>32</sup>

### **Armenia and self-determination**

As the war progressed, the future of the Armenians evolved from an initial desire of self-government within Turkey to outright demands for complete autonomy under some form of Russo-Allied protection. Boghos Nubar presented the Armenian aspirations to French, British and Russian ministers as well as the BAC.<sup>33</sup> Armenian representatives believed the on-going debate over the future of Turkish territories and alternatives to European imperialism was a favourable context in which to state their case, though the main issue in this debate was the future of the German Colonies in Africa.<sup>34</sup>

An alternative to the historic practice of annexation was never high on the agendas of the British and French governments. The possibility of making new territorial acquisitions, while at the same time restraining German expansion beyond its European borders, was undoubtedly an attractive proposition. In contrast, the British radicals showed no reluctance in tackling the question and soon began debating alternative strategies for the territories of both Germany and Turkey. As a result of government silence on this issue, they were free to think the unthinkable and they ultimately made a significant impression upon the debate.

While initial discussion was concerned with the fate of the German colonies in Africa, it ultimately developed into the ideas of trusteeship that were to characterise the liberal internationalist proposals for the new international system. Amongst the early advocates were E. D. Morel, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, C. E. Fayle and Brailsford.<sup>35</sup> For

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32 Williams was Chairman of First Garden City, the builders of the new Garden City; Raymond Unwin, *Functions of a League of Nations. Schemes of if International Organisation no. II* (London: League of Nations Society, 1917); Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, 63.

33 *Boghos Nubar's Papers*, ed. by Ghazarian, 71.

34 See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism 1688-2000* (Harlow: Pearson, 2002), 565-590.

35 Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, 200-201.



Lowes Dickinson, equality between all nations with respect to economic opportunities in colonial Africa was required, while Morel saw the possibility of extending his campaign for the improvement of conditions of native Africans by calling for the preservation and enforcement of native rights. Fayle argued that, with the possible disintegration of Turkey's Asiatic territories, some form of international agreement was required to secure free trade. Brailsford, however, saw that a future League could regulate trade and competition to enable all member states to have equal access to the colonies of both member states as well as those acquired as a result of the war.<sup>36</sup>

In *Towards International Government*, Hobson attempted to introduce proposals that are more explicit. Again, he sought equality between nations over opportunities relating to capital and trade, which would be under the supervision of an international council. This would, he argued, reduce the potential for conflict between nations, which had historically clashed due to the demands of 'political and economic expansion.'<sup>37</sup> In a similar vein to Brailsford, he too called for the proposed scheme to include all the existing colonies of member states, thereby enabling equal economic access to all, the 'open-door' principle.<sup>38</sup> He proposed that the former colonies should come under the protection of an international League as either a joint international protectorate or a single nation at the League's instigation. The potential for the new system to be extended to existing colonies would also be taken up later by Noel Buxton who saw trusteeship as eventually undermining the traditional basis of imperialism by forcing the Western nations to stop viewing the mandates and colonies as private property.<sup>39</sup>

### *Liberation from tyranny*

The liberal internationalist vision was buoyed-up by the Allies' claim they were 'fighting not for selfish interests but, above all, to safeguard the independence of peoples, right,

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36 Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold*, 335-336.

37 Hobson, *Towards International Government*, 138-142.

38 J. A. Hobson, 'The Open Door', in *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, ed. by C. R. Buxton, (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1915), 105-107.

39 Noel Buxton and T. P. Conwell-Evans, *Oppressed People and the League of Nations* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1922), 54.

and humanity.’<sup>40</sup> Woodrow Wilson reinforced this in his message to the provisional government of Russia, when he declared they were not fighting for any material profit or aggrandisement, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from aggression and autocratic force.<sup>41</sup> In addition, he stated that the liberated should not be forced under an undesired sovereignty and that there should be no transfer of territory, except for the purpose of securing the life and liberty of its inhabitants. However, in a House of Commons debate a month earlier Cecil had stated that any change - even ‘imperialistic annexation’ - would be of benefit to Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia in order to release them from Turkish misgovernment.<sup>42</sup> While the German colonies had not been attacked for the purpose of rescuing the natives, he nevertheless viewed with horror the idea that they should be returned to German control.

The Foreign Office’s original lukewarm response over the future of Armenia was transformed by the Allies’ war aims, which stated their desire for ‘the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire.’<sup>43</sup> The significance for the liberal internationalists was the intention not to just liberate the Armenians from the tyranny of the Turk, but to guarantee them autonomy through the process of enfranchisement. That such schemes in the past had proved worthless was conveniently passed over.

However, by June 1917 the policy of ‘enfranchisement’ had become one of ‘liberation’, with the War Cabinet agreeing to this being one of Britain’s war aims.<sup>44</sup> Two days later Lloyd George revealed the change in British policy to a meeting in Glasgow, where he outlined Britain’s peace terms:

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40 *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918*, ed. by Scott, 35-36.

41 ‘Mr Wilson to Russia’, *The Times*, 11 June 1917.

42 *Hansard*, XCIII, HC, 16 May 1917, col. 1668-69.

43 *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918*, ed. by Scott, 35-36.

44 War Cabinet Minutes, 27 June 1917, TNA CAB 23/3 171.



What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the Peace Conference when it meets, but there is one thing that will never happen to it – it will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. At best he was the trustee of this far-famed land on behalf of civilisation. He has been false to his trust and the trusteeship must be given over to more competent and more equitable hands, chosen by the Congress, which will settle the affairs of the world. The same observation applied to Armenia, a land soaked with the blood of the innocent massacred by people who were bound to protect them.<sup>45</sup>

In the House of Commons, statements to this effect were made on 6 November by Balfour, as Foreign Secretary and by Lloyd George on 20 December.<sup>46</sup> The following month, during Lloyd George's Trades Union speech he stressed Armenia could not remain under Turkish sovereignty.

#### *Armenia and the Sykes-Picot Agreement*

The Tsar's abdication in March 1917 resulted in the formation of the Provisional government, the so-called 'dual power' between the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, and their incompatible visions for a post-Tsarist Russia. The replacement of the Tsarist regime with a much weaker democratic one encouraged long-suppressed nationalist aspirations. Despite all of its Polish provinces being under German occupation, the Russian Provisional government proclaimed an independent Poland on 30 March (NS) 1917. Demands for full autonomy also came from the Finns and the Baltic provinces. In the Caucasus, the Armenians affirmed their loyalty to the new government and in return received support for their aspirations in Turkish Armenia.<sup>47</sup>

The military, economic and social problems inherited by the Provisional government however proved insurmountable, culminating on 7 November 1917, with the Bolshevik

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45 'British Peace Terms. Prime Ministers Firm Speech', *The Times*, 30 June 1917.

46 *Hansard*, XCVIII, HC, 6 November 1917, col. 2042-2050 and C, 20 December 1917, col. 2220.

47 Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, 69-80.

coup. An assembly held later that day called for a 'just and democratic' peace without annexations or indemnities and repudiated secret diplomacy, and in particular, the agreements made to apportion the spoils of war. Amongst these was the so-called Sykes-Picot agreement which allotted Syria, Cilicia and three of the Armenian provinces to France; Mesopotamia was to come under British control and Russia was to achieve its long-term goal of gaining Constantinople and the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, together with the province of Trebizond, the remaining three Armenian provinces.

The Armenians appear to have been aware of the agreement, since in October 1916 Boghos Nubar had several meetings with both Sir Mark Sykes and Mr Picot, and soon after informed Bryce of their proposals.<sup>48</sup> With this in mind, Bryce attended the BAC's meeting in November 1916, to outline the proposals of the agreement in relation to Armenia and urged the committee not to undertake any form of propaganda in support of Armenian autonomy. In his view once the war was over the conditions would be more favourable to achieve their desires or at least sufficient to guarantee their security.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, the Russian release of the full terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was a severe blow to Armenian desires for the creation of an autonomous and neutral state under the control and protection of the Allies, consisting of the six Armenian provinces together with western Cilicia to secure free access to the sea.<sup>50</sup>

### *The Balfour Declaration*

The publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement altered the situation in the Middle East, as there no longer appeared to be a need for Britain to support a large French sphere of interest. Balfour's declaration on 2 November 1917 that the British government 'viewed[ed] with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' ensured the support of Zionists for British control of the region.<sup>51</sup> Alternative explanations for

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48 Meeting of Boghos Nubar and Lord Bryce, 26 October 1916, in *Boghos Nubar's Papers* ed. by Ghazarian, 387.

49 BAC minutes, 14 November 1916, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506.

50 The Armenian Question (A Brief Memorandum) by Boghos Nubar, in *Boghos Nubar's*, ed. by Ghazarian, 71.

51 There is an extensive body of literature on the genesis of the declaration, see for example Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958*.



the declaration include Britain's acceptance of the Zionists' moral claims, the use of the Zionists to block French and Russian access to an area critical to British interests in Egypt and India, or as a means to gain support of Jews in Russia and America.<sup>52</sup> In contrast, while the Armenians could argue they too had a moral claim upon Britain, their territory was deemed expendable as the Sykes-Picot agreement had clearly illustrated.

### New impetus

#### *'A veritable Peace Bomb'*

The second Russian revolution of 1917 led to the clarification of the aims of the belligerents in an attempt to prove that despite appearances their intentions were not 'imperialistic.' However, before these official responses were made the following January, Lord Lansdowne issued a letter to the *Daily Telegraph*. This appeared on 29 November 1917, as a request for moderate war aims rather than the more disastrous 'knock-out blow' favoured by Lloyd George. As foreign secretary to the earlier Conservative government, Lansdowne could command a certain degree of respect and had a year earlier circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet outlining his concerns over the situation in which Britain and her allies found themselves and advocating a negotiated peace.<sup>53</sup>

The timing of Lansdowne's letter coincided with the inter-Allied Conference that had just convened in Paris, with Colonel House as President Wilson's representative. The President was careful to stress that House was not on a peace mission as, despite his sympathy with the pacifists, Wilson was opposed to what he saw as 'their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind has a contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it and they do not.'<sup>54</sup> On his return from the conference, Lloyd George informed the War Cabinet that 'The Lansdowne letter had rendered it difficult to make any declaration, because a wrong impression might be conveyed to the country.'<sup>55</sup>

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52 Ibid., 130-147.

53 For text of Lord Lansdowne's memorandum of 13 November 1916 and the Cabinets reaction see, Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, I, 514-522.

54 Quoted in *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, ed. by Charles Seymour, (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1928), iii, 279.

55 Quoted in Swartz, *The Union of Democratic*, 193 n76.

In the country, however, the Lansdowne letter was greeted with great enthusiasm, especially amongst the more radical and pacifist liberals. Ponsonby believed that the views of despised pacifists could now be seen to be the 'rational view of an experienced statesman.'<sup>56</sup> For Lady Courtney, it was 'a veritable Peace bomb,' consisting as it did of 'sane discussion & suggestion'.<sup>57</sup> One response was the formation of a Lansdowne Committee by F. W. Hirst, who had been campaigning for a negotiated peace through his periodical *Common Sense*. Many leading internationalists, including Noel Buxton, and Hobson, signed an Address of Thanks to Lansdowne.<sup>58</sup> A series of public meetings followed, the first in February 1918, was described as 'the Lansdowne-Labour Conference', under the chairmanship of Lord Beauchamp.<sup>59</sup> Amongst those present were Wallas, Noel Buxton, Ponsonby, Gooch, Sir Arthur Pears, Lowes Dickinson, Hobson, and Nevinson, a gathering which demonstrated a degree of support for the Conservative peer's viewpoint amongst the liberal internationalists.

### *The League and War Aims*

By the beginning of January 1918, Thomas Jones, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet Secretariat, observed that the atmosphere had 'completely changed. Everybody is talking of peace.'<sup>60</sup> The publication of war aims was seen to be more imperative as a counter-offensive to the vindictive peace proposals being made by Germany to Russia. On 5 January Lloyd George outlined Britain's war aims to the Trades Union Conference. They included a great deal that found favour with the liberal internationalists, including support for the national aspirations of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Turkish Empires, and his acceptance that an international organisation was required to settle international disputes, limit armaments and diminish the probability of war.<sup>61</sup>

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56 Quoted in *Ibid.*, 193.

57 Catherine Courtney, *Extracts from a Diary during the War* (London: Printed for Private Circulation, 1927), 141.

58 *Common Sense*, 2 February 1918; For a discussion on the role of the Lansdowne letter see Robbins, *The Abolition of War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919*, 151.

59 *Common Sense*, 2 March 1918.

60 Thomas Jones. *Whitehall Diary*, ed. by Keith Middlemass, (1969), I: 1916-1925, 42.

61 'British War Aims. Mr Lloyd George's Statement', *The Times*, 7 January 1918.



Wilson, long the champion of liberal internationalism, was to surpass this with his famous Fourteen Points speech on 8 January. He outlined a just and moderate settlement based upon the principles of open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, freedom and non-discrimination in trade, arms limitation, self-determination and an end to colonisation. The fourteenth point provided direct support for the League of Nations idea, through its call for the formation of an association of nations to provide mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to all states.

With the added impetus provided by both the Lloyd George and Wilson speeches, the liberal internationalists actively engaged in the promotion of the league idea to the British public. They sought to get the backing from as many non-league groups as possible, and during 1917 and the early part of 1918, they had presented their vision to over 170 meetings throughout the country. One of these was Williams' speech to the Co-operative Congress held in Liverpool in May 1918, which secured a unanimous resolution in favour of the League. As a sign of the times, the *Labour Leader* saw more significance in the fact that 'not a single pro-war speech was made, while references to peace were vigorously applauded.'<sup>62</sup> In response, the LNS prepared a series of publications to demonstrate public support, including resolutions issued by labour organisations, religious bodies, and the views of statesmen, from Allied, neutral and enemy countries who had expressed sympathy with the League idea.<sup>63</sup>

### *Official Consideration of the League*

Bryce had unsuccessfully attempted to get Wilson to convene an international group of jurists, diplomats and historians to study the various plans for a league. For Bryce, as for many liberal internationalists, it was imperative to consider all the options; Wilson however would not consider such an approach.<sup>64</sup> It fell to the individual groups officially

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62 *The Labour Leader*, 23 May 1918; for the attitude of Labour to the League see Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919*, 167-198.

63 Examples include *The Demand of Labour for a League of Nations*, (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 25, 1918); *The Demand of the Churches for a League of Nations*, (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 33, 1918); *World-wide Support for a League of Nations*; see Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, 64-65.

64 Viscount Bryce to Theodore Marburg, n.d [1 May 1918] & Woodrow Wilson to Theodore Marburg, 6 May 1918, *Development of the League of Nations Idea*, ed. by Latané, 436-442.



sanctioned by the various governments, and groups such as the LNS to formulate how a League of Nations could and should function.

The government in response to the changing attitudes set up the Phillimore Committee to consider a variety of schemes including those of the LNS, the Bryce Group, the American LEP, Leonard Woolf's Fabian Society proposals, the UDC, and L'Organisation Central pour une Paix Durable (The Hague). It considered none of these schemes as completely acceptable or practical. On 20 March, its interim report consisting of a draft convention for a league and an explanation of its provisions was presented to the Foreign Secretary. The final report was presented on 3 July 1918, but neither was published during the war because of opposition from President Wilson.<sup>65</sup> Despite this, copies of the report were made available to certain individuals, including Williams.

The scheme proposed by the Phillimore Committee effectively incorporated the league within existing diplomacy. The result was little more than an alliance of nations or states based upon the existing wartime allies rather than the far-reaching vision of the internationalists. While the members would agree not to go to war with one another without submitting the dispute to arbitration, there was the possibility of being relieved of this provision, and no international court or tribunal was envisaged. This was a matter of concern to many pro-Leaguers, but as far as Cecil was concerned, any attempt to bind nations to submit to a tribunal would end in failure, as it would be impossible to construct one that could command sufficient confidence.<sup>66</sup> The Phillimore Committee envisaged a league that only came together at times of crisis, had no permanence and was in reality little more than a regulated Concert of Europe. Despite this, some parts of the report can be detected in the League of Nations Covenant, such as not resorting to war before arbitration, and economic sanctions.<sup>67</sup> Although never officially adopted by the government, it is indicative of the increasing attention the League idea was attracting.

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65 Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, 236.

66 Lord Robert Cecil to Aneurin Williams, 29 June 1918, AWP AW/3/1/1.

67 David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), i, 9.



Despite the grand statements made by President Wilson, Lloyd George was convinced that the British government had done far more than the Americans. In conversation with Lord Riddell, he cited the examples of the proposals prepared by the Phillimore Committee and also those by General Smuts. Apparently, 'Wilson is very pleased with these and proposes to make them the basis of the constitution of the League.'<sup>68</sup>

### *The 'Jingoes' and the 'Cranks'*

A consequence of the increased support for the League idea was the rapid increase in LNS membership from around 400 in 1917 to 2,000 a year later.<sup>69</sup> Amongst those attracted to the league idea and the LNS were a group of what Martin Ceadel terms 'Government Supporters.'<sup>70</sup> This group included the influential Major David Davies, a millionaire coal-owner and Liberal MP, former Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lloyd George, and 'one of the peace movement's quirkiest figures.'<sup>71</sup>

The arrival of Davies and fellow Liberal MP, Charles McCurdy, was to rekindle the debate over when the League should be formed. At the end of December 1917, Davies expressed his enthusiasm for the League to Thomas Jones, and demanded that 'the Allies should immediately call a Convention, charged with the job of framing the machinery for the League.'<sup>72</sup> Such a suggestion, however, was viewed as impracticable as those who would be competent for the job were fully engaged with winning the war. Undeterred, in January, Davies and McCurdy put their views to a private meeting of the LNS. While some prominent members were won over to their argument for the immediate establishment of a League of Nations between the Allies and the neutrals, it was decided to continue the current programme of building support for the League idea without committing to an exact date for its formation.

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68 *The Riddell Diaries, 1908-1923*, ed. by J. M. McEwen, (London: The Athlone Press, 1986), 254.

69 *League of Nations Society: Second Annual Report, March 1917 to March 1918*, (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 38, 1918).

70 Ceadel, 'Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement', 183; Ceadel, *Semi-detached idealists*, 234-5.

71 Brian Porter, 'David Davies: a hunter after peace', *Review of International Studies*, 15 (1989), 27-36.

72 *Thomas Jones. Whitehall Diary*, ed. by Keith Middlemas, (1969), I: 1916-1925, 41.

This attempt at compromise failed to satisfy Davies and his associates, who in April organised a 'League' lunch at the Carlton Club, to which were invited various influential reporters and MPs. During the discussion his frustration over his failure to 'galvanise [the LNS] into greater activity' became all too apparent as did his dissatisfaction with its 'leading lights,' Willoughby Dickinson and Williams.<sup>73</sup> Davies, it became apparent, had offered £5,000 for propaganda purposes and outlined a plan for an international scheme that would require around £20,000 per annum. However, the LNS were reluctant to undertake such a scheme as it feared being viewed as pacifist and had no desire to weaken the fighting spirit of the country. According to Thomas Jones, who was present at the luncheon, Davies' financial support convinced him that he was gaining control of the LNS, a prospect that alarmed many of its members.<sup>74</sup>

Another new addition to the LNS committee was the novelist H. G. Wells, who devoted his energies to preparing a general declaration of aims, which was to be presented to the forthcoming annual meeting.<sup>75</sup> This declaration was to exacerbate further the tensions within the LNS, with many of its founding members expressing concern over its tone and content, particularly its anticipation of the creation of a super state.<sup>76</sup> It advocated the immediate establishment of a League of free peoples for the ending of war, with the exception of defensive wars, and consequently, the establishment of a permanent Council to supervise and control the military and naval forces as well as the armament industries of the world.<sup>77</sup> This League of Allies and neutrals was to be a prelude to the ultimate formation of a worldwide league once the German people were free from their militarist government and had clearly relinquished their dreams of imperial conquest.

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73 *Thomas Jones. Whitehall Diary*, ed. by Middlemass, 61-2.

74 *Ibid.*, 62.

75 'Drafts of Statement on Policy of Immediate League of Nations, 1918', WHDP, c404, f1-3.

76 Aneurin Williams to Lord Shaw, 31 May 1918, AWP AW/3/1/24.

77 'General Declaration of the Aims of the Association', WHDP, c404, f114-5; League of Free Nations Association, 'A British Organisation to promote an active Propaganda for the formation of a World League of Free Nations as the Necessary Basis of a Permanent Peace (Excerpt from Official Pamphlet, September, 1918)', in *Development of the League of Nations Idea*, ed. by John H. Latané, vols (New York: The Macmillan Co, 1932), ii, 818-819.



There was additionally the fear that the adoption of this declaration would irrevocably commit the LNS to the immediate formation of a League of Nations.<sup>78</sup> Attempts to get Wells to redraft the more controversial sections of the declaration were not received favourably.<sup>79</sup> Events came to a head at the annual meeting on 14 June, with Hobson leading the opponents to amending the LNS constitution and structure. Following a very heated debate, which he lost, Wells 'struck out as wildly as he could, and spat sarcasms at Williams and Hobson,' enabling Virginia Woolf to state approvingly that 'the jingoes were defeated by the cranks.'<sup>80</sup> According to Margaret Cole, such a response from Wells was commonplace; over the years he resigned indignantly from the Fabians and the Labour Party as well as the League groups, as he was totally incapable of collaborating with others for a common goal.<sup>81</sup>

The annual meeting served to illustrate the tensions that had long existed within the League movement, between those willing to continue the painfully slow process of building support for an idea that to many seemed an idealistic or 'utopian' aspiration, and those who saw the League as merely the Allied and Associate Powers incarnate. In an attempt to placate the disaffected parties, the LNS agreed to make significant changes in the procedures for electing its Council and Executive. Ultimately, this failed to appease either faction. Hobson, Brailsford and some other members feared that the new procedures would be undemocratic and effectively undermine the self-government of the society; they actively canvassed for Council members who would be acceptable to them.<sup>82</sup> At the same time, Wells, David Davies and McCurdy separated from the LNS and formed their own League group. It seems likely that the seeds for this new group were sown long before the 'League Lunch' at the Carlton Club and that the annual meeting was the final straw since, after a dramatic exit, Wells was found 'caballing' with McCurdy and J.

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78 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Willoughby H. Dickinson, 4 June [1918], WHDP, c403, 118.

79 H. G. Wells to Aneurin Williams, n.d. [1918], AWP AW/3/1/2.

80 H. G. Wells being the chief jingo, *The Diaries of Virginia Woolf*, ed. by Anne O. Bell, (London: Penguin, 1979), i, 157-8.

81 Margaret Cole, 'H. G. Wells and the Fabian Society', in *Edwardian Radicals*, ed. by A. J. A. Morris, vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 97-113 & 112.

82 Aneurin Williams to Sir Algernon Methuen, 5 July 1918, AWP AW/3/1/20; see also H. N. Brailsford, Sarah Byles and J. A. Hobson's circular letter to prospective Council members, 29 June 1918, and J. A. Hobson to Aneurin Williams, 30 June 1918, AWP AW/3/1/15.



A. Spender.<sup>83</sup> Just ten days later, the League of Free Nations Association (LFNA) came into being. The new rival society advocated the immediate formation of the League of Nations amongst the Entente Powers. In the run-up to the formation of the LFNA, Davies and his colleagues did all they could to foment dissatisfaction and suspicion amongst the League's supporters. Consequently, many previously supportive of the LNS and its objective increasingly sought to dissociate themselves. The Conservative, Arthur Steel-Maitland, was led to believe that 'the direction of the Society was practically collared by the Pacifist section of it.'<sup>84</sup> On further enquiry the source of his information became apparent when he naively admitted, 'I have not the least doubt that David Davies is quite candid and honest in what he tells me.'<sup>85</sup>

While the LNS had failed on at least two occasions to persuade the Oxford classicist, Gilbert Murray to become a member, the LFNA succeeded in securing his support as its chairman.<sup>86</sup> Its direction and finances were clearly under Davies' control and one of its first actions was to issue Wells' rejected declaration under the LFNA's name and initiate a campaign for the immediate formation of the League.<sup>87</sup> The Association however, shared similar aims to the LNS and not surprisingly, the structure of their League reflected the ongoing discussions within both the LNS and other interested parties.

The LFNA plans contained several significant oversights: firstly, the immediate formation of an Allies-based League would make it difficult if not impossible for the Central Powers to join after the war, additionally neutral states would be unable to join a League of Allies while the war was still ongoing. Secondly, the very fact its members were at war would require a completely different constitution from the one they were advocating, which was more suitable for a world at peace with itself.

Hobson made some of these points to Gilbert Murray in the run-up to the disastrous June meeting: if 'we claimed that our Alliance be now constituted a League of Nations,

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83 *The Diaries of Virginia Woolf*, ed. by Bell, 157.

84 Arthur Steel-Maitland to Willoughby H. Dickinson, 19 June 1918, WHDP, c403, f115.

85 Arthur Steel-Maitland to Willoughby H. Dickinson, 22 June 1918, WHDP, c403, f116.

86 Gilbert Murray to Aneurin Williams, 30 May 1915 and 1 November 1917, AWP AW/3/1/20.

87 'General Declaration of the Aims of the Association', WHDP, c404, f114-5.



we virtually force the Central Powers into regarding as a permanent necessity their own Central Europe, & we declare a state of economic war between these two leagues afterwards.’<sup>88</sup> Germany, he concluded, would never be able to join such a league; the only real possibility of future security was if she was included from the beginning. The day after the annual meeting, he again outlined his concerns to Murray: while he regarded Germany’s ‘actions in the summer of 1914 as criminal in the extreme [...] I have not been able to accept your defence of British and French diplomacy before the war.’<sup>89</sup> Consequently, he admitted ‘I see Germany black, but other Powers not white but varying shades of grey.’

The division was potentially disastrous; the sending of mixed messages to the British public could seriously dilute or even weaken opinion in favour of a League of Nations. However, even before the Association held its first public meeting on 13 September in Northampton, a meeting of representatives of the LNS and LFNA had been convened; Willoughby Dickinson, Raymond Unwin, Woolf and Williams represented the former, while Murray, Spender, McCurdy and Spalding represented the latter. The intention was to form either one amalgamated society or close co-operation and joint propaganda.<sup>90</sup> The conflict over when to form the League remained. The LNS’s willingness to delay its formation until after the war was supported by Balfour and Cecil.<sup>91</sup> Cecil’s position was that the mechanics of the League needed to be fully considered first and that impulsive action now could frustrate its universal extension. Despite this, a joint statement was prepared which would be acceptable to both groups, the conclusion of which was that a true League could only be formed after the war was concluded, but a similar organisation among the allies could be formed beforehand provided it did not call itself the ‘League of Nations.’ This approach was supported by Balfour, on 1 August, in a statement to the House of Commons: ‘do not call your Allied combination a League of Nations; otherwise you will never have a League of Nations at all.’<sup>92</sup> For Hobson the ‘League now’ advocates

88 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 19 May 1918, GMP, MS36, f183-6.

89 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 15 June 1918, GMP, MS37, f16-17.

90 Gilbert Murray to Aneurin Williams, 30 August 1918, AWP AW/3/1/20.

91 ‘Notes of discussions with Lord Cecil & A. Balfour, 1918’, AWP AW/3/1/2.

92 *Hansard*, 109, HC, 1 August 1918, col. 722.

were being naïve to assume that it would not be seen as a League of victors, especially by the Germans.<sup>93</sup>

The principal argument supporting amalgamation was the prospect of obtaining the patronage of influential individuals and providing one coherent voice. While the LFNA was able to command strong Conservative support, the LNS had at its disposal the left-wing 'services of such able exponents of the League policy as Mr Lowes Dickinson, Mr Brailsford and Mr J. A. Hobson.'<sup>94</sup> David Davies once again demonstrated his frustration by questioning the need for the amalgamation discussions, while continuing to plan the LFNA's inaugural public meeting. On 28 August, he instructed Murray to stop laying too much stress upon the importance of the LNS, and that the work of the LFNA should not be hampered by 'endless discussion with Sir Willoughby and Aneurin Williams.'<sup>95</sup>

Of the two, it was Williams that Davies particularly targeted, regularly complaining he was difficult to work with and incorrectly stating that he had killed 'more good movements than any one person.'<sup>96</sup> It is difficult to identify exactly what Davies was referring to since Williams, as well as being instrumental in the development of the British League movement, was a leading figure in a variety of other organisations that showed no sign of a premature demise. By 1932 his opinion was more complementary; he now described Williams as an optimist 'whose enthusiasm, zeal and self-sacrifice knew no bounds. He set us all a noble example of devotion to duty and faith in the ultimate destiny of mankind.'<sup>97</sup>

However, in 1918 Williams was closely associated with Hobson, Brailsford and the Buxton's, whose left-wing credentials were viewed as undesirable to Davies' grand vision. This association may have led to a misunderstanding of his motives, but as Willoughby

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93 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 9 October 1918, GMP, MS37, f203.

94 'Notes on Proposals for Amalgamation', WHDP, c403, f241.

95 David Davies to Gilbert Murray, 5 August 1918, GMP, MS178, f134-8.

96 David Davies to Gilbert Murray, 5 August 1918, and 28 August 1918, GMP, MS178 f136 and f157-9.

97 'Extract from Speech by Lord Davies of Llandinam at the monthly luncheon of the [Industrial Co-Partnership] Association', 3 November 1932, AWP AW/3/6.



Dickinson pointed out 'the feeling against him is very ill-founded. People seem to think he is a Pacifist (whatever that may mean) but that is quite untrue. He is as militant in this war as D[avid] D[avies] himself.'<sup>98</sup> Despite this Davies was insistent that his 'sphere of activities in the new body will I trust be carefully curtailed.'<sup>99</sup>

The major driving force behind the merger of the two societies was former Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey of Fallodon. The LFNA sought his consent to be their President, however he insisted he would only do so if they were united as a single organisation. His position as an elder statesman and early advocate of the League idea made him an ideal candidate.<sup>100</sup> In September a joint amalgamation committee consisting of Willoughby Dickinson, Lowes Dickinson, F. N. Keen, Raymond Unwin, Williams and Woolf for the financially weak LNS, and Davies, Murray, McCurdy, J. A. Spender, Wickham Stead and H. G. Wells for the financially secure LFNA met to discuss merger terms. These were to lead to the formation of the League of Nations Union (LNU), which to all intents and purposes was essentially the LFNA: the chairman, acting secretary, office and the aims and objects were all from the LFNA while the LNS provided the bulk of the membership. Despite Davies' assertions that the LNS were pacifists, a ballot of the membership produced an overwhelming 93 percent in favour of accepting these terms.<sup>101</sup>

One of the final acts of the LNS was the publication of its *Scheme of Organisation*, which as Henry Winkler points out was the nearest the LNS came to issuing an official proposal for a League of Nations.<sup>102</sup> Their League was to consist of a Supreme Court, Council of Conciliation, a Conference, and an administrative committee, thereby incorporating aspects of the earlier Williams and Unwin *Schemes of International Organisation*, together with those of the Bryce Group. At the same time, a meeting was organised under the auspices of both the LNS and the LFNA with Viscount Grey in the chair. The

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98 Willoughby H. Dickinson to Gilbert Murray, 24 August 1918, GMP, MS178, f51.

99 David Davies to Gilbert Murray, 28 August 1918, GMP, MS178, f157-9.

100 In May 1915 Williams had unsuccessfully attempted to get Grey to consent to be the LNS' President; Grey to Williams, 21 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13.

101 Over half the membership failed to vote, but of those who did only 89 were against; *World-wide Support for a League of Nations*. WHDP, c406, f131; 'Report of Proposed Amalgamation', WHDP, c403, f238.

102 Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919*, 67.

meeting held on 10 October attracted more people than the Central Hall and the adjacent Caxton Hall in Westminster could accommodate.<sup>103</sup> During his speech, Grey outlined his support for the establishment of a League of Nations, but said this should occur as soon as possible after the termination of the present conflict. For this reason discussion over its structure, functions and powers should commence immediately in order to ensure its swift establishment. This speech was of great importance for the League of Nations movement; virtually all the press covered it and, importantly, it was received favourably. This was in effect the last curtain call for the two societies, which would just three days before the Armistice unite as the LNU. It also marked the first public appearance of Grey since the start of Lloyd George's premiership.<sup>104</sup>

After three years of cautious campaigning and discussions, the LNS's liberal internationalist vision for a League of Nations was closer to reality; the impending Peace Conference had rendered the dispute over the timing of its formation irrelevant. The LNU successfully persuaded high profile individuals to become honorary presidents, including Asquith, Balfour and Lloyd George and subsequently became one of the most successful interwar peace groups.

### **The General Election**

Before more thought could be given to the formation of a League of Nations and a world influenced by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Lloyd George announced the forthcoming general election. The Liberal government elected in December 1910 had in effect ceased in May 1915, with the creation of a coalition government. Asquith had continued as Prime Minister until displaced by Lloyd George in December 1916, though he remained leader of the Liberal Party. In December 1918, Lloyd George therefore sought the approbation of the Country as leader of a coalition with the Conservatives. Lloyd George and the Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law subsequently jointly

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<sup>103</sup> 'League Of Nations, Viscount Grey On The Problem', *The Times*, 11 October 1918.

<sup>104</sup> Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon*, 348.



endorsed their preferred candidates, which included only 159 Liberals. Neither Williams, Noel Buxton nor many of the liberal internationalists received the 'coupon' as it became dubbed.

On the 12 November Lloyd George had announced to a specially selected audience of Liberals at 10 Downing Street that 'In my judgement, the League of Nations is an absolute essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the Peace Conference to guarantee that the League of Nations is a reality'<sup>105</sup> He also stated that the League would be required to protect the small nations, which had been reborn from covetous neighbours. Ten days later in their joint manifesto, Lloyd George and Bonar Law promised that it would be 'the earnest endeavour of the Coalition government to promote the formation of a League of Nations.'<sup>106</sup> Despite this, it rapidly became relegated to the background as the electorate responded more favourably to calls for the prosecution of the Kaiser and stringent reparations. Interestingly, Lloyd George's speech on 12 November had also insisted that the British delegation to the Peace Conference would be one in favour of a 'just peace,' and not for revenge and greed.

The electorate had more than doubled by the extension of the franchise to all adult males and women over 30 years of age who satisfied a modest property qualification. This increase was in response to the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform, to which both Williams and Willoughby Dickinson belonged. Williams successfully contested his seat against the coalition candidate as well as Labour, while Buxton stood unsuccessfully as a Lib-Lab candidate.<sup>107</sup>

The importance of the League was never a major issue during the election; all the parties supported it, the majority of the British public and even the press. The LNU issued a great deal of literature during the election period, explaining its objectives, outlining the various schemes and clearly explaining the need for the League of Nations. They also

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<sup>105</sup> *The Times*, 13 November 1918.

<sup>106</sup> *The Times*, 22 November 1918.

<sup>107</sup> His return to Parliament would have to wait until 1922, when he regained his old seat of North Norfolk as a Labour candidate.

surveyed 1,500 Parliamentary candidates, to ascertain their views and this indicated that 538 were in agreement with the League idea, with only one against.<sup>108</sup> Also a high-level deputation was received by President Wilson at the American Embassy in London on 28 December, headed by Grey, and consisted of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Asquith, Bryce, Willoughby Dickinson and Gilbert Murray. Everything appeared to be in place for the forthcoming Peace Conference; the League idea was widely accepted and had the backing of leading statesmen who had also made public pronouncements in favour of liberating the oppressed Armenians.

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108 *The Times*, 14 December 1918; *World-wide Support for a League of Nations*. WHDP, c406, f133 indicates 700 replies were eventually received, of which only one was against.



## 10

**A new international order? 1919-1922**

With the election over, the attention of the government and the liberal internationalists turned to the forthcoming Peace Conference in Versailles. Also converging on Paris were the representatives of those nationalities that wanted independence based upon the notion of self-determination, and various international League groups. The latter sought to arrive at a joint programme to present to the Peace Conference. Groups from France, Britain, America, Italy, Belgium, Romania, Serbia and China met under the presidency of M. Leon Bourgeois, who had headed the French governmental Commission that recommended a 'Société des Nations.'<sup>1</sup> The proposals, which emerged from five days of discussion, called for the establishment as soon as possible of a League of free peoples for submitting disputes, and preventing war.<sup>2</sup> Much of the agreed programme reflected the existing LNU policy, including the control of the armaments industries. A deputation headed by Bourgeois then presented these to the 'Big Four'.

The LNS had encouraged such international co-operation from its earliest days. Cross-fertilisation was especially strong between the British and American groups, which helped establish a similarity in approach through the sharing of ideas and the fostering of an intellectual debate over the merits of the League. As much as possible it also developed the frank exchange of views with similar societies in other countries. As chairman of the International Co-operation Alliance Williams was able to promote the League idea amongst co-operators within both Allied and neutral countries, and the *International Co-*

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1 'League of Nations Union, Joint Programme for the establishment of a League of Nations', Paris, 26-31 January 1919, WHDP, c405, f73-75.

2 'League of Nations Union, Joint Programme', WHDP, c405, f73-75.

*operative Bulletin* readily promoted the League idea. At the same time, Lowes Dickinson worked closely with a Dutch anti-war society to ensure its policy closely resembled those of the British pro-league groups.<sup>3</sup> In February 1918, Williams had travelled to Paris in an attempt to popularise the League idea in France. His presentation to an audience organised by the Ligue pour une Société des Nations was well received, but as George Noble observes the Ligue was neither very representative nor properly organised.<sup>4</sup> However, on 10 November 1918 the Association Française pour la Société des Nations was formed along similar lines to the British and American groups.

Cecil was one of the liberal internationalists' greatest assets who had long shown far more interest in the League's potential than his ministerial colleagues. His position within the British section of the League of Nations Commission ideally placed him to support those promoting the League idea in Britain. As George Egerton has observed, Cecil's careful manipulation ensured the Covenant was closer to the 'Wilsonian' League than the British government ever envisaged.<sup>5</sup>

### The League of Nations Covenant

The majority of liberal internationalists welcomed the Draft Covenant as a significant step forward for international co-operation and the fostering of peace among nations. The LNU's executive declared itself satisfied since the Covenant was:

Capable of bringing about such a world government as will guarantee the freedom of nations, act as trustee and guardian of uncivilised races and underdeveloped territories, maintain international order, and, finally, liberate mankind from the curse of war.<sup>6</sup>

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3 *World-wide Support for a League of Nations*, WHDP, c406, f107.

4 George Bernard Noble, *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919: Wilsonian Diplomacy, the Versailles Peace and French Public Opinion* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), 101.

5 See G. W. Egerton, 'The Lloyd George Government and the Creation of the League of Nations', *The American Historical Review*, 79, no. 2 (April 1974), 438-42.

6 League of Nations Union, *Comments on the draft covenant of the League of Nations* (London: League of Nations Union, 1919).



The League consisted of an Assembly, a Council and a Permanent Secretariat. The Assembly was composed of representatives of all member states, while the Council consisted of two types of members: the Great Powers as permanent members and rotating non-permanent members. Each state had one vote in the Assembly, the members of the Council also had one vote, and unanimity of the members present was required for political decisions. This meant in practice that the Great Powers could ensure the Council's decisions were not detrimental to their own national interests. Its real strength lay in its working in unison as a collective body; however where the interests of one of the Powers were affected the division rendered it ineffectual.

### *Liberal internationalists and the Covenant*

Despite Cecil's best endeavours, the Covenant ultimately fell short of the expectations of large numbers of those who had long championed the League idea. Ironically, the Covenant had emerged from secret negotiations, the very thing they had hoped the League would eradicate. Added to this was its integration into a vengeful Peace Treaty and the exclusion of both Germany and Soviet Russia, thereby dashing hopes of an inclusive League of all nations. The League sought to maintain the territorial status quo but there was to be a procedure for changing frontiers peacefully. Two key principles of the League were its intention to prevent a revival of German militarism and self-determination. However, without the guiding hand of America, the League was subjected to the differing whims of Britain and France and their interpretations of these twin principles. Liberal internationalists had long recognised the importance of America joining the League, without it there was the danger that 'a League would be at best a revived concert of the Great Powers of Europe, liable at any time to split into rival groups.'<sup>7</sup>

Liberal internationalists were particularly critical of what had been created at Versailles. As far as Hobhouse was concerned, Wilson should have put a bullet through his head rather than sign, while Bryce could 'remember few cases in history where negotiations

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<sup>7</sup> Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon*, 351.

might have done so much good, and have done so much evil.'<sup>8</sup> H. G. Wells who called the League a 'sham world parliament' was particularly disappointed that it had failed to live up to the ideals he and others had set it.<sup>9</sup> While, in *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*, Lowes Dickinson outlined the view of many internationalists that the Treaty of Versailles was:

Conceived on the traditional lines aiming at the weakening of the defeated enemy and the strengthening of the victors by transferences of territory and the indemnities which, in this case, were [...] so absurd.<sup>10</sup>

He concluded that salvation was only possible through the establishment of a truly international League, which could oversee the equitable distribution of raw materials, abandonment of protective policies, genuine disarmament and protection for 'discontented minorities'.<sup>11</sup> The liberal internationalists were not alone in their criticisms of the League; even the leading statesmen behind its creation were sceptical. In August 1919, Lloyd George confided to Lord Riddell that 'The League, I am sorry to say, is a humbug and a sham.'<sup>12</sup> While Wilson, shortly before his death, confided to his close friend Barney Baruch that 'Countries like France and Italy are unsympathetic to such an organisation. Time and sinister happenings may eventually convince them that some such scheme is required. It may not be my scheme. It may be some other. I see now, however, that my plan was premature. The world was not ripe for it.'<sup>13</sup>

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8 *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1928*, ed. by Trevor Wilson, (London: Collins, 1970), 374 & 380.

9 H. G. Wells, *Experiment in autobiography : discoveries and conclusions of a very ordinary brain (since 1866)* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1934), 611.

10 G. Lowes Dickinson, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926), 489.

11 *Ibid.*, 492.

12 *The Riddell Diaries, 1908-1923*, ed. by McEwen, 289.

13 *Ibid.*, 389.



## Self-determination and the Mandate System

One particular hope the liberal internationalists expressed was that the League of Nations could untangle centuries of suspicion, mistrust, and provide a lasting settlement that took notice of what indigenous people actually wanted. Two conflicting possibilities were open now to settle the Eastern Question: the first was to redistribute the former Turkish provinces amongst those states, which had supported the Allies; or, second, recognise the rights of the different ethnicities within these provinces and enable them to determine their own destinies. Naturally, liberal internationalists favoured the latter option based as it was upon the idea of nationality and self-determination, which they believed would be a guiding principle of the peace settlement.

### *Mandates*

The historiography relating to the development of the Mandate System is particularly rich, but is primarily concerned with the former German colonies in Africa, and clearly illustrates that its purpose was to diminish the imperialistic competition of the old order in an attempt to help keep the peace.<sup>14</sup> The official statements in favour of the liberation of 'peoples everywhere' were important to the formulation of trusteeship and international mandates. Such ideas were not entirely new and examples can be found in various international agreements made during the nineteenth century, such as that of the Berlin Africa Conference of 1885.<sup>15</sup>

By the end of 1916, liberal internationalists had achieved a consensus regarding trusteeship. Working together with the Labour movement, they ensured it enjoyed sufficient currency for it to be taken up by General Smuts, and subsequently by President Wilson.<sup>16</sup> Smuts was introduced to the idea of trusteeship through the liberal imperialist *Round Table*,

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14 For a detailed study of the operation of the Mandate system in Africa see, Michael D Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); see also, Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago, IL.: The University of Chicago Press, 1930) and H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organisation (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1948).

15 See Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship*, 18, 92-3.

16 Smuts was a friend of Hobson and was an important figure in the acceptance of liberal internationalist thought; see also Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement*, 206-19.



whose editor, Lionel Curtis, was a former member of Lord Milner's kindergarten in Southern Africa, and member of the League of Nations Union's research committee. In *The League of Nations, a Practical Suggestion* (1918), Smuts proposed the introduction of an international system of mandates over the former territories of the vanquished Powers, a system animated by the concept of a moral duty to develop them in the best interests of the indigenous peoples.<sup>17</sup> An important aspect of this scheme was the notion of tutelage for those areas, which were unable to govern themselves. Self-government was applicable to the former territories of Turkey and Austria-Hungary, but not Germany's former colonies as they were considered to be in too barbarous a state. Perhaps from direct experience he did not advocate a policy of annexation, but a system based upon self-determination or supervision with the consent of the people. His vision was for the League of Nations to assume international authority for these territories, but delegate the everyday administration to another state, which would act as its agent or mandatory. This was to incorporate the ideas of trusteeship, and equal opportunity for all.

For President Wilson, the prospect of the Allies absorbing the conquered German and Turkish territories was not acceptable. For a staunch anti-imperialist, the policy of annexation was one to be avoided at all cost. His stubborn refusal to accept the extension of European imperialism, forced the Allies to consider suitable alternatives to outright annexation. The only real options were the products of liberal internationalist ideas and discussion: trusteeship administered by a League of Nations. Wilson therefore suggested that Smuts' *Practical Suggestion* should form the basis of the discussions at the Peace Conference, but with the addition of the German colonies outside Europe.<sup>18</sup> As a result, in March 1918, Sir Mark Sykes reported that, without the President's support, agreements such as the one made with his French counterpart M. Picot would not carry much weight at the forthcoming Peace conference. Importantly, 'The consent of the governed and the consent of the world are essential to any form of foreign influence or control over an emancipated people.'<sup>19</sup>

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17 J. C. Smuts, *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1918).

18 Ibid., 227.

19 Quoted in Andrew J Crozier, 'The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925: Some Problems created by the Paris Peace Conference', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14, no. 3 (July 1979), 484.



On 30 January, the Council of Ten adopted a resolution, which utilised Smuts ideas as a starting point from which to prepare its own text.<sup>20</sup> Interestingly, this resolution contained the explicit statement that due to:

The historic misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Kurdistan, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire.

Significantly, the final text did not incorporate this particular paragraph. The resolution envisaged the tutelage of those peoples unable to stand by themselves, by 'advanced' nations as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations. It also recognised that certain parts of the Turkish Empire were in such an advanced state that given relevant advice and assistance they could become independent nations in their own right. The latter point was viewed as a favourable signal towards Armenian aspirations.

For liberal internationalists, the mandates system logically complemented the establishment of a new system of international co-operation and would provide the ideal mechanism for territories to be administered and protected from undue exploitation, and ultimately lead to their full independence. The final mandates system was by necessity a compromise between the joint idealism of British radicals and socialists, supported by the Americans, and the desire of the French who wished to retain control over the recently conquered middle-east territories.<sup>21</sup> The former German colonies, together with the Ottoman Empire's Middle Eastern provinces would become 'Mandates', administered by individual Allied countries that were in turn accountable to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), comprised of ten members, four of which were from the mandatory Powers.

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20 The full text is quoted in David Hunter Miller, 'The Origin of the Mandates System', *Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review*, 6, no. 1/4 (1927), 284-285.

21 See Crozier, 'The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925', 483.

The League Council created the PMC to supervise the mandates system through the analysis of the annual reports provided by the mandatory Powers. The report was in reality a questionnaire to which the mandatory Powers answered in a yes/no fashion or with very vague responses. While it nominally represented the principle of international supervision, in practice the ambiguities allowed the Mandatory a great deal of latitude in their interpretation. In addition, the influence the PMC was able to exert upon the Mandatory Powers was limited to the threat of public criticism and utilising the inherent ambiguities to its own advantage.<sup>22</sup>

In January 1919, the Council of Four approved the Mandate system, which was subsequently enshrined in Article 22 of the League Covenant. The aims of mandation were to: a) assist the people so that at some future point they would be able to govern themselves as an independent nation, and b) to ensure that the Mandatory Power would not undertake the economic exploitation for its exclusive benefit, the 'open-door' principle. As the former colonial or dependent territories were in different stages of development, three different forms of Mandates were recognised based upon European definitions of development or modernisation.

Class 'A' mandates were those territories, which had 'reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised.' The mandatory power would offer administrative advice and assistance as required, but not direct government. All were former Ottoman territories: Britain overseeing Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine, and France being responsible for Lebanon and Syria. There were some similarities with the earlier Sykes-Picot agreement, but one notable exception was Armenia.

Class 'B' mandates were primarily former German territories in Central Africa. As these had not reached an advanced stage of development, the Mandatory Powers would be responsible for their administration, subject to guarantees of freedom of conscience and

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22 See Callahan, *Mandates and Empire*, 6.



religion while abuses such as slavery, arms and liquor trafficking were to be outlawed. In addition, they were to ensure that trading was open to all League members and that land transfers were conducted in the interests of the indigenous people. These undeveloped territories included the British mandates of Tanganyika and parts of Togoland and the Cameroons, while the French mandates covered the remainder of Togoland and the Cameroons. Ruanda-Urundi became the responsibility of Belgium. In practice, this acknowledged the wartime partition of German territories amongst Britain, France and Belgium.

Class 'C' mandates were territories in South-West Africa and the South Pacific islands. These were deemed to be even less developed than those in Class 'B', and as a result it was believed they 'can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory.' They were to be subject to the same safeguards as Class 'B' mandates. This administration as integral to the Mandatory was seen as a compensation to the British dominions for their vital role during the war. New Guinea and Nauru passed to Australia; Samoa to New Zealand; South-West Africa (now Namibia) went to South Africa; and Germany's former Pacific island possessions north of the equator came under the control of Japan.

The different classes came into force over a twenty-month period, the less controversial class 'C' mandates were approved in December 1920, Class 'B' followed in September 1921 and class 'A' despite being assigned at the San Remo Conference in May 1920 had to wait until the conclusion of the Turko-Greek war in July 1922. The delay was also in part caused by the United States, as a non-League member, attempting to ensure it had equal rights to the mandates and in particular the potential oil in Mesopotamia.<sup>23</sup>

### *Criticism of the Mandate System*

In *Oppressed People and the League of Nations*, Noel Buxton together with T. P. Conwell-Evans give an in-depth analysis of the role of the League in establishing the Mandates

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23 See Crozier, 'The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925', 497.

System in relation to the principles of self-determination. Having witnessed the 'evils of imperialism', they saw the principle of self-determination as the primary method by which the exploited peoples could remove the shackles of empire. In line with the anti-imperialist views of their pro-Boer predecessors, they recognised that imperialism was inherently an infliction of both physical and moral cruelty upon subjected peoples, whose resources of labour and raw materials were regarded as the private property of the imperialistic power.<sup>24</sup>

Despite President Wilson and other liberal internationalists' desire to prevent the annexation of territory, the Mandate System had allowed this to happen in all but name. Brailsford observed it was hardly surprising that it should operate imperialistically when the League's 'Council is dominated by the great imperial powers [...] When you compose your governing council of the empire themselves, inevitably the interests of empire, the assumptions of empire, the ethics of empire will govern [...] its decisions.'<sup>25</sup> As a result, many Americans believed that the Mandates system was being manipulated in such a way to allow the Europeans to annex new territory under the guise of self-determination.<sup>26</sup> Why, they asked, was Britain so willing to assume new burdens in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and elsewhere, where there was a promise of material advantage, but not to take the burden of Armenia.

One issue of great concern to Arnold Toynbee was the 'Western Question': that is the influence of Western attitudes upon traditional non-Western societies.<sup>27</sup> In the Mandate System, he recognised the imposition of western legal institutions and western conceptions of identity upon the rest of the world. Self-determination was creating nationhood along ethnic lines. As a result, Toynbee claimed, the Middle East was emulating the Western

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24 See Buxton and Conwell-Evans, *Oppressed People and the League of Nations*, 21.

25 Quoted in Quincy Wright, 'The Mandates System and Public Concern', *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, 9, no. 4 (March 1929), 395.

26 For example see Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin co, 1921), 149-61.

27 See Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (London: Constable & Co. Ltd, 1922), 5.



European ideal of nationality based upon religious and linguistic homogeneity.<sup>28</sup> The liberal internationalists recognised certain inherent dangers of such a change. The most compelling recent examples were the Balkan Wars and the 'Turkification' policy, which had resulted in massacre, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Where once the populations were intermixed and interdependent upon each other, now they were estranged, each competing for self-government.

For Buxton, the role of the League was to ensure that the interference by the imperial powers was kept within 'legitimate limits,' that is the avoidance of cruel practices and the exploitation of the people and their resources.<sup>29</sup> Without an international mechanism, there were fears that narrow nationalistic aims would soon supersede the higher moral aspirations proclaimed by the Allied leaders during the war, and ultimately a return to the historic practice of annexation.

In his pamphlet *Mandates and Empire*, Woolf recognised in Article 22 the potential to revolutionise the relationship between the western industrial nations and the less developed ones.<sup>30</sup> Primarily concerned as it was with Africa, his pamphlet stressed the points that would become LNU policy, namely the protection of indigenous land ownership and the investment of profits in the education of the population to ensure the eventual achievement of self-government.

The lack of safeguards within the system was of serious concern to those with an interest in the peoples it was supposed to help. Both Williams and Noel Buxton independently suggested the use of 'inspectors' who were well acquainted with the mandates to undertake periodic inspections and report to the League directly, thereby introducing a form of supervision that the current system lacked.<sup>31</sup> For Williams this would help establish the League as a guardian of the oppressed, while Buxton envisaged the extension of inspection

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28 Ibid., 15-16; This issue is taken up further in Arnold J. Toynbee, *Nationality & the War*, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1915).

29 Buxton and Conwell-Evans, *Oppressed People and the League of Nations*, 52.

30 See Leonard Woolf, *Mandates and Empire* (London: League of Nations Union, 1920).

31 Aneurin Williams, 'Armenia, British Pledges and the Near East', *Contemporary Review*, 121 (1922) 424; Buxton and Conwell-Evans, *Oppressed People and the League of Nations*, 67 & 69-70.

to include 'all weak peoples under alien sway', thereby overseeing the colonial 'native' policies of Britain, France and Japan amongst others.

### *Liberal internationalism and the Mandate System*

While the BAC and the BC were primarily concerned with how self-determination could be applied to Armenia, the LNU sought to influence how the system would work for the benefit of all the Mandated territories and not just for the Mandatory Powers. As a result, in June 1920 the LNU set up a mandates committee to prepare what it considered model legislation for the administration of the mandates. Amongst its members were Gilbert Murray, Arnold J. Toynbee, J. H. Harris, and Leonard Woolf. Its first chairman was Major W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, who was to be Britain's initial representative on the PMC. His successor at the PMC was Lord Lugard, an advisor to the LNU's mandates committee.

The function of the sub-committee was to prepare its own mandate texts with the view of getting the League to accept them instead of the drafts prepared by the Allies. This was an attempt to inject a degree of impartiality into the system, a system controlled by the Supreme Council and not the League Assembly. Their hopes were to develop a system of international administration that would help maintain the post-war peace and provide the basis for the ultimate reformation of European imperialism.

The LNU concern for the indigenous peoples within the mandates was primarily of a humanitarian nature. Concerns were expressed relating to improvements in their social and economic status particularly within the 'B' mandates. Through the process of education and training, they hoped a system of self-government could be developed for the benefit of all inhabitants in a mandated territory, regardless of race.<sup>32</sup>

They also stated that all land not legally held, be considered indigenous land to be managed solely for the benefit of the people. They further suggested that all revenue

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<sup>32</sup> Executive Committee Minutes, 1920-1921, 13 Jan. 1921, BLPES: League of Nations Union Papers (henceforth LNU) f2/3, 29-30.



generated in the mandate be used to improve conditions within it, and not for the benefit of the mandatory power.<sup>33</sup> The idea that the indigenous people should be responsible for their own resources but aided and protected from exploitation by the Mandatory Power was in line with Hobson's views of two decades earlier. In *Imperialism*, he offered the observation that if left to exploit their natural resources:

Undisturbed by the importunate and arrogant control of foreign nations [...] they would let loose a horde of private adventurers, slavers, piratical traders, treasure hunters, concession mongers, who, animated by mere greed of gold or power, would set about the work of exploitation under no public control and with no regard to the future; playing havoc with the political, economic, and moral institutions of the peoples, instilling civilised vices and civilised diseases, importing spirits and firearms as the trade of readiest acceptance, fostering internecine strife for their own political and industrial purposes, and even setting up private despotisms sustained by organised armed forces.'<sup>34</sup>

The presence of MPs within their executive committees allowed the various groups to keep the pressure on the government. For the LNU, the former Cabinet minister Lord Robert Cecil and W. A. G. Ormsby-Gore regularly raised questions in the House of Commons as to why the League had not yet issued the mandates. On 24 June 1920, Cecil attempted to get Lloyd George to outline the situation regarding the position of the Supreme Council in the setting up of the Armenian mandate.<sup>35</sup> The lacklustre response led to his publicly outlining his concerns with the government's professed policy towards the mandates and his fears that a blatant disregard for the League's supervisory role would lead to a return to 'the bad old days of conquest and exploitation.'<sup>36</sup>

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33 Executive Committee Minutes, 1920-1921, 13 Jan. 1921, LNU f2/3, 29-30.

34 Hobson, *Imperialism*, 230.

35 *Hansard*, 130, HC, 24 June 1920, col. 2363.

36 'Mandates: A Duty to the League of Nations', *The Times*, 25 June 1920.

*Armenian representation in Paris*

Failure to obtain representation was one of the greatest frustrations to the Armenians gathered in Paris. The disappointment felt over their exclusion was outlined by Boghos Nubar, who contended that, as a consequence of the massacres and their fighting, with France in Anatolia and Russia in the Caucasus, 'Armenia's tribute to death is thus undoubtedly heavier in proportion than that of any other belligerent nation.'<sup>37</sup> In outlining the important part they had played in the war he stressed that 'having of their own free will cast in their lot with the champions of right and justice, the victory of the Allies over the common enemies has secured to them a right of independence.' Their failure to gain admittance however, was according to Robert Cecil, because they 'represented an aspiration and not an established state.'<sup>38</sup> The only options open to them were to present their case individually to the various delegations in Paris and the Secretariat General. The presence of different bodies attempting to speak for the Armenian people complicated the situation. Not only did a delegation headed by M. Aharonion represent the Russian Armenians of the Erivan Republic, there were initially two representing the Turkish Armenians. The first was Boghos Nubar's AND and the second headed by 'General' Torcom who had unilaterally issued a declaration of Armenian independence in Erzerum in February 1918.<sup>39</sup> In an attempt to avoid the dilution of the Armenian message, Williams had a meeting with General Torcom in December 1918 while he was in London seeking international recognition. The possibility of two voices claiming to speak for Turkish Armenia would, he felt, be fatal, especially as it would be difficult enough getting the most moderate claims accepted.<sup>40</sup> Ultimately, just two delegations represented the Armenians in Paris, those headed by Boghos Nubar and M. Aharonion. In February 1919, the Armenians submitted a joint memorandum to the Peace Conference, which outlined their territorial claims and a request for economic and financial support. The extent of this claim can be seen in Figure 10.1, and included the Erivan Republic plus a significant proportion of Anatolia, stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.

37 'The Rights of Armenia', *The Times*, 30 January 1919; 'Letter to The Times', 24 January 1919, ADNA, Liasse 1/14.

38 Quoted in Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4 February 1919, JBP, MS205, f14.

39 For a translation of Torcom's declaration see 'Armenian Independence Proclamation Act', 31 January to 13 February 1918, JBP, MS204, f178-182.

40 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, JBP, MS204, f167.






Figure 10.1: Proposed boundaries for an Armenian homeland, 1919

### Mandate for Armenia

One important limitation of the Mandate System was the Allies' fixation upon the future of the German colonies and the more profitable parts of the Turkish Empire. In a House of Commons debate on 18 November 1918, Williams had outlined the aspirations of the Armenians and the countless numbers of refugees who, he argued, looked to Britain and her Allies 'to repay the debt we owe them'.<sup>41</sup> He also warned that the failure to establish a mandate and encourage its development as an independent nation under the tutelage of the Great Powers would be to 'put a premium upon massacre'.<sup>42</sup>

While the Allies were preoccupied with other issues, the Armenians were becoming increasingly 'hypnotised' by the notion of self-determination.<sup>43</sup> Their hopes were initially buoyed up by the strong commitment given to them during the war and ultimately the presence, within Article 22 of the League Covenant, of an explicit statement to certain

41 *Hansard*, CXI, HC, 18 November 1918, 3239-3270.

42 *Hansard*, CXI, *ibid.*

43 P. Tonapetean, 'Armenia in the Wheel of British Policy', *The New Europe*, (1 Jan. 1920), 372.



communities within the former Turkish Empire, stating they were sufficiently developed that they could be recognised as independent nations and offered assistance from a Mandatory Power. As far as the liberal internationalists were concerned, Armenia would provide the 'acid-test' for the newly inaugurated Mandate system.<sup>44</sup> For unlike the other 'A' mandates of Syria and Mesopotamia, the Europeans had little reason to covet an area lacking in mineral or agricultural wealth. This meant it was likely to prove to be a millstone around the neck of its Mandatory Power, especially as the PMC only sanctioned the reimbursement of the necessary expenses required for administration. Armenia would then provide a true test of how effective the new system was, and more importantly, it would clearly demonstrate the sincere commitment of the Allies to supporting fledgling nations where there was no obvious reward.

Armenia's supporters in the west hoped America would accept the mandate, but failing this Britain would have been an acceptable alternative, though with serious reservations. One major apprehension was the willingness of Britain to compromise Armenian interests in order to assuage Moslem opinion within the Empire.<sup>45</sup> Especially as in February 1920, Lloyd George confirmed that his statement in favour of Armenia and the other Turkish territories in January 1918, was made to reassure British workers that the government was not fighting for 'some aggressive, imperialistic purpose,' and also to pacify the Moslems in India and encourage them to enlist.<sup>46</sup> Another anxiety was Britain's inherent unwillingness to retreat from areas where she had raised the flag. However, during the protracted search for a suitable and willing Mandatory other countries considered included France, Italy, Australia, Canada, and even the League of Nations itself.<sup>47</sup> Archdeacon G. E. Lloyd of Canada, commented that nothing was more likely to stimulate American interest in accepting the mandate than the possibility of it going to Canada.<sup>48</sup> However, even this was insufficient to stir the Americans.

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44 'The Reform of Turkey before the Peace Conference', NBP, MS951 c.24.

45 'American Military Mission to Armenia', *International Conciliation*, no. 151 (June 1920), 49.

46 *Hansard*, 125, HC, 26 February 1920, col. 1961-2.

47 See for example Estelle Blyth, 'Australia and the Mandate for Armenia', *The Near East*, 24 June 1920); BAC, Propaganda Committee minutes, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506; Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 5 February 1920, JBP, MS206, f21.

48 BAC Minute Book, 23 January 1920, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506 f41.



The liberal internationalists' hopes of the Americans accepting the mandate were constantly in flux. In January 1919, Arnold J. Toynbee unexpectedly found during his meetings with both the American delegation in Paris and the representatives of the American pro-Armenian groups that they were more inclined to undertake the responsibility for Armenia than he expected.<sup>49</sup> By September, Grey was reporting that while the Americans would not take the responsibility for Armenia they would hold Britain responsible for the consequences that would follow a British withdrawal from the region.<sup>50</sup> At the end of 1919, a US delegation headed by General James G. Harbord spent thirty days in Armenia and Transcaucasia. The situation they discovered was one of terrible deprivation, with little food, currency and a large influx of refugees from neighbouring Turkey. The mission concluded that the remedy for Armenia's current situation was for mandatory control by a single great power. Such a policy needed to take into account the question of Turkey and the response of Russia; therefore, the mandated area should include Transcaucasia, Anatolia and Constantinople. While presenting the arguments for and against an American mandate, particularly the financial burden, Harbord concluded that if America refused to assume the mandate, 'we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes.'<sup>51</sup>

British troops had occupied the key cities and strategic communication lines between Baku and Batum immediately following the Mudros Allied-Turkish Armistice, signed on 30 October 1918. The Mudros agreement also included provision for Allied troops to occupy the six Armenian *vilayets* in case of disorder. With Britain the dominant power in the region, enforcement was assumed to be part of its remit. In addition to British troops in the Caucasus, they had garrisons at Aleppo and Mosul in the south, plus parts of Persia. However, by the summer of 1919 the need to demobilise together with what Lloyd George would later describe as Britain's 'overwhelming' responsibilities, led to British troops in the Caucasus being withdrawn.<sup>52</sup>

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49 Arnold J. Toynbee to Lord Bryce, 29 January 1919, JBP, MS205, f13.

50 Lord Grey to Balfour, 9 Sep 1919, House of Lords Record Office: Lloyd George Papers (henceforth LGP), LG/F/12/1/43b.

51 James G. Harbord, 'American Military Mission to Armenia', *International Conciliation*, no. 151 (June 1920), 54.

52 'Memorandum for Submission to H.M. Government by the BAC. 'Armenia and the Turkish Settlement'', JBP, MS210, f131-136.



As far as those with an interest in Armenia were concerned, a stable and secure Armenian Republic was the best solution. Consequently, both Williams and T. P. O'Connor made representations on behalf of BAC to the War Office and the Foreign Office.<sup>53</sup> Sir M. P. A. Hankey, the Secretary to the War Cabinet, in a letter to Lloyd George in September 1919, reported that only the British were in a position to intervene in Armenia and that withdrawal of the troops demonstrated 'a certain callousness.'<sup>54</sup> However, he concluded that it was in the national interests to demobilise the conscript soldiers before discipline was strained to breaking point, and British interests were purely sentimental anyway. For Lloyd George, unless there was a firm commitment from America or some other nation to assume responsibility the situation would quickly deteriorate, thereby making Britain's withdrawal all the more difficult.<sup>55</sup>

Increasingly, an already weary British public was struggling to maintain an interest in Near Eastern affairs. With its attention drawn to Ireland, unemployment and trade union demands, Armenia and the Middle East were pushed into the background. By 1920, Aneurin Williams observed that it was now impossible to get the Press to take any notice of events in Armenia, unless it was a new development.<sup>56</sup> Because it was not a mandate, Armenia even fell below the radar of the LNU, for the organisation had adopted the strategy of using the Mandatory Powers' responses to the PMC questionnaire as a way of subjecting them to public scrutiny. Armenia became something of a 'black hole'.

Following the San Remo Conference, Lloyd George reported to the House of Commons that despite agreement over the mandates for Syria and Mesopotamia, that for Armenia was proving problematic.<sup>57</sup> As a result of ethnic cleansing, large parts of the proposed Armenian territory contained no Armenians. On military advice, Lloyd George believed the Armenians would be incapable of defending more than the existing Republic of Erivan. Instead, he reiterated the hope that America would accept the mandate, and

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53 BAC Minute Book, 18 August 1919, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506, f33.

54 Sir M P A Hankey to Lloyd George, 4 September 1919, LGP, LG/F/1/10.

55 Lloyd George to Sir John Davies, 3 Sep 1919, LGP, LG/F/85/1/10.

56 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 26 March 1920, JBP, MS206, f19.

57 *Hansard*, 128, HC, 29 April 1920, col. 1470.



that President Wilson would arbitrate on the country's boundaries. A month later Lloyd George privately admitted to Williams, that the American Senate would stand in the way of the President undertaking a full mandate for Armenia.<sup>58</sup>

Following a request from the Supreme Council meeting at San Remo, on the Italian Riviera, President Wilson appealed to Congress on 24 May 1920, to authorise the undertaking of the Armenian Mandate. A week later, the Senate passed a resolution declining the mandate, in part influenced by the findings of the American Military Mission.<sup>59</sup> The findings related to more than just Armenia, but the estimated \$756 million required within the first five years raised serious concerns.<sup>60</sup> Significantly, it was the Supreme Council and not the League of Nations that had issued the request. This was part of what Quincy Wright describes as a 'sustained propaganda [...] in favour of the United States assuming mandates over Armenia [...] which] would be a constant financial burden.'<sup>61</sup> The preservation of peace with its 'warlike neighbours,' would require a stronger military presence than America or her allies would be willing to contemplate.

While awaiting the United States Congress' decision on Armenia, the poisoned chalice was speculatively offered to the League of Nations itself. The LNU had passed a resolution in April calling upon the League to accept the mandate.<sup>62</sup> Ultimately, the League had little choice as it was not a state and had neither an army nor the finances required to undertake such a responsibility.<sup>63</sup>

The apparently callous attitude of the western leaders was, according to Arnold Toynbee, akin to treating Armenia as a property, which would increasingly bring in diminishing returns and as a result its 'owners' sought to liquidate its assets.<sup>64</sup> Despite this, Cecil felt

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58 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f7.

59 'American Military Mission to Armenia', 51-3.

60 'The United States and the Armenian Mandate: Message of President Wilson to the Congress, May 24, 1920', *International Conciliation*, no. 151 (1920), 274; see also British report 'Erzerum and the Western Boundary of Armenia' 1920, LGP, LG/F/206/4/14.

61 Wright, 'The Mandates System and Public Concern', 377.

62 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4 April 1920, JBP, MS153, f66.

63 Reply of the League of Nations, LGP, LG/F/206/4/24 & Turkish Peace Treaty, LGP, LG/F/206/4/22.

64 Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations*, 60.



the British obligations to the Armenians were more compelling than most, and in addition they were in 'imminent danger of final extinction.'<sup>65</sup> Cecil nevertheless recognised that it was impossible for Britain to maintain an army of occupation, but suggested that the Americans should provide the necessary finances for the policing of Armenia.

### *Impediments to a solution*

By secretly agreeing to divide the Turkish Empire amongst themselves, Britain, France and Tsarist Russian had placed significant impediments in the way of an Armenian settlement. The subsequent repudiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks put this in a flux, but did not necessarily mean the end of Anglo-French ambitions in the region. The major obstacle to the creation of a unified Armenia was France, because of its territorial expectations and attitude towards the Armenians.<sup>66</sup> In early 1919, Williams travelled to Paris where he held meetings with Boghos Nubar, Cecil and other officials to discuss the future of Armenia and the League. The unofficial attitude of the French foreign office he found particularly disturbing: the Armenians were informed that unless they appealed for French protection they would abandon them; neither prospect being very appealing to the Armenian delegations.<sup>67</sup> The following year, Bryce observed that Clemenceau was angry at the attitude of the Armenians to the French mandate and as a result, Boghos Nubar was cautious of making any move that would give further offence to France.<sup>68</sup>

Another complication in the way of Armenian aspirations arose in May 1919 with the Greek invasion of Smyrna, again fuelled by the indifference and misplaced interference of European politicians. The resultant massacres of Armenians and Greeks by the resurgent Turks were the responsibility of M. Venzelos and Lloyd George, who had together played off the Armenians against the Turks and the encouraged the Greek invasion of Smyrna.<sup>69</sup> The invasion dealt a deathblow to the possibility of establishing an acceptable peace

65 Lord Robert Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, 13 August 1919, LGP, LG/F/7/2/37.

66 A. Safrastian, 'The Armenian Settlement', *The Balkan Review*, III, no. 1 (Feb. 1920), 30.

67 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4 February 1919, JBP, MS205, f14.

68 Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 5 February 1920, JBP, MS206, f21.

69 See Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 312.



settlement in the East and ultimately encouraged a resurgence of Turkish nationalism. For Toynbee the Turkish nationalist movement then set out to recover by force 'all territories inhabited by non-Arab Moslem Ottoman majority.'<sup>70</sup> The resultant conflict was to have serious repercussions on the future composition of Turkey in both Europe and Asia.

### *Turkish Peace Treaty*

Reporting to the House of Commons in August 1919, Lloyd George stated that the delay in setting peace terms with Turkey was wholly due to the United States.<sup>71</sup> In the run-up to the London Conference with Turkey, T. P. O'Connor's questioned whether the Prime Minister's pledges 'still held good that none of the Christian communities shall be again put under the yoke of a power that has periodically butchered and plundered them.'<sup>72</sup> The response was unequivocally positive.

The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 and obliged the Turks to agree to the creation of an Armenian state. Rather than tackling the position of the non-Turkish minorities at a time of Turkish weakness, the Allies had instead concerned themselves with other matters.<sup>73</sup> Ultimately, Turkey had re-established itself along nationalistic lines and achieved far more than was originally envisaged; the Treaty of Sèvres was to all intents and purposes a 'dead letter' or 'still-born'.<sup>74</sup> A month later the invasion of Armenia began and with it the end of the Armenian nation.

### *Under threat*

With the increasingly despairing news reaching him through his contacts in Armenia, Williams anxiously attempted to use his parliamentary connections to get British support for the besieged Armenians. The British government's decision to provide sufficient arms and equipment for a 40,000 man Armenian army in early 1920 was particularly welcomed.<sup>75</sup> In May 1920 Williams held a series of meetings with Lloyd George,

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70 Ibid., 84.

71 *Hansard*, CIX, HC, 18 August 1919, col. 2016.

72 *Hansard*, CXXIII, HC, 18 December 1919, col. 676.

73 Williams, 'Armenia, British Pledges and the Near East', 418-9.

74 Ibid., 419; Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, vii.

75 'Provision of Arms for Armenia', PKP, GD40/17/40, f345.

Chamberlain, Curzon and Churchill, who all expressed their sympathies with the situation Armenia found herself in.<sup>76</sup> Churchill, however, openly expressed his pessimism due to the poor communications within the region. Despite this on 10 June S.S. Hornsea was despatched with guns, rifles, accoutrements, army clothing and medical supplies to Batum, at a cost to the Armenians of £829,634 9s. 4d.<sup>77</sup> Its eventual arrival was too little and too late, especially with the Georgians claiming a percentage of the armaments to enable their safe passage.<sup>78</sup>

News that the Erivan Republic had succumbed under the combined pressure of Turkish and Bolshevist forces and accepted Soviet rule was in line with Churchill's advice. He had informed Williams in May that Britain could do nothing for Armenia and her only chance was 'to make the best terms she can with the Bolsheviks.'<sup>79</sup> The liberal internationalists reluctantly recognised that this was the Armenians only chance of avoiding complete extinction.<sup>80</sup> As Williams explained to his American counterpart, the Armenians would be forced to make a pragmatic decision in order to secure their survival:

The position of the Armenians in the Caucasus has been a cruel one: practically abandoned, except for the charitable relief of private individuals, by all the Great Powers whose allies they had been in the war. They have had to choose, apparently, between extinction at the hands of the Turks, Tartars, Georgians and Bolsheviks, or making such terms with their enemies as they could. I do not know who can blame them if they have come to terms with those at whose mercy they were left.<sup>81</sup>

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76 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f7-8; Aneurin Williams to Nubar Pasha, 21 May 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/21.

77 War office Cypher, 14 June 1920. ADNA, Liasse 1/22.

78 James Malcolm to Boghos Nubar, 10 July 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/22.

79 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f7-8; Aneurin Williams to Nubar Pasha, 21 May 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/21.

80 See Buxton and Conwell-Evans, *Oppressed People and the League of Nations*, 171.

81 Aneurin Williams to James L Barton, 15 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f6.



In a last ditch attempt to elicit support for the besieged Armenians the BAC submitted a memorandum to Lloyd George through the agency of Bryce.<sup>82</sup> In order to aid the Armenians, the BAC requested that the British Navy be more vigilant in preventing the passage of arms and supplies through the Black Sea for use by the Turks. They also called for the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres and its immediate enforcement; however should it be necessary to revise the treaty regarding Smyrna and Thrace it should only be contemplated on condition that the Turks withdrew from the area to be awarded to Armenia by President Wilson and some form of reparation be awarded for recent sufferings. The end of Armenia came with its formal incorporation into the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on 29 November 1920.

### *President Wilson's Award*

Ironically, at the same time as Armenia lost its last vestiges of independence, President Wilson published his declaration on the boundaries of Turkish Armenia. As can be seen in Figure 10.2 this was much smaller than the 1919 proposals submitted by the Armenians themselves (Figure 10.1) and mostly consisted of the *vilayets* of Van, Bitlis, Trebizond and Erzerum. These also corresponded to the award made to the Armenian Republic of Erivan under Article 88-93 of the now dormant Treaty of Sèvres. Incongruously, John H. Harris informed Boghos Nubar that he saw the award as a 'triumph' as it represented a mandate 'in all but name.'<sup>83</sup>

The following month at the London Conference, the Supreme Council rejected the President's award as the recent events had made his decisions superfluous. The Bolsheviks' territorial concessions made to Turkey, together with the advance of its troops into the designated area was therefore accepted as a *fait accompli*. This abandonment of any prospects for Turkish Armenia was finally confirmed with the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over large parts of Asia Minor, in March 1922. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers, this proposal was offered in an attempt to achieve peace between Greece and

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82 Lord Bryce to Lloyd George, 26 November 1920, LGP, LG/F/7/4.

83 John H. Harris to Boghos Nubar, 9 December 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/24.



Turkey; in addition to the potential Armenian homeland, Smyrna, Constantinople, and a large area of Eastern Thrace were returned to Turkish sovereignty.




Figure 10.2: Proposed boundaries for Armenia as delimited by President Wilson, 1920

In a report prepared by Cecil and Williams on the current state of the Armenian Question for the 1921 Imperial Conference, they stated that:

The Turks had treated the charter of Armenian independence incorporated in the Treaty of Sèvres as a scrap of paper, and the Allies had acquiesced [...] The sacrifices and sufferings of the Armenians in the common cause and the repeated pledges of liberation given to them by British and Allied statesmen surely require that the British Empire should not entirely desert them.<sup>84</sup>

When in 1921, Aneurin Williams spoke to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s private secretary, about fulfilling these wartime pledges, Kerr responded by asking what the pledges were and what the Armenians had done in consideration.<sup>85</sup> Apparently the Prime Minister ‘did not think so much of a mere statement of policy made during the war, but that he took the

84 ‘Note on the Armenian Question to Members of the Imperial Conference from the Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, M.P. and Mr Aneurin Williams, M.P.’ 16 June 1921, JBP, MS208, f9-10.

85 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 3 February 1921, JBP, MS207, f104.



Lawyer-like view that where actual considerations had been given to us in consequence of a pledge made by us that we must strictly fulfil it.' The Armenians discovered that just like the Sultan before them, the wartime promises of the Allied leaders were just as hollow; moral commitments were not contractually binding.<sup>86</sup> While a degree of blame-shifting took place, for Williams the 'balance of criminality' was to be equally shared by Britain, America and France.<sup>87</sup>

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86 'Obligations', TNA CAB 24/5, G203; see also Artin H. Arslanian, 'British Wartime Pledges, 1917-18: The Armenian Case', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 13, no. 3 (July 1978), 523.

87 Sarafian to Boghos Nubar, 30 January 1921, ADNA, Liaise 1/24.

# 11

## Conclusions

By the 1920s, the hopes of the liberal internationalists for a world united in peace and co-operation were embodied in the League of Nations. Although regularly dismissed as utopian, and identified even by sympathetic critics as intellectual idealists rather than practical realists, the liberal internationalists were not blind to the inherent weaknesses in the new internationalism, nor the difficulties of their own position. They operated at an important juncture in the transition between the elitist politics of the late nineteenth century and the mass democratic politics of the early twentieth, the 'professionalization' of international relations critique by academia, and a significant period of heightened international tension. Throughout the period under review, the Eastern Question pre-occupied liberal internationalists and provided the formative context in which they developed the concept of moral responsibility in foreign policy. It would be harsh to upbraid them for failing to provide an 'answer' to that 'question': in its contemporary guise, it still has the power to destabilise international relations. The unravelling of the Balkans during the 1990s and the responses to the 2008 Kosovan declaration of independence and the possibility of Turkish integration into the European Union, demonstrate how intractable an issue it remains. Additionally the reaction of Turkey to the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Armenian genocide does not augur well as to the possibility of reconciliation on that still contentious issue.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Three separate events during 2005 serve to illustrate the political sensitivity of the genocide: in June *Time* magazine inadvertently distributed a DVD on behalf of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce purporting to promote tourism in Turkey (in addition to the thirteen minute tourist video it contained a 70 minute feature denying and distorting the accepted facts of the genocide); in September, an international conference organised by Istanbul's Boğaziçi University on the 'Armenian Question' was banned; and in December the leading Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk was charged for 'denigrating Turkishness' by referring to the Armenian genocide in an interview with a Swiss magazine.



*Continuity or change?*

There is a natural tendency to view innovations as the rapid introduction of something new. In doing so the gradual adoption of the subtle and minor changes are overlooked in favour of the apparently sudden and dramatic arrival of a supposedly new phenomenon or political thought. The development of institutionalism as the dominant post-war form of liberal internationalism has similarly tended to occlude its earlier variants. Consequently, historians have tended to exaggerate the advances of the institutional aspects of liberal internationalism as being distinct from those of the preceding epoch. In their survey of liberal international thinking over the previous three hundred years, Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew have demonstrated that liberal international theory has been undergoing a continual evolution.<sup>2</sup> Integral to this is the liberal internationalists' belief in international cooperation, which has proven to be resilient and capable of adaption to changing circumstances. While the institutional arguments within liberal internationalism can trace their origin to antecedents such as Kant's Perpetual Peace, the League of Nations was undoubtedly a product of the cataclysmic effects of total war.

Nonetheless, the progenitors of the League of Nations movement in Britain, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson and Aneurin Williams, had long-term involvement with causes of an international nature, and their inspirational move towards institutional internationalism occurred within weeks of Britain's entry into the European conflict and long before the dreadful toll of war became apparent. The rapid adoption of such ideas by these two pivotal figures demonstrates that such a transition was a natural continuation of the trajectory of international thinking and actions of the liberal internationalists. Their ability to garner the interest of others to discuss such ideas further demonstrates the overall continuity of such ideas within liberal internationalism.

The perception of many liberal internationalists was that the pre-war international situation was anarchical, in the form of ongoing competition between states for resources, culminating in escalating tension and ultimately conflict. They sought the promotion

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<sup>2</sup> See Zacher, Mark W., and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', pp. 111-117.



of international cooperation and the fostering of international institutions to administer various aspects of international relations. Heavily influenced by individuals as diverse as Richard Cobden, W. E. Gladstone and John Stuart Mill, they sought to promote an ethical foreign policy in relation to the Eastern Question, but also the need for intervention on behalf of the subject peoples. The gradual drift towards institutionalism, in part stimulated by The Hague Peace Conferences which focused attention on international law and politics as well as arbitration, could trace its origin back to Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill amongst others. The role of war and international conflict was a significant factor in the adoption and dominance of institutional ideas into liberal internationalism during the early twentieth century. The First World War was pivotal in the rapid advance and acceptance of such ideas, nevertheless the role of moral arguments was not completely subsumed. Consequently, liberal internationalists sought to balance the moral and institutional arguments in the rapidly changing world after August 1914.

While the institutional aspects of liberal internationalism were evident in pre-1914 thinking, their primary concern had been directed towards the prevailing conflicts of internationalism, viz. the problems of nationality and nationhood. By the early twentieth century liberalism's historical sympathy for the small 'nations' and Mill's notion of nationality as a cohesive force were viewed positively, whereas patriotism and nationalism were increasingly becoming associated with the more sinister aspects of jingoism. These were integral to their concerns over the treatment of the Boers, the Macedonians and the Armenians. The belief that international cooperation could foster shared values of morality and justice was central to the liberal internationalist ethos. A long-term association with the Eastern Question demonstrated the futility of balance of power politics to intervene on behalf of the oppressed. The development of international law and international collaboration provided the means by which national self-determination could flourish. The post-war period however confirmed their fears that the problems of nationality and nationhood could not be so easily resolved.

The immediate post-war period as well as witnessing the ascendancy of liberal internationalism also saw the terminal decline of the Liberal Party. Another process



accelerated by the First World War, but for many liberal internationalists its origin could be traced to Asquith's rejection of Campbell-Bannerman's radicalism, which according to Noel Buxton had found a voice in the pro-Boers, in favour of the pursuit of respectability.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, it was during the premiership of the doyen of the pro-Boers, Lloyd George that the final conversion of many National Liberals to a Conservative point of view, and the eventual drift of the radicals to Labour occurred.<sup>4</sup>

### *Effectiveness of the groups*

Looking back, the liberal internationalists could feel pride and satisfaction as well as disappointment and regret. Bryce had observed at the time of his departure to America in 1907 that they had assisted 'at the birth of new nations'.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, it became evident in the post-war period that several of these births had been either premature or failed to reach infancy, let alone maturity. Consequently, many of Buxton's 'lost causes' feature strongly in this period, amongst them was his disappointment over Armenia and Macedonia.<sup>6</sup>

In the form of Mandates, the League, initially at least, offered the prospect of evolutionary progress to national self-determination for 'native' populations in the colonial empires. It introduced a new type of international accountability and institutionalised the principle of trusteeship, which the United Nations would develop further. The flaws in the system, however, meant that the 'underdeveloped' nations were subjected to colonial annexation in a new guise, albeit one legitimised by the League.

Armenia demonstrates the greatest failure of the liberal internationalists and the international community. The danger for Armenia was that by the time it was obvious nothing would be done, nothing could be. Self-determination ultimately proved to be a double-edged sword, which Turkey turned against the very people the liberal

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3 MS Autobiography, Politics draft chapter, NBP, MS951 c7

4 Ibid; Aneurin Williams, 'The General Election and the Future of the Liberal Party', *Contemporary Review*, CXV, (February 1919), 143

5 'The Balkan Committee: Farewell Speech by Mr Bryce', *The Times*, 23 December 1905.

6 Anderson, *Noel Buxton A Life*, 173

internationalists envisaged it helping. As a result, within eighteen months of the Greek invasion and subsequent massacres at Smyrna, the post-war map of the Near East had been redrawn in contradiction to the wartime promises and post-war expectations. The new map represented the military capacity of the Turkish and Bolshevik armies and the national chauvinism of the new regimes. Turkey had reclaimed Constantinople and the whole of Anatolia while Soviet Russia had extinguished the short-lived flame of independence in its wayward Transcaucasia territories.

After seven years of appeals for financial and moral support, public opinion had become apathetic, and to some extent indifferent from prolonged exposure. While the new international system was found seriously wanting, it was the initial reluctance of the Allied leaders to engage seriously with the issue that ensured President Wilson's demarcation of Armenia's boundaries remained mere squiggles on a map. For Bryce, the policy of the allied and associated powers had exacerbated the 'initial blunder of a weak and improvident armistice' by following it with an ill-conceived policy lacking in 'foresight and of energy'.<sup>7</sup>

It would however be a mistake to view the groups as ineffective. Their achievements were many and varied and at times hard to quantify due to their subtle nature. The liberal internationalists were moved by their conscience to speak out on issues of importance; consequently, they were drawn to a wide variety of causes, domestic as well as foreign. The plethora of groups they represented were in the main preoccupied with one particular overarching area of interest, whether it was British militarism in southern Africa, the rights of the 'Macedonians' and Armenians, or the need for an institutional form of 'world government'. In attempting to promote their particular interests they naturally adopted many of the characteristics of pressure groups, however, they were more comparable to parliamentary select committees in their organization. In general terms, as the SACC and LLAAM demonstrate, without some form of tacit government approval or support the groups were rendered impotent in their ability to engage with government officials

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<sup>7</sup> James Bryce, 'The Revision of the Turkish Treaty', *Contemporary Review*, 119, no. May/June (1921), 580



and ministers. Denied the status of insider groups they were forced to rely upon the outsider strategies of rousing public opinion, to which the government proved reasonably impervious.

Despite this, the pro-Boer groups were an important rallying point for liberal internationalists at the turn of the century. Many of those subsequently involved in the early twentieth century groups studied here ‘cut their political teeth’ through their engagement with the issues raised by Britain’s entanglement in Southern Africa. The other groups reveal that by working with the grain of government approval they could achieve so much more, and in doing so were in effect accorded insider status. This enabled them to gain interviews with government officials and ministers, such as those with the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Sometimes these meetings would be in the form of a delegation to the Foreign Secretary, headed by an eminent figure such as the Archbishop of Canterbury or a member from the House of Lords. Those with the Prime Minister however, were reduced to a select group or on occasions to individual private and informal meetings. In this way, the liberal internationalists were able to bring the gravitas of their message directly to those wielding power. The influence of the groups can also be seen in the reaction of foreign governments. In particular the BC was viewed by the newly emergent CUP as a body worth befriending while the neighbouring Powers (particularly the Austro-Hungarians) viewed it with suspicion. In both cases the BC served as an effective organisation which was able to project an image of influence far beyond its ability.

The groups also fully utilised the outsider strategies of arousing public opinion. They achieved this through the silent methods of supplying information to the press in the form of memorandums, letters to the editor, press releases and through their journalistic members. The importance of the latter should not be overlooked, as all the groups had a symbiotic relationship with sympathetic journalists and in particular J. A. Hobson and H. N. Brailsford. This enabled the group’s ideas to reach a wider audience than those directly attributable to the individual groups.

In addition to the silent methods the groups utilised more direct approaches such as those of public meetings, that with careful timing could generate both public support and much needed column inches in the press. Timing was always a difficult issue as the debates within the LNS over when to hold a high profile meeting clearly demonstrate. They were not averse to try alternative and novel methods to help spread their message, as the BC's involvement with the Balkan States Exhibition and the LNU's sponsorship of the *Auction of Souls* film clearly show. Although the latter was released in Britain under the auspices of the LNU it ultimately fulfilled the aims of the BAC, whose chairman and de facto president (Williams and Bryce) were the pivotal figures behind the LNU's involvement.

The *Auction of Souls* was in part a dramatisation of Lord Bryce and Arnold Toynbee's Blue Book for the British government on the atrocities carried out against the Armenians. That this film should provide embarrassment demonstrates the change in circumstances and expediency of the Armenians to Britain's post-war government. It also highlights the role of the liberal internationalists and their ability to work with the government. The Blue Book served the propaganda purposes of the government and desire of the BAC to raise awareness of the atrocities taking place in the former Ottoman Empire, and ultimately as a rallying point to support their calls for the right of self-determination.

Ultimately, despite the success of the groups their impact on the British government was ephemeral. The shifting of British interests at times worked in their favour but often the government's half-heartedness proved the undoing of their hopes. That this should be the case was undoubtedly a disappointment, but the transformation of government policy is not something that can be achieved overnight. Despite setbacks their determination to speak out on issues of importance remained undeterred. Perhaps their greatest weakness was that while they were imbued with Gladstonian moral and humanitarian principles neither Bryce, Buxton nor Williams were powerful and engaging speakers who could command an audience's attention. Collectively, they lacked the great oratorical power and commanding presence of Gladstone. Even Bryce one of their greatest assets could never profess to be of the same calibre. As Buxton admitted, speaking was one of his greatest fears, but like his fellow internationalists, he looked to Bryce and Gladstone



for inspiration.<sup>8</sup> They were part of a venerable history of dissent over British foreign policy, advocating a liberal internationalist approach to foreign affairs, which firmly places them within the trouble makers tradition. Despite their inability fully to persuade the government of the merits of adopting an ethically sound foreign policy, nevertheless they continued to hold ‘aloft the torch of idealism, [thereby] keeping the light burning in the midst of darkness.’<sup>9</sup>

### *Inter-war liberal internationalism*

To use Hoffman’s analogy, the domestic side of the Liberal coin was highly polished; the international side has come to seem decidedly lacklustre in the light of calamitous breakdown of the international order in the 1930s.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the catastrophe of the Second World War should not blind us to the achievements of liberal internationalism, both in capturing the centre ground of British political opinion and in helping shape international institutions that promoted collective security and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The centrality of liberal internationalism to British political argument can be found in *The Next Five Years: An Essay in Political Agreement*, published in July 1935. Its fundamental tenets being that:

We can and must master international anarchy and get rid of the war system by organised collective action; and that the community can and must deliberately plan, direct, and control – not in detail but in broad outline – the economic development to which innumerable individual activities contribute.<sup>11</sup>

Prepared by the Next Five Years Group, an association of individuals belonging to all political parties and none, this roll-call of ‘progressive’ opinion included Conservative back-benchers on the left of the party, such as Harold Macmillan, internationalists like Norman Angell, radical liberals, such as Hobson, journalists, such as Nevinson and A. G.

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8 See Biographies of Living Members of Parliament – questions from Committee on History of Parliament NBP, MS951, c10/8

9 Anderson, Noel Buxton A Life, 173; of the main figures Buxton was increasingly becoming the sole torch bearer, Bryce died in 1922 and Williams in 1924.

10 Hoffmann, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, 161

11 *The Next Five Years: An Essay in Political Agreement*, (London: MacMillan & Co, 1935), 7

Gardiner, the Rowntree brothers, Arnold and Seebohm, the Cadbury siblings, Elizabeth and Laurence, and liberal academics, such as H. A. L. Fisher and Gooch.

The book was written in two parts, the first concerned with economic policy and the second international relations: the latter being the nearest we have to a liberal internationalist manifesto. Avoidance of another descent into the international anarchy of the pre-war years required the creation of ‘an organic structure of international government which comprehends all those competing and conflicting activities that transcend national frontiers.’<sup>12</sup> The objective of British foreign policy then should be peace through the ‘building up a world commonwealth of all the nations, assured of peace, sure and not too slow in affording international justice, efficient in promoting the fullest use of the world’s resources for the general advantage, and sustained by a free and informed public opinion.’<sup>13</sup> In comparison to the anarchical conditions of 1914, those opposed to war were ‘now better organised and immeasurably stronger’, but as they readily admitted the forces making for war were undeniably strong. The League had an important role to play in positively organising for peace, and despite its failings it had ‘proved itself by far the best instrument yet evolved for world cooperation and the safeguarding of peace.’<sup>14</sup> The post-war record of the League and the Permanent Court of International Justice in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes far surpassed the poor record of pre-war years. The Next Five Years Group advocated what it called the Collective Peace System – the League of Nations’ pacific machinery backed up by guarantees of collective security – as the only policy offering ‘a prospect of real security for the British Commonwealth and the world’s peaceful development.’<sup>15</sup> It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the Group’s proposals in greater detail, but the continuity with the earlier liberal internationalism is quite striking. Indeed, on this evidence it is not far-fetched to say that liberal internationalism had become part of the ‘common sense’ of the political class. It would be easy to accuse the liberal internationalists of the Next Five Years Group of being dangerously detached from reality, but that is rather facile. Before the Italian

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12 Ibid., 2

13 Ibid., 215

14 Ibid., 216 & 217-8

15 Ibid., 226



invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, it was reasonable to believe there had been real progress towards the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The liberal internationalists had made considerable contributions to the new international order. However, the plethora of causes to which the progressive and liberal-minded were drawn encouraged a process of selective engagement. Liberal internationalism as exemplified by the single-issue groups failed to project itself as an all-embracing comprehensive doctrine. This failure resulted in its apparent fragmentation into disparate elements, however as this thesis has demonstrated at its heart was a small but constant core, the 'stage army of the good' to use Nevinson's analogy. To the British Government the liberal internationalists' apparent single-mindedness precluded the possibility of their fully appreciating or understanding the wider issues involved. Conversely, the liberal internationalists' approach was more holistic in nature than the government's promotion of national interests above the welfare of others.

The liberal internationalists were no longer starry-eyed idealists; their institutional arguments regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes, and those in favour of self-determination as a means of settling issues of nationality without recourse to force, had won the day. The liberal internationalist 'scratch crowd' then forms an important part of thinking on international relations. In many ways, this thinking has as much relevance today as it did almost a century ago.

**Appendices**



## Appendix 1: Liberal internationalist biographies

The following biographies are of the main individuals associated with the extra-parliamentary groups being studied. The information is collected from a variety of sources, including *Dictionary of National Biography*, *Who's Who*, *The Times*, as well as the memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies listed in the bibliography. Titles received after, or during, the study period are indicated by square brackets.

**ALDEN, [Sir] Percy** (1865-1944) was born at Oxford. After attending Balliol College, Oxford, he devoted himself to settlement-work, serving as warden of Mansfield House in Canning Town. He was Liberal member for Tottenham division of Middlesex, 1906-1918. He stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal in 1918 and re-entered the House of Commons in 1923 as Labour member for South Tottenham (1923-24). During the First World War he was a strong opponent of conscription and was associated with the LNS, especially during the early discussions.

**ANGELL, [Sir] Norman** (1872-1967) was born Ralph Norman Angell Lane. He was educated at the Lycée de St. Omer in France and later at Geneva. Between 1905 and 1914 he was general manager of the Paris *Daily Mail*. His writings on international affairs were widely read, especially *The Great Illusion*. During the war he was a founding member of the UDC. After the war he joined the Labour party and served on its Advisory Committee on International Questions and was Labour member for North Bradford (1929-1931). He actively campaigned for a policy of collective security primarily through the LNU.

**BAKER, Joseph Allen** (1852-1918) stood unsuccessfully for East Finsbury in 1900 but successfully contested the seat in 1905 as a Liberal. He held the seat until his death in July 1918. Before the outbreak of the First World War he organised exchange visits between British and German churches as a means of fostering closer friendship and understanding.

**BARNETT, Canon Arthur T.** (1858-1941) was educated at St John's College, Cambridge. A Church of England minister, he was chaplain at Bordighera, Italy and chaplain to the Bishop of Gibraltar. He was also Vicar at various parishes including Stoke Poges in Buckinghamshire (1912-1926). He was a member of the SACC, LLAAM, and LNS, vice-president of the BC, and a member of the LNU's general council.

**BARNETT, Canon Samuel Augustus** (1844-1913) was educated at Wadham College, Oxford.

He was instrumental in the Charity Organisation Society and in London's Whitechapel he became renowned for social reform and the establishment of the university settlement Toynbee Hall. Although not actually a member of the extra-parliamentary groups, his position at Toynbee Hall enabled him to provide a guiding influence to many of the individuals listed here; particularly James Bryce, Noel Buxton and Aneurin Williams. His wife Henrietta was a member of SACC, BC and on the LNU general Council.

**BARNETT, Mrs Henrietta** (1851-1936) was the wife of Samuel Augustus Barnett. Together they worked at reforming the social conditions for the residents of the East London. Her work in Hampstead Garden Suburb served to reinforce her links with Aneurin Williams, a former Toynbee resident and now Chairman of First Garden City, whose architects Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker helped in creating the suburb's social blueprint. She was a member of the BC, SACC & LNU

**BOURCHIER, James David** (1850-1920) was educated at Trinity College, Dublin and King's College, Cambridge. After a spell teaching at Eton he took up an appointment as special correspondent for *The Times* and from 1892 as its Balkan correspondent. His engagement with Balkan politics and nationalism made him an ideal conduit of information to the BC. Like the Buxtons he was dismayed by Bulgaria's decision to align itself with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1915.

**BRAILSFORD, Henry Noel** (1873-1958) was educated at Glasgow University, where he came to the attention of Gilbert Murray. He enlisted in the Philhellenic Legion which fought alongside the Greeks against the Ottoman Turks. On his return he took up an appointment as special correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* in Crete and Thessaly. A regular correspondent for a series of anti-imperialist papers, he earned a reputation as a critic of British foreign policy. He was involved with the SACC, LLAAM, LNS, LNU and BC, spending many months in Macedonia distributing relief and reporting on the situation. He served on the Carnegie commission of inquiry into the Balkan wars and in 1914 published *The War of Steel and Gold*. He was involved with the UDC and joined the Labour Advisory Committee on International Questions.



**BRYCE, (John) Annan** (1843-1923) was the younger brother of James Bryce. He was educated at Glasgow University and Balliol College, Oxford. His early career for East India merchants was based primarily in Burma and Siam. He sat as Liberal member for Inverness Burghs (1906-1918). He played a less prominent role than his brother but was active in the SACC, LLAAM, BC and BAC.

**BRYCE, James** [Viscount Bryce] (1838-1922) was educated at the Glasgow University and Trinity College, Oxford. He successfully contested Tower Hamlets in 1880 and worked with Canon Samuel Barnett in the establishment of Toynbee Hall. In 1885 he became Liberal member for South Aberdeenshire. He served in several Liberal Governments and in 1907 was appointed ambassador to the United States. His visit to western Anatolia in 1876 coincided with the Bulgarian atrocities and brought him into contact with the Armenians of the region and began his life-long interest in their plight. He was the first President of the BC, but had to resign following the formation of the Liberal Government in December 1905. He retained close contact with its members and in particular Noel Buxton, an old family friend. During the First World War he chaired the Bryce Group, whose *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars* was published following America's entry into the war in 1917. He provided behind the scenes guidance to both the LNS and the BAC. He initiated the first debate in the House of Lords regarding the Armenian genocide, and with Arnold Toynbee was responsible for the Blue Book *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916*. He was elevated to the peerage in 1914.

**BUXTON, Charles Roden** (1875-1942) was a member of a prominent anti-slavery family. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, and served as private secretary to his father Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton during his Governorship of South Australia. He unsuccessfully contested East Hertfordshire in 1906 and Ashburton division Devon in 1908. He sat as Liberal member for Ashburton, Devon from January to December 1910, stood unsuccessfully for Labour in 1918 and re-entered the House of Commons as a Labour member for Accrington (1922-1923) and Elland division of West Riding of Yorkshire (1929-1931). Together with his brother Noel he initiated the BC and in 1914 they both travelled to Bulgaria, at the request of Winston Churchill, in an attempt to induce it to support the Allies. He also served on the BAC executive committee and was an early member of the LNS. During the war he was associated with calls for a negotiated peace and

was an active member of the UDC. After the war he was a member of Labour's Advisory Committee on International Questions.

**BUXTON, Harold Jocelyn** (1880-1976) was educated at Harrow School and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Vicar at Horley, Oxfordshire (1914-1918), and a Chaplain in Jerusalem (1926-1927) and Nicosia, Cyprus (1927-1931), Archdeacon of Cyprus (1928-1933) and Bishop of Gibraltar (1933-1947). With his brother Noel he travelled to both Turkish and Russian Armenia in 1914 (*Travel and Politics in Armenia*). He was an active member of the BAC and Secretary of Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund (1918-1926)

**BUXTON, Noel** [Baron Noel-Buxton of Aylsham] (1869-1948) was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Liberal member for the Whitby division of Yorkshire (1905-1906) and North Norfolk (1910-1918). In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as a Lib-Lab candidate, later regaining his North Norfolk seat for Labour (1922-1930). As a member of the Whitechapel Board of Guardians he came into contact with Canon Samuel Barnett of the Toynbee Hall Settlement. He resigned his directorship of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton Brewery in order to pursue his political ambitions. He was chairman of the BC and wrote extensively on the region. In 1914 he travelled to Bulgaria with his brother Charles in their abortive attempt to persuade them to support the Allies. During the war he supported the work of the LNS, but was closely associated with calls for a negotiated peace. He was reticent to be associated with the UDC unlike his brother Charles. After the war he joined the Labour Party and served on its Advisory Committee on International Questions. He was Minister of Agriculture (1924) and President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries (1929-1930). He was elevated to the peerage in 1930.

**CECIL, Lord (Edgar Algernon) Robert Gascoyne** [Viscount Cecil of Chelwood] (1864-1958) was educated at Eton and University College, Oxford. Conservative member for Marylebone East (1906-1910), and for Hitchin division of Hertfordshire (1911-1923). He entered Asquith's coalition government in May 1915 as parliamentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs and in February 1916 also took on the role minister of blockade. A long association with Aneurin Williams through their involvement in the Labour Co-Partnership Association ensured a fruitful relationship. He became the leading ministerial advocate for a league of nations, and after the war played an important role in the League's formation as part of the British delegation at the Paris peace conference. He went on to



represent South Africa at the first League of Nations assemblies (1920-1922). Following the formation of the LNU he became its chairman, and later in 1923 its president. He was elevated to the House of Lords in 1923.

**CHANNING, Francis Allston** [1<sup>st</sup> Baron Channing of Wellingborough] (1841-1926) was educated at Exeter College, Oxford. He sat as Liberal member for East Northamptonshire (1885-1910). He was involved with the LLAAM. He was elevated to the peerage in 1912.

**CLIFFORD, Dr John** (1836-1923) was educated at University College London. His Doctor of Divinity was an honorary award. A nonconformist Baptist minister became a prominent pro-Boer and executive member of the SACC and LLAAM. He also served on the executive committees of the BC, BAC, LNS and LNU.

**COURTNEY, Leonard Henry** [Baron Courtney of Penwith] (1832-1918) was educated at St John's College, Cambridge. His early career involved spells as a barrister, a leader writer for *The Times*, and political economy lecturer at University College, London. He was Liberal member for Misheard (1876-1885), and Bodmin (1885-1900). He was an anti-imperialist and denounced British policy in Africa, and was a vigorous president of the SACC.

**DAVIES, David** [1<sup>st</sup> Baron Davies] (1880-1944) was educated at Edinburgh and Kings College, Cambridge. Liberal member for Montgomeryshire (1906-1929), but resigned the Whip in 1926 and sat as an Independent until his retirement in 1929. He was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lloyd George while Minister of Munitions and Prime Minister (1916-17). He became interested in the establishment of a league of free nations and was instrumental in the break-up of the LNS into two rival factions. Under pressure from Viscount Grey the two groups soon joined together as the LNU, and Davies became one of its Vice-Presidents. He was elevated to the peerage in 1932.

**DICKINSON, Goldsworthy Lowes** (1862-1932) was educated at Charterhouse and King's College, Cambridge. His position at Cambridge and interests in philosophy and history exerted a tremendous influence on the pre-war students, including Aneurin Williams's son Iolo. During the war he was particularly active in the formulation of plans for a league of nations through both the Bryce Group and the LNS. After the war he joined Labour's Advisory Committee on International Questions and in 1926 published *The International Anarchy*.

**DICKINSON, Willoughby Hyett** [1<sup>st</sup> Baron Dickinson of Painswick] (1859-1943) was the son of an MP for Stroud. He was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Liberal member for St. Pancras, North (1906-1918) and was Chairman of the London Liberal Federation (1896-1918). He was one of the LLAAM preferred candidates for the National Liberal Federation during the South African War. During the First World War he was an active proponent of a league of nations through the Bryce Group and LNS, of which he was Chairman. He was a member of the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform 1916-17. After the war he worked closely with the LNU, of which he was a vice-president and the World Alliance for Promoting international Fellowship Through the Churches. He joined the Labour Party in 1930 and was elevated to the peerage in the same year.

**EVANS, [Sir] Arthur John** (1851-1941) was educated at Harrow and Brasenose College, Oxford. He travelled extensively through the Balkans and his letters from Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1875 insurrections were published in the *Manchester Guardian*. He became keeper of the Ashmolean Museum in 1884, and travelled and lectured widely. He is best known for his excavation of Knossos in Crete which began following the Ottoman withdrawal. His knowledge of the Balkans and Ottoman Empire was of great benefit to the BC and he was one of the members to be invited to Constantinople in 1908. He was knighted in 1911.

**FRY, Isabel** (1869-1958) was the daughter of Sir Edward Fry (1827-1918) a judge with extensive experience of international arbitration, particularly at The Hague. Isabel was an educationalist and social activist who founded and was headmistress of two experimental schools. She was a member of the SACC, BC and LNS; regularly acting as a conduit for her father's opinions to the executive committees.

**GARVIE, Rev. Alfred E.** (1861-1945) was educated at Glasgow University and Mansfield College, Oxford. A Congregational minister, he was an outspoken critic of British policy in South Africa and the treatment of conscientious objectors during the First World War. He was a member of the SACC, BC, the BAC's executive committee, and the LNU's general council.

**GOOCH, George Peabody** (1873-1968) he was educated at Kings College, London and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Private Secretary to James Bryce, when Chief Secretary for



Ireland. He was Liberal member for Bath (1906-Jan.1910) and unsuccessfully contested Bath (Dec.1910) and Reading (1913). He published several historical works, and was co-editor of *The Contemporary Review*. He was active with the BC and BAC

**GREENWOOD, [Sir] Granville George** (1850-1928) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. He unsuccessfully contested Peterborough (1886) and Central Hull (1900), before being elected as Liberal member for Peterborough (1906-1918). He was a member of the SACC, LLAAM, BC, BAC and LNS. He was knighted in 1916.

**GRINLING, Charles Herbert** (c1861-1947) was educated at Hertford College, Oxford. On graduation he became a resident of Toynbee Hall, working closely with Samuel and Henrietta Barnett. Soon after his arrival he was ordained and later become rector of Woolwich and an active councillor. During his lengthy residency he was closely associated with a wide variety of projects to improve public services and social conditions, such as housing, education and health care. He published several books on local natural history and social work. He was a member of the SACC, BC and LNS.

**GURDON, Sir William Brampton** (1840-1910) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. Originally a civil servant and private secretary to W. E. Gladstone (1865-1866 and 1868-1874) and served on the Transvaal inquiry commission (1881). He stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal for South West Norfolk (1885), Rotherhithe (1886) and Colchester (1888). He was elected as Liberal member for North Norfolk (1899-1910); a seat subsequently won by Noel Buxton. He was a prominent member of the LLAAM. He was knighted in 1882.

**HARRIS, John H.** (1874-1940) together with his wife spent many years working as a Baptist missionary in Africa. He was secretary to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and worked closely with the Congo Reform Association. He was a member of LLAAM, and was on the executive committees of the BC, BAC and LNU.

**HERBERT, Aubrey** (1880-1923) was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. Beginning his career in the diplomatic service, his interest in the Middle East was fired by an appointment in Constantinople. He travelled extensively through the region; he worked for the cause of Albanian nationalism, and joined the executive committee of the BC. He was also a member of the LLAAM and general council of the LNU. He was Conservative

member for South Somerset (1911-1918) and Yeovil (1918-1923). During the First World War he served in the Irish Guards.

**HOBHOUSE, Leonard Trelawny** (1864-1929) was educated at Marlborough School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he developed a friendship with Gilbert Murray. He tutored at Oxford before joining the *Manchester Guardian* in 1897. He was an outspoken critic of the government's imperialist policies, especially in Southern Africa. In 1902 he left Manchester to embark on an academic career but continued to write for the *Guardian* as well as *The Nation*. He occupied the chair of sociology at the London School of Economics (1907-1929). He served on the executive committee of the BC.

**HOBSON, John Atkinson** (1858-1940) he was educated at Derby and Lincoln College, Oxford. As a journalist he reported for the *Manchester Guardian* during the South African War. His experiences led to the publication of *Imperialism* and *The Psychology of Jingoism*. During the First World War he was active with the LNS, the Bryce Group as well as the UDC. In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate and shortly after joined the Labour Party.

**LAW, Hugh** (1872-1943) was educated at Rugby and University College, Oxford. The son of the former Lord Chancellor of Ireland, he was Nationalist member for West Donegal (1902-1918). During the War he served in the Ministry of Munitions and News Department of the Foreign Office. He was a member of the SACC, the executive council of the BC and general council of the LNU.

**LAWSON, Sir Wilfred** (1829-1906) stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal for West Cumberland in 1857, but was elected for Carlisle (1859-1865 and 1868-1885), Cockermouth division of Cumberland (1886-1900 and 1906), and Camborne division of Cornwall (1903-1906). He was a long-standing critic of British foreign policy, especially secret treaties and played an active role in the LLAAM.

**LEHMANN, Rudolph Chambers** (1856-1929) was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. He stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal for Cheltenham (1885), Central Hull (1886), and Cambridge (1892), before being elected for Harborough division of Leicestershire (1906-Dec. 1910). A strong critic of British policies during the South African War and was Chairman of LLAAM and served on the executive committee of the SACC and was a supporter of the BC.



**MACKARNESS, Frederic Coleridge** (1854-1920) was educated at Marlborough and Keble College, Oxford. He held many legal appointments including that of Advocate of Cape Supreme Court in 1882. He was a founder of SACC a member of the LLAAM and LNS.

**MADDISON, Fred (1856-1937)** was a trade unionist who stood unsuccessfully as a Lib-Lab candidate for Central Hull (1892 and 1895), before being elected for Sheffield Brightside (1897-1900) and Burnley (1906-1910). His opposition to the South African War and militarism was not popular with his constituents, many of whom were employed in armaments manufacture. He was active executive committee member of the LLAAM and SACC. His involvement with the Labour Co-Partnership Association brought him into close contact with Aneurin Williams. In 1908 he became secretary of the International Arbitration League.

**METHUEN, [Sir] Algernon Methuen Marshall** (1856-1924) changed his surname from Stedman in 1899. He was educated at Wadham College, Oxford. He was founder and chairman of the successful publishers, Methuen & Co., and unsuccessfully contested the Guildford division of Surrey (1910). A resident of Hindhead he was a close friend of Aneurin Williams and a member of the Haslemere Friends of Conciliation, the SACC, LLAAM and LNS. He wrote *Peace or War in South Africa* (1901) and *The Tragedy of South Africa* (1905). He was created a baronet in 1916.

**MEYER, Rev. Frederic Brotherton** (1847-1929) was a Baptist minister, who from the 1880s became a prominent free-church campaigner in south London. An outspoken critic of the South African War, the treatment of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the rights of conscientious objectors during the First World War. He was a member of the SACC, BC, the executive committee of the BAC, a vice-president of the LNS and member of the general council of the LNU.

**MOLTENO, Percy Alport** (1861-1937) was educated at the University of Cape of Good Hope and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was the son of Sir John Molteno the first Premier of Cape Colony. He was a member of LLAAM and one of the founders of the SACC and Royal Institute of International Affairs.

**MOORE, William Arthur** (1880-1962) was secretary of BC, he travelled to the Balkans where he was taken on as a correspondent for one of the British papers. He travelled extensively

throughout the Balkans, Middle East, and India; reporting on nationalist movements in Persia, Albania. During the First World War he reported from the front, working for *The Times* and other leading papers.

**MURRAY, (George) Gilbert Aimé (1866-1957)** was educated at St John's College, Oxford, and a fellow of New College, Oxford. Elected to the chair of Greek at Glasgow University in 1889, a post he held for ten years. On his resignation, due to ill health he moved to Churt, Surrey and came into contact with Aneurin Williams and the Haslemere Liberals. In 1905 he took up a fellowship at New College, Oxford, and in 1908 was appointed regius professor of Greek. While at Oxford he taught his future son-in-law Arnold Toynbee. He was a member of both the SACC and LLAAM during the South African War, and subsequently supported the BC. After several years of persuasion he became a Vice-President of the LNS and Chairman of the LFNA and the LNU which arose from a merger of the two groups in 1918. He worked closely with Lord Robert Cecil on League matters until its demise.

**NEVINSON, Henry Woodd (1856-1941)** was educated at Christ Church, Oxford. He developed an interest in Christian Socialists and went to work at the Toynbee Hall settlement in Whitechapel. In 1897 he reported on the Graeco-Turkish war for the *Daily Chronicle* and subsequently regularly reported from war zones and civil disturbances. These included the South African War, the First Balkan War, and the western front and Dardanelles during the First World War. He assisted in aid relief for the Macedonians and Albanians and was an important member of the BC and supported the LLAAM during the South African War.

**NUBAR, Boghos (1851-1930)** was the son of a former Egyptian prime minister was educated in Paris. He became engaged in the Armenian Question during the 1895-6 massacres when as chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Armenian Diocese in Alexandria where he helped provide shelter and work for fleeing Armenians. In 1913 he was appointed by the Catholicos as his representative in Europe. As President of the Armenian National Delegation he worked closely with Lord Bryce and Aneurin Williams in order to raise awareness of the genocide being perpetrated against the Armenians within Turkey.

**O'CONNOR, Thomas Power (1848-1929)** was educated at Queen's College, Galway. His early career was as a journalist in Ireland before successfully transferring to London; setting up a series of evening and weekly papers in the 1880s and 1890s. He stood as a home-rule



candidate for the borough of Galway (1880-1885) and an Irish Nationalist for the seat at Liverpool Scotland (1885-1929). As an ardent supporter of home-rule for Ireland he equally believed in Armenian self-determination, and was an active member of the BAC.

**PERCIVAL, Rev. John** (1834-1918) was educated at Queen's College, Oxford. Former headmaster of Rugby School he was during the period of study the Bishop of Hereford. He was an early supporter of the Workers' Educational Association and educational reform. He was a member of the SACC, vice-president of the BC and LNS, an executive committee member of the BAC, and general council member of the LNU.

**PONSONBY, Arthur** [Baron Ponsonby of Shulbrede] (1871-1946) was the son of Sir Henry Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary. He was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. He originally served in the diplomatic service and Foreign Office, and was private secretary to Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1905-1908). He was a strong critic of the Liberal Government's foreign policy; he was chairman of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group, member of the BC and a founder of the UDC. He was elected as Liberal member for Stirling Burghs (1908-1918). He stood unsuccessfully in 1918 and subsequently joined the Labour Party. He returned to parliament as Labour member for Brightside division of Sheffield (1922-1930). He held several posts in the post-war Labour Governments and was elevated to the peerage in 1930.

**ROBERTS, Charles** (1865-1959) was educated at Marlborough and Balliol College, Oxford. He married Lady Cecilia Howard, daughter of the 9<sup>th</sup> Earl of Carlisle. He was Liberal Member for Lincoln (1906-1918), Borough of Derby (1922-1923). He was a member of the SACC, the general council of the BC and executive committee of the LNU.

**ROBERTSON, John M.** (1856-1933) joined the staff of the *Edinburgh Evening News* before moving to London. He reported from South Africa during the war as 'Scrutator' for the *Morning Leader*. He was Liberal member for Tyneside division of Northumberland (1906-1918). He was a member of the SACC, an associate of the BC and served on the LNU's general council.

**ROWNTREE, Arnold** (1872-1951) was educated at the Quaker's Bootham School in York. He was Liberal member for York (1910-1918) and part of the well-known chocolate manufacturers. He was a member of LLAAM, the BC and the LNS.

**SCOTT, Alexander MacCullum** (1874-1928) was educated at Glasgow University, where he was a contemporary of H. N. Brailsford. He was actively engaged in Liberal politics and was Liberal member for Glasgow Bridgeton (Dec.1910-1922). He was the secretary of LLAAM, after the South African War he became secretary of the New Reform Club following its merger with the now defunct LLAAM. He joined the executive committee of the BC, a founding executive member of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group. He was parliamentary private secretary to Winston Churchill at the Ministry of Munitions and later in the War Office. He wrote several books based on his travels and observations of Scandinavia and Russia, as well as political columns for several newspapers.

**SCOTT, Charles Prestwich** (1846-1932) was educated at Corpus Christi, Oxford. In 1871 he joined the *Manchester Guardian*, and the following year began his 57 year editorship. Amongst the distinguished writers attracted by Scott were James Bryce, J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford and Arnold Toynbee. The paper opposed British imperialism, and armaments as well as providing the main (and sometimes only) outlet for liberal internationalism. He was Liberal member for Leigh (1895-1906). He was an executive member of the LLAAM and SACC and was a supporter of the BC.

**STOW, [Sir] Frederic Samuel Phillipson** (1849-1908) a resident of the Orange Free State, he became connected with the diamond fields in Southern Africa in 1869 and also practiced law until 1885. He was one of the founders of the de Beers Mining Company and one of the first Life Governors of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. Before the outbreak of the South African War he had settled in Haslemere, Surrey and was one of the founders of the SACC. Baronetcy created in 1907.

**SWANN, Sir Charles Ernest** (1844-1929) was educated at the University College, London. In 1913 he changed his name from Schwann by Royal licence. He was Liberal member for Northern division of Manchester (1886-1918). His wife was a member of the SACC and BC.

**SYMONDS, Arthur G.** (c.1855-1924) stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate for the High Peak division of Derbyshire. He was secretary of several political organisations and following William Arthur Moore's departure became secretary of the BC and later the BAC. He was a regular visitor to the House of Commons and worked in the Secretaries Room from 1875 to 1918.



**THOMAS, Frederic George** (1872-1937) was educated at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge and trained as a barrister. In 1911 he represented the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the reception of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions. He was a member of the SACC, the executive committee of the LLAAM, the general committee of the BC and LNS.

**TOYNBEE, Arnold Joseph** (1889-1975) was educated at Balliol College, Oxford where he caught the attention of Gilbert Murray (his future father-in-law). His travels through Italy and Greece gave him a deep understanding of the region, before taking up the role of an Oxford tutor. During the First World War he was engaged at Wellington House in the preparation of propagandist material. While there he collaborated with Viscount Bryce in the preparation and publication of the Blue Book *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916*. He later joined the foreign intelligence department and was a member of the British delegation to the Paris peace conference. These positions ensured that he played an important role in the BAC.

**WALLAS, Graham** (1858-1932) was educated at Corpus Christi, Oxford. He was a member of the Fabian Society (1886-1904) and was a university extension lecturer before taking up a position at the London School of Economics. He was involved in early discussions regarding the formation of the LNS and consulted by Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson. He joined the general Council of the LNU.

**WELLS, Herbert George** (1866-1946) was educated at Midhurst Grammar School and the Royal College of Science. He is best known as a highly successful novelist. He was a member of the Fabian Society (1903-1908) but resigned over a difference of opinion. An active supporter of Britain's participation in the First World War, he joined the LNS and formulated a policy for a league of Allies which was instrumental in the LNS' break-up. After the war he joined the Labour Party and unsuccessfully stood as a candidate in 1922 and 1923.

**WESTLAKE, John** (1828-1913) was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge and later trained as a barrister. He gained a reputation in international law where his opinion was highly valued. His parliamentary career was short-lived, as MP for Romford division of Essex (1885-1886). In 1888 he was appointed to the Whewell chair of international law at the University of Cambridge, where he published several important works. He sat on the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague (1900-1906). An original member of the

BC's general committee, he took on the role of president in 1905, following James Bryce's appointment as Irish chief secretary.

**WILLIAMS, Aneurin** (1859-1924) was educated privately and at London University and St. John's College, Cambridge. He stood unsuccessfully for the Medway division, Kent (1906) and was Liberal member for Plymouth (Jan-Dec.1910), North West division of Durham (1914-1918) and Consett division, Durham (1918-1922). During the South African War he was actively involved with the SACC and LLAAM. Afterwards he joined the BC and became chairman of the BAC when it was formed in 1912. His interest in internationalism led to his publication of 'Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection Among Nations' in November 1914. He brought together a body of like-minded individuals and established the LNS. Despite the personal animosity of David Davies he remained active with the LNU following its formation. During the war he was closely associated with the Armenian Question and raising awareness of the ongoing genocide, both in parliament and the country. He was a member of the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform 1916-17, and chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (1921-1922)



Appendix 2: Extra-parliamentary group membership

Abbreviations used

Membership categories

Ordinary members denoted by date of first appearance on membership lists<sup>1</sup>

A	Associate (similar to Vice President)	PC	Provisional Committee
EC	Executive Committee member	P	President
GC	General Council	VP	Vice President
LS	Local Secretary for Balkan Committee		

Liberal internationalist groups

SACC	South Africa Conciliation Committee
LLAAM	League of Liberal Against Aggression and Militarism
BC	Balkan Committee
BAC	British Armenia Committee
LNS	League of Nations Society
LNU	League of Nations Union

Comparative groups

ARCF	Armenian Red Cross Fund <sup>2</sup>
AR(LM)F	Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund <sup>2</sup>
BWRF	Balkan War Relief fund <sup>2</sup>
CRA	Congo Reform Association <sup>3</sup>
LFAG	Liberal Foreign affairs Group <sup>4</sup>
UPG	Un-named Parliamentary Group <sup>5</sup>
UDC	Union of Democratic Control <sup>6</sup>

University Colleges

All St.	All Saints College
Bal.	Balliol College
Bras.	Brasenose College
Camb.	Cambridge University
Christ Ch.	Christ Church College
Corpus	Corpus Christi
Down.	Downing College
Gon.	Gonville & Caius College
Linc.	Lincoln College
Magd.	Magdalen College
Mans.	Mansfield College
Mer.	Merton College
New	New College
Newn.	Newnham College
Oxf.	Oxford University
Sidn.	Sidney Sussex College
Trin.	Trinity College
Univ. Col.	University College
Univ. Of	University of
Wadh.	Wadham College
Worc.	Worcester College

Sources

1 See chapter 3 for an explanation of the different groups membership records  
2 Official headed paper  
3 *Official Organ of the Congo Reform Association*, October 1906 Committee and supporters list  
4 List in NBP, MS951 c19/1 & Swartz, *Union of Democratic Control*, 6-7  
5 R. D. Denman Papers,  
6 *The UDC Supplement First Annual Report*





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr J. A. Abbott			(29/3/01)														
Lady Aberconway (1854-1933)							VP (1916)	GC. (1919)									
Lord Aberconway (1850-1934)	Barrister & Politician	Edinburgh						GC. (1919)									
Lord Aberdare (1885-1957)	Barrister	New Col. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr E. Aberdeen			(17/3/00)														
Earl of Aberdeen (1847-1934)					VP (1903)												
Mr F. Ackeman								GC. (1919)									
Rt Hon Sir Thomas Dyke Acland (1842-1919)	Barrister & Politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.			(1903)												
Mr Adam Adams				(1902)													
Mr Bryn Adams			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Joseph Adams	Congregational Minister		(17/3/00)														
Prof. William George Stewart Adams (1874-1966)	University Professor	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr William Adamson (1863-1936)	Miner & Politician							EC. (1919)									
Hon Rev. James Granville Adderley (1861-1945)	CoFE. Minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.			A (1903)												
Sir Charles Stewart Addis (1861-1945)	Banker & government advisor							GC. (1919)									
Sir William Ryland Adkins (1862-1925)	Barrister & Politician	Un. Col. Lon.						GC. (1919)	✓								
Rev. William Affleck B.D. (c.1839-)	Minister, United Free Church		(27/6/00)														
Sir James Tynte Agg-Gardner M.P. (1846-1928)	Brewer & Politician						VP (1916)	GC. (1919)									
Rev. J. R. Aitken	Minister		(17/3/00)														
Rev. C. F. Aked	Baptist Minister		(11/1/00)												✓		
Mrs Priscila Albright (c.1857-)					(1903)												
Mr William Arthur Albright (1853-1942)	Chemical Manufacturer		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)	(1903)										✓		

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Percy Alden M.A. (1865-1944)	Warden Mansfield College	Bal. Oxf.	(17/3/00)						✓							
Mr William Steadman Aldis (1839-1928)	Academic	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)	(1902)	(1906)											
Mr John Henry Aldridge MD, JP.	Medical Practioners			1902												
Mr Joseph Gundry Alexander LL.B. (1848-1918)	Barrister		(17/3/00)											✓		
Professor Samuel Alexander (1859-1938)	Professor	Melbourne & Bal. Oxf.	(17/3/00)													
Mr A. C. Allen			(17/3/00)													
Miss A. M. Allen			(31/10/00)													
Mr Charles Francis Egerton Allen (1847-1927)	Barrister & Politician	Camb.	(17/3/00)													
Mr Charles Peter Allen (1861-1930)	Politician & Barrister	Univ. Col. Oxf.			A (1903)											
Mr Gordon Allen							(03/16)									
Mr J. A. Allen					(1903)											
Mr J. E. Allen			(27/6/00)	(24/3/01)												
Rev. Leonard Arthur Cecil Allen	CofE. Minister	All St. Oxf.			(1903)											
Mrs M. Allen					(1903)											
Miss Mary Allen			(27/6/00)													
Mr Raymund Allen							(12/6/15)									
Mrs Raymund Allen							(12/6/15)									
Mr Robert Andrew Allison M.P. (1838-1926)	Politician	Tnn. Camb.	(17/3/00)													
Dr George Johnston Allman LL.D., F.R.S. (1824-1904)	Professor		(11/1/00)													
Mrs Sheldon Amos			(11/1/00)													
Mr J. Kerr Anderson LL.B.			(17/3/00)	(1902)												
Mr William Crawford Anderson (1877-1919)	Politician							GC. (1919)		✓						
Mr H. O. Anderton					(1903)											
Mr Samuel F. Angel				(1902)												
Mr Walter Appleyard			(17/3/00)													
Mr Joseph Arch (1826-1919)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(29/3/01)													
Rt. Rev. Mervyn Archdall (Bishop of Killaloe)	CofE Bishop	Tnn. Dublin						GC. (1919)								
Mr William Aridge			(27/6/00)													
Mr William Aridge Junr			(27/6/00)													
Mrs Elizabeth Claridge Armfield (1826-1904)				(24/4/01)												



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr G. Faulkner Armitage			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr Robert Armitage (1866-1944)	Director & Politician	Trin. Camb.			A/GC (1906)												
Mr G. G. Armstrong								GC. (1919)									
Miss G. Rose Armstrong			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. R. A. Armstrong	Unitarian Minister		(29/3/01)														
Mr Frank Arnold J.P. (c.1843-)	Local Politician & Draper		(27/6/00)														
Mr [Prof] Edward Vernon Arnold Litt.D. (1857-1926)	Professor	Trin. Camb.	(27/6/00)		LS (1903)												
Mr Thomas Arnold M.A. (1823-1909)	Fellow, Royal University of Ireland		(27/6/00)														
Mr S. A. Aronson				(24/4/01)													
Councillor M. Arrandale J.P.			(27/6/00)														
Mr Arslanian						EC											
Mr Charles Robert Ashbee (1863-1942)	Architect & Planner	King's Camb.					(03/16)										
Mr Walter Ashburner (1864-1936)	Barriester & Professor	Un. Col. Lon. & Bal. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr William Asher			(27/6/00)														
Rt Hon Evelyn Ashley (1836-1907)	Politician & Social Reformer	Trin. Camb.			A (1903)												
Mr Thomas Gair Ashton (1855-1933)	Politician & Industrialist	Univ. Col. Oxf.			A (1903)												
Mr William Ashton							(12/6/15)										
Mr Herbert Henry Asquith MP. (1852-1928)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.						VP. (1919)									
Mr J. Atcherley				(18/5/00)													
Mr L. A. Atherley-Jones Q.C., M.P. (1851-1929)	Judge & politician	Bras. Oxf.	(11/1/00)												✓		✓
Rev. Percy Smith Atkinson	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr Stanley Bean Atkinson B.Sc., LL.B. (1873-1910)	Medical Barrister	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr William Atkinson (c.1866-)	Tea Dealer & Trade Mason Secretary		(27/6/00)														
Rev. D. K. Auchterlonie			(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Francis Wilkins Aveling M.A., B.Sc.	Congregational Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr J. Baines				(24/4/01)													
Mrs Baird-Smith			(17/3/00)														
Mr Philip Baker								EC. (1920)									
Mr R. Homfeld Baker							(03/16)										
Mr C. J. Baldock			(17/3/00)														
Miss Baldwin					(1905)												
Rev. Leyland Baldwin (c.1838-)	CofE. Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr Arthur James Balfour MP. (1848-1930)	Politician	Trin. Camb.						VP. (1919)									✓
Mr B. R. Balfour					(1903)												
Lord Balfour of Burleigh (1849-1921)	Politician	Oriel Oxf.						VP. (1919)									
Miss Florence Balgamie (1856-1928)	Campaigner		(17/3/00)														
Mrs Elizabeth Ball (c.1863-)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Kenard Ball (c.1864-)	Solicitor		(17/3/00)														
Mr Sidney Ball			(17/3/00)														
Mr Fred Ballard			(17/3/00)														
Mr George Ballard			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Maria Ballard			(17/3/00)														
Rev. J. S. Balmer	Methodist Minister		(29/3/01)														
Rev. Ransden Balmouth							(03/16)										
Mrs Balston			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. E. Balston			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. Banister				(1902)													
Mr J. B. Banistern				1902													
Mr F. Bannister			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Henry J. Bannister (c.1854-)	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mrs Barber					(1906)												
Mr A. Barbour					EC (1909)												
Mr C. R. Barbour					(1903)												
Mr G. F. Barbour					(1905)												
Mr [sir] Godfrey Baring					A (1906)												



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Canon Barker			(29/3/01)														
Mr Ernest Barker								GC. (1919)									
Rev. J. T. Barkley			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss A. E. Barlow					LS (1903)												
Sir C. A. M. Barlow M.P. (1868-1951)	Politician	King's Camb.						GC. (1919)									
Sir Thomas Barlow (1845-1945)	Physician							GC. (1919)					✓				
Rev. J. H. Barnard			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Ernest William Barnes (1874-	CofE Minister & Master of the Temple	Trin. Camb.					VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Mr Fred Barnes (1856-1939)	Barrister	Liverpool & Jesus Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr George Barnes (1859-1940)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(27/6/00)					VP. (1919)									
Mr T. T. Barnes				(24/4/01)													
Mr Basil Bamhill (c.1864-)	Journalist & Author		(27/6/00)														
Rev. James Barr BD. (1862-1949)	United Free Church of Scotland Minister	Glasgow		(1902)													
Sir John Barran (1872-1952)	Politician	Trin. Camb.			(1906)				✓								
Sir Roland Barran (1858-1949)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr [Sir] Francis Leyland-Barratt (1860-1933)	Barrister	Trin. Camb.			A (1906)												
Mr Thomas Barratt (1841-1914)	Soap Manufacturer & Advertising pioneer		(17/3/00)														
Rev. H. E. Barrell			(29/3/01)														
Professor William Fletcher Barrett F.R.S. (1844-1925)	Physicist & psychological researcher		(17/3/00)				(12/6/15)										
Mr C. W. Barritt					LS (1906)												
Mr Arthur Barrow			(17/3/00)														
Mrs R. C. Barrow			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Eleanor Barton (1872-1960)	Campaigner							GC. (1919)									
Mr W. J. Barton			(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr C. G. H. Bascombe					(1903)												
Rev. W. Udy Bassett			(29/3/02)														
Mrs B. M. Bates			(11/1/00)														
Mrs Bateson			(17/3/00)														
Mr R. R. Batesone				(24/4/01)													
Mr John Battersby			(27/6/00)														
Count Ervin Battiany							(12/6/15)										
Countess Ervin Battiany							(12/6/15)										
Mr Thomas Baty (1869-	International Lawyer	Univ. Col. Oxf.	(27/6/00)														
Mr Victor Bauer (c.1834-)	Accountant		(17/3/00)														
Mr Ernest Belford Bax (1854-1926)	Philosopher		(17/3/00)														
Mr Alfred Baxter (c.1858-)	Printer, Composer		(27/6/00)														
Mr Edric Bayley (c.1841-)			(17/3/00)		(1903)												
Miss Ada Ellen Bayley ("Edna Lyall") (1857-1903)	Novelist [pseud. Edna Lyall]		(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Sir Thomas Bazley Bart. (1829-1919)	Cotton Manufacturer	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Miss Beales					(1903)												
Mr Joseph Beament				(1902)													
Rev. Henry Beamish	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr S. P. Beare			(11/1/00)														
Earl Beauchamp (1872-1938)	Politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.			A (1903)			GC. (1919)	✓						✓		
Rev. W. H. Beckett			(27/6/00)														
Rev. William Beddow																	
Mr William Bedford			(31/10/00)														
Rev. John Albert Bedward (1865- )	Methodist Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr W. H. Beeby (c.1850-)	Bank Clerk		(27/6/00)														
Mr Alfred Beesly (c.1855-)	Chemist		(29/3/01)	(18/5/00)													
Professor Edward Spencer Beesly (1831-1915)	Historian	Wadh. Oxf.	(11/1/00)														
Mr W. F. Beeston			(27/6/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. J. Agar Beet (1840-1924)	Theology Lecturer					EC											
Mr H. C. Beeton			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. W. Henderson Begg			(29/3/02)														
Mr Gustav Behrens							(12/6/15)										
Mr C. W. Bell					(1903)												
Mr George Bell					(1903)												✓
Rev. George Kennedy Allen Bell (1883-1958)	CofE. Minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.				EC											
Mr Henry Bell								GC. (1919)									
Mr Richard Bell (1859-1930)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(27/6/00)												✓		✓
Mr William Bell			(29/3/02)														
Lieut-Gen. Sir William Bellairs K.C.M.G. (1828-1913)	Retired General		(31/10/00)														
Sir Arthur Shirley Benn M.P. (1858-1937)	Barrister & politician							GC. & EC, (1919)									
Rev. A. Bennett M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Alfred William Bennett B.Sc. (1833-1902)	Botanist & publisher	Un. Col. Lon.	(27/6/00)														
Mr Arnold Bennett (1867-1931)	Writer							GC. (1919)									
Mr Joseph Bennett (c.1829-1908)	Politician		(17/3/00)														
Mr William Bennett			(29/3/02)														
Mr [sir] Godfrey Benson (1864-1945)	Politician & writer	Bal. Oxf.			GC (1903)												
Lord Henry Cavendish Bentinck M.P. (1863-1931)	Politician						1918 Committee	GC. & EC, (1919)								✓	
Mr Edmund Clerihew Bentley (1875-1956)	Writer	Mer. Oxf.		(18/5/00)													
Mrs Dickinson Berry M.B.								GC. (1919)									
Mr Thomas Berry				(1902)													
Miss Matilda Betham-Edwards (1836-1919)	Writer		(17/3/00)														
Baron de Bethune							LA										
Mr W. B. C. Betts				(24/4/01)													
Rev. Henry Bickersteith Ottley (c.1850-1932)	CofE. Minister				GC (1903)												
Mr Clarence Bicknell (1842-1918)	botanist	Trin. Camb.					(12/6/15)										
Mrs Percy [Edith] Bigland (1862-1951)	Campaigner						(12/6/15)										
Mr Percy Bigland							PC (1915)	GC. & EC, (1919)									





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)/F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss E. M. Bowers					(1906)												
Mr John Bowing			(17/3/00)														
Rev. William Boyden (1825- )	Methodist Minister		(29/3/02)														
Mr E. Gurney Boyle (1875-1945)	Barrister		(11/1/00)	EC	EC (1905)	EC							✓				
Sir Edward Boyle (1848-1909)	Barrister				LS (1910)												
Mr Michael J. Boyle B.A.			(27/6/00)														
Sir Edward William Brabrook CB. (1839-1930)	Civil Servant						(12/6/15)										
Miss E. D. Bradby			(27/6/00)														
Mrs E. S. Bradby			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Miss L. Bradby			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
General Bradford			(29/3/01)														
Mrs H. Bradlaugh-Bonner (1859-1935)	Freethinker & radical		(31/10/00)														
Rev. J. T. Bradley			(17/3/00)														
Canon Russell Bradley					(1903)												
Mr John Bradshaw			(17/3/00)														
Professor George S. Brady M.D., F.R.S. FSA.			(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)													
Mrs Jane Brailsford (1874-1937)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Joseph Bevan Braithwaite (1855-1934)	Stockbroker							(1919)									
Miss A. Bramwell			(27/6/00)														
Mr James Branch J.P., L.C.C. (1845-1918)	Boot Manufacturer		(27/6/00)														
Mr Fred J. Brand			(17/3/00)														
The Hon. Robert Henry Brand CMG. (1878-1963)	Merchant Banker & Public Servant	New Col. Oxf.						EC. (1920)									
Mr Henry Samuel Brandreth (1841-1919)	Barrister	Trin. Camb.			(1906)												
Mr Victor Bransford							(12/6/15)										
Mrs Victor Bransford							(12/6/15)										
Lord Brassey (1836-1918)	Politician	Univ. Col. Oxf.			VP (1903)								✓				✓
Mr F. J. Brazier			(17/3/00)														
Mr William Alfred Brend (1873-)	Medical Student	King's Lon.	(17/3/00)														
Mr E. A. Bretey				(1902)													
Sir Frederick Bridge CVO. (1844-1924)	Organist & composer							GC. (1919)									
Mr John Henry Bridges M.D., M.B, F.R.C.P. (1832-1906)	Medical Doctor	Wadh. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)													

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr T. R. Bridgewater			(11/1/00)														
Miss E. Briggs					(1903)												
Miss Irlam Briggs					(1906)												
Miss Agnes Bright			(29/3/01)		(1905)												
Mr Allan Heywood Bright (1862-1941)	Politician		(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)													
Mr John Albert Bright (1848-1924)	Politician	Un. Col. Lon.	(17/3/00)	EC													
Mrs John Albert [Edith Eckersley] Bright			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Canon Rhodes Bristow					A (1903)												
Mr J. C. V. Broder					(1903)												
Mr Henry Brodie					A (1906)												
Mr John C. Brodie					(1903)												
Mr John Brooke			(27/6/00)														
Mr Edmund Wright Brooks (1834-1928)	Cement Manufacturer		(17/3/00)		EC (1903)	EC							✓	✓	✓		
Mr James Howard Brooks			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Dr Brown			(11/1/00)														
Rev. F. Brown			(17/3/00)														
Mr F. H. Brown				(1902)													
Rev. H. Brown					(1903)												
Mrs H. B. Brown				(24/4/01)													
Mr James Brown				(1902)													
Col James Clifton Brown (1841-1917)	Politician	Trin. Hall Camb.		(1902)													
Mr William Henry Brown (1840-1915)	Com Merchant						(12/6/15)										✓
Mr W. J. Brown				(1902)													
Mr William Brown			(29/3/01)														
Mr William Brown			(17/3/00)				(12/6/15)										
Mrs William Brown			(17/3/00)														
Mr James W. Browne M.A., M.B.			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Miss Leigh Browne			(11/1/00)														
Mrs W. P. Browne			(27/6/00)														
Mrs S. Woolcott Browne [or Brown]			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Oscar Browning M.A. (1837-1923)	Politician & Historian	King's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Basil Brown-Morison			(31/10/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr G. L. Bruce			(11/1/00)		(1903)												
Rev. Rosslyn Bruce (1871-1956)	CofE Minister	Worc. Oxf.			GC (1903)												
Mr John Fowler Leece Brunner (1865-1929)	Manufacturer &	Trin. Camb.			A (1906)												
	Chemical Manufacturer & Politician																
Sir John Tomlinson Brunner Bart (1842-1919)			(17/3/00)	Treasurer	A (1906)				✓								
Miss Margaret Bruson					(1903)												
Mrs Sophia Bryant D.Sc. (1850-1922)	Educationalist & suffragist		(17/3/00)														
Miss Bryce				(24/4/01)													
Mr J. Annan Bryce (1843-1923)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	(1902)	EC (1906)	EC			✓				✓				
Viscount James Bryce OM. (1838-1922)	Politician	Trin. Oxf.			(1903)			(1919)					✓				✓
Mrs James [Elizabeth Marion] Bryce (-1939)			(11/1/00)										✓				
Mr W. Frith Bryden					(1903)												
Mr [sir] David Brynmor Jones KC.					A (1906)												
Col John Buchan (1875-1940)	Author & Director of Ministry of Intelligence	Glasgow						EC. (1919)									
Mrs S. O. [Edith Augusta] Buckmaster (-1935)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Stanley Owen Buckmaster (1861-1934)	Barrister & politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr E. B. Bull								EC. (1920)									
Mr John Bullock M.A.			(31/10/00)														
Rev. Ebenezer Bulmer	Wesleyan Minister		(27/6/00)														
Rev. John Bulmer B.D.			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr J. Burford JP.				(18/5/00)													
Rev. Walter H. Burgess			(27/6/00)														
Mr W. C. Burley				(1902)													
Lady Georgiana Burne-Jones (1840-1920)			(17/3/00)														
Sir Philip Burne-Jones Bart			(17/3/00)														
Mr C. Delisle Burns (1879-1942)	Author & lecturer							GC. (1919)									
Mr John Burns M.P. (1858-1942)	Labour leader & politician		(27/6/00)	EC													
Principal R. M. Burrows D.Litt (1867-1920)	Classical scholar	Christ Ch. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs R. W. Campbell			(17/3/00)														
Mr R. W. Campbell			(27/6/00)														
Mr W. A. Campbell				(1902)													
Rev. W. H. Campbell					(1906)												
Mr A. Sidney Campkin				(1902)													
Mr Henry Cane				(18/5/00)										✓			
Miss E. Cantlow					(1903)												
Mr E. Carlile						EC											
Countess of Carlisle (1845-1921)			(11/1/00)														
Mr W. Camelley				(24/4/01)													
Captain Carpenter R.N.			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr Edward Carpenter (1844-1929)	Socialist, Author & thinker	Trin. Hall Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. Professor J. Estlin Carpenter M.A. (1844-1927)	Unitarian Minister & college Head	Un. Col. Lon.	(11/1/00)					GC. (1919)									
Mr Thomas Carpenter					(1903)												
Mr George T. Carr			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Carter					(1903)												
Mr J. R. Carter			(31/10/00)														
Mr T. Carter			(27/6/00)														
Mr Wallace Carter				(1902)													
Mr James Carver							LA										
Mr Egerton St John Catchpool (1890-1971)	Social Worker					EC											
Mr William Catchpool (1828-1920)	Millar			(24/4/01)													
Lt Gen Earl Cavan KP, GCMG. (1865-1946)	Army Officer							VP. (1919)									
Mr Christopher Cavanagh			(17/3/00)														
Lady Frederick Cavendish (1841-1925)					VP (1903)								✓	✓			
Lord Robert Cecil M.P. (1864-1958)	Politician	Univ. Col. Oxf.						GC. & VP, (1919)								✓	
Rev. Samuel Chadwick (1860-1932)	Wesleyan Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Chalcroft			(17/3/00)														
Mr George Chalton			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Thomas Champness			(11/1/00)														
Mr F. W. Chance					A (1906)												

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr H. G. Chancellor																	
Rt Hon Lord Chancellor (1872-1930)							?	VP. (1919)									
Sir Francis A. Channing M.P. (1841-1926)	Politician	Exeter Oxf.	(11/1/00)	EC	A (1903)									✓			✓
Mr H. J. Channon			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs Allan Chaplin			(27/6/00)														
Mr E. A. Chapman			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Hugh Boswell Chapman	CofE Minister	Keble Oxf.	(29/3/02)														
Mr J. W. B. Chapman				EC													
Mr J. Wallis Chapman				(1902)													
Rev. J. Charlesworth					(1903)												
Rt Rev. Francis James Chavasse (1846-1928)	Bishop of Liverpool	Oxford			VP (1903)									✓			
Mr John Frederick Cheetham (1835-1916)	Politician & Cotton Manufacturer		(11/1/00)														
Miss Constance de la Cherois-Crommelin (1867-1960)		Newn. Camb.	(27/6/00)														
Mr Richard Robert Cherry Q.C., LL.D. (1859-1923)	Politician & Judge	Trin. Dublin	(27/6/00)	(1902)													
Mr Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936)	Writer	Un. Col. Lon.		(1902)	GC (1903)												
Mr R. Chiddleditch																	
Mrs Herbert Chitty			(11/1/00)														
Mr Bertram Christian					EC (1903)										✓		
Mr A. L. Christie			(17/3/00)														
Mr G. R. S. Clack					(1903)												
Mr W. H. Clapham				(1902)													
Miss Jane Hume Clapperton (1832-1914)	Philosopher & Social Reformer			(1902)													
Mrs A. W. Claremont								GC. & EC, (1919)									
Mr A. W. Claremont LCC.								GC. & EC, (1919)									
Mr Claude A. Claremont							PC (1915)										
Miss Ethelberta Claremont							(03/16)										
Miss Alice Clark (1874-1934)	Campaigner		(17/3/00)				(03/16)										
Dr Gavin Brown Clark (1846-1930)	Politician	Glasgow, Edinburgh & King's Lon.						GC. (1919)									



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss Hilda Clark (1881-1955)	Physician & Humanitarian		(17/3/00)														
Miss J. K. Clark			(29/3/01)														
Rev. J. P. Clark(e)			(17/3/00)														
Mr John Bright Clark (1867-1933)	Shoe Manufacturer		(27/6/00)	(18/5/00)													
Miss Margaret Clark (1878-			(17/3/00)														
Mr Roger Clark (1871-1961)	Shoe Manufacturer		(27/6/00)														
Mrs Sarah Bancroft Clark (1877-1973)			(29/3/02)														
Rev. T. H. Clark					(1906)												
Mrs W. S. [Helen Priestman] Clark (1840-1927)			(17/3/00)														
Mr William Stephens Clark (1839-1925)	Shoe Manufacturer		(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. A. Clarke			(29/3/02)														
Rev. Edwin Clarke	Congregational Minister		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr H. Eventt Clarke							(12/6/15)										
Mr J. Clarke			(17/3/00)	?													
Mr John Clarke				(1902)													
Mrs Percy Clarke							(12/6/15)										
Mr Percy B. Clarke							(12/6/15)										
Mr Roderick Kendall Clarke				(1902)													
Mr William Clarke (1852-1901)	Journalist	Cambridge	(11/1/00)	EC													
Rev. J. Rhenius Clarkson B.A.	Congregational Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. William Frederick Clarkson B.A.	Congregational Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr J. T. Clausonthue				(1902)													
Rev. W. H. Claxton			(29/3/01)														
Mr Peter W. Clayden (1827-1902)	Journalist & Author		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Edward Edney Cleal	Congregational Minister		(17/3/00)														
Rev. John Samuel Clemens	Methodist Minister	Un. Of Lon.		(24/4/01)													
Mr J. H. Cliff			(27/6/00)														
Mr Alfred Cloake							(12/6/15)										

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr E. Clodd																	
Miss C. Beatrice Clothier			(27/6/00)			(1906)											
Mr S. Thompson Clothier (1857-1933)	Stone Merchant & Architectural technician		(27/6/00)														
Mr Charles Thomas Clough M.A. (1852-1916)	Geologist	St John's Camb.	(29/3/01)														
Mr W. M. Clough MP.	Politician		(29/1/01)							✓							
Mr J. R. Clynes M.P. (1869-1949)	Trade Unionist & Politician							GC. & EC, (1919)									
Sir Stuart Coats Bart (1868-1959)	Politician						EC						✓				
Mr Felix T. Cobbold (1841-1909)	Banker & Politician	King's Camb.	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss Cobden				(1902)													
Miss Helena Cobden			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr Sydney Carlyle Cockerell (1867-1962)	Book Collector		(17/3/00)														
Miss Magda Coe							EC						✓				
Mr J. B. Cohen Ph.D.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs M. Cole					(1903)												
Mrs Madeline Cole						EC							✓				
Dr Robert J. Colenso (c.1851-)	Medical Doctor		(11/1/00)														
Lord Bernard J. Coleridge Q.C. (1851-1927)	Kings Councllor, Peer of Parliament	Trin. Lon.	(11/1/00)														
Lady Mary Alethea Coleridge (-1940)			(17/3/00)														
The Hon. Audrey Coleridge			(27/6/00)														
Mrs E. Colles (1878-1922)					(1906)												
Hon. C. F. Collier					GC (1903)												
Mr Godfrey Pattison Collins (1875-1936)	Politician & Publisher							GC. (1919)									
Sir William Job Collins (1859-1946)	Ophthalmic Surgeon & Politician	Un. Of Lon.					(12/6/15)										
Rev. Charles G. T. Colson			(17/3/00)				EC							✓			
Mr F. H. Colson																	
Mr Philip Comyns-Carr			(11/1/00)														
Mr Herbert Congreve			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Richard Congreve			(31/10/00)														
Prof. Robert Seymour Conway (1864-1933)	University Professor	Gon. Camb.			GC (1903)												



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Charles Augustus Vansittart Conybeare (1853-1919)	Politician & Barrister	Christ Ch. Oxf.		EC													
Mr Samuel Cooke					(1903)												
Lady Coomara-Swamy			(27/6/00)														
Mr A. K. Coomara-Swamy			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. J. Cooper			(29/3/02)														
Rev. Theodore James Cooper	CofE Minister		(29/2/02)														
Capt Colin Reith Coote MP. (1893-1979)	Politician & journalist	Bal. Oxf.				EC											
Mr Howard Coote (c.1864-)	Farmer		(17/3/00)														
Mr G. C. Cope			(27/6/00)														
Rev. W. Copeland-Bowie M.L.S.B.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Charles Coppack				(1902)													
Mr C. H. Corbett					A (1906)												
Miss Edith M. Corderoy							(12/6/15)										
Mr W. J. Cornick			(17/3/00)														
Rev. John Rundle Cornish (1837-1918)	Bishop of St Germans	Sidn. Camb.			(1906)										✓		
Rev. T. B. Cornish			(17/3/00)														
Mrs H. Cotes				(1902)													
Mr Henry Cotes				(1902)													
Mrs Cotton			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Miss Cotton				(24/4/01)													
Sir Henry Cotton KCSI. (1845-1915)	administrator	King's Lon.	(17/3/00)		A (1906)												
Mr James S. Cotton M.A.																	
Major George Lloyd Courthorpe (1877-1955)	Politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mrs Catherine Courtney (1847-1929)	Social worker		(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)							✓						
Miss Kate D'Olier Courtney (1878-1974)	Campaigner							GC. (1919)			✓						
Right Hon. Leonard Courtney M.P. (1832-1918)	Politician	St John's Camb.	(11/1/00)														✓
Mr W. P. Courtney			(17/3/00)														
Mr Thomas Coventry (c.1865-)	Bank Cashier		(27/6/00)														
Mr W. H. Cowan					A (1906)				✓						✓		
Lady Cowdray (1862-1932)							VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. John Charles Cox LL.D., F.S.A. (1843-1919)	CofE. Minister	Queen's Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr R. Hippiusley Cox			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Stewart Crabb					(1903)												
Mrs Pearl Craigie (1867-1906)	Novelist & Playwright		(11/1/00)														
Mr C. T. Cramp								GC. (1919)									
Mr Walter Crane (1845-1915)	Illustrator & Painter		(17/3/00)														
Mr G. E. Crawford				(18/5/00)													
Mr W. C. Crawford			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Louisa Hume Creighton (1850-1936)	Activist & writer							GC. & VP, (1919)					✓				
Mr William Randall Cremer (1828-1908)	Politician		(27/6/00)		A (1905)												
Rev. George Critchley B.A.	Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(27/6/00)														
Miss Constance Crichton-Stuart			(31/10/00)														
Miss Mabel H. Crockford							(12/6/15)										
Mr J. W. Crombie					A (1903)												
Mr Henry Crompton			(17/3/00)														
Mr Joshua Crook			(17/3/00)														
Mr William Montgomery Crook (1860-1945)	Journalist	Trin. Dublin	(11/1/00)	EC	EC (1903)												
Mr William Crooks M.P. (1852-1921)	Politician						VP (1916)	(1919)									
Sir Arthur H. Crosfield Bt.								GC. & EC, (1919)									
Col. George Crosfield DSO.								GC. (1919)									
Mr J. Herbert Crosland (1874-1949)	Steel Manufacturer		(31/10/00)														
Mr George Crosoer				(1902)			(12/6/15)										
Mr J. Ashton Cross			(17/3/00)														
Mr E. Richard Cross LL.B.	Solicitor		(17/3/00)				PC (1915)										
Mrs Richard Cross							PC (1915)	(1919)									
Mr Frank Crossley			(17/3/00)														
Mr Fred H. Crossley				(24/4/01)													
Mrs M. Crowdy						EC											
Mr W. E. Crozier			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. J. Cudworth			(27/6/00)														
Mr Charles Cullimore			(29/3/02)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Edmund Cullimore			(17/3/00)														
Miss Jessie Currie			(27/6/00)														
Mr Thomas Cuthbertson				(24/4/01)													
Prince Boris Czetwertynski															✓		
Lady Dale			(27/6/00)														
Sir C. Dalrymple Bart					A (1903)												
Mr A. M. Daniel M.B., M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr David R. Daniel			(27/6/00)														
Rev. J. Dann			(17/3/00)														
Mr G. Dannatt Junr			(17/3/00)														
Mr R. D. Darbshire			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. William Evans Darby LL.D.	Minister		(11/1/00)														
Earl of Damley (1859-1927)		Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)											✓			
Mr Herbert E. Dauncey (c.1869-)	Postman		(17/3/00)														
Rev. A. A. David DD. (1867-1950)	Headmaster & later Bishop of Liverpool	Queen's Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr Henry Davidson				(24/4/01)													
Randall Thomas Davidson (1848-1930)	Canterbury	Trin. Oxf.						VP. (1919)									
Mrs A. C. Davies					(1903)												
Mr Alfred T. Davies (1861-1949)	Solicitor			(24/4/01)													
Rev. B. Davies			(27/6/00)														
Major David Davies M.P. (1880-1944)	Politician & Coal Mine Owner	King's Camb.					EC (1918)	GC. & EC, (1919)									
Mrs Dixon Davies					(1903)												
Mr Dixon H. Davies					(1903)												
Rev. E. A. Davies D.D.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Emil Davies							(12/6/15)										
Miss Margaret Llewelyn Davies (1861-1944)	Campaigner	Queen's Lon. & Girton Camb.	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)				GC. (1919)			✓						
Rev. R. E. Davies			(29/3/02)														
Mr T. Brett Davies			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Timothy Eynon Davies	Congregational Minister		(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Sir W. Howell Davies (1851-1932)	Politician					EC	VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Mr William Davies			(17/3/00)														
Mr J. Davies [or Davis]			(27/6/00)														
Mr James Davison F.R.C.S.I.			(17/3/00)														
Dr Elizabeth Dawes (1864-1954)	Classical scholar	Girton Camb.					(12/6/15)										
Rev. Canon John Samuel Dawes DD.	CofE Minister						(12/6/15)										
Mr Joseph Day			(29/3/02)														
Rev. Joseph Day			(27/6/00)														
Mr Lewis F. Day			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Lewis F. [Ruth Emma] Day (1850-1929)			(17/3/00)														
Mrs De Bunsen					LS (1903)												
Miss Agnes C. De Burgh			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)	M (1905)												
Colonel De Kantzow			(17/3/00)														
Miss [or Mrs] Jeannie De Pass			(17/3/00)														
Mr George F. Dean			(27/6/00)														
Mrs George F. Dean			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Peter Dean M.S.B.			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Percy Deamer (1867-1936)	CofE. Minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.			GC (1903)												
Mr Frank Debenham (1837-1917)	Owner		(11/1/00)	EC													
Mr Richard Douglas Denman (1876-1957)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)	✓	✓	✓						
Mr J. M. Dent						EC											
Mr P. Descours			(17/3/00)														
Rev. E. I. Devenish			(27/6/00)														
Mr G. Lowes Dickinson MA. (1862-1932)							PC (1915)	GC. & EC, (1919)									
Sir Willoughby Hyett Dickinson (1859-1943)	Politician	Trin. Camb.					PC (1915)	GC. & EC, (1919)	✓	✓							
Sir Charles Dilke Bart (1843-1911)	Politician	Trin. Hall Camb.			A (1906)										✓		
Mrs John Dillon			(11/1/00)														
Miss Edith Dimock			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Albert Duncan Dixey	CofE Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr W. R. Dixon			(27/6/00)														
Mr Thomas Dobson			(27/6/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr F. Lawson Dodd M.R.C.S.			(17/3/00)														
Mr J. Theodore Dodd					M (1903)												
Mr F. Dolman L.C.C.			(29/3/02)														
Mr Robert Donald (1860-1933)	Journalist							GC. (1919)									
Miss Mary Donkin				(18/5/00)													
Rev. Alex Donovan B.A.			(17/3/00)														
Miss B. Doubleday					M (1903)												
Professor Thomas W. Dougan M.A. (-1907)	University Professor	Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. Percy Douglas	CofE Minister		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Robert P. Douglas (c.1844-)	Minister		(27/6/00)		M (1903)												
Rev. H. Enfield Dowson			(17/3/00)														
Mr Fred H. Drabble				(1902)													
Mr H. Cecil Drane							(12/6/15)										
Mr Warwick H. Draper (c.1874-)	Barrister Solicitor		(11/1/00)														
Rev. Harry Drew (1856-1910)	CofE. Minister	Keble Oxf.	(11/1/00)												✓		
Mrs Mary Drew (1847-1927)			(17/3/00)												✓		
Mr K. Drost			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. Drummond				(1902)													
Rev. J. Meldrum Dyerre				(1902)													
Dr Drysdale							(03/16)										
Mrs Dockar Drysdale (c.1845-)			(17/3/00)				(03/16)										
Mr Henry Duke			(31/10/00)														
Mr Charles Duncan (1865-1933)	politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr J. Hastings Duncan (1855-1928)	Politician				A (1906)												
Mr Ernest R. Dunkley			(17/3/00)														
Mr Binnie Dunlop							(03/16)										
Mr Albert Edward Dunn (1864-1937)	Solicitor & politician				A (1906)												
Mrs J. T. Dunn							(12/6/15)										
Dr John Thomas Dunn (1858-1939)	Chemist & Public analyst						(12/6/15)										
Mr J. C. Durant	Stage Carpenter		(29/3/02)														
Rev. Durham				(24/4/01)													
Miss M. E. Durham								GC. (1919)									





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)/F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. W. D. Etherington M.A.			(27/6/00)														
Dr [sir] Arthur Evans FRS. (1851-1941)	Journalist & Archaeologist	Bras. Oxf.			EC (1903)												
Rev. D. B. Evans			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Glendower Evans							(03/16)										
Dr Griffith Evans M.D. (1835-1935)	Army Vet	McGill Montreal	(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. Owen Evans			(31/10/00)														
Rev. R. Mon Evans			(27/6/00)														
Mr Samuel Thomas Evans M.P. (1859-1918)	Barrister & politician	Un. Of Lon.	(11/1/00)														
Mr Sparke Evans				(1902)													
Mr W. Evans				(1902)													
Miss M. A. Eve			(17/3/00)														
Miss Mary M. Eve			(17/3/00)														
Mr Robert Lacy Everett (c.1833-)			(17/3/00)	(1902)	A (1906)												
Mr William F. Everett (c.1846-)	Hatter Shop Keeper		((17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr E. Eveson			(27/6/00)														
Mr G. H. Faber					A (1906)												
Rev. Principal Fairburn D.D., LL.D.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry C. Fairlie	Chemical Manufacturer		(29/3/02)	(24/4/01)													
Mr James Fairlie (-1960)	Chemical Manufacturer		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs James Fairlie			(17/3/00)	(24/01)													
Mr Henry Fane			(27/6/00)														
Mr Hugh R. Farren			(27/6/00)														
Lord Farrer							VP, 1917	GC. (1919)									
Mrs Farrer			(17/3/00)														
Lady Farrer			(17/3/00)		(1906)												
Mr J. A. Farrer			(11/1/00)	EC													
Lord Lord Farrer				(1902)	GC (1903)												
Mrs Henry [Millicent] Fawcett (1847-1929)	Campaigner																
Mr R. C. Fell			(17/3/00)					VP. (1919)									

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr William Fell																	
Mrs Fellows			(29/3/02)				LA										
Miss M. C. Fellows			(29/3/02)														
Mr Donald Ferguson			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr W. J. Field				(1902)													
Mr W. J. Finnis				(1902)													
Mr A. Finsler			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. Finsler				(1902)													
Mr H. A. L. Fisher MP. (1865-1940)	Historian & politician	New Col. Oxf.						VP. (1919)									
Lady Emma Fitch (c.1831-1909)			(29/3/01)														
Sir Joshua Fitch LL.D. (1824-1903)	Educationalist	Un. Of Lon.	(29/3/01)														
Rt Hon. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice M.P. (1846-1935)	Historian & politician	Trin. Camb.			VP (1903)												
Colonel T. S. [or F. S.] Fitzpatrick	Indian Staff Corps		(29/3/02)	(1902)													
Mr Robert Fleming (1869-1939)	Secretary, Co-op Union						(12/6/15)										
Rev. Henry Mordaunt Fletcher	CofE Minister	Bal. Oxf.	(31/10/00)														
Mr Howard Fletcher			(27/6/00)														
Mr S. W. Flint	Alderman		(29/3/02)					GC. (1919)									
Mr A. W. Fluck			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr C Flugel			(17/3/00)														
Senateur Henri La Fontaine [Belgium] (1854-1943)	Professor of International Law						PC (1915)	GC. (1919)									
Miss Bessie Ford			(17/3/00)														
Miss Isabella Ford (1855-1924)	Campaigner & author		(17/3/00)								?						
Mr John Rawlinson Ford (c.1845-)	Solicitor		(17/3/00)														
Miss Margaret L. Ford				(1902)													
Mr T. Benson P. Ford (1846-1918)	Engineer & Silk Spinning mill owner		(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs E. O. Fordham				(1902)													
Mr E. W. Fordham				(1902)													
Rev. J. C. Forrest					LS (1903)												
Rev. J. M. Forson					(1903)												
Mr Walter Forster			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs Geddes			(27/6/00)														
Mr H. C. Gedge			(27/6/00)														
Mr Allen Gee (1852-1939)	Trade Unionist		(27/6/00)														✓
Prof. W. G. Geldart								GC. (1919)									
Alderman W. George								GC. (1919)									
Rev. G. E. German					(1903)												
Professor Gibb			(11/1/00)														
Lady Dorothea Gibb (1861-1949)								GC. (1919)									
Sir George Gibb (1850-1925)	Company chairman	Aberdeen					VP (1916)	GC. (1919)									
Mr John Gibb				(1902)													
Miss Mary S. F. Gibson			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Rev. George Henry Giddins	Congregational Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr Robert Murray Gilchrist (1868-1917)	Novelist		(27/6/00)														
Mr John Gill			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Joseph Sturge Gilpin (c.1825-)	Insurance Agent		(31/10/00)														
Mr E. D. Girdlestone			(27/6/00)														
Miss M. Catherine Gittins			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr H. V. Gladstone				(24/4/01)													
Miss Helen Gladstone (1849-1925)		Newn. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry N. Gladstone (1852-1935)	Businessman	King's Lon.	(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)											✓		
Rt Hon Herbert Gladstone M.P. (1854-1930)	Politician	Univ. Col. Oxf.			VP (1903)												
Mr Robert Gladstone junr (1833-1919)	Businessman	Edinburgh	(17/3/00)														
Rev. Stephen Gladstone (1844-1920)	CofE Minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)	A (1903)								✓				
Mrs Stephen E. Gladstone (1844-1920)			(29/3/02)														
Mrs Glascott					(1903)												
Mr Samuel Gleave [or Gieave]			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. James Paterson Gledstone	Minister			(24/4/01)													
Mr J. G. Godard			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs Goddard			(27/6/00)														
Mr Hugh Godley (1877-1950)		Bal. Oxf.	(11/1/00)														
Mr G. T. D. C. Goedhart							(12/6/15)										
Capt Frank Walter Goldstone (1870-1955)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr J. P. Goodridge			(17/3/00)	(1902)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Alfred Goodwin				(1902)													
Mr J. E. Goodwin				(24/4/01)													
Mr James Goodwin			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr J. C. Gordon			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Charles Gore (1853-1932)	Bishop of Worcester & Oxford	Bal. Oxf.			VP (1903)	EC	VP (1918)	GC. (1919)						✓			
Capt W. Ormsby Gore M.P. (1885-1964)	Politician	New Col. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr Harry Gosling (1861-1930)	Trade unionist & politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr Henry Gale Gotch (-1941)							(03/16)										
Mr A. Gottschling				(1902)													
Mrs H. Goudge			(29/3/02)														
Mr Ernest Grace			(17/3/00)														
Capt George Frederick Gracey (1878-1958)	Soldier & relief worker					EC											
Rev. Edward Charles Graff	CoffE Minister				(1906)												
Mr J. W. Graham			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Sarah Grand			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Canon William Leighton Grane	CoffE Minister	Gon. Camb.					(12/6/15)										
Mr Arthur J. Grant M.A. (1862-1948)	University Professor	King's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Come Grant (1850-1924)	Bamster & politician		(11/1/00)		A (1903)												
Mr G. F. M. [or G. S] Grant			(17/3/00)														
Rev. George Graves			(11/1/00)														
Mr Ernest Gray (1857-1932)	politician				A (1903)												
Mr Newenham Arthur Eustace Graydon (-1914)	Journalist & Editor	King's Lon.	(17/3/00)														
Mrs Green				(24/4/01)													
Mr J. F. Green			(29/3/02)														
Mrs W. H. Green			(17/3/00)														
Mr Raymond Greene (1869-1947)	Politician & soldier	Oriel Oxf.			A (1903)												
Mr J. H. Greenhalgh			(29/3/01)														
Rev. W. Greenwell (1820-1918)	Archaeologist	Univ. Col. Durham			(1903)												
Dr T. Greer M.A., M.D.			(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr William Greer			(27/6/00)													
Rev. B. D. W. Gregory			(29/3/02)													
Lieut Col G. M. Gregory						EC							✓			
Rev. James Gregory			(17/3/00)													
Mr J. B. Greig J.P.			(17/3/00)													
Mr R. H. Gretton					EC (1910)											
Viscount Grey of Falloden KG. (1862-1933)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.			A (1903)			VP. (1919)								
Rev. J. Griffin			(27/6/00)													
Mr James D. Grout (c.1847-)	Wire worker		(27/6/00)													
Lady Grove (1863-1926)			(17/3/00)													
Miss Mary Grover			(17/3/00)													
Mr Edward Grubb (1854-1939)	Campaigner & Social reformer	Un. Col. Lon.		(1902)						✓						
Mr Frederick Grubbe			(17/3/00)													
Miss J. F. Gruner							(12/6/15)									
Rev. G. Grylls					(1903)											
Mr Philip Guedalla (1889-1944)	Barrister & author	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)								
Capt Frederick Edward Guest M.P. (1875-1937)	Soldier & politician							GC. (1919)								
Mrs F. E. [Amy] Guest Hon.								GC. (1919)								
Mr H. Grattan Guinness MD.														✓		
Mr John W. Gulland (1864-1920)	Politician	Edinburgh			A (1906)			GC. (1919)								
Miss M. A. Gunning			(17/3/00)													
Sir William Brampton Gurdon K.C.M.G., M.P. (1840-1910)	Politician	Trin. Oxf.	(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)	A (1903)											
Miss Isabel Gwyther							(12/6/15)									
Mr Hacobian	Author & Journalist					EC										
Mr Alfred Haggard			(17/3/00)													
Mr Thomas Haigh				(1902)												
Mr W. T. Hailes				(24/4/01)												
Rt Hon Richard Burdon Haldane KC. (1856-1928)	Politician	Edinburgh			A (1903)											
Rev. Charles W. Hall			(29/3/02)													
Mr R. Hall				(1902)												
Mr Robert Hall			(17/3/00)	(1902)												



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Charles E. Hallé (1846-1919)	Artist		(17/3/00)														
Mr Robert Halstead							(12/6/15)										✓
Mrs Ham				(1902)													
Rev. E. T. Hamel			(17/3/00)														
Miss Mary Hamer					(1903)												
Mr S. H. Hamer							(12/6/15)										
Major Collingwood George Clements Hamilton (1877-1947)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr H. W. B. Hamilton			(27/6/00)														
Mr John C. Hamilton			(17/3/00)														
Mr R. H. Hamilton				(1902)													
Mr J. L. Hammond (1872-1949)	Historian & journalist	St. John's Oxf.	(11/1/00)	EC	EC (1903)												
Mrs Charles Hancock (c.1849-)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Charles Hancock (c.1849-)	Barrister				(1903)												
Mr E. Hancock								GC. (1919)									
Mr John George Hancock (1857-1940)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(27/6/00)														
Mr S. Hancock				(1902)													
Mr Martin Handon (c.1874-)	music School Clerk		(17/3/00)														
Capt Hankey					(1903)												
Rev. Josiah Hankinson	Congregational Minister				(1903)												
Mrs Hanna			(17/3/00)														
Colonel H. B. Hanna (c.1840-)	Retired Colonel		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr J. Keir Hardie (1856-1915)	Politician		(27/6/00)		A (1905)												
Mr Thomas Hardie			(27/6/00)														
Mr A. P. Hardy				(24/4/01)													
Mr G. A. Hardy					EC. (1907)									✓			
Rev. Charles Hargrove M.A.			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Miss Constance Hargrove			(11/1/00)														
Rev. Henry Law Harkness	CofE Minister	King's Camb.			(1903)												
Rev. Robert Harley M.A., F.R.S.	Congregational Minister	Oxford	(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss G. Harlock							(03/16)										
Mr Charles Harper				(1902)													
Mrs Ernest Harrington							LA										
Mrs Philip Harrington			(17/3/00)														
Mr Cecil Harris					EC (1903)												
Rev. Dr. Edward Harris	CofE Minister	Linc. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. E. T. Harris			(27/6/00)														
Mr Edward Harris				(1902)													
Mr H. B. Harris					EC (1907)												
Mr Henry Harris			(27/6/00)														
Mr [Prof] J. Rendel Harris M.A., Litt. D. (1852-1941)	Scholar	Clare Camb.	(27/6/00)	(1902)	GC (1903)	EC								✓			
Mrs J. Rendel [Helen] Harris (-1914)			(27/6/00)	(1902)													
Mr Frederic Harrison (1831-1923)	Jurist, historian & reformer	Wadh. Oxf.	(11/1/00)														
Mrs Frederic [Ethel] Harrison (-1916)			(11/1/00)														
Mr G. E. Harrison			(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)													
Miss Jane Harrison								GC. (1919)									
Rev. W. R. Harrison					(1903)												
Rev. J. W. Harrold [or Harald]			(17/3/00)														
Mr T. Hart-Davies					A (1903)												
Mr Vernon Hartshorn J.P. (1872-1931)	Trade union leader & politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr Alexander Gordon Harvey (1858-1922)	Politician						1918 Committee	GC. & EC, (1919)	✓	✓							
Rev. Arthur J. Harvey			(27/6/00)		(1903)												
Mrs Robert Harvey			(17/3/00)														
Mr Thomas Edmund Harvey (1875-1955)	Politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.					LA		✓	✓							
Lord Haversham (1835-1917)	Politician	Bras. Oxf.			A (1905)												
Rev. Bertram Robert Hawker	CofE Minister	Trin. Camb.			(1903)												
Mr W. Hawkes				(18/5/00)													
Mr R. C. Hawkin			(11/1/00)														
Mr John Hawkins					(1903)												
Sir Arthur Haworth Bt (1865-1944)	Politician							EC. (1920)									
Mr Frank A. Haworth				(1902)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr James Haworth					(1903)												
Sir A. D. Hayter					A (1903)												
Mr A. G. Haywood				(18/5/00)													
Rev. T. J. Hazzard			(27/6/00)														
Sir Robert Garnett Head Bart. (1845-1907)			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr Charles Heape				(1902)													
Mr C. E. Hecht			(27/6/00)		EC (1903)												
Mr R. G. Hember			(31/10/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Arthur Henderson (1863-1935)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Rev. James Henderson					(1903)												
Sir Charles S. Henry M.P. (1860-1919)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Rev. G. Henville M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Ronald Hepburn				(1902)													
Mr Arnold Herbert (-1940)	Barrister & politician	St John's Camb.			A (1906)												
Professor W. H. Hereford			(17/3/00)														
Mrs W. H. Hereford			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Laura Herford				(1902)													
Rev. W. H. Herford				(1902)													
Mr E. G. Hemerde	Politician			EC					✓								
Mrs [Rose] Hertz (1880-1930)			(11/1/00)														
Rev. J. H. Hertz Chief Rabbi (1872-1946)	Chief rabbi						VP, 1917	GC. & VP, (1919)									
Rev. J. F. A. Hervey (1840-1926)	CofE. minister	Tnn. Camb.	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. Sydenham Henry Augustus Hervey (1846-1946)	CofE Minister	Tnn. Camb.	(17/3/00)	(24/1/01)													
Rev. F. Heslop				(1902)													
Mr W. T. S. Hewett			(11/1/00)														
Mr S. Hughes Hewitt			(17/3/00)														
Rev. John Frederick Heyes	CofE Minister	Mag. Oxf.			(1905)												
Mr W. A. Heywood				(1902)													
Mr Hickson					LS (1906)												
Mrs Hickson					(1906)												
Mr Albert Hide				(24/4/01)	(1906)												
Dr Charles G. Higginson			(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Sir Clement Hill					A (1906)												
Miss Florence Hill			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Frank P. Hill			(27/6/00)														
Dr G. Birkbeck Hill D.C.L., LL.D.			(11/1/00)														
Rev. Geoffrey Hill	CofE Minister	Exeter Oxf.			LS (1905)												
Mr J. Spender Hill							(12/6/15)										
Mr John Hill J.P.								GC. (1919)									
Mr Maurice Hill			(17/3/00)														
Miss Octavia Hill (1838-1912)	Social reformer				A (1905)												
Mr R. C. J. Hill				(24/4/01)													
Rev. T. Hill					(1903)												
Mr William Hill							(03/16)										
Mr William K. Hill	Finance Committee						(12/6/15)										
Mr F. J. Hillier				(24/4/01)													
Miss Christina D. Hills			(17/3/00)														
Major John Walter Hills (1867-1938)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Miss Katherine Hills			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. H. Hills			(17/3/00)														
Mrs W. H. Hills			(17/3/00)														
Mr James Hilton				(1902)													
Mr John De Witt Hinch			(27/6/00)														
Mr Daniel Hinchcliffe				(1902)													
Rev. Robert Hind				(24/4/01)													
Mr F. W. Hirst (1873-1953)	Barrister & editor	Wadh. Oxf.		EC													
Mr W. Brook Hirst			(17/3/00)														
Rev. James Hirst-Hollowell (1851-1909)	minister &		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Michelmore Hitchcock				(1902)													
Mr Walter M. Hitchcock				(1902)													
Mrs E. C. Newnham Hoare								GC. (1919)									
Rev. Edward Newenham Hoare (c.1842-)	CofE Minister		(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. John Newenham Hoare	CofE Minister			(24/4/01)													
Lt Col Sir Samuel Hoare Bt						EC		GC. (1919)									



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Lady Hobart (-1914)			(17/3/00)														
Lord Arthur Hobhouse (1819-1904)		Bal. Oxf.		(1902)													
Miss Emily Hobhouse (1860-1926)	Activist & charity worker		(11/1/00)														
Mr L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929)	Social philosopher & journalist	Corp. Oxf.			EC (1903)												
Lady Mary Hobhouse (c.1826-1905)	Peeress		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Walter Hobhouse (1862-1928)	University lecturer & editor	New Col. Oxf.			A (1903)												
Mr John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940)	Journalist, economist & author	Linc. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	EC							✓						
Mrs John A. [Florence] Hobson (c.1860-)		Linc. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. Silas Kiffo Hocking (1862-1928)	Novelist		(11/1/00)	(1902)		EC											
Mr John Hodge (1855-1937)	Politician				A (1906)												
Mr G. L. Hodgkin					(1906)												
Mr Thomas Hodgkin DCL. (1831-1913)	Banker	Un. Col. Lon.			LS (1905)										✓		
Rev. James Henry Hodson	Methodist Minister	Belfast			(1906)												
Rev. L. B. Hodson					(1903)												
Mr D. G. Hogarth					GC (1909)												
Mr J. M. Hogge				(1902)													
Sir Edward Holden Bt (1848-1919)	Politician						VP (1918)										
Mr H. B. Holding			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Holiday (1839-1927)	Artist		(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)													
Mrs Henry [Catherine] Holiday (-1924)			(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)			LA										
Mr C. B. Holinsworth			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr W. Holland			(27/6/00)														
Mr Frank Hollins J.P. (1877-1963)	Company director	Mag. Oxf.	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr C. B. Hollinsworth				(24/4/01)													
Rev. James Hirst Hollowell	Minister		(17/3/00)	1902													
Mr Holman							(03/16)										
Miss J. Holman							(03/16)										
Rev. R. Holman (c.1867-)	Primitive Methodist Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr Gerald Holmden				(24/4/01)													

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Paul Holme																	
Mr Richard Duming Holt (1868-1941)	Shipowner		(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)			LA	GC. (1919)									
Mrs Robert Holt (c.1846-)	wife of Cotton Broker		(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs E. Holyoak Marsh							(12/6/15)										✓
Mr F. Percy Home							(12/6/15)										
Rev. Frederick A. Homer			(27/6/00)														
Mr C. J. Hood			(17/3/00)														
Mr John D. Hope					A (1903)				✓								
Mr G. A. Hopkins			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. William Hopkins			(29/3/01)														
Mr Alfred Hopps			(17/3/00)	?													
Mr J. A. Hopps				(24/4/01)													
Rev. John Page Hopps (1834-1911)	Baptist Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr C. H. Hopwood KC.				(1902)													
Mr J. G. Hopwood				(1902)													
Mr Frederick Horlebog			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Benjamin E. Horlick			(17/3/00)														
Mr Herbert Horne				(24/4/01)													
Miss J. B. Horner					(1903)												
Mr E. Horsfall				(1902)													
Lady Eldred Horsley								GC. (1919)									
Sir Victor Horsley (1857-1916)	Surgeon						(12/6/15)										
Miss Hort					(1906)												
Rev. Herbert William Horwill M.A.	Methodist Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(11/1/00)														
Mr John Hotchkiss			(17/3/00)														
Lady Aurea Howard (1884-)			(27/6/00)														
Lady Dorothy Howard (1881-1968)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928)	Town Planner						(03/16)										
Hon Geoffrey Howard (1889-1973)	Judge	Christ Ch. Oxf.		(24/4/01)													
Mr Joseph Howard (1834-1923)	Barrister	Un. Col. Lon.			A (1903)												
Mr George R. Howat			(17/3/00)											✓			
Mr T. G. Howe																	
Mr B. Howroyd				(1902)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr G. W. S. Howson							(03/16)										
Rev. H. Huddleston			(27/6/00)														
Mr Claude N. Hughes			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. Hughes				(1902)													
Mr Leonard Hughes M.R.C.S.			(29/3/01)														
Rev. William Edward Hughes	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Rev. Percival Wood Hulbert	CofE Minister	Cambridge			(1903)												
Mr F. H. Humbey				(1902)													
Mr John H. Humphreys							LA										
Mr Arthur Charles Humphreys-Owen (1836-1905)	Politician	Trin. Camb.		EC													
Mr Ernest E. Hunter			(27/6/00)														
Mr G. B. Hunter					(1903)												
Rev. John Hunter D.D.			(17/3/00)														
Rev. W. R. Hunter					(1903)												
Mrs Huntington			(27/6/00)														
Mr Hurst				(24/4/01)													
Miss Husband				(1902)													
Mr Joseph Hyder	Secretary of Land Nationalisation Society						(12/6/15)										
Mr Alfred Illingworth (1827-1907)	Politician			EC													
Mrs Margaret Illingworth			(11/1/00)														
Rt Rev. Edward Ilsley (1838-1926)	Bishop of Birmingham				VP (1903)												
Mr G. Inchbould			(17/3/00)														
Rev. W. R. Inge	Dean of St Pauls						VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Rev. C. A. Ingram			(17/3/00)														
Dr John K. Ingram (1823-1907)	Professor	Trin. Dublin	(11/1/00)														
Mr A. Inskip				(1902)													
Rev. W. E. Ireland M.A.			(27/6/00)														
Mr S. S. Ironson			(17/3/00)														
Miss Irving				(1902)													
Mr Daniel Irving (1854-1924)	Trade unionist			(1902)													





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs W. Stanley [Harriet Ann] Jevons (-1911)			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Very Rev.d T. W. Jex-Blake (1832-1915)	CoFE Dean of Wells	Univ. Col. Oxf.													✓		
Mr Augustus Johnson J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Mr B. S. Johnson				(1902)													
Mr Harry Johnson			(29/3/01)														
Rev. J. Johnson			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr W. Johnson LCC.					(1906)												
Rev. James Johnston					LS												
Mr C. W. Jones				(1902)													
Mr David Jones			(27/6/00)														
Rev. E. P. Jones B.A.			(29/3/02)														
Miss Emily F. Jones			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Evan Jones			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Jones LLD. (1852-1922)	Professor	Glasgow			EC (1910)			GC. (1919)									
Captain Henry S. Jones			(17/3/00)														
Mr J. S. Jones					(1903)												
Rev. J. S. Jones			(29/3/01)														
Mr James E. Jones				(24/4/01)													
Mr James G. Jones				(1902)													
Mr Leif Jones (1862-1939)	Politician & campaigner	Trin. Oxf.	(17/3/00)						✓	✓							
Mrs Margaret Jones								GC. (1919)									
Mr R. Foulkes Jones			(17/3/00)														
Rev. T. Gray Jones			(29/3/02)														
Mr T. Heys Jones				(1902)													
Mr W. B. Jones				(1902)													
Mrs Ashton Jonson			(11/1/00)														
Rev. Charles Joseph			(29/3/01)														
Rev. John Henry Jowett MA. DD. (1864-1923)	Congregational minister							GC. (1919)									
Mr C. G. [or C. J] Jowitt				(24/4/01)													
Rev. John Jull			(29/3/01)														
Rev. W. J. Jupp (c. 1859-)	Unitarian Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr J. Arthur Jutsum						EC								✓			

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Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Sir Alfred Keogh GCB, KCB, MD. (1857-1936)	Soldier							GC. (1919)									
Sir G. W. Kevevich					A (1906)												
Rev. E. S. Kiek (1883-1959)	Congregational minister	Wad. & Mans. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Miss Kilgour					(1903)												
Dr R. Kimmins								EC. (1920)									
Mr Alfred John King (1859-1920)	Cotton Spinner & campaigner				A (1906)												
Mr Bolton King (1860-1937)	Historian & educationalist	Bal. Oxf.	(11/1/00)														
Mr Joseph King MP.	Politician	Trin. Oxf.							✓	✓							
Rev. Jabez King			(29/3/02)														
Mrs Lewis King					(1903)												
Mr R. Moss King J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Walter King			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Lord Kinnaird (1847-1923)		Trin. Camb.			A (1903)									✓			
Mr W. T. Kinnear				(1902)													
Mr Robert Hill Kinton			(17/3/00)														
The Very Rev. George William Kitchen (1827-1912)	Dean of Durham		(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)													
Rev. Charles Knibbs	minister		(27/6/00)														
Dr C. F. Knight			(17/3/00)														
Mrs C. F. Knight			(17/3/00)														
Mr F. C. Knight			(17/3/00)														
Mr G. J. Knight				(24/4/01)													
Mr George F. Knight			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs Margaret Knowles					(1906)												
Rev. R. H. Knowles-Kempton			(27/6/00)														
Mr E. A. Labrouse			(17/3/00)														
Mr E. H. Lamb					A (1906)				✓								
Mr J. Lamont			(17/3/00)														
Mr G. Lander				(18/5/00)													
Mr Ralph Lane				(1902)													
Rt. Rev. Cosmo Gordon Lang (1864-1945)	Bishop of Stepney & Archbishop of York	Glasgow & Bal. Oxf.			GC (1903)			VP. (1919)						✓			



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UDC	BG	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Richard Bartleet Langbridge M.A.	CofE minister	Trin. Dublin	(27/6/00)												
Rev. Erskine William Langmore	CofE minister	Keble Oxf.			(1903)										
Mr George Lansbury (1859-1940)	Politician		(27/6/00)												
Mr Walter Larden			(29/3/01)												
Mr Reginald Larmuth			(17/3/00)												
Mr F. De N. Larpent			(17/3/00)												
Miss Lassell				(1902)											
Mr F. L. Latham			(17/3/00)												
Rev. Henry Laurence	CofE minister		(17/3/00)												
Mrs J. M. Laurie															
Mr Thomas Lavender				(1902)											
Rev. William Law (1865-1937)	CofE. minister	Keble Oxf.													
Mr A. W. Lawrence					(1906)										
Mr F. W. Pethick Lawrence (1871-1961)	Politician	Trin. Camb.	(29/3/01)	EC	GC (1903)					✓		✓			
Sir Henry T. W. Lawrence Bart					A (1903)										
Rev. Dr Thomas Joseph Lawrence	CofE minister & Professor of International Law	Down. Camb.					VP (1918)								
Mr Robertson Lawson				(1902)											
Sir Wilfred Lawson Bart., M.P. (1829-1906)	Politician		(17/3/00)	EC											
Mr G. A. Le Birt					(1903)										
Mrs Le Lacheur			(17/3/00)												
Mr John Leach			(29/3/01)	(24/4/01)											
Miss Emily Leaf								GC. (1919)							
Mr Walter Leaf (1852-1927)	Banker	Trin. Camb.						GC. (1919)							
Mr William Scarnell Lean			(17/3/00)												
Mr F. Leaver					(1903)										
Mr James Crawford Ledlie (1860-)	Barrister	Linc. Oxf.	(29/3/01)												
Mr E. Henry Lee			(17/3/00)	(1902)											
Mr Samuel Lee			(27/6/00)												
Rev. A. G. A. Lees			(29/3/02)												
Rev. Andrew Lees			(17/3/00)												
Mr B. St. G. Lefroy			(17/3/00)												

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Dr Legge																	
Mrs Legge							(12/6/15)										
Rt. Rev. Augustus Legge (1839-1913)	Bishop of Lichfield	Christ Ch. Oxf.			VP (1903)		(12/6/15)										
Mrs R. C. Lehmann			(11/1/00)														
Mr Rudolph Chambers Lehmann MP. (1856-1929)	Politician & Journalist	Trin. Camb.	(11/1/00)	Chair EC	A (1906)												
Lord Leigh (1824-1905)		Trin. Camb.	(31/10/00)														
Mr Frank R. Leigh			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Frank R Leigh			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Lemann			(17/3/00)														
Rev. James Lemon			(29/3/02)														
Mr A. L. Leon J.P., L.C.C.			(29/2/02)														
Sir Herbert S. Leon (1850-1926)				(1902)													
Mr W. R. Lester			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. R. Lethaby			(17/3/00)														
Col Sir A. L. Lever Bt (1860-1924)	Politician				A (1906)			GC. (1919)									
Lord Leverhulme (1851-1925)	Businessman & politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr [Sir] Maurice Levy (1859-1933)		Un. Of Lon.			A (1906)				✓								
Miss Eden Lewis			(17/3/00)														
Mr Guy Lewis M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Hugh Lewis M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Hugh Lewis M.A., J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Jane Eden Lewis			(17/3/00)														
Mr L. W. P. Lewis			(29/3/02)														
Rev. Robert Walter Michael Lewis	CofE. Minister	Corp. Camb.			(1905)												
Mr F. Lewisohn				(24/4/01)													
Mr Charles Liddicoat				(24/4/01)													
Rev. J. Scott Lidgett DD. (1854-1953)	editor	Un. Col. Lon.				EC	VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Rev. Henry William Lillington	Methodist minister		(29/3/02)														
Very Rev. Edward Charles Wickham (1834-1910)	Dean of Lincoln	New Col. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)	(1906)												
Rev. F. S. Lindsay					(1903)												
Mr W. Arnold Linnel			(27/6/00)														
Mr W. R. Lister				(1902)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. H. B. Livens			(29/3/02)														
Mr C. M. Lloyd					GC (1907)												
Mr George Lloyd					EC (1909)												
Rev. Thomas Lloyd (1857-1935)	Minister		(27/6/00)														
Rev. W. Lloyd			(29/3/02)														
Mr D. Lloyd-George M.P. (1863-1945)	Solicitor & Politician		(29/3/01)	EC				VP. (1919)									
Mr B. Fossett Lock (1847-1922)	Judge	King's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. W. Lock (1846-1933)	Warden of Keble College	Corp. Oxf.					VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Sir Oliver Lodge FRS. (1851-1940)	Physicist	Un. Col. Lon.			A (1903)			GC. (1919)									
Rev. J. Moffat Logan (1870-1944)	Baptist minister	Glasgow	(27/6/00)														
Mr John William Logan M.P. (1845-1925)	Politician		(17/3/00)						✓								
Marchioness Londonderry (1879-1959)								EC. (1920)									
Rev. Charles Newell Long	CofE. Minister	Keble Oxf.			(1903)												
Mr E. W. Longman			(27/6/00)														
Monsieur Jean Longuet							(12/6/15)										
Mr A. R. Lord				(24/4/01)													
Mr Thomas Lough M.P. (1850-1922)	Politician		(29/3/01)						✓								
Mr W. B. Louthier				(1902)													
Miss F. H. Low			(17/3/00)														
Rev. William Boswell Lowther (1843-1910)	Methodist minister		(27/6/00)	?													
Colonel C. H. Luard			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Miss Florence Luard			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr C. H. Lucas			(27/6/00)														
Rev. George Lucas			(29/3/02)														
Mr S. B. Lucas				(1902)													
Mr G. S. Lucraft			(27/6/00)	(1902)													
Mr Henry S. Lunn (1859-1939)	Campaigner & Politician	Trin. Dublin		(24/4/01)													
Mr Arnold Lupton (c.1846-1930)	Mining engineer & politician		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)	A (1903)												
Mr Vernon Lushington K.C. (1832-1912)	Judge	Trin. Camb.	(29/3/02)														
Mrs Lyell			(17/3/00)														
Miss M. A. Lyle			(27/6/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr G. M. Lynch			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Charlotte Lyndon				(1902)													
Rev. Edward Lyttelton Hon. (1855-1942)	Headmaster	Trin. Camb.												✓			
Earl of Lytton (1876-1947)					GC (1903)												
Mr S. C. Maberley				(24/4/01)													
Mrs Gerald C. Maberly							(12/6/15)										
Mr Gerald C. Maberly [or Maberley]			(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)			(12/6/15)										
Mr G. W. Macalpine (1850-1920)	Company Chairman		(17/3/00)														
Miss Mary MacArthur							Committee										
Mr C. T. [or C. F.] Macaulay			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. Canon Malcolm MacColl (-1907)	CofE Canon of Ripon	Edinburgh			VP (1903)												
Mr J. Macdonald			(27/6/00)														
Rev. J. A. Murray Macdonald								GC. (1919)									
Mr J. M. MacDonald					GC (1903)				✓								
Mrs J. R. [Margaret Ethel] MacDonald (1870-1911)			(31/10/00)														
Mr James R. MacDonald (1866-1937)	Politician		(31/10/00)		A (1906)					✓					✓		
Mrs G. P. Macdonell			(11/1/00)														
Rev. Dugald MacFadyen (1867-1936)	Congregational minister	Mer. Oxf.															
Mr Ronald Campbell Macfie M.A., M.B. (-1931)	Medial practioner	Aberdeen	(17/3/00)					GC. (1919)									
Mr A. G. Macgregor				(24/4/01)													
Dr Robert D. MacGregor (c.1860-)	Medical Practioner		(17/3/00)														
Mr W. D. Macgregor			(29/3/01)														
Mr M. E. Mack					(1903)												
Mr J. W. Mackail			(11/1/00)														
Mrs J. W. Mackail			(11/1/00)														
Mrs Frederic [amy] Mackarness (-1916)			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr Frederic C. Mackarness (1854-1920)	Judge & Politician	Keble Oxf.	(11/1/00)	EC			(12/6/15)										
Mr John H. Mackay			(17/3/00)														
Mr Harold Mackenna				(1902)													
Mr Archibald Mackenzie M.A.			(29/3/01)														
Professor J. S. Mackenzie M.A.			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr W. M. D. Mackey			(27/6/00)	(1902)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr William Mackey				(1902)													
Sir Donald MacLean M.P. (1864-1932)	Politician			(18/5/00)			VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Rev. John Kirk Maconochie	minister		(29/3/02)														
Rev. William Merry Macphail M.A. (1857-1916)	Presbyterian minister	Edinburgh	(17/3/00)														
Mr Hector MacPherson (-1924)	Author & journalist			(1902)													
Mr James Macrae				(24/4/01)													
Mr Fred Maddison M.P. (1856-1937)	politician		(27/6/00)	EC													✓
Mr J. Maddison			(27/6/00)														
Dean Magill							(12/6/15)										
Rev. Charles Arthur Maginn B.D.	CofE minister	Trin. Dublin	(27/6/00)														
Sir Philip Magnus M.P. (1842-1933)	Politician	Un. Col. Lon.						GC. (1919)									
Mr Pierce Mahony			(17/3/00)														
Mr Alfred Main				(1902)													
Mrs Alfred Main				(1902)													
Sir Arthur D. Steel Maitland M.P. (1876-1935)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.					VP, 1917	GC. & EC, (1919)									
Rev. George Makin	Wesleyan minister		(27/6/00)														
Mrs Charles Mallet			(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr G. R. Malloch					EC (1903)												
Mr J. J. Mallon							Committee	(1919)									
Miss Amy Mander			(17/3/00)														
Miss Jemima T. Mander			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Manfield								GC. (1919)									
Mr W. Mansell			(11/1/00)														
Mr S. Mansfield				(18/5/00)													
Mr J. Marchand			(17/3/00)														
The Lady Isabel Margesson (1863-1946)			(11/1/00)														
Mrs Alfred Marks			(27/6/00)	(1902)													
Mr Alfred Marks			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. E. Marks			(29/3/02)														
Mr A. J. Marriott				(1902)													
Mr John Marsden				(1902)													
Mr A. H. Marshall				EC													✓
Sir Arthur Marshall								GC. (1919)									

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs J. Marshall				(24/4/01)												
Mrs J. M. Marshall				(1902)												
Miss Josepine Marshall					GC (1903)											
Mrs Martin			(17/3/00)													
Rev. David Basil Martin M.A.	minister	Oxford	(11/1/00)													
Mrs Dora Martin			(17/3/00)													
Rev. Henry Martin M.A.			(17/3/00)													
Mr J. B. Martin			(17/3/00)						✓							
Rev. John Martin			(17/3/00)													
Miss Marian J. Martin			(27/6/00)													
Rev. S. W. Martin			(27/6/00)													
Councillor Robert F. Martineau (c.1832-)	Brassfounder		(27/6/00)													
Mr F. S. Marvin			(17/3/00)	(1902)												
Mr John Masefield (1878-1967)	Poet & Novelist							GC. (1919)								
Mr David M. Mason (1865-1945)	Banker & politician	Glasgow	(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)	GC (1903)				✓	✓						
Mrs Stephen Mason			(17/3/00)													
Mr Charles C. Massey			(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)												
Mr Stephen Massey			(17/3/00)													
Mr H. W. Massingham (1860-1924)	Journalist & editor		(11/1/00)	EC												
Mr Charles Frederick Gurney Masterman (1873-1927)	Politician & author	Christ ch. Camb.		EC	EC (1903)										✓	
Mrs C. F. G. [Lucy] Masterman (1884-1977)								GC. (1919)								
Rev. Canon John Howard Bertram Masterman (1867-1933)	CofE minister & Professor of History	St John's Camb.				EC								✓		
Rev. James Mather					(1903)											
Rev. John Mather	Methodist minister		(29/3/02)		(1903)											
Rev. Z. Mather			(27/6/00)													
Mr Donald Matheson					(1903)											
Mr T. Mathews				(1902)												
Mrs Ferdinand Mattheson							(03/16)									
Rev. Albert J. Matthew			(29/3/02)													
Mr R. J. Matthews				(1902)												
Miss A. E. Maude			(27/6/00)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Aylmer Maude			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr C. E. Maunce			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss E. Cameron Mawson			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss Elizabeth Mawson (c.1844-)			(17/3/00)														
Miss Harriet Cameron Mawson (c.1854-)			(29/3/01)														
Mr D. C. Maxwell				(1902)													
Mr William Maxwell JP.							(12/6/15)	GC. (1919)									
Mr H. J. May								GC. (1919)									
Miss A. M. Mayo			(27/6/00)														
Miss M. E. Mayo			(27/6/00)														
Mr A. D. H. McAnally			(29/3/02)														
Miss Mary McArthur								GC. (1919)									
Mr John M. McCallum						A (1906)											
Mr Justin McCarthy (1830-1912)	Author		(17/3/00)														
Sir John McClure								GC. (1919)									
Rev. H. H. McCullagh (c.1851-)	Wesleyan Minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr Charles Albert McCurdy (1870-1941)	Politician	Pem. Camb.						GC. & EC, (1919)									
Mr Edward McCurdy					GC (1903)												
Mr Reginald McKenna (1863-1943)	Politician	Camb.	(11/1/00)														
Mr James J. McSheedy (c.1875-)	Clerk Stock exchange		(27/6/00)														
Mr R. R. Meade-King			(11/1/00)														
Mr Thomas F. Meldrum			(17/3/00)														
Mr C. J. Melland				(24/4/01)													
Miss Beatrice Mellors							(03/16)										
Mr Algernon Methuen (1856-1924)	Publisher	Wadh. Oxf.	(29/3/02)	(1902)			(12/6/15)										
Miss Jessie C. Methven			(29/3/02)														
Rev. [Horace] Rollo Meyer (-1953)	CoffE minister	Trin. Camb.			LS (1903)												
Mr Seb W. Meyer				(1902)													
Mrs L. C. [Emily] Miall			(11/1/00)														
Professor Loius Compton Miall F.R.S. (1842-)	University Professor		(11/1/00)														
Mr James H. Midgley			(17/3/00)														
Prof Miliukoff					VP (1906)												

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. William R. Mill F.R.G.S.			(17/3/00)														
Rev. B. A. Millard			(29/3/02)														
Mr J. C. Miller					(1903)												
Mr Joseph Miller (c.1857-)	Engine fitter		(27/6/00)														
Mrs John Mills			(17/3/00)														
Mr Thomas Mills (c.1852-)	Boarding House Keeper		(17/3/00)														
Mr James Milne			(27/6/00)														
Mr P. S. Milner				(18/5/00)													
Mr R. A. Milner			(29/3/02)	?													
Mr R. S. Milner				(24/4/01)													
Miss Mintum			(31/10/00)														
Mr A. A. Mitchell			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. Alfred Mansfield Mitchell	CofE minister	Trin. Dublin	(27/6/00)														
Dr Chalmers Mitchell								GC. (1919)									
Rev. Henry N. Mitchell			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Isaac Mitchell			(27/6/00)														
Mr Percy A. Molteno (1861-1937)	Barrister	Tnn. Camb.	(11/1/00)	(18/5/00)													
Mr [sir] Alfred Mond (1868-1930)	Manufacturer &	Camb.	(17/3/00)						✓							✓	
Mr Leo George Chiozza Money (1870-1944)	Author & Politician								✓								
Mr G. H. Monk				(1902)													
Lord Monkswell					A (1903)										✓		
Lord Monteagle					A (1903)												
Mrs D. B. Montefiore			(17/3/00)														
Mr Robert Montgomerie				(1902)													
Mr E. R. P. Moon															✓		
Mr Frederick Moore					EC(1907)												
Mr William Arthur Moore FRGS. (1880-1962)	Political secretary & Journalist	St John's Camb.			Secretary (1903)												
Mr J. B. Morel				(24/4/01)													
Mr G. Hay Morgan					A (1903)				✓								
Sir Herbert Morgan KBE.								EC. (1920)									
Rev. Morris Morgan			(17/3/00)														
Rev. William Morison M.A.			(17/3/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Fred Morley			(27/6/00)														
Mr Robert Morley			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr Philip Morrell (1870-1943)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.							✓	✓	✓					✓	
Miss May Morris			(27/6/00)														
Mr Hugh Morton J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Robert H. A. Morton	Wesleyan minister				LS (1903)												
Mr Felix Moscheles (1833-1917)	Artist & campaigner		(17/3/00)		(1903)												
Mr Mosditchian						EC											
Mr Samuel Moss					A (1905)												
Mr John G. Mothe-Burghlum			(17/3/00)														
Rt Rev. Handley Moule (1841-1920)	Bishop of Durham	Trin. Camb.			A (1906)									✓		✓	
Rev. James Hope Moulton M.A. (1863-)	Wesleyan minister	King's Camb.	(11/1/00)														
Rev. Alfred Dean Mozley (c.1849-)	CofE. Minister	Jesus Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr H. N. Mozley			(17/3/00)														
Mr J. J. Mozley M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Muff				(24/4/01)													
Rev. John Mugliston M.A.	teacher	Wadh. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Alex Muir	President, Edinburgh Trades Council		(29/3/01)														
Mr James F. Muirhead			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mrs John H. Muirhead			(17/3/00)														
Professor John Henry Muirhead (1855-1940)	University Professor		(17/3/00)														
Mr Roland E. Muirhead				(1902)							✓						
Lord Muir-Mackenzie (1845-1930)	Civil Servant & politician	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Rev. D. Mullan					(1903)												
Mr Thomas S. Mullard (c.1853-)	Chartered Accountant		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr William E. Mullins (c.1835-)	Retired College Master		(11/1/00)														
Mrs M. Mumby			(27/6/00)														
Mr A. J. Mundella M.L.S.B.			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr H. S. Murray				(18/5/00)													





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Harry Nuttall				(24/4/01)					✓								
Rev. Henry Oakley			(29/3/02)														
Mr R. L. O'Beime			(17/3/00)														
Rev. A. E. O'Connor			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Thomas Power O'Connor MP. (1848-1929)	Journalist & Politician					EC								✓			
Mr H. J. Ogdén			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr James Ogilvie				(1902)													
Mr James O'Grady (1866-1934)	Trade unionist & politician		(27/6/00)														
Mr James Oliphant							(12/6/15)										
Mrs Oliver			(11/1/00)														
Mr Charles E. Oliver			(27/6/00)														
The Hon. R. Oliver			(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr S. W. L. Oliver				(24/4/01)													
Mr Samuel Oliver			(17/3/00)	?													
Sir Sidney Oliver KCMG.								GC. (1919)									
Sir Edward O'Malley (1842-1932)	Barrister & Consular Chief Justice	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Prof C. W. C. Oman								GC. (1919)									
Rev. Professor James Orr (1844-1913)	Theology Professor	Glasgow	(17/3/00)														
Lady Osborne-Morgan			(17/3/00)														
Sir William Osler Bt, MD, FRS. (1849-1919)	Professor of Medicine							GC. (1919)									
Mrs E. Osmaston							(12/6/15)										
Rev. A. M. O'Sullivan O.S.B.			(29/3/01)														
Rev. Robert Lawrence Ottley DD. (1856-1933)	CofE minister & professor of theology	Pem. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Ouida			(17/3/00)														
Mr R. Owen				(24/4/01)													
Sir George Paish (1867-1957)								GC. (1919)									✓
Mr Alex Palli				(24/4/01)													
Rev. George Papkin			(27/6/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr James Park				(1902)													
Mr Ernest Parke			(27/6/00)														
Mr Barry Parker (1867-1947)	Town Planner & Architect		(17/3/00)				(12/6/15)										
Mr C. E. Parker					(1903)												
Mr N. S. Parker			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. Parmenter			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. S. G. Parmiter					(1905)												
Lord Parmour							1918 EC										
Rev. H. R. Parnell			(27/6/00)														
Mr Joseph H. Parry (c.1858-)	Solicitors Manager		(17/3/00)														
Mr Charles Parsons (c.1874-)	Postman		(27/6/00)														
Rev. J. Ash Parsons					(1906)												
Miss E. M. Partridge			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Professor James Alexander Paterson D.D. (1851-1915)	University professor & Presbyterian Minister	Oxford	(17/3/00)														
Mr J. L. Paton								GC. (1919)									
Mr John Patinson J.P.			(29/3/02)														
Rev. J. G. Patton			(17/3/00)														
Mr Herbert Paul (1853-1935)	Journalist & Politician	Corp. Oxf.	(11/1/00)	EC													
Dr Henry Payne			(27/6/00)														
Rev. W. H. Payne			(17/3/00)														
Sir Edwin Pears							VP, 1917	GC. (1919)					✓				
Mrs Ellen B. Pearsall			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. D. Pearsall M. Inst. C.E.			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Alfred E. Pease M.P. (1857-1939)	Politician	Trin. Camb.	(11/1/00)														
Mr Edward Pease							(12/6/15)										
Miss Alexander Peckover			(27/6/00)														
Miss Priscilla Hannah Peckover (1833-1931)	Campaigner			(1902)													
Rev. E. W. Penfold					(1903)												
Mr Frederick Pennington (1819-1914)			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr J G. Pennington ICS.							(12/6/15)										
Mr J. Doyle Penrose (1862-1932)	Artist		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs J. [Elizabeth] Doyle Penrose (1859- )			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Madame Penter					(1903)												
Mr George L. Pepler (1882-1959)	Town Planner						(12/6/15)										
Lord Eustace Percy MP. (1887-1958)	Politician	Chnst Ch. Oxf.				EC											
Rev. James Pugh Perkins	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr Fred Pemin				(1902)													
Mr G. H. Pemis				EC													
Mrs M. R. Peters				(24/4/01)													
Mr Edward Augustus Petherick (1847-1917)	Bookseller & Collector		(11/1/00)														
Mr S. Pewtress				(1902)													
Rev. Dr George Phear (1829-1918)	CofE. Minister		(17/3/00)														
Sir John B. Phear (1825-1905)	Judge	Pem. Camb.	(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr Vivian Phelips							PC (1915)										
Mrs Vivian Phelips							(12/6/15)										
Rev. A. Phillips			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Lawrence Arthur Phillips	CofE minister	Trin. Oxf.	(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Rev. Thomas Phillips			(29/3/02)														
Mr William Phillips J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs J. Philpot				(1902)													
Miss A. C. Phipson				(1902)													
Mr H. Picard			(27/6/00)														
Mr J. E. Pickles M.A., B.Sc.			(27/6/00)														
Miss Pickton			(29/3/01)														
Dr Bedford Pierce	Medical Consultant		(27/6/00)														
Mr Thomas F. Pigot			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Clement E. Pike							(03/16)										
Captain Duncan Vernon Pirie M.P. (1858-1931)	Army officer & politician		(29/3/01)						✓								
Mr G. T. Plant				(1902)													

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss Caroline E. Playne (1857-1948)	Historian & Psychologist		(27/6/00)	(1902)							✓						
Mrs George Frederick [Margaretta] Playne			(29/3/02)														
Rev. Francis Bowes Plummer (1851-1932)	CofE minister	Trin. Oxf.			(1903)												
Sir Horace Plunkett (1854-1932)	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr John Poleen							(12/6/15)										
Col S. H. Pollen CMG.								EC. (1920)									
Sir Frederick Pollock Bt, DCL. (1845-1937)	Jurist	Trin. Camb.						GC. (1919)									
Master of Polwarth					A (1903)												
Mr Arthur Ponsonby MP. (1871-1946)	Diplomat & Politician	Bal. Oxf.			EC (1903)				✓	✓	✓						
Mr Howard Poole			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Charles Henry Poppleton (1857-1940)	Methodist minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr Alexander Porter			(27/6/00)														
Sir Alexander Porter								GC. (1919)									
Mr [rev] E. W. Porter					(1903)												
Ven. Archdeacon Beresford Potter	CofE Minister	Trin. Dublin			EC (1910)												
Mr Arthur Bayley Potter			(29/3/02)	(1902)													
Rev. Edwin Mansfield Potter	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr E. L. Poulton			(27/6/00)														✓
Mr J. E. Powell JP.			(17/3/00)														
Mr James Powell							LA										
Mrs James Powell							LA										
Mr R. Leonard Powell				(1902)													
Miss E. E. Power MA.								GC. (1919)									
Rev. J. J. Poynter (c.1851-)	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)														
Miss A. E. Poyser							LA										
Miss T. Ross Poyser							(12/6/15)										
Mr Hodgson Pratt (1824-1907)	Peace Campaigner			(1902)													✓
Mr John William Pratt (1873-1952)	Politician	Glasgow								✓							
Mr Walter Pratt			(17/3/00)														
Mr Frank Prentice (c.1862-)	Engineer & Manager		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Gardner Preston M.S.B. (c.1857-)	Minister		(17/3/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
The Hon. Thomas Preston			(17/3/00)														
Mr C. E. Price					A (1906)				✓								
Miss Anna M. Priestman			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss M. Priestman				(24/4/01)													
Mr Samuel Priestman (1850-1914)	Mechanical Engineer & Businessman		(29/3/02)														
Rev. Pristley Prime			(27/6/00)														
Mr John William Proctor (1849-1925)	Agricultural Merchant			(24/4/01)													
Miss Milicent Proctor				(1902)													
Rev. Edward S. Prout M.A. (c.1837-)	Congregational Minister		(29/3/02)														
Rev. James Prouton			(27/6/00)														
Sir E. Pryce-Jones Bt																	
Sir Robert Pullar				(1902)				GC. (1919)									
Mr W. B. Pullin				(24/4/01)													
Mr Wm Frank Purdy								GC. (1919)									
Almeric Hugh Paget (Lord Queenborough) (1861-1949)	Politician							EC. (1920)									
Mr Charles Horace Radford (1854-1916)	Retired Draper		(17/3/00)						✓								
Miss M. McLaren Ramsay								GC. (1919)									
Rev. J. Randall			(29/3/02)														
Sir John Randles (1857-1945)	Iron Master & Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mr Alfred Ranson				(1902)													
Mr Morris Raphael				(24/4/01)													
Miss Eleanor Rathbone (1872-1946)	Campaigner	Liverpool	?					GC. (1919)									
Mr Herbert Reynolds Rathbone (1862-1930)	Lord Mayor of Liverpool		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Canon James Hamer Rawdon (c.1836-1916)	CoffE minister	Bras. Oxf.			(1903)												
Rev. H. Rawlings M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Canon H. B. Rawnsley					GC (1903)		LA										
Mrs Rayner			(27/6/00)														
Miss Hope Rea							(12/6/15)										

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr [sir] Russell Rea (1846-1916)	Politician				A (1903)									✓		
Mrs Walter [Evelyn] Rea (-1930)							(12/6/15)	GC. (1919)								
Miss Read			(29/3/01)													
Mr F. W. Read				(18/5/00)												
Mr W. O. Reader			(17/3/00)													
Earl of Reading (1860-1935)	Politician							VP. (1919)								
Rev. William Reason	Minister	Oxford					(12/6/15)									
Sir James Reckitt (1833-1924)	Businessman		(17/3/00)	EC								✓				
Mr C. C. Reed				(24/4/01)												
Rev. Edward T. Reed			(17/3/00)													
Rev. F. A. Rees						EC										
Rev. Gwilym Rees	Minister		(17/3/00)													
Rev. Levi Rees	Congregational Minister		(27/6/00)													
Hon W. P. Reeves					A (1903)											
Miss Emily Reid (c.1854-)			(17/3/00)	(1902)												
Sir Robert Threshie Reid G.C.M.G., Q.C., M.P. (1846-1923)	Politician & Lord Chancellor	Bal. Camb.	(11/1/00)													
Sir H. R. Reichel LLD. [principal]								GC. (1919)								
Mr Athelstan Rendall					A (1906)				✓							
Lady Rendel (-1912)			(27/6/00)													
Rev. Joseph Renshaw (1831-1909)	Methodist minister		(27/6/00)													
Miss Reynell, Pack			(27/6/00)													
Councillor Reynolds								GC. (1919)								
Mrs Reynolds			(29/3/01)													
Mr Edward Seaman Reynolds (1871-1953)	Draper, Shopkeeper		(29/3/01)													
Mr Ernest Rhys (1859-1946)	Author						PC (1915)	(1919)								
Mrs Ernest Rhys							(03/16)									
Rev. W. Casnodyn Rhys			(27/6/00)													
Mrs Henry Richard			(17/3/00)													
Rev. J. T. Richard			(29/3/02)													
Mrs J. Morgan Richards			(11/1/00)													
Mr Tom F. Richards MP. (1863-1942)	Trade Unionist & Politician				A (1906)			GC. (1919)								



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss Richardson					GC (1903)												
Mrs A. M. Richardson					(1903)												
Mr Ewart Richardson	Solicitor						(12/6/15)										
Mr Hugh Richardson							(03/16)										
Mr John Richardson (c.1842-)	Steam Engine Manager		(17/3/00)														
Mr T. Richardson				(1902)													
Mr A. G. Rickards KC.								GC. (1919)									
Sir Joseph Crompton Rickett (1847-1919)	Politician				A (1903)									✓			
Mr James Riddell			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. M. Ridgeway				(1902)													
Sir West Ridgeway (-1930)	Diplomat						VP (1916)	GC. (1919)									
Mr Edgar O. Ridley				(1902)													
Madame André Rieder							(03/16)										
Mr Richard Rigg					A (1903)												
Miss Riley				(1902)													
Miss Riley				(24/4/01)													
Rev. William Riley	Minister		(27/6/00)														
Marchioness of Ripon			(17/3/00)														
Mr Herbert Rix			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs Herbert Rix			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. Milton Rix							(03/16)										
Rev. W. Rix							(12/6/15)										
Lady Cecilia Roberts (-1947)			(17/3/00)														
Mrs F. G. Adair Roberts			(17/3/00)														
Rev. H. Ellis Roberts			(27/6/00)														
Rev. J. E. Roberts M.A.			(27/6/00)														
Mr J. H. Roberts					A (1903)												
Mr J. Q. Roberts			(27/6/00)	(1902)													
Mr John Bryn Roberts M.P. (1843-1931)	Politician & Judge		(17/3/00)	EC													
Mr R. D. Roberts D.Sc.			(11/1/00)														
Mr W. C. Roberts					(1903)												
Rev. W. R. Roberts			(29/3/02)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Miss Caroline Robertson			(27/6/00)														
Miss Georgina Robertson			(27/6/00)														
Mr J. B. B. Robertson			(29/3/02)														
Sir John R. Robinson				(1902)					✓								
Mr Richard Robinson			(27/6/00)			EC							✓				
Mr John Herbert Robson (c.1875-)	Textile Manufacturer		(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Moses Da Rocha				(1902)													
Mr E. A. H. Roe			(17/3/00)														
Rev. John Rogers				(24/4/01)													
Mrs Rogerson			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. E. G. Rope				(1902)													
Mr William Roper			(17/3/00)														
Mr F. Roscoe				(24/4/01)													
Mr Edward Rose			(29/3/01)														
Mr Edward B. Rose			(29/3/01)														
Mr J. Holland Rose					(1906)												
Mr W. M. Rossetti (1829-1919)	Author		(17/3/00)														
Rev. Canon Ross						EC							✓				
Mr Allan Rowntree (1853-1940)	Draper, Shopkeeper		(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr B. Seebohm Rowntree (1871-1954)	businessman			(1902)			(12/6/15)										
Councillor John Watson Rowntree (1854-1935)	Local Politician & Grocer			(18/5/00)													
Mrs J. Watson [Eliza Stansfield] Rowntree (1857-1940)				(18/5/00)													
Mr John Stephenson Rowntree (1834-1907)				(24/4/01)													
Mr John Wilhelm Rowntree (1868-1905)	Manufacturer		(29/3/01)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Joseph Rowntree (1836-1925)	Manufacturer			(24/4/01)													
Mr Joshua Rowntree (1844-1915)	Social reformer		(17/3/00)														
Miss S. Elizabeth Rowntree			(27/6/00)	?													
Mr William Stickney Rowntree J.P. (1849-1939)	Draper	Un. Col. Lon.	(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)				GC. (1919)									
Miss Maude Royden (1876-1956)	Campaigner	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Lt Col Edmund Royds MP (1860-1946)	Politician & director							GC. (1919)									
Mr A. H. Ruegg Q.C. (-1941)	Judge		(11/1/00)														
Mr A. W. Rumney			(17/3/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Walter Runciman (1870-1949)	Politician	Trin. Camb.						GC. (1919)									
Mr W. G. Rushbrooke (1849-1926)	Teacher	St John's Camb.			(1905)												
Miss Russell							LA										
Lady Agatha Russell (1853-1953)			(17/3/00)														
Mr David Russell				(1902)													
Hon. F. A. R. Russell			(11/1/00)														
Mr George William Erskine Russell (1853-1935)	Politician & Author	Univ. Col. Oxf.	(17/3/00)										✓				
Mr John Russell (1855-1937)	Headmaster	St John's Camb.					(03/16)	GC. (1919)									
Mrs John [Bess] Russell (~1923)							(03/16)										
Hon Rollo Russell (1849-1914)		Christ Ch. Oxf.		(18/5/00)													
Rev. J. Ruston			(17/3/00)														
Rev. John Rutherford M.A., M.D.			(27/6/00)														
Mr V. H. Rutherford MD.					EC (1907)	EC											
Mr Clarence E. Rutter			(27/6/00)														
Dr J. R. Rygate			(29/3/01)														
Rev. Harold Rylett	Unitarian Minister		(27/6/00)														
Miss Emily Ryley			(27/6/00)														
Miss K. Ryley			(27/6/00)														
Mr Safistian						EC											
Rev. F. J. Saintly			(29/3/02)														
Marquis of Salisbury KC. (1861-1947)		Univ. Col. Oxf.						VP. (1919)									
Mr Samuel Salmon				(1902)													
Mr Henry S. Salt (1851-1939)	Administrator	King's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Rev. Thomas W. Salt			(29/3/02)														
Mr Alfred Salway			(17/3/00)														
Miss E. M. Samson			(27/6/00)														
Mr Herbert Samuel (1870-1953)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.			EC (1905)			GC. (1919)									
Mr James Samuelson				(1902)													
Rev Prof William Sanday DD. LL.D.	CofE minister & professor of theology	Bal. Oxf.															
Mr James Harris Sanders (1844-1916)	Businessman		(17/3/00)					GC. (1919)									





Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs Thomas [Catherine] Selby			(11/1/00)														
Miss H. M. Selby					(1903)												
Rev. R. A. Selby			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Thomas Gunn Selby (1846-1910)	Wesleyan minister		(11/1/00)														
Prof Ernest de Selincourt D Litt (1870-1943)	Professor	Univ. Col. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr F. C. Selous (1851-1917)	Explorer		(11/1/00)														
Mr Roland Sephton							(03/16)										
Mr Charles R. Serpell			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Robert Herbert Sewell	Congregational minister		(27/6/00)														
Rev. Robert Sewell	Congregational minister	Un. Of Lon.	(27/6/00)														
Mr W. J. Sewell				(1902)													
Mr Henry Seymour			(17/3/00)														✓
Sir David James Shackleton (1863-1938)	Politician				A (1906)												
Sir Ernest Shackleton CVO. (1874-1922)	Explorer							GC. (1919)									
Mr James W. Shannon					(1903)												
Mr John Shannon			(27/6/00)														
Mr D. Sharp			(17/3/00)														
Mr Isaac Sharp (c.1848-)	Clerk Religious Society of Friends		(27/6/00)														
Mrs Isaac [Isabella] Sharp (c.1846-)			(27/6/00)														
Rev. John Alfred Sharp (1856-1932)	Methodist minister					EC											
Rev. Henry Josiah Sharpe	CoFE minister	St John's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Edward J. Shaw JP.			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr F. J. Shaw								GC. (1919)		✓							
Mr J. V. Shaw					(1903)												
Mr James Shaw					(1903)												
Mr T. Shaw MP.	Politician			EC													
Rev George William Hudson Shaw	CoFE minister	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline (1850-1937)	Politician & Advocate	Edinburgh					(12/5/15)	GC. & VP. (1919)									

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Lady Constance Shaw-Lefevre (-1929)			(17/3/00)														
Miss Emily Shaw-Lefevre			(11/1/00)														
Right Hon. George John Shaw-Lefevre (1831-1928)	Politician	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)		(1903)												
Miss Mary Shaw-Lefevre			(17/3/00)														
Mrs C. E. Shea			(17/3/00)														
Mr Charles E. Shea			(17/3/00)														
Mr J. T. Sheard				(1902)													
Rev. Charles John Shebbeare (1865-1945)	CofE minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Miss Mary Shebbeare					(1903)												
Mr A. W. Shepherd				(1902)													
Mrs Constance Shepherd			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. F. Shergold			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Thomas Travers Sherlock B.A.	Congregational Minister	Un. Of Lon.	(27/6/00)		(1903)												
F. R. Shields					(1903)												
Rev. John Shields	Congregational Minister		(29/3/02)														
Mr Anthony George Shiel			(27/6/00)														
Rev. E. Shillito M.A.			(27/6/00)														
Miss Shirley					(1903)												
Miss Arabella Shore			(27/6/00)														
Mr John William Shorthouse (1835-1921)	Manufacturing Chemist & Lacquer Manufacturer		(17/3/00)														
Mrs Cobden Sickett			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Arthur Sidgwick			(11/1/00)														
Mr Alfred Sidgwick				(1902)													
Mr Arthur Sidgwick M.A. LL.D.			(11/1/00)	EC													
Mrs Henry [Eleanor Mildred (Nora)] Sidgwick (1845-1935)	Former Principal Newnham College, Cambridge	Newn. Camb.						VP. (1919)									
Rev R Simey			(17/3/00)														
Miss Edith Simcox			(27/5/00)	(24/4/01)													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr C. P. Simmonds				(1902)													
Rev. Albert Ernest Nicholas Simms (1869-1952)	CofE minister	Trin. Dublin					(12/6/15)										
Mr [sir] John A. Simon KC. (1873-1954)	Barrister & Politician	Wadh. Oxf.	(11/1/00)		A (1906)			GC. (1919)							✓		
Mr Alfred Simpson			(17/3/00)														
Mrs J. A. H. Simpson					(1903)												
Miss V. Simpson															✓		
Rev. John D. Sinclair			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)	(1903)												
Rev. E. Singininx			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Degge Wilmot Sitwell	CofE minister	St John's Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Sir Charles Skelton															✓		
Mr James Skinner			(29/3/01)														
Lieut.-Colonel D. Scot Skirling			(29/3/01)														
Miss Agnes Slack															✓		
Mrs Slagg			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. Slatter			(27/6/00)														
Mr J. W. Sleep					(1903)												
Mr P. J. Smit			(17/3/00)														
Mr Smith				(24/4/01)													
Mr Arthur Lionel Smith (1850-1924)	Master of Balliol	Bal. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Mr Adolf Smith			(17/3/00)														
Capt Albert Smith																	
Mr Baldwin M. Smith			(17/3/00)					GC. (1919)									
Mr C. Jeffrey Smith							LA										
Mr Charles Smith				(1902)													
Mr E. H. Smith				(1902)													
Mr E. S. T. Smith				(18/5/00)													
Mr Frank Smith L.C.C.			(27/6/00)														
Rev. George Vlad Smith M.A.	Congregational minister	Aberdeen	(27/6/00)														
Mr George Smith				(1902)													
Mr George Mall Smith			(17/3/00)														
Dr Gilbert Smith	Medical Practitioner		(29/3/01)														
Mr H. Crawford Smith					A (1903)												

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Harvey Smith			(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry Smith			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Miall Smith B.A.			(17/3/00)														
Professor Robert H. Smith			(17/1/00)	(24/4/01)	(1903)												
Mr Samuel Smith JP.					GC										✓		
Miss Susan J. Murray Smith			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr T. Smith			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Thomas Smith				(24/4/01)													
Rev. William Hodson Smith (1856-1943)	Methodist minister		(17/3/00)														
Mr W. J. Smith					(1903)												
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien GCMG, GCB.								GC. (1919)									
Rev. Charles James Sneath	CoFE minister	Birmingham	(29/3/02)														
Mr T. E. Snelgrove			(31/10/00)														
Mr Charles B. Snelling			(27/6/00)														
Mr George H. U. Snow			(27/6/00)														
Mr A. W. Soames					A (1903)												
Mrs Edgar Soames			(27/6/00)														
Mr Edgar Soames			(27/6/00)														
Mr Saul Solomon			(17/3/00)														
Miss A. M. Somervell					(1903)												
Miss Somerville					(1903)												
Mr George Somes J.P.			(17/3/00)														
Mr John Edmund Southall (1866-1937)	Pharmaceutical Chemist			(1902)													
Mrs Southey				(1902)													
Mr Robinson Soutar (1848-1912)	Politician		(17/3/00)	EC													
Rev. S. J. Sowers			(29/3/02)														
Principal Scaford M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Nellie Soakling							(03/16)										
Mr Henry Norman Soakling (1877-1953)	Civil servant	New Col. Oxd.					(12/5/15)	GC. & EC. (1919)									
Rev. George Soarks			(23/3/02)														
Mr A. S. Labouchère Soarling B.A.			(27/5/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Sir John Ward Spear	Politician							GC. (1919)							✓		
Earl Spencer KG. (1857-1922)	Politician	Trin. Camb.						GC. (1919)									
Mr Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)	Philosopher		(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mr Harold Spender (1864-1926)	Journalist & author	Univ. Col. Oxf.	(27/6/00)	EC	EC (1907)										✓		
Mr J. A. Spender (1862-1942)	Journalist	Bal. Oxf.	(11/1/00)					GC. & EC. (1919)									
Sir Albert Spicer (1847-1934)	Company director & politician				GC (1903)		VP (1918)	GC. (1919)	✓								
Mr Evan Spicer (1849-1937)	London County Councillor						(03/16)										
Mr Arthur Spurgeon (1861-1938)	Managing Editor		(27/6/00)														
Mr John Collings Squire (1884-1958)	Editor, Author & poet	St John's Camb.					(12/6/15)										
Mr B. T. Stallybrass			(27/6/00)														✓
Earl of Stamford (1850-1910)		Exeter Oxf.			A (1903)												
Mr H. Y. Stanger				(1902)													
Mr Joseph Stanley			(31/10/00)	(1902)													
Lord Stanmore (1829-1912)	Politician & diplomat	Trin. Camb.			VP (1903)												
Prof V. H. Stanton					(1903)												
Rev. George E. Startup	Wesleyan minister			(24/4/01)													
Miss F. M. Stawell								GC. (1919)									
Mr Alfred Stead					EC (1903)												
Mr William Charles Steadman M.P. (1851-1911)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(27/6/00)	EC													
Miss L. S. Stebbing MA								GC. (1919)									
Mr Henry Wickham Steed (1871-1956)	Newspaper Editor							GC. & EC. (1919)									
Mr William Stevens			(17/3/00)														
Mr John Stephen				(1902)													
Rev William Stephen						EC											
Mrs Stephens			(11/1/00)														
Miss Winifred Stephens							(03/16)										
Rev Henry Major Stephenson	CoFE minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs C. A. Stevens			(27/6/00)														
Mrs Thomas Stevens			(27/6/00)														
Mr F. S. Stevenson					A (1903)												
Mr William Stevenson				(1902)													
Mr Charles M. D. Stewart			(17/3/00)														
Mr Halley Stewart J.P. (1838-1937)	Politician & businessman		(17/3/00)														
Mr James Stewart				(1902)													
Sir Mark MacTaggart Stewart Bart					A (1903)												
Mrs E. Stewart-Brown			(17/3/00)														
Mrs D. Stirling					(1903)												
Mr T. Stoate			(27/6/00)														
Rev. Henry T. Stodden					(1903)												
Rev. S. Stokes					(1903)												
Mr James Stollard			(17/3/00)														
Mr Harold Stoner				(18/5/00)													
Mr Raynor Storr			(11/1/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. G. M. Storrar			(17/3/00)														
Mr Frederic Stow Philipson Stow (1849-1908)	Diamond Magnate		(11/1/00)					GC. (1919)									
Mr Oliver Strachey																	
Mr James Strang			(17/3/00)														
Mr Albert Strange			(17/3/00)														
Mr B. S. Strauss					A (1906)												
Mr E. A. Strauss					A (1906)												
Rev C. J. Street				(24/4/01)													
Rev James C. Street			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev Arnold Streuli			(27/6/00)														
Mrs F. Strickland			(17/3/00)	(1902)							?						
Rev Charles Strong D.D. (1844-1942)	Minster	Glasgow	(31/10/00)														
Rev John Strong			(29/3/02)														
Rev Thomas Banks Strong O.O.	Dean of Christ Church, Oxford	Christ Ch. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Miss Eliza Sturge			(17/3/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr Joseph Sturge (1847-1934)	Corn Merchant		(17/3/00)														
Mr Joseph Marshall Sturge			(17/3/00)														
Miss Sophia Sturge (1849-1936)			(17/3/00)														
Mr Sidney Style			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Sidney Style			(17/3/00)														
Mr Lamer Sugden F.R.I.B.A. (1850-1901)	Architect		(11/1/00)														
Mr A. B. Sully							(12/6/15)										
Professor James Sully M.A., LL.D.			(11/1/00)														
Mr T. Sulman			(17/3/00)														
Mr Thomas Summerbell (1861-1910)	Trade Unionist & Politician		(27/6/00)														
Mr George G. O. Sutcliffe				(24/4/01)													
Duke of Sutherland								GC. (1919)									
Mr John Cameron Swan							(03/16)										
Mrs Louise B. Swann			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr Walter Sweetman B.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr Shapland Hugh Swinny (1857-1923)	Political Activist	St John's Camb.	(11/1/00)														
Mr A. C. Swinton			(17/3/00)	(18/5/00)													
Maj Gen Sir Frederick Sykes CMG.								EC. (1920)									
Col Sir Mark Sykes MP.	Politician							GC. & EC. (1919)									
Mr Arthur G. Symonds (c.1855-1924)	Political Secretary		(11/1/00)		GC (1903)	EC								✓			
Mrs H. C. Taft					(1903)		(12/6/15)										
Rt Rev Edward Stuart Talbot (1844-1934)	Bishop of Southwark, Rochester & Winchester	Christ Ch. Oxf.			A (1903)		VP (1918)	GC. (1919)							✓		
Rev W Tansley					(1903)									✓			
Sr Charles J Tarnag						EC											
Mr R Landon Tate							(12/5/15)										
Rev T M Tatchell DSO.								GC (1919)									

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr W. Tattersall			(17/3/00)														
Mrs W. Tattersall			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Frederick Tavender	Congregational minister	Un. Of Lon. & St Andrews	(17/3/00)														
Mr R. H. Tawney								GC. (1919)									
Mr Stephen S. Tayler			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mrs Arnold Taylor				(1902)													
Rev. Arnold Taylor			(29/3/01)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. Arnold Dawes Taylor	CofE minister	Gon. Camb.	(29/3/01)	(1902)													
Dr E. C. Taylor					(1903)												
Mrs H. B. Taylor				(24/4/01)													
Mr H. R. Taylor L.C.C.			(27/6/00)														
Mr John E. Taylor				(24/4/01)													
Mr Theodore C. Taylor					A (1903)												✓
Mr T. E. Tebbutt			(17/3/00)														
Mr Frederick Temple			(11/1/00)														
Mr H. Tennant				(1902)													
Mr John Tennant			(17/3/00)														
Mr John B. Tennnet [or Tennant]			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr John Terry							(12/6/15)										
Mr Henry Thacker			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. M. Theedam			(29/3/01)														
Mr William Theobald				(1902)													
Mr F. E. Thompson [or Thompson]			(11/1/00)														
Mr Andrew W. Thomas	President, Bath Trades Council		(29/3/01)														
Mr D Morgan Thomas J.P.			(11/1/00)														
Rev. E. L. H. Thomas B.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr George Thomas				(24/4/01)													
Rev J Thomas					(1903)												
Mr John Henry Thomas (1874-1949)	Trade Unionist & Politician							GC. & EC. (1919)									
Mr J M Lloyd Thomas			(17/3/00)														
Mr John Thomas			(17/3/02)	1902													



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Urijah Rees Thomas ( c.1839-1901)	Congregational minister		(11/1/00)														
Mr W. P. Thomas					(1903)												
Mr John Pennington Thomasson (1841-1904)	Cotton Spinner & Politician		(29/3/01)	EC													
Prof Thommanian						EC											
Mr A. H. Thompson MD.				(24/4/01)													
Mrs A. H. Thompson			(31/10/00)														
Mr Arthur H. Thompson			(17/3/00)														
Mr G. C. Thompson					(1903)												
Mr Henry Yates Thompson (1838-1928)	Barrister, Newspaper proprietor	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Herbert M. Thompson			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Rev. John Thompson					(1903)												
Mrs Percy [Lilian Gilchrist] Thompson			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)	(1903)												
Mr Sydney Thompson			(17/3/00)														
Mr W. Thompson				(24/4/01)													
Mr William Thompson			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr H. C. Thomson			(11/1/00)														
Rev. Richard Thorne M.A.			(27/6/00)														
Mr George R. Thorne M.P.	Politician							GC. (1919)									
Mrs H. Thomycroft							LA										
Mr G. Thourmanian						EC											
Lord Thring (1818-1907)	Parliamentary draftsman	Mag. Camb.			A (1903)												
Lord Alexander Thynne (1873-1918)	Politician	Bal. Oxl.			EC (1910)												
Mrs Charles Thynne			(11/1/00)														
Rev A. Tidsley (c 1857-)	Baptist Minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr F. Tillyard				(1902)													
Rev E. M. Todd B.A.			(17/3/00)														
Rev Frederic Todd			(27/5/00)														
Rev James Toll			(29/2/02)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mr H. R. Tomkinson			(27/6/00)														
Mr James Tomkinson (1840-1910)	Bank Director & Politician	Bal. Oxf.		(24/4/01)													
Mr H. J. Torr					EC (1910)												
Mr Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975)	Academic & Writer	Bal. Oxf.				EC											
Rev. Charles Travers				(24/4/01)													
Rev. George Herbert Tremeneheere	CofE minister	Trin. Oxf.	(17/3/00)		(1906)												
Mr Charles P. Trevelyan (1870-1958)	Politician	Tnn. Camb.			GC (1903)					✓	✓				✓		
Mr George Macaulay Trevelyan (1876-1962)	Historian	Tnn. Camb.			GC (1903)												
President Trinity College					A (1903)												
Rev. The Master of Trinity College					A (1903)												
Mr J. S. Trotter			(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Miss E. F. Tucker			(29/3/01)														
Rev. William Tuckwell	CofE minister	New Col. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Henry S. Tuke			(29/3/01)														
Miss Flora Turnbull				(1902)													
Mr Peveril Turnbull							(12/6/15)										
Councillor Ben Turner JP.								GC. (1919)									
Mr George Tweedie			(17/3/00)								✓						
Mr George R. Tweedie			(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr Edward L. Tyndall			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Jane Cobden Umwin (1851-1947)			(11/1/00)	(1902)											✓		
Mrs Ethel Umwin senior							(12/6/15)										
Mr Raymond Umwin (1853-1940)	Town Planner & Architect	Mag. Oxf.	(17/3/00)					GC. & EC. (1919)									
Mrs Raymond [Ethel] Umwin (1855-1949)							PC (1915)										
Mr Stanley Umwin							PC (1915)										
Mr Thomas Fisher Umwin (1843-1935)	Publisher		(11/1/00)	(1902)				GC. (1919)									
Rev William Sully Umwin (c.1952- )	CofE minister	Mag. Oxf.					(12/6/15)										
Mr Yealder Umwin			(29/3/01)	(1902)													
Rev William Umwin M.A.	Congregational minister	Trin. Dublin	(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr John Valentine			(29/3/01)														
Mr A. J. Vallance F.S.A.			(17/3/00)														



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Mrs D. M. Van Lessen							(12/6/15)										
Mr Derrick M. Van Lessen							(12/6/15)										
Sir R. V. Vassar-Smith Bt							VP (1916)	GC. & EC, (1919)									
Sir Edmund Verney Bart (1861-1910)	Baronet		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr Frederic Verney (1846-1913)	Politician	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Lt Col Sir Harry Verney Bart (1881-1974)	Politician	Bal. Oxf.					VP (1918)	GC. (1919)									
Mr William J. Vernon			(27/6/00)														
Mr Thomas Viccars F.G.S.			(27/6/00)														
Sir Patteson Vickalls				?													
Mr L. Villari					EC (1903)												
Prof Sir Paul Vinogradoff DCL, LLD, FBA.								GC. (1919)									
Mr Henry Vivian (1868-1930)	Politician		(29/3/01)	(1902)													✓
Lt Col H. H. Wade								GC. (1919)									
Judge William H. Wadhams	Judge							GC. (1919)									
Mr Robert Waite			(27/6/00)														
Rev. A. J. Waldron			(29/3/01)														
Mr E. Walger				(1902)													
Mr A. Walker			(17/3/00)														
Rev. E. Walker			(17/3/00)														
Mr Emery Walker			(27/6/00)														
Mr James Douglas Walker Q.C. (1841-1920)	Barister	Univ. Col. Oxf.	(11/1/00)														
Dr Jane Walker								GC. (1919)									
Rev Sydney Richard Maynard Walker	Core minister	Christ Ch. Oxf.	(17/3/00)														
Mr Alfred Russel Wallace L.L.D., F.R.S.			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Hugh C. Wallace			(27/6/00)														
Rev Hugh Cunningham Wallace	minister		(27/6/00)														
Mr J W Wallace (c.1954-)	Assistant Architect		(17/3/00)														
Prof Graham Wallas (1853-1932)	University Lecturer	Corp. Oxf.						GC. (1919)									
Rev George Henry Somerset Walpole (1854-1923)	Bishop of Edinburgh	Trin. Camb.						GC. (1919)									
Rev Walter Walsh			(27/6/00)	(24/4/01)													
Lieut-Colonel Warburton			(17/3/00)														
Mrs Warburton			(17/3/00)														

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFLAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Arthur Ward			(17/3/00)														
Rev. H. Ward			(17/3/00)														
Mr Herbert Ward						EC											
Mr John Ward (1866-1934)	Trades unionist & politician		(31/10/00)														
Mrs Warr			(11/1/00)	(1902)													
Mrs G. C. Warr				(1902)													
Professor George Charles Winter Warr (1845-1901)	University Professor	Trin. Camb.	(11/1/00)														
Major G. O. Warren			(17/3/00)														
Rev. William Quin Warren			(17/3/00)			(1903)											
Mrs Cathcart Wason	CofE minister	King's Lon.	(17/3/00)												✓		
Mr A. C. Wates								GC. (1919)									
Mr Frank Watkins			(11/1/00)														
Dr Watson			(29/3/02)	?													
Mr R. Spence Watson				EC													
Gen W. A. Watson CB, CMG.								GC. (1919)									
Mr [sir] William Watson			(11/1/00)														
Miss Watts							LA										✓
Rev. Frederic Waudby			(17/3/00)														
Mr Arthur T. Webb			(29/3/02)				(12/6/15)										
Mr Philip Webb			(27/6/00)														
Mr E. F. Webster			(11/1/00)														
Mr Francis Webster				(1902)													
Mr Henry Webster				(24/4/01)													
Sir William Wedderburn Bart. M.P. (1838-1918)	administrator	Edinburgh	(11/1/00)														
Mr Josiah C. Wedgwood M.P. DSO. (1872-1943)	Politician						(12/6/15)	GC. (1919)	✓	✓							
Mr H. A. Weeks								GC. (1919)									
Mr H. T. Weeks							(03/16)										
Rev. Gilbert Wengall	CofE minister	Keble Oxf.				EC											
Mr J. G. Wier					A (1903)												
Professor F. E. Weiss (1855-1953)	Academic	Un. Col. Lon.	(17/3/00)	(1902)													
Mr A. G. Wield			(17/3/00)														
Rev. James Edward Cowell Weldon (1854-1937)	Dean of Durham	King's Camb.						GC. (1919)					✓				



Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFA	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Rev. Ed Wells MA				(24/4/01)													
Mr Herbert George Wells (1866-1946)	Author							(1919)									
Prof. John Westlake KC. (1828-1913)					GC (1903) / Pres. (1905)												
Mr Henry B. Weston	International Lawyer	Trin. Camb.					(12/6/15)										
Rev. Timothy Wheatley (c.1851-)	Methodist Minister		(27/6/00)														
Rev. T. J. Wheldon M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Mr John Whitburn (c.1863-)	Trade Union secretary		(27/6/00)														
Mr Stafford B. Whitby			(17/3/00)														
Mrs White			(17/3/00)														
Rev. Alex C. White				(24/4/01)													
Mr George White (1840-1912)	Politician			(18/5/00)	A (1903)												
Mr H. Costley White (1878-1966)	CoffE Minister & Headmaster	Bal. Oxf.		(24/4/01)													
Mr J. Dundas White (1866-1951)	Barrister & politician	Trin. Camb.	(17/3/00)														
Mr William Hale White (1931-1913)	Author [psed. Mark Rutherford]		(17/3/00)	(24/4/01)													
Mr John Howard Whitehouse MP. (1873-1955)	Politician								✓	✓						✓	
Mr Samuel H. Whitehouse (c.1849-)	Miners Agent		(27/6/00)														
Mr John Whiteman			(17/3/00)														
Rev William Whitham			(29/3/02)														
Mr J. H. Whitley MP. (1858-1935)	Politician	Un. Of Lon.						GC. (1919)							✓		
Mr Arthur Whidow			(27/6/00)														
Mr L. Whitmore							(12/5/15)										
Mr A. F. Whyte								GC. (1919)	✓								
Mr Charles Wickes				(1902)													
Mr Charles Wickstead				(1902)													
Rev Philip H. Wicksteed M.A.			(17/3/00)														
Miss Rebecca Wicksteed			(29/3/01)														
Mr I. Wiener			(17/3/00)														
Mr H. J. Wild			(17/3/00)														
Mr T. Wildes					A (1905)											✓	

Individual	Occupation	University	SACC	LLAAM	BC	BAC	LNS	LNU	LFAG	UPG	UDC	BG	ARCF	AR(LM)F	CRA	BWRF	LCA
Councillor W. S. Wilkins				(1902)													
Dr Wilkinson			(17/3/00)	?													
Mr J. Rennie Wilkinson				(24/4/01)													
Mr B. J. Willats			(17/3/00)														
Miss Williams			(11/1/00)														
Mrs Aneurin Williams (1863 -1922)							(12/6/15)										
Mr Bert Williams	Secretary Southern Co-operative Union						(12/6/15)										✓
Rev. D. J. Williams			(27/6/00)														



## Appendix 3: Pro-Boer Candidates

### 1. Pro-Boer Candidates in 1900 General Election

Candidate	Elected	Unsuccessfully contested	List
Robert Andrew Allison §	1885-1900 Eskdale, Cumberland		
L A Atherley-Jones §	1885-1914 NW Durham		TPAR
Fred Barnes §	1895-1900 Faversham, Kent	1892 NE Derbyshire; 1906 & Jan. 1910 Northampton	D
Richard Bell §	1900-Jan. 1910 Derby		
John Albert Bright §	1889-95 Central Birmingham (LU); 1906-Jan. 1910 Oldham	1900 Montgomery District	R
Sir John Brunner § v	1885-86 & 1887-Jan. 1910 Northwich, Cheshire		TPR
John Burns § v	1892-1918 Battersea	1885 W Nottingham (SDF)	TPAR
Thomas Burt § v	1874(b)-1918 Morpeth		TPAR
William P Byles § v	1892-95 Shipley, Yorks.; 1906-17 N Salford	1900 Leeds	
Robert Cameron § v	1895-1913 Houghton-le-Spring Division Durham	1892(b) Central Division Sheffield	TPAR
Frances A Channing § v	1885-Dec. 1910 E Northants.		TPAR
John F Cheetham §	1880-85 N Derbys.; 1905(b)-Jan. 1910 Stalybridge	1885 & 1892 High Peak, Derbys.; 1895 Bury; 1900 Stalybridge	
Richard R Cherry § v	1906-1909 Exchange Division, Liverpool	1900 Kirkdale, Liverpool	
Felix T Cobbold § v	1885-86 Stowmarket, Suffolk; 1906 Ipswich	1900 Woodbridge, Suffolk	
W Randall Cremer §	1885-95 & 1900-08 Haggerston, Shoreditch	1868 & 1874 Warwick	PAR
John Edward Ellis § v	1885-1910 Rushcliffe Division Nottinghamshire		TPAR
Samuel T Evans §	1890(b)-1910 Mid Glamorgan		TPR
Corrie Grant §	1900-Jan. 1910 Rugby	1885(b) Woodstock; 1892(b) W Birmingham; 1895(b) Rugby; 1899(b) Harrow	
George Greenwood § v	1906-1918 Peterborough	1886 Peterborough; 1900 Central Hull	
Sir William Brampton Gurdon § v	1899(b)-Jan. 1910 N Norfolk	1885 SW Norwich; 1886 Rotherhithe; 1888(b) Colchester	TPAR
Keir Hardie §	1892-95 West Ham; 1900-1915 Merthyr Tydfil	1888 Lanarkshire; 1896 E Bradford; 1900 Preston	
Sir John Jardine §	1906-1918 Roxburghshire	1900 Roxburghshire	

Leif Jones §	1905(b)-Jan. 1910 Appleby, Westmorland; Dec. 1910-1918 Rushcliffe, Notts.; 1923-24 & 1929-31 Camborne, Cornwall	1892 Westminster; 1895 Central Leeds; 1900 S Manchester; 1922 Camborne, Cornwall	
George Lansbury §	Dec. 1910-1912 & 1922-1940 Bow & Bromley	1895 Walworth (SDF); 1900 Bow & Bromley; 1906 Middlesbrough	
Sir Wilfred Lawson § v	1859-65 & 1868-85 Carlisle; 1886-1900 Cockermouth, Cumberland; 1903(b)-1906 Camborne, Cornwall; 1906-1906 Cockermouth	1857 W Cumberland	TAR
David Lloyd-George § v	1890-1945 Carnarvon District		TPAR
John W Logan §	1891-1904 & Dec. 1910-1916 Harborough, Leics.		TPAR
Thomas Lough §	1892-1918 W Islington	1886 Truro	TPAR
James R MacDonald §	1900-1918 Leicester; 1922-1929 Aberavon; 1929-1935 Seaham; 1936-1937 Scottish Universities	1895 Southampton; 1900 Leicester; 1921 Woolwich E	
Fred Maddison § v	1897-1900 Brightside, Sheffield; 1906-Jan. 1910 Burnley	1892 & 1895 Central Hull; Dec. 1910 Darlington; 1918 Holderness, E Riding; 1922 S Dorset; 1923 Reading	TAR
Alfred Mond §	1906-Jan. 1910 Chester; 1918-23 W Swansea; 1924-1928 Carmarthen	1900 Salford; 1923 W Swansea	
Alfred E Pease §	1885-92 York; 1897(b)-1902 Cleveland, Yorks	1895 York	TPR
Sir R T Reid §	1880-85 Hereford; 1886-1905 Dumfries District	1885 Dunbartonshire	TPR
Charles Roberts §	1906-18 Lincoln; 1922-23 Derby	1895 Wenesbury; 1899 Osgoldcross, Yorks.; 1900 Lincoln; 1920(b) S Norfolk; 1924 Central Nottingham	
J Bryn Roberts § v	1885-1906 Eifion, Carnarvonshire		TPAR
Charles E Schwann §	1886-1918 N Manchester	1885 N Manchester	TPAR
C P Scott §	1859-1906 Leigh, Lancs.	1886, 1891 & 1892 NE Manchester	TPAR
Robinson Souttar § v	1895-1900 Dumfriesshire	1892 Oxford	TAR
William C Steadman § v	1898-1900 Stepney; 1901-Jan. 1910 Central Finsbury	1892 Mid Kent; 1895 Hammersmith	TAR
Halley Stewart §	1887-1895 Spalding, Lincs; 1906-Jan. 1910 Greenock	1885, 1886 & 1895 Spalding, Lincs.; 1900 Peterborough	
Robert Williams §	1895-1922 W Dorset		
Charles Henry Wilson v	1874-1885 Hull; 1885-1905 Hull West		TPR
Henry J Wilson § v	1885-1912 Holmfirth division Yorkshire		TPAR



2. Pro-Boers who sat in Parliament before 1900

Candidate	Elected	Unsuccessfully contested	List
C F Egerton Allen ‡	1892-1892 Pembroke & Haverfordwest		
Joseph Arch ‡	1885-1900 NW Norfolk		
E Bayley ‡	1892-95 N Camberwell	1886 N Camberwell	
Joseph Bennett ‡	1885-86 & 1892-95 West Lindsey		
James Howard Brooks ‡¶	? 1885 Altringham, cheshire		
Right Hon. Leonard Courtney ‡	1876-85 Misheard, Cornwall; 1885-1900 Bodmin, Cornwall	1874 Misheard	
J C Durant ‡	1885 Stepney, Tower Hamlet		
John Passmore Edwards ‡	1880-1885 Salisbury	1885(b) Rochester; 1886 Truro	
James Ellis ‡	1885-1892 Bosworth, Leics.		
Robert Lacy Everett‡¶	1885-86, 1892-1895 & 1906-Jan. 1910 Woodbridge, Suffolk	1880 E Suffolk (Farmer's Candidate)	
Herbert Paul ‡	1892-95 S Edinburgh; 1906-Jan. 1910 Northampton		
Captain D Pirie ‡ [served SA 1899-1900]	1896-1918 N Aberdeen	1895 W Renfrewshire	TPAR
Joshua Rowntree ‡	1886-1892 Scarborough		
George W E Russell ‡	1880-1885 Aylesbury; 1892(b)-1895 N Bedfordshire	1885 & 1886(b) Fulham	
Right Hon. G J Shaw-Lefevre ‡	1863-1885 Reading; 1886-1895 Central Bradford		
John Pennington Thomasson ‡¶	1880(b)-1885 Bolton		
Sir William Wedderburn ‡	1893(b)-1900 Banffshire	1892 N Ayrshire	
Joseph Woodhead ‡¶	1885-1892 Spen Valley Division West Riding Yorkshire	1893 Huddersfield	

3. Pro-Boers who unsuccessfully contested elections before 1900

Candidate	Unsuccessfully contested
Prof. E S Beesly <sup>§</sup>	1885 Westminster; 1886 E Marylebone
William Bell <sup>§</sup>	1892 & 1894 Leith District of Burghs
J Bonham-Carter <sup>§¶</sup>	1892 & 1897(b) Petersfield, Hants
E W Brooks <sup>§</sup>	1892 SE Essex
Oscar Browning <sup>§</sup>	1886 Norwood; 1892 E Worcs.; 1895 W Derby, Liverpool
P W Clayden <sup>§</sup>	1885 Norwood; 1886 N Islington
R Hippisley Cox <sup>§</sup>	1895 Chatham; 1900 Kirkcudbrightshire
W M Crook <sup>§</sup>	1892 Wandsworth
Frank Debenham <sup>§¶</sup>	1892 Cheltenham
J A Farrer <sup>§¶</sup>	1892 Kendal; 1895 Skipton, W Riding
Frederic Harrison <sup>§</sup>	1886 London Universities
Sir Robert Garnet Head <sup>§¶</sup>	1895 Brixton
Rev. John Page Hopps <sup>§</sup>	1886 S Paddington
Bolton King <sup>§</sup>	1901(b) Stratford Upon Avon
Edmund K Muspratt <sup>§</sup>	1885 Widnes, Lancs.
Sir Patteson Nickalls <sup>§¶</sup>	1885 Sevenoaks, Kent; 1895 Dartford, Kent
Sir J B Phear <sup>§¶</sup>	1885 Honiton, Devon; 1886 Tavistock; 1892 Tiverton, Devon
J Harris Sanders <sup>§</sup>	1886 Harborough, Leics.; 1886(b) Kings Lynn; 1887(b) Taunton; 1887(b) Ramsey, Hunts.; 1892 Wellington, Shrops.
A G Shiell <sup>§</sup>	1885 Howdenshire, Yorks
Frank Smith <sup>§</sup>	1892 Hammersmith (Lib/Lab); 1894(b) Attercliffe, Sheffield (ILP); 1895 Tradeston, Glasgow (ILP); 1909(b) Taunton (Lab); 1909(b) Croydon (Lab); Dec. 1910 Chatham (Lab)



#### 4. Pro-Boers who were elected after 1900

Candidate	Elected	Unsuccessfully contested
Percy Alden †	1906-1918 Tottenham(Liberal); 1923-24 Tottenham North (Labour)	
Rev. F W Aveling †v		1906 Lewisham
George Barnes †	1906-1918 Glasgow, Blackfriars & Hutchesontown (Labour); 1918- Glasgow, Gorbals (coalition Labour)	1895 Rochdale (ILP)
James Branch †	1906-Jan. 1910 Enfield, Middx.	Dec. 1910 Enfield, Middx.
Allan H Bright †v	1904(b)-1906 Oswestry, Shrops.	1899 & 1900 Exeter; 1901(b) Oswestry, Shrops.; Jan. & Dec. 1910 Stalybridge
J Annan Bryce †v	1906-1918 Inverness Burghs	
Stanley O Buckmaster †	1906-Jan. 1910 Cambridge; 1911(b)- 1915 Keighley, W Riding	Dec. 1910 Cambridge
Hugh Fullerton †	1906-Jan. 1910 Egremont, Cumberland	1918 Royton, Lanes.
G P Gooch †	1906-Jan. 1910 Bath	Dec. 1910 Reading
John George Hancock †	1909(b)-1918 Mid Derbys.; 1918- 1923 Belper	
Rudolf C Lehmann †v	1906-Dec. 1910 Harborough, Leics.	1885 Cheltenham; 1892 Central Hull
Arnold Lupton †v	1906-Jan. 1910 Sleaford, Lincs.	1918 Plaistow; 1921(b) Westminster Abbey
Frederic C Mackarness †v	1906-Jan. 1910 Newbury	
David M Mason †v	Dec. 1910-1918 Coventry; 1931- 1935 E Edinburgh	1906 & 19__ Tradeston Glasgow; 1922 Chislehurst, Kent; 1923 Romford, Essex; 1929 Barnstaple, Devon
P A Molteno †v	1906-1918 Dumfriesshire	1923 Kinross & W Perthshire
James O'Grady †	1906-1918 E Leeds; 1918-24 SE Leeds (Labour)	
John M Robertson †	1906-18 Tyneside	1895 Northampton; 1923 Hendon
John A Simon †	1906-18 Walthamstow, Essex; 1922- 1940 Spen Valley, Yorks.	1919(b) Spen Valley, Yorks.
Thomas Summerbell †	1906-Jan.1910 Sunderland	
Frederick William Verney †v	1906-Dec.1910 N Buckinghamshire	1885 SW Kent; 1886 Bath; 1895 Norwich; 1900 Exchange Division Liverpool
Henry Harvey Vivian †v	1906-Dec.1910 Birkenhead; 1923- 1924 Totnes	1911(b) S Somerset; 1918 Edmonton; 1922 Northampton
John Ward †	1906-1918 Stoke-on-Trent; 1918- 1929 Stoke Division Stoke-on-Trent	
James Dundas White †	1906-Dec.1910 Dunbartonshire; 1911(b)-1918 Tradeston Division Glasgow	1923 W Middlesbrough; 1924 Central Glasgow
Aneurin Williams †v	1910(b)-1918 NW Durham; 1918-22 Consett, Durham	1906 Medway, Kent
William Llewelyn Williams †	1906-1918 Carmarthen Boroughs	1921 Cardiganshire

5. Pro-Boers who unsuccessfully contested elections after 1900

Candidate	Unsuccessfully contested
Silas Hocking §ψ	1906 Aylesbury; Jan. 1910 Coventry
A. L. Leon §	Jan. & Dec. 1910 Croydon
W. R. Lester §	Jan. & Dec. 1910 Mid Norfolk
A. M. S. Methuen §ψ	Jan. 1910 Guildford, Surrey
Sir Edward O'Malley §	1906 S Kensington; Dec. 1910 Lewisham
Herbert R.Rathbone §	1902(b) East Toxteth
Rev. William Riley §	1906 S. Hackney (ILP)
Rev. Harold Rylett §	Dec. 1910 Burton, Staffs.
Herbert Spencer §	1918(b) Finsbury East

Key:

Symbols

- § Member of South Africa Conciliation Committee
- ψ Member of League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism

Lists

- T Pro-Boer candidates from *The Times*, 19 October 1900,
- P Pro-Boer Members 1900, from Price, Richard, *An Imperial War and the British Working Class* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p250-251
- A Pro-Boer Liberal MPs, 1899-1902, from Auld, John W, 'The Liberal Pro-Boers', *The Journal of British Studies*, 14, no. 2 (May 1975), p100-01
- R Liberal pro-Boer candidates, 1900, from Readman, P., 'The Liberal Party and Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, 12, no. 3 (2001), p142-3



Appendix 4: Pro-Boer membership sample

Published Address			Age in 1901
Rev. Joseph Adams	19 Boscombe Road, Shepherd's Bush, W.	Congregational Minister (Hamersmith)	46
Rev. J R Aitken	Dunnington Manse, Alcester, Warwickshire		
Mr William Atkinson	57 Carr Street, Darwen	Tea Dealer & Trade Mason Secretary	35
Rev. Leyland Baldwin	Leyland, Preston	Church of England Clergyman	63
Mrs Ball	St John's House, S. Giles, Oxford		38
Mr Kenard Ball	23 Stanley Crescent, Notting Hill, W	Solicitor	37
Mr Basil Barnhill	30 Furnival Street, WC	Journalist & author	37
Mr W H Beeby	Hildasay, Thames Ditton	Bank Clerk	51
Mr Alfred Beesly	53 Warrington Crescent, Maida Vale, W	Chemist	46
Lieut-Gen. Sir William Bellairs	Clevedon, Somerset	Retired General	72
Mrs J Bernard Boanquet	The Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey	Social worker	41
Mr James Branch	24 Fountayne Road, Stoke Newington, N	Boot Manufacturer	56
Mr W A Brend	6 Argyll Road, Kensington, W	Medical Student	29
Mrs William Brown	182 Croydon Road, Anerley, SE		
Mr George Cadbury	Bournville, Birmingham	Company Chairman	62
Miss Julia Cameron	7 Kensington Studios, Stanford Road, W	Artist	48
Mr Alexander Cameron	Seathaugh, Blackford, Perthshire		
Mr J F Cheetham	33 Princess Gardens, SW	Politician & Cotton Manufacturer	66
Mrs W S Clark	Mill Field, Street, Somerset		60
Rev J P Clarke	Cheddar, Willingdon Road, Eastbourne		
Rev. E Clarke	Heather-bank, Matlock		
Mr Felix T Cobbold	The Lodge, Felixstowe	Banker, Liberal MP	59
Dr Robert J Colenso	91 Cromwell Road, SW	Medical Doctor	50
Lord Coleridge	8 Wetherby Place, SW	Kings Councillor, Peer of Parliament	49
Mr Howard Coote	The Rookery, Fenstanton, Hunts	Farmer	37

Mr Thomas Coventry	3 Liverpool Road, Birkdale, Southport	Bank Cashier	36
Mr H E Dauncey	56 Bayston Road, Stoke Newington	Postman	32
Mr James Davison	Drimateryl House, Ballynakill, Queen's County		
Mr F Lawson Dodd	41 Wimpole Street, W		
Rev. Robert P Douglas	The Manse, Otterburn, Northumberland	Presbyterian Minister	57
Mr Warwick H Draper	19 Old Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, W.C.; 110 Heath Street,	Barrister Solicitor	27
Mrs Dockar Drysdale	Wick Hall, Radley, Berks	Widow (son is a Barrister)	56
Mr J C Durant	South Croydon	Stage Carpenter	41
The Very Rev. George William Kitchen	Durham Cathedral	Dean of Durham	74
Mr Eustace J Eastman	National Liberal Club, SW	Clerk	45
Mr William F Everett	Etgasa, D' Aubigny Road, Brighton	Hatter Shop Keeper	55
Lady Emma Fitch	13 Leinster Square, W		70
Mr John Rawlinson Ford	Quarrydene, Weetwood, Leeds	Solicitor	56
Professor George Carey Foster	Ladywalk, Rickmansworth	University Professor of Physics	66
Mr Joseph Sturge Gilpin	88 Parliament Street, Nottingham		
Rev. Stephen Gladstone	Hawarden Rectory, Chester	Church of England Rector	56
Mr J P Goodridge	Petersfield, Beulah Hill, Upper Norwood		
Mr James D Grout	22 Buckland Street, N	Wire worker	54
Mr Robert Hall	Salisbury		
Mrs Charles Hancock	125 Queen's Gate, SW	Barrister's wife	52
Mr Martin Handon	Rosemead, Kent House Road, Beckenham	Clerk in music school	27
Colonel H B Hanna	Ashcroft, Petersfield	Retired Colonel	61
Sir Robert Garnet Head	2 Sussex Place, W		56
Mr C E Hecht	3 Essex Court, Temple		
Rev. Edward Newenham Hoare	The Vicarage, Oakhill Park, Liverpool	Church of England clergyman	59
Lady Hobhouse	15 Bruton Street, W	Peeress	75
Mrs John A Hobson	Elmstead, Limpsfield, Surrey; 3 Gayton Crescent, Hampstead	Wife of journalist	41
Rev. R Holman	9 Stanley Terrace, Diss, Norfolk		
Mrs R Holt	54 Ullett Road, Liverpool	Wife of Cotton Broker	55



Rev. John Page Hopps	Sanderstead Hill, South Croydon	Baptist Minister	67
Mr G Inchbould	6 Dorset Street, Fleet-street, EC		
Rev. Thomas Islip	Cockington, Torquay	Retired Wesleyan Minister	77
Rev. R W Jackson	Victoria Villa, Oxford Road, Macclesfield	Congregational Minister	
Rev. W J Jupp	14A Belvidere Road, Liverpool	Unitarian Minister	42
Mr Frederick Kaye	29 St Michael's Road, Workington	Steel Worker	30
Mr J G Kenyon	Gillingham Hall, near Beccles, Norfolk	Former Chamberlain to His Holiness Pius X	57
Mr Reginald Larmuth	Norton Lees, Stretford, Manchester		
Mr Hugh Law	3 Grosvenor Road, SW	Politician & Barrister	29
Mr James Crawford Ledlie	The Garth, Cobham, Surrey	Barrister	40
Mr Guy Lewis	9 Winchester Road, Oxford		
Miss F H Low	25 Grand Parade, St Leonards		
Mrs Lyell	9 Cornwall Gardens, SW		
Mrs G P Macdonell	40 Lansdowne Crescent, W		
Dr R D MacGregor	7 Upper Montague Street, WC	Medical doctor	41
Councillor Robert F Martineau	Birmingham (18 Highfield Rd)	Brassfounder	69
Miss Harriet Cameron Mawson	Ashfield, Low Fell, Gateshead		47
Miss Mawson	Ashfield, Low Fell, Gateshead		57
Mr James J McSheedy	114 Queen's Road, Walthamstow	Clerk Stock exchange	26
Mrs L C Miall (Emily)	8 Spring Road, Headingley, Leeds	Wife of University Biology professor	
Mr Joseph Miller	159 Gordon Road, Nottingham	Engine fitter	44
Mr Thomas Mills	Balmoral House, Cleethorpes	Boarding House Keeper	49
Mr [Sir] Alfred Mond	66 Lowndes Square, W	Chemical Manufacturer	32
Mr Felix Moscheles	80 Elm Park Road, Chelsea, SW	Artist & peace activist	68
Rev. A D Mozley	Wigginton Rectory, Banbury	Church of England Minister	52
Professor John Henry Muirhead	1 York Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham	University Professor	46
Mr Thomas S Mullard	Bank Chambers, 14 Waterloo Street, Birmingham	Chartered Accountant	48
Mr W E Mullins	18 Lyndhurst Gardens, Hampstead, NW	Retired Assistant College Master	66
Mr T P Newman	Hazelhurst, Haslemere	Licensed Victualler	61
Rev. A E O'Connor	2 York Terrace, Babbicome, Torquay		
Mr Joseph H Parry	226 Caledonian Road, N	Solicitors Manager	43
Mr Charles Parsons	117 Winstanley Road, Battersea, SW	Postman	27

Rev. Professor James Alexander Paterson	United Presbyterian College, Edinburgh	United Presbyterian Minister & Professor	50
Mr J E Powell	Irvon, Wrexham		
Rev. J J Poynter	Oswestry	Congregational Minister	50
Mr Frank Prentice	Bishop's Hill, Ipswich	Engineer & Gas Works Manager	39
Rev. Gardner Preston	Castle Gardens, Hastings	Non-conformist Minister	44
Rev. Edward S Prout	Summerlea, Craven Road, Reading	Congregational Minister	64
Mr Charles Horace Radford	2 Queen's Gate Villas, Plymouth	Retired Draper former Mayor of Plymouth	46
Miss Emily Reid	The Mount, Meads Road, Eastbourne		47
Mr E S Reynolds	13 East Street, Bridport	Draper, Shopkeeper	30
Mr John Richardson	South Park, Lincoln	Steam Engine Manager	59
Mr John H Robson	Dalton, Huddersfield	Textile Manufacturer	69
Mr G W E Russell	18 Wilton Street, SW	former politician, author	48
Mr Henry S Schwann	Merton Cottage, Merton, Surrey	Stock Broker Agent	32
Mrs Isaac Sharp	38 Forest Drive E, Leytonstone	Wife to Recording Clerk of the Religious Society of Friends	53
Mr John W Shorthouse	59 Wellington Road, Edgbaston, Birmingham	Manufacturing Chemist	64
Mr Henry Smith	30 Mollart Street, Hanley		
Mr Arthur Spurgeon	National Press Agency, Carmelite street, EC	Managing Editor	40
Mr William Steevens	26 Marlborough Place, Brighton		
Rev. Charles Strong	St Kilda East, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia	Australian Church	57
Mrs Louise B Swann	Lisnagarvey, Chesterfield Road, Bristol		
Mr Arthur G Symonds	17 St Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea, SW	Political Secretary & Journalist	46
Mr Henry Yates Thompson	19 Portman Square, W	Barrister,	63
Mrs Percy Thompson	Kippington Rectory, Sevonoaks		
Rev. A Tildsley	30 Thorngrove Road, Upton Park, E	Baptist Minister	34
Mr George R Tweedie	High Street, High Wycombe		
Sir Edmund Verney	Claydon House, Winslow, Bucks	Barronet	62
Mr J W [or J M] Wallace	Anderton, near Chorley, Manchester	Assistant Architect	47



Professor George Charles Winter Warr	Earl's Terrace, Kensington Road, W	University Professor	56
Mr William Watson	G1, The Albany, W		
Rev. T Wheatley	Woodland Leigh, Torquay	Methodist Minister	50
Mr John Whitburn	20 Bigg Market, Newcastle-on-Tyne	Trade Union secretary	38
Mr S H Whitehouse	Radstock, near Bath	Miners Agent	52
Rev. W B R Wilson	Dollar, N.B.		
Mr Oliver C Wilson	146 Burngreave Road, Sheffield		
Mr William Yeo	50 Granleigh Road, Leytonstone	General Labourer	23

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